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NAME OF SUPERVISOR/*NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE* Dr. Arthur K. Davis

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PROFESSIONALLY-CREDENTIALED WORKERS AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: A MARXIST RESPONSE TO POST-INDUSTRIAL THEORY

by

RICHARD W. THATCHER

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The Undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled PROFESSIONALLY CREDENTIALLED WORKERS AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: A MARXIST RESPONSE TO POST-INDUSTRIAL THEORY submitted by Richard Thatcher in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Arthur K. Davis
Supervisor

External Examiner

Date: September 7, 1978

Whatever there is of value in this thesis

is dedicated to my daughter, Megan

ABSTRACT

Macro-sociologists have identified three fundamental social processes with the transformation of pre-industrial community life into a "mass-society". These include: urbanization, the development of mass production and mass distribution techniques, and the bureaucratization of work authority.

In recent years a number of writers have argued that major long-term changes in class, status and power arrangements are now evident which are transforming the mass-society into a "post-industrial society". These changes have been associated with the numerical expansion of occupational positions which require that candidates possess university credentials and professional certification for both employment and promotion. The post-industrial society is said to be a "professionalizing" society.

In sociology a profession is depicted as a unique form of work organization in the industrial occupational structure; it cannot simply be identified with business or with labour. Occupation has commonly been used by sociologists as the primary indicator of social class position. Thus, a trend towards the expansion of professionals to numerical predominance in the work force would appear to demand a novel conception of stratified economic relations. Indeed, post-industrial writers assume that such a trend is showing itself. Furthermore, they also argue that the class conflict between labour and capital which characterized industrial capitalism is gradually disappearing.

In this thesis we attempt to demonstrate the theoretical and empirical inadequacy of the post-industrial perspective. We argue that post-industrial writers have confused rather than clarified the sociological

study of class structure.

To analyze the relationship between professionally-credentialed occupations and class structure, we employ a conceptual framework derived from Marx's analysis of the development of capitalist production relations. In Capital, Marx traced out the objective changes in both the labour process and the social relations of production which were required for the continued expansion of capital.

Marx showed how a once complex labour process enacted by an individual artisan was transformed into a collective, interdependent labour process. The complexity of individual labour gradually became a routinized and highly specialized activity which was almost wholly regulated and scheduled by managerial overseers. The complexity of the craft role was devolved to a collectivized labour process in which individually the producer played but a minor role. Marx suggested that under such circumstances - because the final product could only result from a multitude of extremely specialized, interdependent operations - it made better sense to describe the labour process as "collective labour" and the labouring class as the "collective worker".

Since the time that Marx wrote, large oligopolistic corporations have come to dominate economic production and the state has played an increasingly active role in the economy. The economic function of capital has itself been devolved into a diverse array of interdependent fractional operations. Only in combination do these operations fulfill the necessary requirements for the continued accumulation of capital; capital becomes "collective capital".

Within this maze of fractionalized capitalist and labour functions, the identification of classes by reference to occupation alone becomes impossible. We have therefore conceived of class in terms of the functional relations between different economic roles and the processes of capital accumulation, the realization of surplus-value in exchange and finally, the reproduction of both labour-power and capitalist relations of production.

Our analysis suggests that professionally-credentialed workers can be identified with three different economic classes within monopoly capitalist social relations of production. If they perform only the functions of the "collective worker" they are best identified with the working-class. If they perform only the functions of "collective capital" they can be identified with the capitalist class. More commonly, however, professionally-credentialed workers perform both labour and capital functions and are best identified with what we have called the "new middle-class".

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INTRODUCTION

Convention has it that if one must work to sustain oneself, the burden of that necessity is lightened by membership in a "profession". At least three assumptions are embedded in the conventional wisdom. Firstly, the professions are assumed to possess the highest status of all occupational groupings. Secondly, they are expected to provide remuneration, both secure and in sufficient amount, to afford their members a comfortable life style. Thirdly, it is assumed that they are exempted from the routine, repetive work schedule which, for most workers, is typically set and regulated by managerial overseers.

Students of social organization have long exhibited fascination with those occupations commonly viewed as professions. Their interest, however, has not been confined to the social privileges accruing to members of these occupations. Rather, they have attempted to describe "profession" and explain its distinctiveness as a pattern for organizing certain types of work activities.

In this century and the latter decades of its predecessor, the idea has been occasionally entertained that such a pattern might extend across the division of labour. Prior to the 1930's, this idea was expressed as both speculation and hope. Since that time, it has been given more systematic expression. However, its fulfillment to date, remains speculative. The idea of a fully professionalized work force remains confined to projections, both statistical and theoretical, which describe an occupational profile of the future. Further, a lack of concensus in the literature concerning appropriate indicators of professional organization, have clouded attempts to even formulate investigative strategies.

In the 1950's, North American sociology was dominated by "structural-functionalism". Indeed, Kingsley Davis was given to comment that sociology was "structural-functionalism" (1959). Theorists associated with that perspective considered the trend towards increased membership in, and the multiplication of, occupations seeking professional status to be nothing less than inevitable. It was considered to be but the irreversible advance of cognitive rationality and the growing rationalization of the division of labour.

In the North America of the 1950's, there was a pervasive optimism that economic growth had few limits. Further, technological developments during the post-war boom were awesome. It was assumed that advancing technology and the expansion of public services required upgraded labour. Innovations of that advance required new occupations. Thus, the educational system was expected to expand at all levels, particularly the universities, to prepare the type of recruits with the sufficient motivation, the required discipline and the necessary skills, to meet the new demands. Some anticipated that the labour force would eventually be numerically dominated by university graduates.

By tradition, the possession of a "university education" had marked the "professions" off from the "trades". It therefore appeared to follow that an increasing proportion of the work force qualified by university credentials, might provide an indicator of professionalization generally. A leading functionalist theorist, William Goode, was thus given to observe that: "An industrializing society is a professionalizing society" (1960:902). Additionally, Talcott Parsons, its definitive spokesman, commented that: "The development and increasing strategic importance of the professions probably constitute the most important change that has occurred in the occupational system of modern societies" (1968:536).

The discipline's self-confidence, as indicated by Davis' identification of sociology with structural-functionalism, has been subsequently attenuated.[1] Concurrently, the identification of professionalization with industrialization, has suffered a similar fate. Yet as we shall see, the professionalization theme has been given new life recently under the aegis of a theory which presumes the emergence of a society which succeeds industrial capitalism.

It is true that in the industrialized nations, the proportion of the work force in possession of university credentials has increased dramatically in recent decades.[2] However, the assumed relationship between university training and growing professionalism is extremely superficial. When students of the subject have carefully examined the organizational pattern characteristic of recognized professions such as medicine and law, they have viewed credentials as but one amongst a number of distinguishing features.

The literature suggests that, of at least equivalent importance to university credentials is the authority structure within which such work is executed. That is, sociologists have emphasized the recognized professions' superior authority at the point of production relative to other occupations.

Upon employing a more complex model which included the authority dimension, one writer who studied the many occupations observed to be making some claim to the professional title, concluded that in fact, "few make the grade" (Wilensky, 1964:137). Indeed, in the sociological literature, it has been necessary to coin a number of terms in the vocabulary to refer to such failed or partially realized projects: the "semi-professions", the "pseudo-professions", the "quasi-professions", the "aspiring professions" and the "heteronomous professions".

The final entry - "heteronomous professions" - refers to credentialed occupations wholly integrated into bureaucratic organizations. Independence, as traditionally symbolized by the personalized "shingle" of the legal or medical practice, had long been considered an essential distinguishing feature of the professions. However, the growth in number of specialized, white-collar workers, qualified for employment by universities, has largely taken place within the sphere of large-scale, public and private organizations. This phenomenon discouraged the idea that professionalization (meaning the generalized growth of occupations resembling the "established" professions) was of special macro-sociological interest at all. Indeed, the study tended to shift to the details of the various processes involved in adapting workers with extensive, pre-employment training, to bureaucratic authority structures.

The functionalist approach, which is to be credited with systematizing the study of professions, also generated a corpus of theory which described the evolution of societies in terms of one general pattern, popularly termed "modernization". It emphasized the homogenizing effects of technological development, economic growth and increased interaction among nations, on a broad range of social institutions. The occupational structure was of central import to their theory, particularly as it related to conceptions of changing class relations.

The functionalists argued that industrialization leads ultimately to the decline of the traditional working class both as a proportion of the total labour force and as a focus of collective political consciousness. This was seen to occur as the occupational structure was altered in conjunction with the advancing technologies of mass production and mass distribution. In this view, as affluence becomes generalized, spreading into the shrinking manual ranks, culture-shaping forces come to predominate which have a homogenizing effect on previously divergent localistic and class characteristics. Consequently, regardless of disparate individual functions in the division of labour, the behaviour and outlook of the populace would tend to become relatively similar. In short, modernization theory gave formal expression to a cliché of twentieth century history: "We're all becoming middle-class!" Further, as Elliott has remarked, the striving by a host of occupations to be accorded professional status, gives new form (and we should add, impetus) to this cliché (1972:1).

While generating little serious interest in a macro-sociological approach to professionalization, the functionalists did encourage the development of a specialized sub-field of the sociology of work. Indeed, the "sociology of the professions" is now well-established. In terms of quantity, its literature is now substantial. Thus, Moore listed over 850 references in North American sociology alone (Moore, 1970). However, in a survey in the mid-1960's, Ben-David concluded of that literature: "The only more or less consistent trend (in the sociology of the professions) has been an increasing micro-sociological, or social-psychological approach to the problem" (1963-64:263). Other writers who have reviewed the more recent literature suggest that the same constricted focus persists. A particularly marked emphasis has concerned the social-psychological conflicts and the patterns of ameliorative response, generated within the "heteronomous" mode.

It may be argued that to emphasize the study of professions at a macro-sociological level in general and their significance for class relations in particular, is to assume their broader import "a priori". However, the fact remains that in certain academic quarters, and not simply those exclusively inhabited by structural-functionalists, their macro-sociological significance is assumed. Indeed, despite the circumspection of formal contributions to the sociology of the professions, less specialized writers have exercised very little restraint on their speculations. As Johnson has correctly observed of a more ambitious literature, ". . . social commentators have been ever ready to identify 'true' inheritors of power from among the ranks of professionals - the 'technocrat', 'expert', 'organization man', 'manager', have each been seen at least to populate the corridors of power . . ." (1972:9). Further, the subject inspires more general interest than the specialized literature would suggest. As Elliott observes, "The study of professionalism provides a focal point which can show the interconnections between a number of apparently different developments" (1972:1).

Despite the prevalent assumption of a positive relationship between professionalization and technological advance, there is little agreement concerning the extent to which various occupations purporting to be professions, can credibly sustain such claims. Wilensky's conclusion (above) is indicative of one line of dissensus. To even pose the issue in the interrogative is problematic; for the terminology - profession, professionalization and professionalism - is burdened with imprecision.

Efforts to operationalize the concept "profession" have been confounded by a bewildering range of sociological definitions. It should be added that definition has been a major preoccupation in the literature. Thus, the noun "profession" conveys a common status distinction between occupations; yet sociologists are unable to concede common criteria for demarcating its exclusiveness. Given this lack of concordance, it is hardly surprising that the verb "professionalize" would secure a more agreeable climate of reception amongst social theorists.

Despite these difficulties of achieving conceptual concensus, in "everyday life", the professions and their occupational ideology are assumed to be, in various ways, special. One need only be mindful of the career aspirations of North American parents for their progeny, to appreciate the grip of the so-called "professions" on normative values.

Sociologists _have_ had difficulty in constructing an enduring definition of the distinguishing attributes of a profession. Indeed, in a canvas of twenty-one writers who attempted to set out formal criteria, Millerson found no less than twenty-three "elements" (1964:15). In that collection, there was no single item accepted as essential by all the authors canvassed. In the case of nine "elements", there was a single advocate only. Millerson also found that no two contributors were agreed that the same combination of attributes could be taken as definitive.

Millerson's canvas netted numerous sociological attempts to secure a composite of professional traits. The majority of these efforts were intended to render an ideal-type. Against such a conceptual construct, the intention was to compare and contrast occupations seeking professional status, to ascertain whether or not, as in Wilensky's words, they had "made the grade".

Originally, the ideal-typical approach rested on the assumption, derived from folk wisdom, that medicine and law could serve as models. However, if one sticks tenaciously to those occupations as prototypes, a host of complicating factors must enter our calculus. These shall be discussed in various ways in the ensuing text. However, one point should be presently made: changes in the occupational structure in the past two centuries have had extremely subversive effects on the social structure of any single occupation. Thus, the employment of any ideal-type can only capture a point in rapid flux. The obvious risk, then, of "freezing out" a profile of attributes lies with the tentative status of the elements captured.

Few sociologists today, would argue that the occupational structure of the Western, industrialized nations is presently dominated numerically by the units of a professional organizational model - however defined. Nor would they argue that the short-term trend is towards the absorption of all occupations to the units of such a model. However, in recent years, a body of theory, "bold" in the sense noted, has made professionalization a focal point of macro-sociological synthesis in the manner suggested by Elliott. That synthesis has been associated with the concept of a "Post-Industrial" society. In that conception, emphasis is placed on both the relative power of professional occupations today and a long term tendency for professionalized work activity to dominate numerically.

The concept of a "post-industrial" society is the product of a number of diverse strands of social theory. As Kumar (1976:439) has pointed out, the major advocates of the post-industrial concept have, in North America, been a group of social scientists associated with the "end of ideology" thesis in the 1950's. In Western Europe, a number of social theorists have come to basic agreement with the North Americans concerning the structural changes in the western, industrialized nations. As Kumar adds, however, they have drawn different implications from the North Americans, often in a radical direction.

A synthesis of these "diverse strands" - which we shall articulate - reveals an image of an emerging social structure and economy which represents a fundamental transformation of the infrastructure and superstructure of industrial capitalism. Furthermore, many of its advocates call for the recasting of social theory in order to respond adequately to the social reality which is allegedly being so dramatically transformed.

Post-industrial theory works a number of older themes in the literature through to their summative conclusion. One is hard pressed to specify a temporal framework within which their analyses and predictions operate. While some contributions are specifically described as futurological forecasts, others attempt to describe the present and recent past.

Of the central categories traditional to social analysis which post-industrial theorists would have us recast, perhaps the most fundamental is that of social class, as tied to property relations. In this, the continuity with modernization theory is immediately apparent. In brief, in post-industrial thought, the possession of "human capital" rather than physical capital becomes the most vital power resource in the "emerging" society.[3] Further, such capital is nurtured in professional training institutions. Its possession is conceived of as an individually held, institutionally acquired, cognitive capacity, rather than a routine, interchangeable skill. Its growth and security,regulation and legitimation, are deemed the responsibility of the collegia, the professional association, and the university.

Implicitly or explicitly, the utility of "class", viewed as an important axis of social differentiation, dissolves in post-industrial thought as the concept "capital" blends into the concept "labour". It is "human capital" for which the economy is seen to increasingly thirst. Property loses its power-conveyance function; the entrepeneurial capitalist, his interitance-privileged offspring, and the unskilled manual worker, tend to become historical artifacts. Sociological theory is thus expected to focus on professional institutions, their advances in science which determine their productivity, their relations between each other, and on their relations with other institutional structures.

It was perhaps inevitable that the expansion of the skilled, white-collar ranks of the labour force would be the source of inspiration for an abundance of sociological conjecture. The most compelling source of temptation to extrapolate derives from the apparently hybrid character of skilled, white-collar work in the class structure. Ben-David made the same point when he observed that neither the general character of white-collar work or the so-called "professions" neatly fit prevalent categories of social class (1963-64).

Perhaps most significantly, Marx had predicted the long-term trend towards class polarization into the now familiar proletariat/bourgeoisie duality. Yet Marx himself was somewhat ambiguous concerning those classes positioned between the polar types. As Giddens observes:

> There is a now famous short passage in the 'fourth volume' of Capital, Theories of Surplus Value, in which Marx criticizes Ricardo for having neglected 'the constantly growing number of the middle classes, those who stand between the workman on the one hand

> and the capitalist and landlord on the other.' These middle classes, Marx declares, 'are a burden weighting heavily on the working base and increase the social security and power of the upper ten thousand.' The statement is an enigmatic one, in spite of some recent attempts to make it appear otherwise, because it does not accord with the main weight of Marx's theoretical thinking, either on class in general, or the 'middle class' in particular (1973:177).

Indeed, the "main weight" of Marx's writing did stress the bifurcation of the class structure. Further, when it came to the professions, Marx assumed that they too, were vulnerable to proletarianization processes. In the Communist Manifesto, he and Engels wrote, "The bourgeoisie has robbed of their haloes various occupations hitherto regarded with awe and veneration. Doctors, lawyers, priests, poets and scientists have become its wage labourers". With this process, Marx did not show particular concern, for he saw them as secondary and derivative from the productive relations of a capitalist economy. Thus, his specific attention to them was limited.

We will take up the discussion of Marx's analysis of proletarianization in detail in this thesis. However, one thing should be pointed out in advance. Marx and Engels themselves devoted but scant attention to the professions "per sé". Yet as we shall demonstrate, that brevity does not preclude the possibility of a probing analysis of the subject derived from their more general study of capitalist production.

In recent years, a number of social thinkers claiming alignment with Marxism, have counterposed the professionalization vision with the idea that such occupations are now undergoing a process of proletarianization.

In 1968, the Belgian Trotskyist, Ernest Mandel, visited the United

States to address a forum described as the "Fourth Annual Socialist Scholars Conference."[4] Subsequently, his address was widely published in North American left wing newspapers and journals. The central idea contained in his speech was that in the advanced capitalist countries, even the most prestigious stratum of "white-collar" workers was being "proletarianized". The publications which made Mandel's speech available to the North American left wing community, popularized the theory of the "new working class"; the ideas comprising the substance of his speech already having achieved a brief but somewhat longer currency in Europe.

If Mandel had simply intended to point out that the white-collar strata had become workers wholly dependent for their incomes on the sale of their labour, his ideas would not have raised a stir on this side of the Atlantic. Indeed, it had been as much as seventeen years since C. Wright Mills had documented and popularized the fact of the tremendous growth of the non-manual work force in characteristically large-scale, hierarchically structured, public organizations and private corporations.

Mills' publication had noted that the independent commodity producer, the independent salesman, indeed that the whole diverse array of self-employed workers had already narrowed to a fraction of the total work force. When Mills wrote White Collar (1951) however, he termed this strata the "new middle class" and suggested that the question as to which class-linked ideology they would adopt, was open. Whether they would be moulded by conservative politicians, or by contrast, acquire a working class consciousness, Mills did not see them as any political vanguard. Rather, he saw them as tail ends of whatever bloc or movement appeared to be most influential. "The new middle classes," he wrote, "are up for sale; whoever seems respectable enough, or strong enough, can probably have them" (1951:353).

In Marxist circles, the class identification of the white-collar worker had been approached with caution. This caution was particularly evident when it came to the identification of those workers possessing a post-secondary, academic, or advanced technical education. For traditionally, those institutions had been considered the preserve of the most privileged groups in society.

By the early part of the twentieth century, however, the increase in technical, commercial and administrative labour seemed to cut across the bipolar class model which the main weight of Marx's writing appeared to anticipate. This introduced a complicating element for contemporary Marxist theory.

Harry Braverman has noted that the discussion of this "complication" amongst socialists was taken up in the Second International (1974:10). However, it was abortive, "in part", he writes, "because its tendencies had not yet ripened sufficiently . . . (and) . . . thus it faded away without conclusive results even while the substance of the problem increased in scope" (1974:10). Braverman's further explanatory insights are worthy of duplication. He continues:

> Meanwhile, the cataclysmic events of this century - two world wars, fascism, the successive disintegrations and restabilizations of capitalist economies in the aftermaths of wars and in the Great Depression, and revolutions both proletarian and nationalist - dominated the analytical work of Marxism. The front of this violent stage was taken and held by monopoly, militarism, nationalism, the 'crisis' or 'breakdown' tendencies of the capitalist system, revolutionary strategy, and the problems of the transition from capitalism to socialism.

> The extraordinary development of scientific technology, of the productivity of labour, and to some extent of the customary levels of working-class consumption during this century have had, as has often been noted, a profound effect upon the labour movement as a whole. The unionized working-class, intimidated by the scale and complexity of capitalist production, and weakened in its original revolutionary impetus by the gains afforded by the rapid increase of productivity, increasingly lost the will and ambition to wrest control of production from capitalist hands and turned ever more to bargaining over labor's share in the product. The labour movement formed the immediate environment of Marxism; and Marxists were, in varying degrees, compelled to adapt to it.
>
> The adaptation took various forms, many of which can now be seen as ideologically destructive. The working philosophy of Marxism as distinguished from its holiday pronouncements, focused increasingly not upon its various conjunctural effects and crises. In particular, the critique of the mode of production gave way to the critique of capitalism as a mode of distribution (1974:10-11).

Beginning in the 1950's, however, and accelerating in the 1960's, particularly in North America, enrollments in the universities had mushroomed. This could, of course, be partially explained by the educational system's deliberate accommodation of the post-war "baby boom". Eventually, vast numbers of work recruits, degrees in hand, entered the employment market.

Predictably, such a development was secured by many as datum to signify capitalism's "progress". In turn, the political and social implications of this phenomenon demanded the serious analyses of the left as well. Thus, in recent years, socialist theorists have been returning to the Marxist emphasis on the mode of production. The body of analyses identified as "new working-class" theory, is but one indication of this shift.

What Mandel argued was that, if in the past the argument was unwarranted that the white-collar sector was being proletarianized, it was fast becoming secure. He cited reduced wage differentials between white- and blue-collar workers, increased unionization and militancy amongst white-collar workers, rising similarity of working conditions and equalization of the conditions of reproduction of labour through mass education.

Along with Neo-Marxists' Alain Touraine, Serge Mallet and Andre Gorz, Mandel concluded that in essence, the white-collar sector, together with some segments of the most skilled of traditional manual workers - subjected as they were to conditions of work devaluation - were to become the lever of revolutionary change.[5] The white-collar sector or "salariat" was being offered up as the "new working-class". More educated, with a more fully developed social conscience achieved through the exposure to the radical student culture of the 1960's, white-collar workers in the upper layers of such employment, employed by organizations rather than independently, were to become the vanguard of the proletariat.

From the socialist perspective, the majority of white-collar work force had already been conclusively "proletarianized". Its numerical growth was explained, not as a product of the replacement of blue-collar positions in the labour force. Rather, it was attributed to (1) the decline of pre-capitalist sectors rather than a major absolute reduction in the number of blue-collar workers, and (2) the growth of the clerical sub-sector, made up largely of low-paid, female labour. The evidence seemed to bear out their argument.[6] However, anticipations of the development of an inevitable convergence of class consciousness, between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers, remained cautious.

It was the relation of that stratum of the work force with advanced training - technicians, scientists, engineers, public health workers, educators, the social service workers, and administrators - to "manual" workers and the majority of white-collar employees, which had posed class-locational problems for socialists since the development of the diversified and stratified working class of modern capitalism. Further, the numbers of "credentialed" workers were growing; advanced training was increasingly becoming essential for the individual to secure employment.

The European Marxist thrust represented by Mandel, amongst others, stressed that such labour, like all labour under capitalism, is cut off from its product. Further, once subject to intensive work devaluation processes, it would become an integral and perhaps even vanguard wing of the working class.

The thesis advanced by Mandel did not go unchallenged amongst Marxists. Opponents, echoing traditional precautions, noted the better pay, comfortable working conditions, and prestige of this "upper stratum" - despite the narrowing differences. Further, they laid particular stress on the authoritarian relations between these workers and others, often equating them with management as "proxies for the capitalist class" (II Manifesto, 1972:68).

A further line of skepticism was generated by the "dual labour market" theorists. While recognizing a "structural convergence" of white-collar workers and organized, blue-collar labour, they have stressed the emergence of a separation between each of these and what they term a "secondary labour market." Giddens provides a useful summary of the argument:

> A primary market is one in which available occupa-

> tions manifest the characteristics traditionally associated with white-collar jobs: a high and stable or progressive level of economic returns, security of employment, and some chance of career mobility. A secondary market is one in which these conditions are absent: where there is a low rate of economic return, poor job security, and low chances of career advancement. In the past, the differentiation between these has tended to follow skill lines within the working class, in the European societies and the United States: skilled workers have enjoyed the advantages of the primary market in labour. Where, however, considerable segments of the working class are affected by an increasing tendency to negotiate long-term contracts collectively, the distinction between primary and secondary markets begins to cut across skill divisions. The same discontinuity, however, persists. In other words, the worker possessing the market capacity allowing him only to enter secondary employment is unlikely ever to be able to acquire a job in the primary market (1973:219).

The theory is premised on the observation that this organization follows the suit of the differentiated lines of economic stability amongst employers. In the stable sectors, where oligopolies and state organizations dominate, the primary labour market for both white- and blue-collar workers operates. However, in the less stable, competitive, private sector, where local and regional consumer markets limit the sales scope, the "secondary market" operates. Here the most oppressed workers must seek employment, being disqualified from the primary market by educational, ethnic, racial or sex-linked discriminators. The conclusion is markedly different from that reached by Mandel; for, despite the alleged "convergence" of white-collar and blue-collar work conditions in the primary markets, it is argued that an underclass of less privileged workers has crystallized. Working-class unity may actually be significantly inhibited by the very real differences between workers in the primary and secondary labour markets.

The identification of the "new working-class" at the lower rather than the upper reaches of the occupational structure has also been argued for by S.M. Miller (1960). Miller identified an underclass of manual workers living below a "poverty line". This notion was given wide expression in the 1960's in both Canada and the United States. After a wave of statistical studies which revealed dramatic inequalities of income distribution, the federal governments of both countries devised a cluster of social policies which, in aggregate, were dubbed the "War on Poverty." Behind all this, was a theoretical assimilation of the Weberian conception of class position as being predicated upon "calculable life chances".

The socio-political atmosphere which gave reception to Mandel's version of "new working-class" theory was charged with both positive and negative valence. At one pole rested the "New Left", the theoretical and political expression of student radicalism in the late 1960's. Its Literati was disdainful of what it considered the "authoritarianism" of orthodox Marxism.

Largely centred on the universities - the traditional qualifying institutions for professional status - the New Left sought identification with the "oppressed" rather than the "oppressors". Viewing the traditional working-class as fully assimilated into capitalist culture - for them, the term "hard hat" became a synonym for "reactionary" - they argued that all potentialities for change must be sought amongst those not yet incorporated. If Mandel's thesis was not yet valid, some believed that it might well be by the time these "progressive" students would fill out the work roles for which their college credentials would provide them access.

In what Martin Rein (1972) called a "restless search for relevance", a diverse spate of "alternative institutions" sprang up: medical and legal "street clinics", youth hostels and "drop-in" centres for youth identifying with the "counter-culture", student-organized tenants' unions, community organization collectives centering their work on ghetto areas, and a network of politically motivated "underground" newspapers.

Both students and recent graduates of various disciplines, including law, medicine, journalism, architecture, education, and social work manned these "alternative" institutions, rallying under the activist banner of what was obscurely termed the "movement". The professions, as the title to one book suggested, were to be "for the people" (Gerstl and Jacobs, 1976). In Charles Reich's Greening of America (1970) and Theodore Roszak's The Making of a Counter Culture (1969), a fondly paternalistic view of the "movement" was popularized for mass consumption.[7] The "new professions" movement, viewed by some as a corps of the "counter culture", was linked to the more general expression of 1960's New Left radicalism by Rudi Dutschke's polemical advocacy of a ". . . long march through the institutions" (Bowles and Gintis, 1976:287).

At the negative pole, social theory, including but not exclusive to structural functionalism, had long rejected both the method and intent of class analysis. It is from this pole that the affirmative vision of post-industrial society has emerged. There are three central themes in this literature which, taken together, serve to deny the continued salience of social class economies of the industrialized, western nations.

The first theme concerns the affluence associated with mass distribution techniques. Various writers have argued that (1) rising levels of income, and (2) the expansion of public, universally accessible social services (health, education and welfare), have transformed traditional class structures. In this view, capitalism has so successfully "delivered" in the consumption sphere that occupational class is no longer an important discriminator of political interest cleavages.

The second theme stems from the pervasive influence of technological-determinism on analyses of the organization of social production in industrialized societies. It suggests that in capitalist and socialist societies alike, the interrelated processes of bureaucratization and industrialization are inevitable. The elaboration of technique, determined by inputs of scientific knowledge, induces an increase in the division of labour which in turn, calls into being a process of "imperative co-ordination". The latter process refers to what sociologists, after Weber, have called "bureaucratization". In such structures, it is assumed that positions of authority are merely functional, for they ensure the efficient co-ordination of an atomized division of labour based upon intensively specialized, applied knowledge. In this view, authority structures become simply the direct and necessary means to co-ordinate the complexity of a highly specialized productive system.

The unfortunate result of this technological-determinist position is to "de-socialize" the meaning of division of labour. As Johnson has argued, it becomes, under such auspices, simply a "technical division of labour" (1976:6).

The third theme is given expression by celebrants of post-industrial society. While they have taken the first theme as datum, they have, at least in part, challenged the second - the inevitability of bureaucratization. Indeed, they envision bureaucratic authority structures as being radically transformed by the growth of a "professional" mode of occupational authority.

The implications of all these analyses for interpretations of the dynamics of class relations - at least as Marx viewed them - are clear. Individuals are seen to attain positions of authority because of the skills they can offer on the market rather than from the systematic biases of class. Those lacking skills, and thus occupational authority, are appeased by the goods and services which their affluence allows them to consume during their leisure hours. In such a view, class politics recede; for both the structural conditions promoting them have declined and the ideology which fuels them has ended (Bell, 1960).

Some writers have argued that a new set of pre-eminent social conflicts are actually replacing those of social class. Notably, they include as more politically significant "interest tensions" - conflicts between organized consumer groups and corporate and government institutions on the one hand, and on the other, conflicts on the job between highly trained specialists and representatives of bureaucratic authority. The possibility that class politics has merely been redirected to these areas temporarily, does not seem to have been seriously entertained.

It is this discord, both political and theoretical, which sets the stage for a critical examination of the professions and their relation to the class structure of contemporary, Western societies. The following thesis is presented as a partial remedy to the theoretical neglect of macro-sociological concerns, particularly of class relations, by specialized students of the sociology of work concerned with those occupations conventionally termed "professions".

We take issue with the post-industrial concept. In emphasis, we challenge the manner in which its North American advocates have advanced the idea of a professionalizing division of labour. We believe that by ignoring the macro-sociological aspects of their specialized objects of scholarship, students of the professions have created a theoretical vacuum. Unfortunately, it has been filled by the facile claims of "new working class" theory on the one hand, and a highly speculative social commentary - "post-industrial" theory - on the other.

In fairness, there have been some notable exceptions to the "circumspect" focus of analyses within the sociology of the professions. Those exceptions have provided us with a baseline from which our entry into the debate can proceed. Further, we should register sympathy and even respect for the ambitious product of post-industrial thought. The words of an American writer, reflecting upon the social-psychological conditions which inspire such efforts, will suffice to make the point:

> A land that is now unknown is most disturbing when we felt that we once knew it and were comfortable in it. The sense of security and understanding is ebbing among citizens of advanced industrial capitalist nations. Short-run events disturb, partly because of their unpredictability. More important, intimations of deeper changes, indeed transformations, jar one into doubting the traditional comforting wisdoms. In such circumstances, social analysis is needed, emerges, and plays a key political role as well as intellectual role. Social analysts are now shaping the perceptions of the profound changes sweeping through industrial societies (Miller, S. Michael, 1975:1).

The scope and intent of the analysis in this thesis are much more humble than the efforts which Miller must have in mind. It merely sets about to critically examine certain of these "perception-shaping" ideas in the light of a single, highly durable, analytical framework. It is hoped that the cumulative effect of such lesser efforts as these and others, may help to ensure that the most ill-founded of popular "social analysis" will never come to rest as "comforting wisdoms".

Plan and Objectives of the Thesis

Our discussion is presented in three parts. Each is subsumed, respectively, by the following titles: (1) "Professions and the Sociological Imagination", (2) "Professionalization and Post-Industrial Theory", and finally (3) "Professionally-Credentialed Workers and Class Relations Under Monopoly Capitalism: A Marxist Alternative to Technological-Determinism".

In Part One, we are concerned to trace the ancestry and explain the contemporary appeal of professionalism - viewed as an occupational ideology - to students of social organization. That appeal, we shall argue, stems from the apparent uniqueness of professions in the evolution of capitalist social relations. This section will be comprised of Chapters One through Four.

In Chapter One, we trace the socio-historical conditions in European society which gave birth to the professional mode of occupational organization. We shall argue that the emergence of "modern professions" was linked to the rising fortunes of the middle classes during the nineteenth century. For two reasons, the literature review for this analysis concentrates on Britain. Firstly, the bulk of literature relevant to our analysis is concerned with the development of professional occupations in that country. Secondly, the rising fortunes of the middle classes to which we refer are associated with the political, social, and technological transformation of Europe subsequently identified with the "Industrial Revolution". It was Britain which first experienced the fullest sense of that transformation.

In Chapter Two, we shall discuss the thematic product of social theory's confrontation with the effects of technological advance on the shape and quality of contemporary social institutions. Following Robert Nisbet, we are able to see much of the "sociological tradition", as arising out of a "quest for community" in a social structure in which mass production and mass distribution appear to sacrifice both traditional and idealized conceptions of social quality for the production of material abundance.

We will argue that "post-industrial" theory is but the latest expression of a long line of "mass-society" theory. It is comprised of both a critical or "anti-technocratic" wing and "pro-technocracy" celebrants. However, we shall argue that post-industrial thinkers share a "technological-deterministic", conceptual framework for explaining social change. Further, we shall argue that Marxism, fortunately, provides a mode of analysis which is exempt from this reification of technology.

In Chapter Three, the influential theoretical precursors of the post-industrial, professionalization thesis, are discussed. The professions, appearing as an organizational anomaly in the occupational structure, have long inspired the sociological imagination. The discussion in this chapter will concentrate upon their appeal to Emile Durkheim, Karl Mannheim and the "managerial revolution" theorists.

In Chapter Four, we shall present the attributes of a profession, derived from a review of the pertinent literature. As that review will make evident, while conceptual concensus has not been achieved in that literature, a "loose image" of profession does emerge. However, we shall argue, in response to that review, that this imagery does little to improve upon lay conceptions or the self-serving distinctions of professional status, espoused by the membership of such occupations. Further, we shall argue that implicit to this "image", is a theoretical explanation for professional privilege. That implicit explanation is made explicit by the literature of "structural-functionalism".

In Part Two, we shall reconstruct the post-industrial paradigm and elaborate the ideological legitimation provided by its celebrants. Further, we shall present a critique of that paradigm generally and more specifically, of its legitimation. Part Two will comprise Chapters Five and Six.

In Chapter Five, the technocratic paradigm which frames post-industrial thought and its legitimation in the presumed growth of professionalism will be elaborated. In Chapter Six, post-industrial theory will be subjected to criticism. Our principal focus here, will be on those aspects of the theory which are linked to the assumed growth of professionalism.

In Part Three, we shall develop a conceptual framework of social class relations in advanced capitalism, derived from Marxist political economy. With this framework, we will conceptualize the location of professionally-credentialed workers in the class structure.

In Chapter Seven, we will present a preliminary discussion of the Marxist approach to the study of social class in capitalist society. Chapter Eight will comprise of an extension of this analysis into the era of "monopoly capitalism". Further, in this chapter, we will examine the distribution of professionally-credentialed workers in what

Marx termed the economic spheres of surplus value "appropriation" and surplus value "realization".

In Chapter Nine, we shall consider the class distribution of workers in the sphere of "reproduction", largely concentrated in state employment in the health, education and social services. We shall also discuss the "social unionism" movement which is largely concentrated amongst state employee unions. Further, we will briefly discuss the ideology of professionalism as a superstructural inhibition on the development of a strong social unionist movement.

Finally, in Chapter Ten, we shall conclude our thesis by reiterating the "structuralist-Marxian" approach which guided our study of professionally trained workers.

INTRODUCTION

Footnotes

1. While structural-functionalism continues to be the theoretical "starting point" for many North American sociologists, the more dominant trend has been towards a multiple or "poly-paradigmatic" division of the field. Other perspectives include: "Positivism"; "Symbolic Interactionism"; "Ethnomethodology"; "Critical Theory", and more recently, a revitalized interest in "Structural Marxism".

2. These data will be presented an critically discussed in the pursuant text.

3. For a discussion and critical assessment of "Human Capital" theory, see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1975).

4. The occasion and content of Mandel's address is reported in Martin Oppenheimer (1970:31-32).

5. Martin Oppenheimer summarizes "New Working Class Theory" in the following, ". . . white-collar workers are displacing blue-collar workers as the major working class grouping in the technologically advanced societies. As the rationalization of their work develops and as they become subject to the economic and social crises of advanced capitalism/imperialism, their political consciousness will develop along lines roughly analagous to their European blue-collar predecessors: from trade unions to social democracy to revolutionism" (1972:29).

6. These data will be discussed in the text.

7. Both Roszak and Reich wrote in celebration of those youth movements in the 1960's, particularly those popularly known as the "New Left" centred on the campus protest organization - and the "Counter Culture" - identified with the "Hippies". They were "fondly paternalistic" in the sense that each wrote from the perspective of academics whose life style distanced themselves from ready inclusion in either. At the same time, their writing professed to welcome the phenomenon.

Part I

PROFESSIONS AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROFESSIONAL PRACTITIONER: FROM STATUS TO OCCUPATION

In Part One of this thesis, the sources of theoretical attraction to the professions will be discussed as represented in the writings of Durkheim, Mannheim, Marshall, and Carr-Saunders and Wilson, as well as more recent sociologists. Prior to that discussion, however, we will examine the pre-capitalist origins of professional practice. Further, we will outline the organizational conditions which mark the transformation of the concept profession, considered primarily as a privileged "status" exempting its members from common labour, to the "professional occupations" of the nineteenth century.

In the present chapter, it will be our argument that the advent of industrial capitalism, as precociously developed in England and subsequently diffused throughout the West, profoundly transformed the institutional matrix of social activities commonly deemed "professional". So profound was that transformation, we shall argue, that the development of contemporary professions can best be considered to have originated with the industrial revolution. As W.J. Reader has observed: "the professions as we know them are very much a Victorian creation, brought into being to serve the needs of industrial society, (however) like so much else in Victorian England, they took on some of the outward forms of older and very different institutions" (1966:2).

I. The Pre-Industrial Profession: The Practice of a "Gentleman's" Art

In pre-industrial Europe, those who bore the highest social status were not engaged in "occupations" at all. That is, of course, if we assume the modern idea that such engagement implies a "specific activity with a market value which an individual continually pursues for the purposes of obtaining a steady flow of income . . ." (Saltz, 1962:58-62). The pre-industrial professions were characterized by their compatibility with the "good life" of gentlemanly leisure (Marshall, 1939). As Elliott remarks, "professionals were an appendage to the high-status groups in society at that time" (1972:15). Their origins, however, trace in part, to the guild system of feudal Europe.

During the feudal period, the craft and merchant guilds were organized within a social framework of orders and estates. It was the social character of an estate to blur the private rights and public duties of individuals. As Gilb has pointed out, men did not simply "own", they had "rights" (Gilb, 1966:6). An estate was a complex of rights and obligations which integrated the individual to the community.[1]

The guilds had restricted competition, set prices, defined the quality of craftsmanship and raw materials, controlled entrance and training, and established ordinances. These ordinances shaped the relations between the craftsman and his colleagues, non-members, the members of other guilds, dependent workers, future members and consumers (Heaton, 1949:203). Indeed, the guilds were the principal organizing bodies of the medieval town. Furthermore, they were self-governing.

From the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the guild system spread across Europe and embraced the universities, themselves comprised of students and teachers or "guilds of learning" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:289). These guilds of learning soon came under the dominating influence of the church, and in name at least, the graduates were all ecclesiastics.

In a religious culture, the church exercised great influence. Thus, association between the church and the universities extended superior status to the graduates of the latter. The association between the church and the universities was so intimate that Rashdall claimed, "that in the north of Europe the church was simply a synonym for the professions" (1936, Vol. 3:446).

To the turn of the nineteenth century, the so-called "gentlemanly professions" were but three in number: divinity and university teaching, law, and "physic" (the latter being one branch of medicine) (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933). The first recognized professions of divinity and physic enjoyed association with the university. On the continent, where Roman Law was used in the courts and taught in the universities, university qualification became a prerequisite of professional standing (Elliott, 1972:18). Further, as Elliott observes of the English case,

> . . . a similar association between the legal profession and the universities was prevented by the system of common law, retained and developed in the English courts. Although common law was not considered a proper subject for the universities, the Inns of Court took on some of the functions of a purely legal university in London (1972:18).

Over time, the guild system declined with the growth of the mercantilist system.[2] However, the "gentlemanly professions" were protected against the demise of the guilds. Their affiliation, first with the powerful church and later with the aristocracy, gave them protective sanction. Freidson goes so far as to argue the case generally:

> A profession attains and maintains its position by virtue of the protection and patronage of some elite segment of society which has been persuaded that there is some special value in its work. Its position is thus secured by the political and

> economic influence of the elite which sponsors it (Freidson, 1970:73).

Upon the closing of the Middle Ages, the craft guilds declined simultaneously with the emergence of the merchant guilds as a powerful economic force. The craft guilds had produced for local use and had regulated production and distribution on a local scale. The merchant guilds, on the other hand, developed the "putting out system", which involved the letting out of equipment or contracts to rural families for the production of articles for an expanded market.

In effect, the merchant guilds bypassed the controls of the town-centred guilds, thus usurping their authority. In so doing, they began what is best described as a "near capitalist" mode of production. The craft guilds served larger markets, both domestic and foreign. As Gerstl and Jacobs have summarized these developments:

> The ascendancy of capitalism on the heels of feudalism thus saw the crushing of the power of the craft guilds by the upper guilds or guild merchants. The monetary power of the upper guilds challenged the feudal aristocracy, and trading associations spearheaded international trade and colonization. Consequently, the craft guilds, originally conservative, began to act analagously to the modern trade unions (1976:3).

The personnel which comprised the professions were buffered, by their family connections with property, from the proletarianization of the craft guilds. As late as the eighteenth century, even England drew the major source of its wealth from agricultural production (Reader, 1966:2). The professions offered a status equivalent to property possession, in an economy in which land ownership was highly concentrated. Thus, "the English professions in the eighteenth century were an acceptable successor to the feudal idea of landed property as a means of earning a living" (Gerstl and Jacobs, 1976:3). As Reader states:

> Most of the land was firmly in private ownership, and the possession of land was at the root of the most important political, legal and societal assumptions. Not, however, the possession of land by an individual. The holder of an estate for the time being was fundamentally looked upon more or less as a life tenant, managing the estate for the benefit of his descendants and of his family generally, as much as for himself, and the legal system was well adapted to see that he did so . . . This had an important effect on the way the gentry looked upon the matter of getting a living. Since the prestige of the gentry was immense, it also affected the way the matter of getting a living was looked upon in the country at large, particularly among those who fancied their chances of becoming gentry themselves (1966:2).

The significance of Reader's distinction between simple, individual ownership and the estate lies in the burden of the estate owner's obligation to his family. The estate was a resource, expected to be drawn upon by its possessor to provide both security, and relatedly, social position, to his offspring. This insured the continuation of the family name on the highest rungs of the social ladder. Land, however, was at a premium, and obviously, its equivalent inter-generational transfer was restricted to one. Primogeniture, which differentiated the obligation of the land-owner to his children according to their sex and relative age, partially solved the problem of deciding upon the apportionment of inheritance. However, obligation did not stop at the eldest son. Furthermore, the availability of land was at a premium. Thus, alternatives to property transfer for ensuring the security and social position of one's family were sought. The single most important resolution to this dilemma was the patronage system. The patronage system engulfed, in preferential order, a means of securing for one's intimates (1) a military rank, (2) a government posting, and (3) the "gentlemanly" or "liberal" professions (Reader, 1966:3-24).

Marshall's statement (1939:325) that the pre-industrial professional "paid in order to work" rather than "worked in order to get paid" was not merely the exaggeration of scholarly emphasis. The gentleman could purchase for his male kin, a commission in the army or navy, invest capital in the stock of a trading company, or endow a university with funds, thus securing a position in either commerce or one of the professional vocations. Income was not derived from a fixed salary. Indeed, "the whole subject of payment . . . seems to have caused professional man acute embarassment, making them take refuge in elaborate concealment, fiction and artifice" (Reader, 1966:37). Military officers of high rank had a variety of means of securing wealth, quite apart from the minimal commissions they received. In government, income came in the form of sinecure, investments, the privileged knowledge of calculable risk of which such positions provided special access to, and even from the investment of public funds, a part of the return of which could be personally exploited (Reader, 1966:8). In the "liberal professions" themselves, as Reader explains, there was a feeling:

> that it was not fitting for one gentleman to pay another for services rendered, particularly if the money passed directly. Hence, the device of paying a barrister's fee to the attorney, not to the barrister himself. Hence, also the convention that in many professional dealings the matter of fee was never openly talked about, which could be very convenient, since it precluded the client or patient from arguing about whatever sum his advisor might eventually indicate as a fitting honorarium (1966:37).

Patronage however, involved more than the purchase system and the other financial means of securing military, government or professional standing. In the professions, it also involved a less tangible filtering system which restricted entry, largely to the propertied or their kin. That system centred on the elite qualifying institutions. In England, access to the Inns of Court was based upon invitation, which in turn was based upon family connections with the incumbent membership. The College of Physicians allowed membership only to graduates of Oxford or Cambridge and members of the Church of England. Ironically, Oxford and Cambridge provided no medical education at all. The clergyman was considered a gentleman, an official of the establishment, but only if he was a member of the Church of England.

In short, the nominal precursors of the modern professions were estate-like positions. They retained this status in the face of the general erosion of the guilds, which, as we pointed out, had themselves once been organized as an estate of the corporate order. A professional "competence" conveniently broke the connection between work and income in a similar way that landed property had. Thus, in his account of the different orders of British society, William Harrison wrote in the time of Elizabeth I:

> Whosoever studieth the Laws of this realm, whoso abideth in the university giving his mind to books, or professeth physic and the liberal sciences, or beside his service in the role of captain of wars or good counsel at home, whereby his commonwealth is benefited, can live without manual labour, and thereto is able and will bear the post, charge and countenance of a gentleman, he shall for money have a coat and arms bestowed upon him by the heralds (who in the charter of the same do of custom pretend antiquity, service and many gay things) and thereunto being made so good cheap shall be called master, which is the title that men give to esquires and gentlemen, and reputed gentlemen ever after (1972).

Larson argues that it is difficult to speak of an "internal stratification" of the professions until well into the eighteenth century.

For the "learned professions", social standing was equivalent to their association with elites and with the state. The "lower branches" or "common professions" and the "learned professions" can be seen to have "inhabited different social worlds" (Larson, 1974:5). The "gentlemanly professions" practiced in the service of an elite. The "common professions" practiced for a more popular clientele and their membership was drawn from humbler origins.

As Laslett has emphasized, the division between those who could call themselves gentleman and those who had to work for a living was rigid (1965). The "gentlemanly professions" were exempted from not only manual labour but commerce or trade as well. As gentlemen, they were expected to "maintain a leisured life style without actively working to support it" (Elliott, 1972:21). Yet their counterparts, originating from lesser status positions, of necessity, interacted with a clientele outside the confines of the elite. Their services were exchanged in an explicitly commercial manner. In an elitist phrase of the time, they "sullied their hands with trade".

In England, the "lower branches" of medicine included the apothecaries and the surgeons. The "lower branches" of law were first termed "attorneys" and later "solicitors". In the health-attending disciplines, it was the "physicians" who were recognized as possessing professional status. They were organized as early as 1518 in the "Royal College" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:83). As we noted, they restricted entry to their collegiate by confining recruitment to gradutes of Oxford and Cambridge. In the practice of law, only the Inns of Court provided access to the Bar. Only the barristers were considered "learned" and only they could preside over the courts as judges. This, despite the fact that neither Oxford nor Cambridge taught medicine and that legal education was not seriously undertaken nor objectively examined in the Inns of Court in the seventeenth or eighteenth century. The elite professions were highly concentrated. The "lower branches" numbered in the thousands, the liberal professions in the hundreds.

The distinction was also made in the natural sciences. The skilled tradesman might, through his inventiveness, develop innovative production techniques and perhaps even become wealthy if sufficiently patented. However, for the gentleman:

> Science and technology might provide an agreeable means of spending money: hardly for earning it. They were learned diversions for country gentleman: hardly more. "Perhaps it may be thought", wrote R. L. Edgeworth in 1808, in his book on professional education, "that much skill in mechanics would be necessary to enable a country gentleman to judge the merits of new machines, and to explain their principles to illiterate and uninformed neighbours and tenants; but in fact, the knowledge necessary for this purpose is so easy, and comprised in so small a compass, that a few hours well employed are sufficient for the purpose". A little further on he suggests that metalwork may be "an agreeable occupation and amusement in the country" because "a carpenter or cabinet-maker is to be hired everywhere; but for optical and astronomical instruments, timekeepers and various other works, accurate workmen cannot easily be procured: and as these employments require invention, as well as execution, they are particularly suited to the gentleman. And he concludes by suggesting some knowledge of astronomy "which is indeed particularly suited to country life"; mineralogy ("at least such a tincture of it as would prevent his being imposed upon by the finders of mines and minerals") and chemistry which "every day promises more and more to be serviceable to agriculture". But none of these is put forward as a possible basis for a gentleman's livelihood. The view of science as a fit hobby for well-bred amateurs, but nothing more, persisted long in England (Reader, 1966:6-7).

The "lower branches" comprised subordinate social divisions of similar areas of activity to those carried out by the "gentlemanly" professions. The lower branches were explicitly deemed occupations; their activities unpretentiously undertaken for direct remuneration in contrast with the more devious means of earning engaged by their status superiors. The constraints of the stratification system prevented the unification of these related areas of practice.

There were then, "limitations to what association with the dominant class could ensure for the 'learned professions': ensconced in the world of the elites, they had only weak claims against their more popular rivals" (Larson, 1974:5).

As Freidson remarks of medicine:

> Both themedieval university and the guild gave specific public identity to the physician and set up the mechanisms by which his standing relative to other occupations could be fairly clearly established. Technically, he was preeminent among related workers like grocers and apothecaries, and supervised their work. However, neither university nor guild could by themselves establish the physician's monopoly over the work of healing because they could not create a widespread public confidence and thus encourage widespread public utilization of physician services (Freidson, 1970:19).

II. Challenges from Below

In the eighteenth century, the estatism of the English professions was challenged by the mobilization of the "lower branches". As Gerstl and Jacobs explain:

> As might be expected, up to that point knowledge, skills and techniques remained stagnant under conditions where professional schooling consisted merely of the traditional classical education at universities, and where a professional career sufficed to perpetuate an aristocratic life style. It was assumed that a gentleman merely needed a

> liberal education . . . The lower branches, so-called, were not part of the learned professions proper . . . came from lower strata than did the physicians and barristers . . . (However), particularly in medicine, it was among these socially inferior occupations that most of the advances in knowledge were made (despite the fact) . . . that they were considered merely craftsmen and shopkeepers (or clerks) (1976:5).

Throughout the eighteenth century, the "lower branches", as well as newly developing occupations crystallizing around technical innovations, were gathering momentum for their challenge to the status of the "established professions". The most obvious resources were twofold. Firstly, as we have indicated, their real contribution to technical advance was increasingly providing them with a basis for propaganda. That is, such evidence of cognitive superiority provided a "resource of persuasion" upon which they could draw to convince an expanding clientele of their technical and creative superiority relative to their status superiors. At the same time, the lower branches, by extending themselves to the broad and growing "common clientele" external to the bastions of elite circles, were finding a lucrative income base. When such practitioners came together to organize for their collective mobility, such wealth would be a second resource of crucial import.

Equipping themselves for the contest for public confidence, became a primary task of the late eighteenth century "lower branches". As Larson has argued:

> Both logic and historical evidence indicate that the heirs of the pre-industrial professional elites were not the main actors in this effort: secure in their privileges, they had no urgent reason to become the vanguard of the modern process of professionalization (1974:6).

We have pointed out that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the recognized "gentlemanly" professions practicing were only in divinity and university teaching, law, and physic. As Carr-Saunders and Wilson observed:

> Divinity found a place in the list because it was at one time either the only profession or the basis upon which other professions were built. It took its place with physic and the law, as it were, by ancient right . . . (however) . . . (upon divesting) . . . itself of duties relating to the ordinary business of life, its position in the list was anomalous . . . throughout the eighteenth century, the professions were regarded first and foremost as gentleman's occupations (1933:294-295).

In England, medicine and law were hierarchically divided into their higher and lower branches. Careers in the higher branches were reserved by the landed gentry for their own. Thus, younger sons of the gentry comprised the great majority of recruits to the high status professions (Elliott, 1972:27). Both the recruitment process and financial dependence bound the professions to the landed class. Further, this dependence, prior to the industrial revolution, was reinforced by their general lack of expertise. By the eighteenth century, in the case of medicine, the "skills and learning of a physician were . . . limited mainly to the art of writing complicated prescriptions. He might have extensive learning in classical literature and culture, but he depended on his gentlemanly manner, impressive behaviour and his client's ignorance to develop a medical practice" (Elliott, 1972:28).

In England, the acquisition of a practical medical education depended upon the personal initiative of the aspirant. If such initiative were exercised, however, it did little to aid the candidate to meet the requirements of the licesing authorities. Indeed, "the Royal College had allowed their educational activities to lapse and examinations which they conducted made little pretense of testing medical knowledge" (Elliott, 1972:28).

The legal profession, similarly, had a slim basis in objective evidence for persuading a clientele of its superior knowledge to organize its service, save that of literacy. Literacy, of course, was at a premium, and overwhelmingly class-related.

The Inns of Court had originally been active educational institutions and continued as such up to the sixteenth century. Their practices were based upon lectures, disputations and "moot" law suits - all derived from medieval tradition. However, by the middle of the eighteenth century, "at the Middle Temple all the obligations of the student could be compounded for 38 6s 2d, this being the total sum due in fines where a gentleman forfeits his vocations, keeps not his terms and fails in the performance of his exercises" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:38). The system of vocational training appears to have disappeared in England during the period of Cromwell's government. As Elliott states, "all that remained were financial provisions . . . and the requirements that students should attend the Inns, if only to eat dinners" (1972:29-30).

Thus, in pre-industrial society, after the Reformation, the status professions maintained their social position, not through any basis in expertise. Rather, it was accomplished through their family connections and acquaintance with a "gentlemanly culture". In the lower branches, however, there was more emphasis on the responsibility of practitioners for acquiring a body of expertise. Indeed, despite the general erosion of the guild system, in the lower branches of medicine,

> Guild organization survived . . . in such forms as the Company of Surgeons and the Society of Apothecaries. These bodies controlled their occupational

> groups, laid down regulations for training and apprenticeship and set qualifications for membership. However, their powers to control the misappropriation of their name or the usurpation of their functions were not extensive. Although apprenticeship suggested some form of practical training and experience, supervision was loose and experience might be no more than that of a poorly paid and menial assistant. The examinations conducted by the two bodies had little stringency until changes were made at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Elliott, 1972:32).

Ostensibly, the status professions were responsible for a particular problem area. However, their responsibilities lacked clear definition and they were inadequately backed by expertise. Furthermore, they were principally oriented to a high status clientele. As we have noted, in the case of medical practice, the delivery of services was divided between the physicians (the staus profession), and the surgeons and apothecaries (occupations). The physicians were supposed to be responsible for internal medicine, while the surgeons provided the more unpleasant tasks of external treatment. In claiming this latter domain, they sought consciously to differentiate themselves from the lowly barbers. The apothecaries, in turn, were responsible for the prescription of drugs.

The establishment of these domains of responsibility had followed a quarrelsome course. Only the study of "physic" was considered to approximate one of the "liberal arts" in the medieval universities (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:66). Therefore, the practice of internal medicine was alone among the health-attending disciplines in considerations of appropriate scholarship for the gentleman. Even "physic", however, was not considered respectable enough to consume the gentleman's scholarship as a primary interest. In contrast, neither the surgeons nor the apothecaries had been either ecclesiastics or university graduates. Despite this, some surgeons did acquire considerable status. Thus,

> . . . when Henry V went to France, on the campaign which led to Agincourt, he took with him, as physician, Nocolas Colnet, and as surgeon Thomas Morstede, for each of whom were provided an equivalent guard and equal pay. In London these outstanding surgeons obtained ordinances and were recognized as constituting a separate mystery in 1353 (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:67).

Indeed, there had been one attempt, in the first year of the reign of Henry VI, to unite the surgeon and physician in a common professional organization and to ensure that all should be duly qualified by a university training. This provides some evidence that the surgeons were, at times, considered to be on equal footing with the physician. However, as Carr-Saunders and Wilson conclude, "If the petition was granted, which seems uncertain, the arrangement did not last for long. The two branches of the same great profession went their own ways, to be united again within our own times" (1933:67).

The physicians in England benefitted from the revival of classical scholarship in Renaissance Italy, which included a re-awakened interest in and development upon Greek (classical) medical literature. Medicine or "physic", as a result of the visits by English physicians to the respective Italian universities, became a fully recognized "liberal art". Thus,

> The leading physicians came to take high places in the world of scholarship. When Henry VIII granted a charter to the Royal College of Physicians, he did so "partly imitating the example of well governed cities in Italy and many other nations"; the college was on the one side a learned academy of the kind with which the physicians had become familiar in their travels, and on the other side a guild (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:68).

In 1552, Oxford and Cambridge were, for all intents and purposes, made the major native educational institutions where studies could lead to the license to practice. However, it appears that foreign studies remained the most respectable means of acquiring what was then considered a body of superior knowledge.

The fortunes of the surgeons took a reverse course relative to the physicians, "As the physicians rose, the surgeons sank in status" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:68). Lacking contact with Greek learning and challenged by the growing power of the barbers with whom they amalgamated in 1540, surgery descended to a trade. It was a status which they held for two centuries (Ibid.).

The third recognized order of medical practice, the apothecaries, differentiated themselves from chemists and druggists, rating themselves above the latter two. While the basis for their claims to distinction are obscure, Reader suggests that it might have ". . . rested on the fact that apothecaries went out and visited patients, whereas chemists and druggists were shop-bound . . ." (1966:40). Furthermore, they only charged for the remedies prescribed, not for advice and attendance, while the apothecary charged a small fee" (Reader, 1966:40-41) for the latter.

The struggle by druggists and chemists to receive full professional status as consulting apothecaries continued even until 1841. At that time, they set up their own professional body, the Pharmaceutical Society. It was an admission of defeat, "The apothecaries had left their shops and become doctors. The druggists had stayed in them and become pharmaceutical chemists" (Reader, 1966:41).

The apothecaries had themselves fought a series of battles with the physicians over the right to give medical advice, in addition to prescribing drugs (Elliott, 1972:33; Reader, 1966:40-41). In 1703, this right was unsuccessfully challenged in court, but the House of Lords overturned the decision in favour of the physicians, disallowing the apothecaries from charging for advice. However, in 1815, the consulting fee was regained through the passage of the Apothecaries Act.

As Carr-Saunders and Wilson have documented, the scientific enterprise and learning of the sixteenth century physician, stimulated through contact with Italy, had withered in Britain in the eighteenth century. It was, as we have pointed out, replaced by a pre-occupation with cultural gentility. Meanwhile, the lower branches were struggling to improve their position. They had developed a more rigorous system of self-discipline and had been more inventive. Indeed, it was the apothecaries who were to establish the first system of qualification and registration now familiar to modern professions:

> . . . the passing of the Apothecaries Act, in 1815, marked the emergence of nineteenth-century general practitioners, in the sense of a practitioner holding recognized qualifications in medicine and surgery, since from that time forward it became customary for anyone who wanted to go into reputable general practice to "pass the Hall", which meant getting the Society of Apothecaries license, and to get the diploma of membership of the Royal College of Surgeons (Reader, 1966:41).

The advent of the nineteenth century brought with it industrial change, population growth (the "demographic explosion"), and accelerated urban development. These developments radically altered the social structure in which medical practice was enacted. The physician, for a time, remained largely in the service of the nobility and gentry, leaving the apothecaries and surgeons to meet the rapidly growing demand for services amongst the new industrial "middle" and "working" classes.

The unification of the medical professions was accomplished in 1858 with an act which created the General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the United Kingdom. It united the three orders, the physicians, the surgeons and the apothecaries. The period between 1815 and 1858 had been marked by a series of developments arising from the struggle between the physicians and the lower branches. The lower branches waged their campaign through a reform movement aimed at sweeping away the exclusive licensing powers of the ancient corporations and universities, which retained little basis of claim to superiority. Their means to the achievement of this goal, included not only the establishment of the British Medical Association (B.M.A.), but the creation of a single licensing authority as well. While the 1858 Act did create a single regulating body, to the disgruntlement of the reformers, the old corporations and universities retained their licensing powers within the new framework. Nevertheless, the direction was clear. The reformers had won the major points of contest and the physicians, like the surgeons and apothecaries, were expected to be subjected to examinations based upon technical knowledge. That knowledge was a blend of the three disciplines. Further, the universities were henceforward expected to provide a practical education in medicine in order to prepare candidates for licensing exams.

The contest between the lower and upper branches of the law followed a similar course, culminating in their consolidation in the nineteenth century. Perhaps because the attorney and solicitor were generally mistrusted, a series of regulating acts to expell the incompetent and dishonest were passed in the eighteenth century.[3] This appears, however, in the long run to have worked out to the advantage of the lower branches. For one consequence was the creation, by the force of parliamentary law, of a regular system of articled training. In response, the first "Law Society" was founded which ". . . attempted to develop standard procedures for training and qualification, to supervise professional practice and to improve its quality, and to represent the interests of attorneys at the Bar and society in general" (Elliott, 1972:40). Through compromise, by accepting the regulating imposition of parliament and by embracing them as their own, they were able to challenge the Inns of Court.[4]

The role of the Inns of Court, like Oxford and Cambridge in medicine, had dissipated as serious educational institutions. In 1825, the lower branches succeeded in affiliating with a portion of the barristers to form the "Society of Attorneys, Solicitors, Proctors and others, practicing in the Courts of Law and Equity in the United Kingdom (Elliott, 1972:40). The Inns, however, remained an obstacle to consolidation, restricting entry on the basis of status. The victory of the lower branches over the Inns, as in the case of medicine, came indirectly. The Inns, subjected to the pressure of the educational reform movement, introduced legal training and objective examinations. The general effect of this move was to open out the qualification for practice before the bar to the industrial middle class. Thus, the objective testing of standardized examinations and the formalization of training regimens were the resources which the lower branches used to politicize their case for the dismantling of the status barriers restricting their entry. They were, therefore, able to consolidate their positions alongside the recognized professions. In both the practice of law and medicine, the nineteenth century marked the passage of the profession from a "privileged status" to an "occupation", albeit a privileged occupation, but at the same time lodged partially in the market relations which defined the infrastructure of the new mode of production.

III. The General Conditions of Professionalization in the Nineteenth Century.

The success of the lower branches of the professions was not isolated but rather, was connected with the general improvement of the fortunes of the middle classes in the nineteenth century. The French Revolution has popularized the notion that ancient statuses were both irrational and archaic barriers to the advent of a liberal-democratic society. In the sphere of work, this was translated to mean that careers should be open to talent. However, even in France, with the exception of government and the military, "the opening was more ideological than real until the industrial take-off" (Hobsbawm, 1962:227-33).

It will be remembered that the upper branches had originally secured their status during the medieval period, through their association with the university. From this association, the distinction was founded between the professions on the one hand, whose members possessed a "liberal education", and the trades on the other, whose members possessed a practical training. This same conception of a liberal education also affected North America in colonial times, where for example, the clergy exercised exclusive influence over higher education (Jencks and Riessman, 1968:207).

The rise of the modern professions are intimately linked with the rise of industrial capitalism and the shedding of the mercantilist system. The liberal rallying call of the industrialists was for "competition in all spheres". The education system was no exception and became a pivotal target for the aspiring reformers. As Larson states:

> Both the rise of the modern professions and the reform of the civil service (which in Britain, became a fact only after the Public Health Act of 1848 and the 1855 report of the Civil Service Commission) were crucially linked to the rise of the competitive examination system. The move by merit against birth and patronage was closely connected to the political fortunes of the middle classes, and in England, of course, to the electoral reform of 1832. Although the democratization should not be overestimated, the constitution of modern professions and the emergence of a pattern of professional career represented for the middle classes a possibility of gaining status through work (Larson, 1974:8).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution and the campaign by the political reform movement forced open the doors of the professions to the middle classes. Scientific and technological development demanded new, specialized workers. Services which had previously been available only to the upper strata could now be afforded by an expanding middle class. A variety of new health problems associated with industry and urbanization emerged. The need for urban planning, public administration, a variety of engineering skills, architectural designs suited to the new environment as well as the construction innovations to implement them; all these multiplied, creating a new and vast market for specialized services. In what Carr-Saunders and Wilson have called a "wave of association", the principal professional associations of today were established in England and North America. Remarkably, this took place in the temporal span of two generations.

In England, between 1825 and 1880, ten of the thirteen contemporary professions which Wilensky listed as "established" or "in process" (Wilensky, 1964a:141), acquired an association of national scope. In the United States, of the same thirteen, eleven were organized between 1840 and 1887. Table "I" illustrates this development (Larson, 1974:9):

Table I

Professional Associations of National Scope

ENGLAND		UNITED STATES
	1897	Opticians
	1896	Nurses
Brit. Optical Association	1895	
Royal Brit. Nurses Ass'n	1887	Accountants
British Dental Ass'n Insti. of Chartered Accountants	1880	
	1878	Lawyers
Librarians Association	1877	
	1876	Librarians
	1874	Social workers
National Union Teachers	1870	
	1867	Civil engineers
	1863	Veterinarians
	1857	Teachers; Architects
Society of Engineers	1854	
	1852	Pharmacists; Civil engineers (N.Y.; fails to survive)
	1847	American Medical Ass'n
Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons	1844	
Pharmac. Society of G. Britain	1841	
	1840	Dentists
Royal Institute of British Architects	1834	
British Medical Ass'n	1832	
Law Society	1825	
Inst. of Civil Engineers	1818	

Source: Larson constructed this table through reference to two sources: Geoffrey Millerson (1964) and Harold Wilensky (1964).

This wave of professional association, as we have argued above, was linked to the general social changes which can be identified with the industrial "take-off" in the nineteenth century. That take-off meant, economically, the dismantling of the mercantilist system; and politically, the success of industrial capital in achieving state power. It was from the ranks of the middle classes, rather than the growing proletarian masses, that the membership of the nineteenth century professions was recruited.

The industrial "take-off" may be correctly viewed as a capitalist victory, and thus associated with the acceleration of labour commodification. However, it also produced a qualitative leap in social conditions, which justifies the claim that the "industrial revolution" was a social as well as a technological rupture with the past. No one, it should be pointed out, was more aware of this than Marx, despite his devastating indictment.

Literacy must be counted as an important indicator of this "qualitative leap". In 1851, in England, there were 76,000 people who described themselves as school teachers when the population stood at 21 million (Hobsbawm, 1962:232). As Larson points out, the political and cultural vitality of the English working class, described in E. P. Thompson's study (1963), "indirectly attests to the spread of literacy" (1974:12). In the United States, the public system of education only became a reality after 1860, yet by 1880, Beard points out that there was only 17 percent illiteracy over the age of ten in the general population (Beard, 1960:347). While we may be astonished at these statistics and rightly question their reliability, they do suggest a remarkable expansion of the population covered by formal schooling. In

Canada, compulsory education was established by 1900 (Wallace, E., 1950:384-386).

Most western countries in the second half of the nineteenth century developed a communications infrastructure of roads, railways, a national postal system, the telegraph, and newspapers had multiplied tremendously. Indeed, these developments were vital to the establishment of a metropolitan economy. They also provided, along with the more central innovations in manufacturing related to the harnessing of new power sources, a basis for the growth of total national wealth. In the United States, the total value of manufacturing output in 1860 was twice that of 1850, and more than four times that of 1787 (Beard, 1960: 190). England, the richest country in the world at the time, accelerated its output dramatically as well. Its population of workers had shifted "from the farm to the factory" to such a considerable extent in 1851, that only two million of the nine million working Britons were engaged in agriculture (Hobsbawm, 1967, Vol. 3:158). By 1881, that ratio stood at 1.6 million out of 12.8 million occupied workers.

The familiar "demographic explosion" associated with the industrial revolution meant, in England and Ireland, that the population rose from ten million in 1750 to thirty million in 1850 (Palmer, 1957:426). That "explosion" took place largely in the industrial cities. It was estimated that there were only three cities outside of London in England and Scotland which exceeded 50,000 inhabitants in 1785. Seventy years later, there were thirty-one cities of this size (Palmer, 1957:426).

As Hobsbawm warns us, however, the social transformation should not be exaggerated; for in England, outside the ken of "bourgeoise civilization" lived the "other nation"; a social aggregate comprised of the working masses, largely experiencing abject poverty (Hobsbawm, 1962). They lived in:

> the new urban agglomerations . . . drab places, blackened with the heavy soot of the early coal age . . . Housing for workers was hastily built, closely packed, and always in short supply . . . there were whole blocks of tenements in the cities, each swarming with a thousand ragged children . . . Hours in factories were long, fourteen a day or occasionally more . . . Holidays were few . . . Workers in the factories, as in the mines, were almost entirely unorganized . . . a mass of recently assembled humanity without traditions or common ties. Each bargained individually with his employer, who, usually a small businessman himself, facing fierce competition with others . . . held his "wages bill" to the lowest possible figure that he could manage (Palmer, 1957:428).

The new middle class, from whom the great bulk of the "occupational" professions were drawn, were but a fraction of the total population. Hobsbawm (1962:353) illustrates the English case:

> In 1801, there had been about 100,000 taxpayers earning above £150 a year in Britain; at the end of our period there may have been about 340,000; say with large families, a million and a half persons out of the total population of 20 million (1851). Naturally, the number of these who sought to follow middle-class standards and ways of life was very much larger. Not all these were very rich; a good guess is that the number of these earning more than 5000 a year was about 4,000 . . . We may assume that the proportion of the "middle-class" in other countries was not notably higher than this, and indeed was generally rather lower.

While the increase in the number of occupations with recognized professional associations continues up to the present, the greatest increase occurred during the mid-nineteenth century. Between 1841 and 1881 there was a percentage increase of 63 per cent, while from 1881 to 1911, that fell to 39 per cent. The following table provides the comparison:

Table II

Increase of 17 Professional Occupations (1841-81-1911) and of Commercial Clerks

	1841	1881	1911
Accountants	4,416	11,606	9,499
Actors	1,357	4,565	18,247
Architects	1,486	6,898	8,921
Artists	4,272	11,059	11,619
Authors	167	3,434	13,786
Barristers	2,088	4,019	4,121
Clergy	14,527	21,663	24,859
Dentists	522	3,583	8,674
Engineers (Civil)	853	7,124	7,208
Midwives	734	2,646	6,602
Ministers	5,923	9,734	11,984
Musicians	3,600	25,546	47,116
Physicians and Surgeons	17,500	15,116	23,469
Priests (RC)	--	2,089	3,302
Solicitors	11,684	13,376	17,259
Surveyors	4,086	5,394	5,063
Teachers	51,851	168,920	251,968
TOTAL	125,066	317,222	473,697
Increase %		154	50
Total less Teachers	73,215	148,302	221,729
Increase %		103	50
Commercial Clerks	48,689	181,457	477,535
Increase %		273	163
Population of England and Wales	15,914,000	25,974,000	36,070,000
Increase %		63	39

Source: W. J. Reader, Professional Men; The Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-Century England. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 211.

IV. Summary

In summary, a manifold of factors associated with the emergence of industrial capitalism created the conditions for the formation of occupational professions. Just as the kin of the gentry comprised the pre-industrial status professions, so the kin of the industrial bourgeoisie - the new ruling class - comprised the nineteenth-century professions.

Perhaps lacking the sufficient predisposition or talent to compete for the economically vital work of the entrepeneur and distancing themselves from the manual labour of the unskilled factory worker, the aspirant professionals exploited various features of the transformed social structure. Their contest with the "status" professions of the old order was won through the newly acquired political influence of industrial interests on the state. Their claims to a monopoly of expertise in a specialized sphere of endeavour were secured, via their professional associations, through the sanction of the state. Their claims succeeded through the educational reform movement and the introduction of objective examinations. However, as the population figures indicate, the opening of careers to meritorious contest suggests the arrival of a limited meritocracy; its doors open only to the middle class.

The expansion of the quantity of professional associations and the numbers of workers qualified in professional training schools continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Such a phenomenon could not pass without notice in sociological theory. In a society in which the stability of the old corporative order was being destroyed, the new professions appeared to some as a resurrection of the guilds.

As Carr-Saunders and Wilson stipulate, the professions, associationally and organizationally, tend towards monopoly. While this tentency has been criticized as usurpatious of market principles, it is often held that such monopoly assures the maintenance of standards of accepted performance and competence. Furthermore, the reform of the qualifying process linked the new professions to the competitive ideology of the new order.

Significantly, the nineteenth-century professions appeared to be an attractive institutional hybrid; their substance was derived from the best of two worlds - the passing social order and the newly emerging one. Their continuity, in name at least, with the older professions, and their organizational similarity to the guilds, identified them with the stability, security, and craft values of the medieval order. At the same time, they made conscious efforts to rationalize their disciplines by putting them on a firm theoretical and technical basis, and formally encouraging their members' competence. The professionalization process, which included the development of an institutionalized research function within the training schools, contributed in a major way to what Marx termed the "advancement of the forces of production."

CHAPTER ONE

Footnotes

1. Hobsbawm (1962:237) has described this pre-industrial, corporate ideology, as "the general social conviction that men had duties as well as rights, that virtue was not simply the equivalent of money, and that the lower orders, though low, had a right to their modest lives in the station to which God had called them".

2. The literature on these developments is now enormous. We might recommend the following: Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, revised edition (1963); Frederick L. Nussbaum, A History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe (1968); G. Renard and G. Weulersse (1926), Life and Work in Modern Europe: the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries; L. B. Packard, The Commercial Revolution, 1440-1776 (1927); P. Buck, The Politics of Mercantilism (1942); E. Hecksher, Mercantilism (2 Volumes) (1935).

3. According to Elliott (1972:40), these included an act in 1729 which institutionalized a system of "articles" for training.

4. The attorneys and solicitors responded to the 1729 act by forming a "Law Society" which formally alleged to function to standardize training and qualification, to improve the quality of practice, to supervise the same, and to represent the interests of members. As Elliott remarks (1972:40), "The development of occupational self-consciousness seems to have been at least in part a response to external intervention as embodied in the Act of 1729 and public criticism of the attorneys at this time. This factor of external intervention and influence has a continued, if paradoxical, importance in fostering professional autonomy.

CHAPTER TWO

INDUSTRIALIZATION, MASS-SOCIETY AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL "QUEST FOR COMMUNITY"

I. Technology and Mass-Society Theory

It is a recurrent theme in social criticism and topical debate that modern man's social existence has increasingly become subordinated to technology. The theme embraces both the modern work environment and the social organization of consumption. The former - the work place - is seen to reflect, on the social plane, an approximation to the organizational structure of the physical aspects of industry.

Harry Braverman, who is highly critical of social theorists given to treat men as the slaves of technology, has wryly observed; "The attributes of modern society are seen as issuing directly from smokestacks, machine tools and computers. We are, as a result, presented with the theory of societas ex machinas, not only 'determinism' but a despotism of the machine" (1974:16). Further in this vein, Noble has observed:

> It has become fashionable to account for the myriad of social changes attendant upon the extension of technological activity tautologically, by simple reference to the supposedly essential nature of the activity: it expands. Thus, a stock device of recent social analysis is to view modern technology as though it had a life of its own, an internal dynamic which feeds upon the society that has unleashed it. Propelled according to its own immanent logic and operating through witting and unwitting human agency, it ultimately outstrips the conscious activities which gave birth to it, creating a system in which people are but functional parts of a system (1977:vii).

It is generally acknowledged that there has been no more fundamental preoccupation of western social thought in the modern era, than assessments of the subversive impact of technological innovation on social relations. This preoccupation long predates this century. It also predates the formalization of systematic social observation; preceding even the term "sociology" itself. It was, however, with the advent of the social *sciences*, conceived as a method by which knowledge of the relations between human subjects could be abstracted as object, that the idea comes to pervade and even *haunt* the contemporary consciousness. It *haunts* because it suggests the possibility of invidious manipulation. The idea that such knowledge can be acquired in the law-like, generalizable format of the natural sciences, is attended by a host of troublesome ethical and political concerns. Perhaps most significantly, even if such knowledge were attainable, it is in no sense given that its use would fall automatically to the service of the general welfare. If society is divided by interest and power, then differential access to and control over such knowledge may be expected. Furthermore, the assessment of its value as a technical instrumentality will vary strategically by group membership and ideological perspective.

Theoretical interest in the relationship between the advance of production technology and other social relations dates at least to the observation that European society began to change dramatically with the wedding of innovative agricultural and craft techniques to the merchant capitalist market.[1] Based on the transfer of ownership of productive equipment from the craftsmen to the merchant, the historical scholarship concerned with economic development identified the "putting out" system as the intial impetus of revolutionary change. The reorganization of productive relations set a protracted transformation of the fundamental structure of European society into motion.

In Europe, the feudal "mode of production" - to employ Marx's terminology - was gradually destroyed between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. Feudalism had consisted of a multitude of local, largely subsistence-producing economies which existed in relative isolation, one from the other. It was gradually replaced by production oriented to a national and international market place. The institutional framework organized around the economic base, in response to these changes, was restructured to a point beyond recognition to the medieval eye.

We have discussed the awesome developments which marked the transformation of mercantilism - a mix of feudal residues and protective, merchant capitalism - to the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century. During that century, for a complex of reasons, social change became highly visible. Despite the stated longevity of the entire transformation, social observers in the nineteenth century witnessed a greatly accelerated rate of social change. The speed-up made previous developments seem plodding. It was not simply the rate of social change in the nineteenth century which heightened the general fascination with the relationship between technology and the structure of society in general. The communications infrastructure - the railroads, roadways, canals, commercial book stores, public libraries and the public education system - which had experienced such remarkable growth, made the printed word considerably more accessible. Social commentary, variously described as journalism, philosophy, or science - packaged for both academics and a growing popular readership - was preoccupied with the social changes associated with the rapid industrialization process.

Broadly speaking, there were two sets of issues which virtually demanded the scrutiny of nineteenth century social theorists and their growing readership. Firstly, there was the political cataclysm of the

French Revolution and the subsequent - and associated - spread outwards of liberal-democratic politics. In the wake of this political revolution the institutional basis of participatory decision-making in western society was opened out to critical examination.

Representational politics entered European history as a revolutionary concept. It emerged with the contractual relations developing between divergent interests and the waning of the inherited rights of participation exclusive to the narrow elite clusterings sustained in the feudal mode.

The dissolution of feudal authority relations concomitant of the changing economic base made the social structure of decision-making problematic and subject to contest. The various contesting interest-groups were faced with the task of deciding upon which aspects of social life were appropriately political and which were better "left to themselves" (laisser-faire). While the first democratic theorists attempted to separate the "techniques" (both craft and administration) of production - the economy - from the political realm, such a separation was to prove impossible over time.

The second phenomenon which social theorists were unable to avoid was, of course, the relationship between industrial advance and the social conditions which appeared simultaneously. The emergence of an economy in which manufacturing became the motor of growth, appeared to finalize the destruction of traditional European society. It was many of the attendant, unanticipated changes which created the paradox for early liberal-democratic theory; for that theory had been underlaid by a radical critique of the inequality of the feudal hierarchy. As the industrial capitalist chapter was entered into the textbook of history, its indictment was quickly appended.

The indictment came from various quarters but the themes were common: under the yoke of private property and factory organization, man had not only been cut off from the product of his labour, but from the bonds of morality and communal intimacy which gave him purpose and pleasure. "Every advance of industry", wrote T.N. Whitehead, "has so far been accompanied by a corresponding impoverishment of social living" (1936:165). Industrial technology, promising abundant wealth and freedom from the constraint of tradition, instead meant unsatisfying work, urban crowding, poverty, class conflict and individual isolation. Industrialization, as articulated within the political-economic framework of capitalism, was to prove that the separation between politics and economics was impossible.

Social theory, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, had inherited an empiricist orientation from the rationalist philosophers of the eighteenth century. Its contributors attempted to achieve a scientifically-oriented assessment of changing social structures. Many social theorists sought to contrast empiricism with the social-philosophical analysis ideologically attached to either the emerging or declining modes of production. Social philosophy had long been given antithetical expression; its literature tended to assume affinity with one of the contending historical elites.

On the one hand, the landed aristocracy, rural gentry and non-industrial middle classes, had been the principal beneficiaries of the limited surplus produced in the pre-industrial, agricultural economy. Attached to these interests, the literature of conservative thought reacted to the shift away from the agriculturally-centered economy. Instead, the conservative literature praised the social relations and virtues lost in the transition. The "romantic-conservative reaction", as their literature would be later described, celebrated the corporate order of inherited status, communal agriculture, the guild system and the once powerful church. The central theme of their preachment was social conservation. However, in the face of the burgeoning manufacturing growth, it was a futile sermon, epitomized in practice by the machine-smashing Luddites.[2]

On the other hand, the emerging bourgeoisie saw in feudal and quasifeudal tradition, repugnant constraints, artificially imposed upon the free will of the individual to exercise economic prerogatives. The demise of the traditional protectionist constraints of the old order, their final buttress being the mercantilist system, became seminal to the liberal theory of social progress espoused by those enamored with industrial capitalism. The individual's freedom to compete openly on a market of labour and capital was idealized. In classical political economy, competition came to be viewed as but the natural inclination of the individual. The insight was considered a practical philosophical breakthrough which marked the intellectual recognition of the beginnings of unlimited economic progress.

Social theorists eventually took up such titles as "sociology", "economics" and "political science" to mark off their domains of enquiry from the elite interests of previous social philosophers. The mould in which their initial selection and treatment of problems was forged, however, had been cast by the very social philosophers they sought to transcend.

A fundamental dilemma faced by the early sociologists rested upon the apparent antinomy between technological advance and social betterment. We have noted that the indictments of the industrial revolution were legion. Social institutions were suspected of an inherent sluggishness when their rate of change was compared with that of technology. This "suspicion" was eventually to be given formal expression by Ogburn (1947) as the simplest and most explicit version of technological-determinism.

Ogburn's argument was based on the idea that human culture has two parts: (1) material culture (machine tools, artifacts), and (2) non-material or adaptive culture (ideas, knowledge, values, institutions). Such a view suggests that "social maladjustments" stem from the fact that changes in material culture precede changes in non-material culture. That is, material culture changes exponentially while non-material culture tends to lag behind. Therefore, the most significant source of social "problems" in industrialized society is seen to lie in the fact that social norms and institutional structures fail to adapt rapidly enough to the ever-increasing stock of new inventions.

It is gross over-simplification to assume that the "cultural lag" thesis was the definitive contribution of sociology to the technological-determinist position. Indeed, the great abundance of sociological literature has been extremely critical of it. What is more dominant in sociology, is a perspective which assumes that only after a rationalist culture (value system) has been institutionalized, does industrialization "take off". Subsequently, once certain specifiable elements of industrial plant have been established, technological innovation becomes the prime motor of social change. In this view, there is a causal chain posited: (1) the generalization of rationalist values, (2) the acceleration of rational technique in all productive spheres, and (3) the adaptation of social institutions to and around technological innovations.

In assuming this sequence, sociologists have tended to fix upon the third link in the chain - adaptation - and work from there to both describe contemporary society and seek resolution to its problems. There is perhaps no better catchphrase than that of the "mass-society" to subsume many diverse social theories which seek to summarily depict the present order. It is a flat, ignoble image of contemporary man, summarized as follows by Bell:

> The revolutions in transport and communications have brought men into closer contact with each other and bound them in new ways; the division of labour has made them more interdependent; tremors in one part of society affect all others. Despite this greater interdependence, however, individuals have grown more estranged from one another. The old primary group ties of family and local community have been shattered; ancient parochial faiths are questioned; few unifying values have taken their place. Most important, the critical standards of the educated elite no longer shape opinion or taste. As a result, mores and morals are in constant flux, relations between individuals are tangential or compartmentalized rather than organic. At the same time, greater mobility, spatial and social, intensifies concern over status. Instead of fixed or known status, symbolized by dress or title, each person assumes a multiplicity of roles and constantly has to prove himself in a succession of new situations. Because of all this, the individual loses a coherent sense of self. His anxieties increase. There ensues a search for new faiths. The stage is thus set for the charismatic leader, the secular messiah, who, by bestowing upon each person the semblance of necessary grace and of fullness of personality, supplies a substitute for the older unifying belief that the mass society has destroyed (1960:21-22).

While Bell is critical of the concept, terming it "analytically slippery", he does content that, Marxism apart, "it is probably the most influential social theory in the western world today" (1960:22). We shall return to Daniel Bell's particular relationship with the concept subsequently; for Bell is the principal advocate of the "post-industrial" society concept in North America. At this point, we simply wish to record his description of the mass-society because it accords favourably with the general usage in the discipline.

Robert Nisbet, perhaps more than any other influential interpreter of the history of sociology, has stressed the discipline's preoccupation with the contrast between the concept of "community" and the "mass society". He argues that the intellectual project of "rediscovering community" was the common moral heuristic which guided the classical efforts in the discipline of sociology. For all the "great" sociologists, Nisbet argues, the grand quest was the search for community in a society in which the development of modern industry appeared to shatter the stability of traditional institutions.

Nisbet is worth quoting for the purposes of grasping the evasive but compelling attraction of the concept. He writes:

> By community I mean something that goes far beyond mere local community. The word, as we find it in much nineteenth and twentieth century thought, encompasses all forms of relationships which are characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion, and continuity in time. Community is founded on man conceived in his wholeness rather than in one or another of the roles, taken separately, that he may hold in a social order. It draws its psychological strength from levels of motivation deeper than those of mere volition, interest, and it achieves its fulfillment in a submergence of individual will that is not possible in unions of mere convenience or rational assent. Community is a fusion of feeling and thought, of traditions and commitment, of membership and volition. It may be found in or be given symbolic expression by, locality, religion, nation, race, occupation or crusade. Its archetype, both historically and symbolically is the family, and in almost every type of

> genuine community the nomenclature of family is prominent. Fundamental to the strength of the bond of community is the real or imagined antithesis formed in the same social setting by the non-communal relations of competition and conflict, utility or contractual assent. These, by their relative impersonality and anonymity, highlight the close personal ties of the community (1966:47-48).

Nisbet argues that sociology's initial focus on the industrial revolution and the rupture between the "communal" order of the past and the non-communal of the new, was a nakedly moral concern. Whether the focus on determinants of social relational change was industrialization or the capitalist organization of production; whether the conclusions reached were negative, affirmative or mixed; and whether, if negative, the solutions were conservative, liberal or radical, classical sociological theory was never divested of the moral.

If we follow Nisbet, the unifying question confronting the great sociologists might have been stated, "How could a mass of individuals, increasingly habituated to urban population concentrations, direct the growth and fruits of technology in a manner consistent with a specific conception(s) - here the unity is shattered - of qualitative social relations?" The answers have varied with the specific conception of "quality" preferred. Some have stressed egalitarianism both as a means of its achievement and as ends envisioned to constitute its fulfillment. Others, skeptical of these levelling aspirations, have stressed the inevitability of stratification; thus, demanding its recognition, their models have emphasized the maintenance of social order in a "functionally" stratified society.

II. Marxism Contrasted with Mass-Society Theory[3]

Post-industrial society theory, in its two major variants which we shall term "radical-pessimism" and "radical-optimism", is the most recent representative of the mass-society tradition. Contributors to this tradition have tended to commit the error of reification. Premising their theoretical constructions on a technological-determinist view of social change, they have reified technology: they have maintained a crude analytical distinction between "technology" on the one hand, and "society" (or culture) on the other, as if the two were made of different substance. Post-industrial theory, implicitly or explicitly, makes the same distinction. In such a framework it follows that, "since society contains all that is human, technology must be something other than human, a disembodied historical force impinging upon the affairs of men" (Noble, 1976:xviii-xix). In short, technology is seen to exert so powerful an influence on the social structure that, it is conceptualized as something independent of the very humanity which authored it.

Post-industrial theory traces to the nineteenth century sociological concern with the emergence of mass-society and the alienation of man from the traditional communal relations of the pre-industrial order. The "radical-pessimist" variant incorporates twentieth century technological developments to its coverage and describes an inescapable loss of human freedom which attend them. By contrast, the "radical-optimist" variant, in part, views the vacuum of community as being gradually filled by the progressive development of the occupational structure. Community, it is argued, is "rediscovered" in the social milieu of professional work.

It is perhaps a surprise of no great magnitude that the progeny of the wedding of science to technology would impress the contemporary mind. Its yield, by any standards, has been enormous. Nor is it particularly surprising when contemplating that yield as a historical phenomenon, that it would be tempting to impute independent causal status to technology or science. However, it is something of a curiosity that such analytical crudeness would be expressed in sociology. It is a "curiosity" because sociology is a research discipline whose object of investigation concerns social constructions.

In contrast with the tradition of mass-society theory, Marx presented a much more subtle view of communal breakdown and its relation to technological developments. Marx insisted on the study of technology as a social activity. Thus, his central work, Capital, was exempted from the technological determinism which came to pervade other social theories. That work was a study of social relations and may be seen as an attempt to demystify the reification of both the market of labour and capital and technology. As Lefebvre notes, a "fundamental idea" of Marx was that:

> social relations (including juridical relations of ownership and property) constitute the core of the social whole. They structure it, serve as intermediary (that which "mediates") between foundation or "substructure" (the productive forces, the division of labour) and the "superstructures" (institutions, ideologies). Though they do not exist substantially in the manner of things, it is they that have proved the most enduring over the ages (1969:7).

The Marxist conception of capitalism depends upon a specification of the social relations of production in their antagonistic forms. With what the writer would call his "socilogy of production relations" (deliberately stressing the "sociological" in order to avoid the often misconstrued "economistic" theoretical construction imposed upon Marxism by the untutored), Marx established both a theory and a method for explaining the expansionary dynamics of capitalism as a mode of production. Marxist analyses itself arose as a critical response to the failure of political and economic theory to penetrate a fetish-like view of commodity production. According to Marx, such a view - "commodity fetishism" - ideologically attended the revolution in technology and labour organization in nineteenth century Europe.

Capitalism organized landless workers in large-scale manufacturing enterprises to produce goods for a national and international marketplace. It was a revolutionary means of accelerating the absolute quantity of labour productivity and the share of output accruing to the owners of capital. The capitalist mode of wealth appropriation, in the nineteenth century, came to be viewed as the concrete implementation of the most efficient and rational system of production and distribution.

The extraordinary success of industrial capitalism in producing economic growth and technical innovation appears, on hindsight, to have encouraged the belief amongst the classical political economists that capitalism was the embodiment of the "natural laws" of a self-regulated market in goods and labour. Thus, any organized opposition to the operation of the system of commodity production and exchange - whether from the Church, the State, or from Labour - came to be viewed as a roadblock on a unilinear path to material and social progress.

It is now generally conceded that this view of laisser-faire capitalism was historically specific and systematically biased in favour of specific classes and nations. However, it was Marx more than any other social thinker who forced social theory to look behind the surface features of human industry as socially organized in the capitalist mode to identify the fundamental social contradictions upon which it rested.

To abandon the Marxist method in attempts to locate the primary determinants of social change - as post-industrial theorists would have us do - is of signal import. Such a decision is only warranted if the contradictions which Marx identified have themselves been rendered insignificant. The post-industrial thesis, as expressed in North America, alleges to have secured such a warrant in its interpretation of the professionalization of the labour process and the decision-making process in the industrial system. In short, it presents a view of an emerging society in which the central contradiction between labour and capital identified by Marx is rendered insignificant.

The general equation of value and labour time which Marx had begun with was an insight of the classical political economy which he attacked. Capitalism was the practical application of this "equation": the practice of appropriating wealth through the sophisticated organization and exploitation of labour-power.

Marx analyzed the specific manner of capitalist appropriation in his critique of political economy. According to Marx, the secret of capitalism's success in accumulating wealth and improving technology - in Marx's terminology, the latter refers to the advancement of the "forces of production" - rested on specific social relations between capital and labour in the productive process. The secret of that success lay in the appropriation of surplus-value from workers, which is to say, the appropriation of that portion of the working day in which value is produced over and above what was necessary to maintain the labour force at a given living standard. For Marx, surplus-value was equivalent to surplus-labour time.

Marx argued that the driving force of capital accumulation and technical advance was the capitalist's structurally induced stimulus to increase surplus-value. The capitalist's response to this stimulus was intrinsically antagonistic to the interests of the workers he employed. For, in order to increase surplus-value, the capitalist was forced to increase the surplus (unpaid) labour-time expenditure of his employees. The capitalist's reward for adhering to the norm of surplus-value expansion was situated in the dynamics of market competition. In brief, the larger capital formations in competition with the capitalist in the market, posed the threat of undermining his market position by reducing the price of goods. To be driven from the market was to lose one's ownership of enterprise and thus one's class position and the perquisites which accompanied it.

In the Marxist schema, it was labour-power and its technological extensions, harnessed to the appropriation and transformation of natural resources which produced all value. The capitalist functioned to transform the "use-value" of the worker's product into an "exchange-value", the latter of which would incorporate the capitalist's surplus. According to Marx, there was an irreducible wage level (settling at a historically conditioned subsistence level) which confronted the capitalist. In order to increase surplus-labour input beyond the time necessary to pay this minimum wage bill as well as the costs of maintaining capital equipment, the capitalist sought firstly to increase the worker's surplus labour-time. However, once this limit was reached, his only recourse was to alter the forces of production if he was to increase the productivity of his firm.

In this schema, Marx conceptualized the antagonistic basis of capitalist production, providing social analysts with a framework as well as a method - dialectical materialism - for penetrating the "fetishism" of commodity production from a sociological perspective. In the briefest possible version, the class antagonism between the worker and the capitalist is established by the structural requirement of the capitalist to extract surplus labour time from the worker in order to maintain his class position. Further, technical innovation, encouraged by the pressure to bypass the natural limits put on such appropriation increases, served to increase worker productivity without increasing actual labour time. However, it also served to undermine the market value of labour-power and set in motion an ever-intensifying division of labour. This division of labour reduced industrial labour to mundane, repetitive toil, and also established the necessary conditions to induce collective labour organization in defense against the insecurities created by imputations of labour-substitutive technology.

According to Marx, the pace of social production in capitalist society is accelerated by the competitive struggle for capital accumulation and the demand for more profitable means of production. As we have outlined, the social relations of production peculiar to capitalist society make this accumulation possible. The relations between the capitalist class and the proletariat are centered upon the appropriation by the former of the social surplus-product of the latter. The specific conditions of these antagonistic relations not only made capital accumulation possible, but as Marx attempted to show, they also fostered the rapid development of the forces of production. For Marx, these "forces of production" included innovations in labour-saving and labour-substitutive technology. They also included the scientific organization of labour activity and the authority structures which coordinate that activity.

For Marx, the development of the forces of production in turn held out the promise of a new social order. As Noble describes this so well, it was envisioned as:

> . . . one marked not by the capitalist trauma of over-production, economic crises, wasteful competition, routine exploitation of the many by the few, mindless detail labour, and physical drudgery, but rather by collective ownership of the means of production by society as a whole, cooperative enterprise, rational allocation of resources to meet social needs, and the fuller development of the social individual. Thus, in the light of these new forces of production, the relations of capitalism tend increasingly to appear anachronistic - stark and oppressive vestiges of a more primitive past, fetters upon further social development. Given the requisite revolutionary consciousness on the part of the exploited class - itself a recognition of the disparity between the actuality and the potential of social production - the contradiction erupts into revolution and the old capitalist is sloughed off. In Marx's words, "Forces of production and social relations - two different sides of the development of the social individual - appear to capital as mere means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high (Noble, 1977:xx).

III. Marx Rejected

We have argued that sociologists, assuming the sequence and determinate relation between technology and social relations outlined above, have tended to fix upon the adaptation of social institutions; social adaptation to and around technological innovation. In contrast, Marx rejected both that sequence and that fixation. We have also noted that the early liberal attempts to separate politics from economy had proven impossible. Indeed, in the sociology of industrial society, political sociology and the sociology of work overlap considerably. A central concern which conjoins the two has been a preoccupation with the relation between the division of labour and the social distribution of power.

As we have seen, this "central concern" was also a key theme in the development of Marxist theory. Yet Marx's mode of analysis - based upon the "antagonistic relations of production" - has never been fully accepted by the mainstream of sociology. Indeed, it has been more common to forcefully reject it. One conjecture is that orthodox (non-Marxist) sociology has developed in great part, as a "debate with Marx's ghost" (Zeitlin, 1968). In brief, the "revolutionary message" intrinsic to the Marxist framework has been the negative inspiration for much of the post-Marxist development of sociological theory.

Marxism aside, it is common to the sociological tradition to assume that technological change shapes the division of labour, which in turn establishes the framework for the social division of power and authority. As we have argued, it is from this perspective that the mass-society tradition arises. As a political sociology, this perspective suggests that the very rapidity of changes in the technological infrastructure create special problems of social control. It presents as antithetical interpretations of the participatory tendencies associated with the authority structures of industrial society. On the one hand, it emerged as an elitist critique of democratic tendencies in general, and Marxism in particular. On the other hand, it developed as a critique of the tendency for industrial societies to move away from a democratic ideal towards a centrally controlled authoritarianism.

In brief, the key problems of the mass-society are much the same problems as those raised in the early conflict between liberal and conservative ideology. Specifically: "To what extent should production be politicized?" In other words, what are the appropriate structures for political participation in industrial society - given the increasing recognition that the division of labour is increasingly "interdependent".

Much of sociology has been premised upon a conception of modern societies as organic wholes: changes in one part of the whole will affect the entire society. Thus, decision-making in one work place will tend to affect not only the immediate association of workers and management, but other such production associations, and the sphere of consumption as well.

Marxists have shared in this organic conception of society. Yet Marx distanced himself from any technological-determinism in identifying primary determinants of change. For Marx, the sociological preoccupation with "adaptation" would be seen as reactionary. The idea was not to adapt to the technical division of labour, but to change its social basis. However, the failure of the "ripening of revolutionary conditions" in the west encouraged the rejection of the Marxist method. Further, in this century, the increase in technical, commercial and administrative labour did appear to cut across Marx's anticipated bipolar model. Indeed, the structural-functionalists by the 1950's, were advising sociologists to study the significance of "professionalization" as opposed to "proletarianization" in efforts to grasp the balance of pwoer in contemporary society. Parsons was so convinced of the relationship between the growth of the professions and the decline of Marxist analysis, that he wrote:

> We do not know what lies in store for the next phase of professionalization. I suggest, however, that the professional complex has already not only come into prominence but has even begun to predominate the contemporary scene in such a way as to render obsolescent the primacy of the old issues of political authoritarianism and capitalistic exploitation (1968:546).

IV. Radical-Optimism: Post-Industrial "Professionalization"

We have observed that the specialized study of the professions has, in general, concentrated on micro-sociological issues. In macro-sociology, however, Parsons' view of the declining utility of Marxist analysis engages a much wider group of theorists. As Miliband contends, a number of writers have assumed that "the question of alternatives to capitalism have been rendered obsolete by internal developments of the system itself; capitalism, the argument goes, has been so thoroughly transformed in the last few decades that the need to abolish it has conveniently disappeared" (1968:215).

In 1967, in a study reported in the American Journal of Sociology, Faunce and Clelland (341-351) attempted to provide empirical support for the obverse of the "proletarianization thesis". They observed, upon studying the changing occupational distribution of an American city (population: 25,000), that "an increasing proportion of occupations requiring professional skills" [was becoming] "an increasingly important determinant of the character of contemporary communities" (Faunce and Clelland, 1967:342). Table III yields the comparison of the occupational distribution within the community they studied, between 1940 and 1960.

Table III

A Comparison of the Changing Occupational Distribution in the City Studied by Faunce and Clelland, and other Cities of 10,000 - 50,000

	1940	1950	1960
Professional and technical:	19.2		
City Studied	19.2	25.2	28.7
Mean, Small Cities .	9.9	11.3	13.7
Managers, Proprietors and Officials:			
City Studied	9.0	10.7	10.4
Mean, Small Cities .	11.6	12.1	11.1
Clerical and Sales:			
City Studied	17.6	23.0	21.9
Mean, Small Cities .	22.0	23.3	25.2
Craftsmen:			
City Studied	14.4	14.6	13.8
Mean, Small Cities .	12.9	14.9	14.0
Operatives:			
City Studied	20.3	14.6	12.0
Mean, Small Cities .	21.5	20.9	18.6
Private-household Workers:			
City Studied	5.9	2.3	4.0
Mean, Small Cities .	6.5	3.4	3.7
Service Workers:			
City Studied	7.9	7.1	7.0
Mean, Small Cities .	6.5	8.3	9.2
Labourers:			
City Studied	5.7	2.5	2.2
Mean, Small Cities .	7.2	5.8	4.5

Source: This table is reproduced, in part, from William Faunce and Donald Clelland, "Professionalization and Stratification Patterns in an Industrial Community". American Journal of Sociology. 72 (January): 343. The writers reported that the means of the "other cities" were computed from a five per cent systematic sample of all urban places with populations ranging between 10,000 and 50,000 during the entire 1940 - 1960 period. The national sample of small cities was drawn from United States census data.

Examination of the first two rows of Table III serves to dampen our enthusiasm for their thesis. The labour force in the city which they studied was over-represented by workers in the "professional-technical" category, relative to the national mean for cities of a similar size. Furthermore, the percentage increase - between 1940 and 1960 - of workers in that category in the "city studied", was disproportionately greater than the national mean. During the relevant period, 9.5 percentage points were added to the "professional-technical" group in the city which they studied: only 3.8 per cent was added to the national mean. Regardless of these disparities, Faunce and Clelland argued from these data and data collected through a survey of sampled workers that,

> The attributes of the community we studied are seen as typical of a developing period of professionalization characterized (1) by decreasing occupational specialization with an increasing proportion of professionals and technicians in the labour force, (2) by a status-assignment system in which contribution in one's field of work is a major status criterion and gaining professional recognition an increasingly important mobility pattern, (3) by a system of power in which the professional is increasingly dominant, and (4) by a class structure in which there is decreasing class cleavage with class distinctions based upon access to education (1967:342).

Faunce and Clelland cautioned that, while the period of professionalization had clearly not yet arrived, the characteristics of the city they investigated were "representative of the direction of change in industrial societies" (Faunce and Clelland, 1967:350). Their argument is premised on the assumption that the principal industry in their research community - which employed almost half the labour force - typified the organizational structure which was fast becoming dominant in America. Their logic is that, because of the proportion of workers employed in the one industry - which was "integrated through . . . automatic control devices and materials-handling" (1967:350), the presumed "wave of the future" - "the pattern of change in labour-force composition in this community can be easily discerned as the dominant trend in national labour-force statistics" (Ibid.).

With a similar temporal ambiguity, Daniel Bell's publication - The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973) - brought the focus on professionalization to the centre of the most contemporary "debate with Marx's ghost". A work of grand synthesis, it was heavily indebted to three previous versions of a sociological "resolve" to the problems of mass-society. In the ensuing chapter, we shall discuss these three "resolves". They centre on the work of Emile Durkheim, Karl Mannheim, and the "Managerial Revolution" theorists.

In Bell's publication of 1973, a long history of social theory and an abundance of recent, current, and projected statistics are marshalled to describe and herald the decline of industrial capitalism; by any account, a work which must be regarded as a formidable opus. In this study a new social order is seen to be emerging in which the "masses" are typically, skilled professionals. Furthermore, it is from this same mass that the decision-making elites are recruited - through meritorious contest - thus becoming the legitimate heirs to the seats of power once possessed only by the capitalist class.

For Daniel Bell, the prospect of professionalization appears to be a welcome trend. The reasons for his optimism are hinted at above, but they will be made clear in subsequent chapters.

V. Radical-Pessimism: The Anti-Technocrats

A number of other writers, equally preoccupied with technology and the consciousness which it assumedly forms, have also employed the term "post-industrial" society. However, these writers, who we have called the "radical pessimists", have provided a much gloomier image of contemporary society and its horizons. From Max Weber, they have derived the concept of "rationalization", based upon three principal and interconnected historical expressions: industrial capitalism, bureaucratic domination, and modern science. Marcuse formulates their general interrelation in the following:

> The specifically Western idea of reason realizes itself in a system of material and intellectual culture (economy, technology, "conduct of life", science, art) that develops to the full in industrial capitalism, and this system tends toward a specific type of domination which becomes the fate of the contemporary period: total bureaucracy (1969:203).

Weber viewed the development of modern society as the progressive intrusion of a rational mode of thought into all institutional spheres. He argued that the rational mode of thought marked the attempt to resolve all questions concerning human social patterning by recourse to a calculus of efficiency for the establishment of predetermined ends. Western history was thus a process of "demystification"; all social relations and institutions were vulnerable to rationalization. Once subjected to the critical scrutiny of instrumental rationality and found inefficient, they would inevitably be restructured accordingly.

At surface, Weber's rationalization concept bears striking resemblance to the Marxist concept of commodification. This extends even to a Marxian pivot: the commodification of labour power under capitalism. In elaborating the course of the historical development of capitalism, Weber stressed that capitalism was the summative product of a set of unique, ungeneralizable historical conditions. While including a number of conditions, Weber believed that the distinguishing feature of modern capitalism was the "rational organization of free labour". Unlike Marx however, Weber took the rational organization of free labour to be a dependent variable, determined ultimately by psycho-social factors in the rise of capitalism. For Weber, Marx's historical materialism must be superseded because the Calvinistic economic ethic favourable to the acceleration of capitalist development had existed prior to industrial capitalism. As Lukacs explained:

> The problem which he (Weber) poses is to explain how capitalism arises and takes root in Western Eurooe and not elsewhere. In contrast to previous conceptions in which capitalism is equated with any quantitative accumulation, Weber sets out to grasp the specificity of modern capitalism, to account for its appearance in Europe and in Europe alone through the difference between the ethico-religious evolution of the West and of the East. In the first place, this presupposes the "de-economization" and spiritualization of the phenomenon of capitalism. The essence of capitalism appears as the rationalization of social and economic life, "universal calculability" (Lukacs; Antony Cutler, trans., 1972:389).

It is true that Weber offered the disclaimer at the end of The Protestant Ethic: ". . . it is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and history". This may be the case, and it is true that Weber's analysis was inclusive of a complex of factors. However, as Frank has observed:

> Karl Mannheim referred to Max Weber as the Marx of the bourgeoisie; and his widow and biographer, Marianne Weber, said that his principal work was an attempt to replace historical materialism as an interpretation. Such otherwise diverse writers as Kautsky, H.M. Robertson, Sorokin, Aron, Bastide, Gerth and Mills, Marcuse, Parsons, Bendix and Gouldner all agree that Max Weber's work represented an attempt to replace, or at least seriously amend, the Marxist theory of economic infrastructural dominance over the superstructure, emphasiz-

> ing instead the importance of psycho-cultural factors and religion in the rise of capitalism (1975:431).

Weber had argued that the "spirit of capitalism", a historically specific, socio-cultural complex, guided the behaviour of the western bourgeoisie. It was based on criteria of non-emotional efficiency geared to the maximization of profits and the manipulation of nature and people. Further, it was akin to an attitude of scientific rationality. This spirit, thought Weber, succeeded historically because of its technical superiority in organizing the economy, public administration and political parties.

In Weber's analysis, the "spirit of capitalism" motivated the bourgeoisie to "rationalize" - make efficient in terms of profit - all institutional spheres. Thus, as it spread, it encompassed an increasing number of occupations, whose traditional practices of production were transformed. The revolutionary principle of the capitalist economy, it had long since been discovered, allowed for a tremendous acceleration of output per worker. Specialization, in turn, required co-ordination. Thus, rationalization exercised its sway over the organization of large aggregates of specialized workers. The "fully developed bureaucratic mechanism", for Weber, was the most obvious manifestation of a rationalistic attitude towards the life of large social groups. Weber drew the analogy that bureaucracy, compared "with other organizations as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production" (Weber, 1948:214).

Like Durkheim, Weber held that socialism, like capitalism, was preoccupied with economic interests (Gouldner, 1955:496). It was bureaucratization that, for Weber, represented the social-structural elaboration of the spirit of capitalism. For it served to bring under control the behaviour of both employees and management alike, in such a way that output was always rendered calculable. Socialism, insofar as it was expressly concerned with economic growth, could then, but borrow the rationalized models of capitalist production. Further, if bureaucratization was essential to such growth, then it was questionable as to whether Marx's position that revolution was emancipatory was credible. As Gouldner summarizes Weber:

> If Marx argued that the workers of the world had nothing to lose by revolting, Weber contended that they really had nothing to gain. "For the time being", he declared, "the dictatorship of the official and not that of the worker is on the march". Capitalism and socialism are thus placed under the same conceptual umbrella - bureaucracy - with the important practical result that the problem of choosing between them loses much of its point (Gouldner, 1955:497).

For Weber, in the modern societies, there was a dangerous disjunction between "substantive-rational" behaviour and "formal rationality". The latter, which he equated with instrumental or formal reason, was linked to the profit motive. The former, which arose from humanistic-ethical considerations, was subordinated to the latter. This occurred because of the nature of social organization endemic to bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy, Weber believed, eroded the liberal-democratic political framework. For Weber, at a minimum, democracy promised to the individual, a basis for resistance to external, "rationally" dictated changes in valued, traditional spheres of life. Unequivocally, Weber states, "democracy as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy, in spite of and perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization" (1948:231). Although bureaucracy embodied the advance of certain formal, democratic principles against the resistance of feudal privilege, it is a contradictory advance:

> . . . democracy inevitably comes into conflict with the bureaucratic tendencies which, by its fight against notable rule, democracy has produced . . . The most decisive thing here . . . is the levelling of the governed in opposition to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group which, in its turn, may occupy a quite autocratic position, both in fact and form (Weber, in Gerth and Mills, 1948: 226).

Even scientific progress and the advance of technical mastery over the world, both natural and social, do not mean increasing democratization. For this vast knowledge is anything but broadly distributed. "The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not, therefore, indicate an increase and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives (Weber, in Gerth and Mills, 1948:138).

The social world then, for the average man in the modern society, becomes more rather than less subject to forces which appear to him to be beyond his control. Technical rationality inevitably works against both substantive equality and substantive democracy.

For Weber, socialist solutions, which he believed to hinge upon the supersession of diverse values by egalitarian ends, was ultimately but a tentative solution to modern man's alienation (Freund, 1969:265-266). For all choices implied selective rejection. To reject particular values, for example inegalitarian values, was not to eliminate them. Rather, the effect was to simply suppress them - a suppression which would inevitably result in their re-emergence.

The fatalism to which we refer in Weber's sociology has been described as a "metaphysical pathos" by Gouldner (1955). It presents its reading of the present and future in such a way that realism results in an almost "escape-proof pessimism" (Walton, 1975:136). Gouldner thus writes:

> Considered only from the standpoint of its political consequences then, the Weberian outlook is not anti-socialist alone, nor anti-capitalist alone, it is both. In the final analysis its political slogan becomes "a plague on both your houses". If Weber is to be regarded as an "ideologist", he is an ideologist not of counter-revolution but of quiescence and neutralism. For many intellectuals who have erected a theory of group organization on Weberian foundations, the world has been emptied of choice, leaving them disoriented and despairing (1955:497-498).

A number of writers who we can loosely associate with the "radical-pessimist" version of post-industrial social thought have taken up Weber's notion of "progressive disenchantment". Weber's sociology was indeed pervaded by his interpretation of western history as a process of demystification; the increasing rationalization of all social relations and institutions. However, as we have observed, Weber himself, like Marx, had laid considerable stress on the growth of a free market in all goods and services, including labour. A number of recent social critics, however, have tended to downplay this element.

Jacques Ellul has emphatically underscored the rationalization thesis and sought to situate the alienating features of the "rational mode of thought" as the central social problem of contemporary man (1964). His key word is "technique", which he simply defines as any complex of standardized means by which men seek to attain any predetermined result. According to Ellul, capitalism is not contemporary man's greatest enemy. Rather, it is technical rationality.

Ellul argues that modern society has moved from industrial society to technological society, a society in which "technique" has permeated all institutional spheres including the political, where propaganda rather than ideology is produced for mass consumption. A dependency on technique, he warns, is so dominant in contemporary consciousness that it threatens to finally absorb man completely into totalitarianism - only to make him the complete slave of the state. He writes:

> The new order (the monolithic technical world) was meant to be a buffer between man and nature. Unfortunately, it has evolved autonomously in such a way that man has lost all contact with his natural framework and has to do only with the organized technical intermediary which sustains relations both with the world of life and with the world of brute matter. Enclosed within this artificial creation, man finds there is "no exit" (1964:428).

Traditional complaints levelled by social commentators against capitalism, according to Ellul, are missing the point. For he argues, they fail to comprehend the total reality which is being redefined by the propensity to employ technique in all spheres of social reality. "Capitalism", he writes, was "only one aspect of the deep disorder of the nineteenth century" (1964:5). The "deeper disorder", he suggests, was that the machine was introduced into a society which was not prepared for it socially. It took technique to integrate the machine into society by pervasively altering society to the culture of technique-science.

Further contributions to this "radical-pessimism" can be found in the social criticism of Marcuse and Habermas. For Marcuse, capitalism has been overly successful in harnessing science to the control of nature (1964). The development of technology has a central role in his analysis. In his discussion of Weber's concept of "formal rationality", Marcuse asserts that this type of rational acting tends to become a goal in itself, far beyond mere production processes. Indeed, he believes that capitalism has created of technology, a system of domination so profound that it suppresses and distorts even human sexuality (1955 and 1964). As Israel summarizes Marcuse:

> Based upon scientific principles, the efficient apparatus of production and administration has

> become the dominating feature in the highly industrialized societies. In earlier phases of the process of industrialization, those in charge of the production and administration apparatus - technocrats and bureaucrats - were in the service of a ruling class. Now they themselves have developed into a ruling class using formal rational behaviour not only for efficient production but also for dominating and ruling society, by setting efficiency as an ultimate goal. Thus, the question "Efficiency: for what and at what cost?" is subordinated to the goal of achieving efficiency and is seldom asked, if asked at all (1971:168).

Marcuse's pessimism is so profound that he rejects even traditional Marxist expectations of historical emancipation by the proletariat. For him, the working class has lost its possibilities for playing the role of the "negative force" waged against the status quo. He sees them as being "bought off" by standard-of-living increments. In Marcuse's derisory view of proletarian consumption behaviour, he sees their "socialist soul" being exchanged for the abundant surplus, itself the yield of advancing production technology.

Theodore Roszak, drawing upon the literature of Marcuse and Ellul, has argued that resistance to advancing technology on the emotional and intellectual level is more and more vital (1969). If we do not want to become what he ominously terms "cheerful robots", he advises that such dissent is essential. For, he argues, technology and science bear an "invisible ideology" of their own. Viewing the working class itself to be absorbed into a "one-dimensional" social reality, Marcuse and Roszak, as Johnson has remarked, "are forced to seek all potentialities for change - all counter-tendencies - at the margins of society among those not yet incorporated into the system; blacks, students, etc." (1976:5).

Roszak by choice, and Marcuse as a result of his following amongst the student movement of the 1960's, came to be identified as intellectual advocates of a "counter-culture". Indeed, for Roszak, the responsibility for saving modern man from his ultimate alienation - particularly as expressed in Ellul's The Technological Society - has "unfortunately" fallen on the shoulders of the very young. Extravagantly, he concluded that, "If the resistance of the counter-culture fails, I think there will be nothing in store for us but what anti-utopians like Huxley and Orwell forecast" (1969:xiii). Presumably, the decline of the counter-culture in the 1970's suggests, if one is pessimistic enough to take Roszak seriously, that the key to Weber's "iron cage" has been - to all of our great chagrin - thrown away.

This "radical-pessimism" has become something of a fashion, as evidenced by an abundance of popular social criticism and unorthodox approaches to social investigation. While some claim to have the cure-all for the "mass society", their principal enterprise is social criticism. Some additional familiar examples of the genre will suffice to illustrate the point.

Ivan Illich views the social services much as Weber did, as expanding with the division of labour and bureaucratization, creating a socially unnecessary dependency on professional monopolies and the state. His solution is to "de-institutionalize" society, a solution which he gives the clearest expression of in his best known essay, entitled Deschooling Society. It is a curious political strategy, more congenial to fancy than practice. Indeed, it bypasses the central issues of class structure and power concentration. Pointing to this naivete, Bowles and Gintis have deftly played on the phrase of Illich's title. They suggest that prior to such a project - de-schooling - it will be necessary to "defactory" capitalist production (1976).

Thomas Szaz and R.D. Laing, critical of traditional psychiatric therapies, have spent much time insisting that the line between sanity and madness in contemporary society is but arbitrary (Szaz, 1970; Laing, 1967). Ethnomethodologists engage much of their energies in attempting to reveal that the "taken for granted" norms of organizational conduct, have behind them, implicit goals which routinely substitute a conception of efficiency for both humane and objectively based decisions. Irving Goffman reduces social life to a theatrical metaphor in which all interactions can be understood in terms of "role playing", acted out in a market-place of "managed impressions" (1961; 1963; 1964; 1967; 1969; 1971). Social life is thus seen to be finally ensconced within a completely contrived constellation of interaction patterns in which Ellul's gloomy circle is closed.

It was left to Alain Touraine (1971) to embrace these various themes and install them under the rubric, the "post-industrial" society. It is with Touraine's publication that parallels become clear between the "radical-pessimist" wing of post-industrial thought and the more optimistic, American variants of the theme. Touraine's work, however, shall not delay us here. For while he indeed draws disparate conclusions from his "optimistic" theoretical cousins, the basic "technocratic paradigm" which his work elaborates is almost identical with that of the celebrants of the concept. It should be noted, however, that Touraine has been a major representative of "New Working-Class" theory, and his contributions will, therefore, be critically examined as part of that theory.

CHAPTER TWO

Footnotes

1. Refer to footnote "2", Chapter One, for the literature relevant on European economic development.

2. The Luddite movement was responsible for riots and the smashing of machines between the years 1811 and 1817. It was a workers' movement which related their own imiserization to the impact of new technologies on the quality of work conditions.

3. This cursory outline of Marx's analysis of capitalist political economy of class relations will be treated in more depth in Part III. The appropriate sources will be annotated fully in that section.

CHAPTER THREE

PROFESSIONALIZATION THEORIES: THE ANCESTRY OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM

I. Introduction

More than any other nineteenth century sociologist, Emile Durkheim established professionalization as an enduring theme in macro-sociology. If Max Weber made it impossible for contributors to the mass-society tradition to ignore "bureaucratization", Durkheim did the same for professionalization. In this regard, Halebsky links Durkheim to mass-society theory with the following:

> It is in Durkheim's analysis of the anomic society, his consideration of types of social integration and disorganization, and the type of relationships the individual can have with groups and to group norms that we touch . . . intimately upon the mass theorist's concerns with the circumstances of modern man. The anomic society is one in which societal norms are weakened, individualism is strong, and the sense of societal obligation, group membership, and a purpose greater than one's own is attenuated (1976:28).

Durkheim saw in the profession-like occupations, the basis for the reconstruction of the industrial social order - a reconstruction which would eliminate the conditions of anomie. He was concerned with the propensity of professional groups to generate social rules and sanctions and to become impermeable to the attempts of outsiders to control them. Furthermore, as Hughes has noted of Durkheim, "as social advocate, he favoured the kind of society in which occupational groups would be the chief organs of control, represented as such in government" (1960:55).

It is of at least passing interest that the first linkage between the term "post-industrialism" and occupational corporatism was first stated by Arthur J. Penty (1917). Penty was a British "Guild Socialist" contemporary with William Morris. The Guild Socialists argued against what they termed the "collectivist" ideas of the Fabians - a term which they associated with a belief in an extensive regulative role for a centralized national government. By contrast, Penty advocated the reconstruction of society on the model of the guild system of the medieval cities. As we shall see, there are similarities between the ideas of Durkheim and Penty.

Norman Birnbaum (1971) has pointed out that in both the critical and the celebrative contributions to the post-industrial conception, the political significance of a "knowledge elite" is assumed. He writes that, they assert

> the emergence of a new social group, understood variously as a technocratic elite or an educational and scientific estate with social functions so important, with a qualitative political role so essential, that our previous models of industrial social organization require severe emendation. In Europe, Lichtheim and Touraine, in the United States, Galbraith, have promulgated models of this sort. Clearly, we are experiencing a reconsideration of an ancient problem, the relationship of knowledge and power (Birnbaum, 1971:418).

In this chapter, we shall also take up this notion of a knowledge elite. The idea that professional organization is a stimulant to the advancement of scientific decision-making - decisions based upon knowledge rather than value-laden criteria - has long intrigued sociologists. Of particular interest in this regard, is the idea that in the realms of politics and public administration professionals have the capacity - because of their competence and socialization - to be relatively free from the ideological schisms which appear to mass-society critics as integral to the social structures they describe.

From this second perspective, the professions, because of their relative assumed class-neutrality, are seen as the most likely candidates to function as mediators between "interested" social groupings. They are viewed as the social group most capable of playing a "balancing" role amidst the various ideological contestants in the shaping of social policy.

In different ways, T. H. Marshall, Karl Mannheim, and the "Managerial Revolution" theorists, saw the professions as the most likely and indeed most deserving heirs to the propertied class in the corridors of economic and political power. As we shall see, their ideas were to be highly influential in shaping post-industrial social thought.

II. Durkheim's Sociological Vision of the Corporative Industrial Society

In his eloquent discussion of the "sociological tradition" (1966), Robert Nisbet describes nineteenth-century conservative social philosophy as an intellectual reaction to "modernism" in its political, economic and cultural aspects. The substance of modernism, Nisbet suggests, developed out of the changes wrought by the Industrial and French Revolutions. He writes that,

> Modern conservatism is, in its philosophical form at least, the child of the Industrial and French revolutions: unintended, unwanted, hated by the protagonists of each, but the child nevertheless. What the two revolutions attacked, the conservatism of such men as Burke, Bonald, Haller, and Coleridge defended. And what the two revolutions engendered - in the way of popular democracy, technology, secularism, and so on - conservatism attacked. If the central ethos of liberalism is individual emancipation, and that of radicalism the expansion of political power in the service of social and moral zeal, the ethos of conservatism is tradition, essentially mediaeval tradition. From conservatism's defense of social tradition spring its emphasis on the values of community, kinship, hierarchy, authority, and religion, and also its premonitions of social chaos surmounted by absolute power once individuals had become wrenched from the contexts of these values by the forces of liberalism and radicalism (1966:13).

Nisbet argues that the "rediscovery of medievalism" in the nineteenth century was of central importance of the conservative idea of the "good society". Further, Nisbet argues that medievalism has "a good deal of significance also to sociological thought, forming the conceptual stuff of much of its response to modernism" (1966:14). In the writings of Emile Durkheim, Nisbet sees a systematic sociological product of the conservative antipathy to liberalism and radicalism.[1] He argues that Durkheim's work represents a culmination of the nineteenth century response to social disorganization. Nisbet also argues that Durkheim's response to medievalism represents the seminal elements of much of contemporary sociology's "conceptual stuff".

Nisbet aside, the judgement that Durkheim's writing was critical to the subsequent development of sociology is made by other influential students of the discipline's history, including Steven Lukes (1973), Anthony Giddens (1972) and Talcott Parsons (1939). Certain reasons for this judgement are perhaps obvious. In Durkheim's *Rules of the Sociological Method*, an ambitious attempt to lay the foundations for a distinctive sociological method can be found. Furthermore, *Suicide* represents one of the earliest attempts to systematically gather empirical data for testing sociological hypotheses. It is questionable, however, that the conclusion obtaining popular currency after Parsons' exegisis, in *The Structure of Social Action* (1939), is warranted: that Durkheim's work, along with that of Max Weber, represents a "great divide" - the turning point in the transition from a "speculative philosophy of history" to "empirical sociology". Giddens, for one, has argued forcefully against such a position. He writes:

> This view is manifestly false . . . and is written in ignorance of the prior history of empirical re-

> search in the nineteenth century. The systematic use of official statistics to examine, in a supposedly "objective" fashion, the distribution of "moral phenomenon"; began much earlier in the century, under the tutelage of the "moral statisticians" such as Quetelet. It is not generally realized today in fact, how far back the tradition of quantitative research into social phenomenon can be traced. Durkheim drew upon a wealth of previous studies which had connected the distribution of suicide to social factors, and there was little that was particularly original either in the statistical method which he employed or in the empirical generalizations which he made use of in his study. (Thus, for example, the correlation between suicide rates and religious denomination was well demonstrated in previous research.) The originality of Durkheim's work lay much less in the methods which he used in Suicide than in the considerably broader context of the problems which occupied him in the Division of Labour and his later writings (1972:367).

Durkheim anticipated that the occupational structure would play a vital role in reconstituting a basis for social solidarity in industrial society. In these anticipations, it is surely speculation if not a "speculative philosophy of history" which undoubtedly prevailed.

Giddens has also rejected the burden of debt which many have asserted Durkheim owes to conservative thought: the idea that Durkheim's work is singularly rooted in the conservative intellectual reaction to the Industrial and French Revolutions.

To Giddens, the point must be conceded that all great nineteenth century social thinkers were synthesizers of conservatism, liberalism and socialism. To identify Durkheim with but one of these is surely unwarranted. Giddens contrarily notes Durkheim's familiar political liberalism. He also points to the diverse influences of theorists of both radical and liberal persuasion on Durkheim, noting also that those influences were often combined in one writer.

If nothing else, Giddens has wisely cautioned us against too narrow an interpretation of Durkheim's ideological debt. Such advice would also be well followed by certain writers who have attempted to find in Durkheim, a silent socialist. As Richter and Neyer (1960 and 1960) have suggested, attempts to discern socialism in Durkheim yield something more like fishing expeditions than a clearly enunciated position.

Efforts to tie Durkheim's writing to the intellectual and social milieu of his time do have their role in a sociologically-sensitive history of ideas. However, to explain his continuing influence up to the present, we must situate the causes of contemporary sociology's receptiveness to his work in the present.

We would follow Zeitlin (1968) and Mills (1960), who rather than seeing a "great divide" in the development of contemporary sociology see it as largely shaped by its critical encounter with Marxism.

We would also argue that the conservative ideology in contemporary social thought must actually be understood as an ideological retention of the ideas of individualism and classical and neo-classical political economy, in short: nineteenth century liberalism.[2] In this sense, Durkheim's conservative influence on contemporary sociology is negligible. Rather, it is on contemporary liberalism - a liberalism at peace with "managed capitalism" and the welfare state - that Durkheim's influence most prominently manifests itself.

According to Karl Polanyi (1957), the "great transformation" - the rise of industrial capitalism - is characterized, as for Marx and Toennies, by the generalization of commodity exchange and an ideological appeal to the principle of exchange equivalence. However, the disorganizational effects of industrial capitalism on pre-industrial institutions and the disintegration of other levels of social practice such as the symbolic, the religious and the political, produces a "countermovement". This "countermovement", according to Polanyi, is based upon,

> the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying supports of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market - primarily, but not exclusively, the working and landed classes and using protective legislation, restrictive association, and other instruments of intervention as its methods (Polanyi, 1957:132).

Durkheim attempted to provide both an intellectual and political reformist resolution to these opposites. Ingeniously, he wed certain insights which he had gleaned from medievalism to his conception of the industrial social structure.

As Giddens has remarked, "the idea of the (coming) obsolescence of property is one which pervades nineteenth century social theory" (1973: 255). For Marx, the ultimate obsolescence of property - as the pivot of social power - would arise from the contradictions of the capitalist system itself. For Durkheim, property also represented a disturbing element in the structure of industrial society. Noting its concentration and therefore its perversion of the ideological principle of "exchange equivalence", Durkheim was forced to confront its implications theoretically. For Marx, the transformation of capitalist social relations would require the revolutionary action of the industrial proletariat. Durkheim conceived of a solution primarily in terms of the evolution of the occupational structure and secondarily in terms of political reform.

Durkheim, in effect, bypassed socialism, though he was influenced by its legacy. In so doing, he provided a conception of a political economy which superficially at least, appears "reasonable" to all classes.

Thus, because of Durkheim's ideological eclecticism - rather than his conservatism, liberalism or radicalism - his influence has been sustained. It is attractive to those who favour the same "bypass"(of socialism).

Durkheim's contemporary influence is probably best explained in terms of orthodox sociology's reaction to the challenge of Marxism. Ironically, it is Durkheim's commonality with Marx - including both the specific questions which he and Marx confronted and their holistic approach - that makes his work so attractive a counterfoil to Marxist theory.

Marx as well as Durkheim indicted the negative social consequences of industrialization. Furthermore, each concerned himself with the division of labour. However, Marx emphasized the exploitation of one class by another and identified conflict between them as the primary determinant of social change. In contrast, Durkheim feared the moral disintegration of industrial society and sought out the prerequisites of social order in the division of labour itself.

Much like Ferdinand Töennies, Durkheim argued that single societies with a limited division of labour owed their solidarity to the strength of a unified collective conscience. In all societies, Durkheim held, there is a collective conscience - a stock of behavioural rules and moral precepts - as well as individual consciences, which are *potentially*, highly variable. In simple societies, where the division of labour is undeveloped, the basis of social solidarity resides in the fact that the differences between the collective conscience and the individual were almost negligible. He thus wrote in the *Division of Labour* that,

> the solidarity which derives from resemblance is at its maximum when the collective conscience is exactly coextensive with the individual's entire conscience and coincides at all points with it; but

> at this moment this individuality is non-existent (1964:129-130).

As the division of labour developed, this "coextensiveness" disappears. For Durkheim, this meant that "mechanical solidarity" receded. Lukes expresses this in the following way: "Durkheim's central theses was that the division of labour is more and more filling the role once filled by the conscience commune" (1973:147). Durkheim thought that the solution to the "loss of community" in mass-society would be provided by the developing division of labour associated with the industrial transformation. In the change from "mechanical solidarity" in which individual differences of social cognition were minimal to the maximized differences of a complex division of labour, Durkheim saw the social milieu of the occupation as generating the social bond.

According to Durkheim, occupational associations, both formal and informal, would help integrate modern workers - diversely situated in an atomized structure of labour activity - into what he called the "organic solidarity" of industrial society. Formal occupational associations and the informal contacts of the workplace would integrate the individual to the broader society and state.

In Durkheim's writing, class conflict and social revolution lose their significance as the dynamic determinants of progressive social change. In his concern with order Durkheim tended to ignore the authoritarian implications of a corporate society based upon occupational associations. In his view, the important problems of industrial society did not stem from the inequality and exploitation intrinsic to the structure of class relations. Durkheim believed that the empirical identification and political institutionalization of those moral norms most appropriate to the new economic conditions were called for.

Durkheim believed that the development of science and industry would permit an increasing interdependence among individuals and groups within society as a whole. He argued that man's interdependence - consequent of the deepening division of labour - would itself provide the necessary if not sufficient conditions for a new form of social solidarity. As the division of labour intensified, increasingly individuals became dependent on the services of a multitude of highly specialized occupations. This interdependence increased because as producers became more specialized, they became increasingly reliant on the innumerable specialties in which they themselves lacked the sufficient expertise. Thus, occupational interdependency was seen as the "missing link" in the theory concerned with the evolution of contemporary social solidarity.

We may crudely illustrate Durkheim's view: A plumber could assemble a complex drainage system but could not wire the electrical system which energized its pumps; the plumber therefore required the services of the electrician who, in turn, was insufficiently skilled to execute the tasks of the plumber. The essential social bond of contemporary society - constituted of a dense web of mutually-dependent specialties - could be viewed as reciprocal occupational need.

Durkheim believed that as the division of labour advanced, "organic solidarity" should increase. If the exchange of services did not reach a reciprocal balance, a morality of work ethics would of necessity, be superimposed. This was to be accomplished through the institutionalization of a moral, secular, formal education and corporate work associations.

It was Durkheim's more general concept of the "secondary groups" which has attracted the most attention to his optimistic theoretical resolve to man's estrangement in the mass society. Out of this more general concept, various theories of social and political pluralism have evolved. However, it was the occupational "corporations" - evolving towards an approximation of a primary group - that were pivotal to Durkheim's analysis.

In associations modeled after the professions, Durkheim saw the heirs of the family and local community providing the social basis of cohesion. He speaks of the replacement of the "natal milieu" by the "occupational milieu" as the "natural" socialization agency. He believed that the work milieu had replaced the milieux of birth, region, family and of commune, in its capacity to become the focus of men's daily activities, their associations and moral development. Thus, he wrote of the decline of regional bonds in the lives of individuals: "To be sure, each of us belongs to a commune, but the bonds attaching us there become daily more fragile and slack" (1957:27). Further, only the occupational group

> is able to perform the economic and moral functions which the family has become increasingly incapable of performing. Men must gradually become attached to their professional or occupational life. Strong groups relative thereto must be developed. In the hearts of men, professional duty must take over the place formerly occupied by domestic duty (cited in Lukes, 1973:185).

The significant bonds between individuals in the occupational sphere, Durkheim saw to be of two types: the "informal" and the "formal". The informal included friendships and the camaraderie evident in the frequent contacts between individuals of the "same calling". The formal bonds included the professional association, the formal code of professional ethics, and the rules of procedure. As Fenton has observed:

> In both the informal sense - the development of attachments, social bonds focused on the occupational milieu - and the formal sense - the creation of professional associations and codes of professional ethics, Durkheim perceived actual

> social developments which should be encouraged and extended in such a way as to provide a foundation for the regulation of economic life (1976:33).

In his early work, Durkheim had stressed that the interdependence of individuals in a complex division of labour was not only a necessary condition for the development of organic solidarity, but perhaps even sufficient. However, over time, he lost much of his early confidence in the inevitability of this relationship. He thus took an increasingly activist stance - the "corporations" had to be developed consciously, through concerted action. As one biographer, Steven Lukes has noted of Durkheim:

> He soon discarded the rather naive evolutionary optimism that allowed him to believe that in due course, organic solidarity would become self-regulating, that in time the division of labour would "give the rules which ensure the peaceful and regular cooperation of divided functions". He soon abandoned this position for one which stressed the need to introduce new forms of behavior, above all in the industrial sphere, in the context of occupational associations, and as part of an extensive reconstruction of the economy (1973:167).

According to Durkheim, the occupational groups are "the only groups which have a certain permanence" (1964:6). Indeed, Durkheim traces this occurrence to Rome and the Middle Ages, and their reappearance in modern times (1964:6-10). Extravagantly, he wrote:

> The fact that after having disappeared the first time they came into being themselves, and in a new form especially, removes all value from the argument . . . that they are no longer in harmony with the new conditions of collective existence (1964:9).

The occupational corporation, a functional substitute for the corporate guilds of medieval Europe, would be the nuclei of social solidarity in industrial society. It was the professions which appealed to

Durkheim as the most suitable existing models for these organizations. In this way, the professions and the ideology of professionalism enter his vision. In them he saw the means by which workers would be constrained to perform the activities necessary to the efficient coordination of industrial society.

Durkheim ignored the actual processes of recruit selection to the various occupations, the qualitative differences between work activities, and the differential market capacities of various skills. Through avoidance, he was therefore able to accentuate the *cooperative* aspects of the social system which he hoped would emerge. Largely by ignoring *capitalist* relations of domination and exploitation, he side-stepped the conflicts identified by Marx.

For Durkheim, market regulation should and could be replaced by public opinion. As a means of reflecting that opinion, he suggested a corporat[illegible] system of representation based upon elections from different occupations to a government assembly.

Durkheim was not entirely unmindful of class-based antagonisms. There is recognition in his writing that property relations were an obstacle to social progress. In this regard, he specifically criticized the institution of inheritance. Durkheim wrote that:

> inheritance as an institution results in men being born either rich or poor; that is to say, there are two main classes in society, linked by all sorts of intermediate classes; the one which in order to live has to make its services acceptable to the other at whatever the cost; the other class which can do without these services, because it can call on certain resources, which may, however, not be equal to the services rendered by those who have them to offer. Therefore as long as such sharp class differences exist in society, fairly effective palliatives may lessen the injustice of contracts; but in principle, the system operates in conditions which do not allow of justice (1958:3).

Remedially, Durkheim argued for the immediate dissolution of inheritance. It was the occupational associations which he argued, should inherit this wealth. The professionally modeled occupations, with their transcending ethos of altruistic service, should rightfully appropriate the wealth of the propertied classes. In his opinion, professional groups "would satisfy all the conditions for becoming, in a sense, in the economic sphere, the heirs of the family" (1958:218).

Durkheim was not entirely comfortable with the power which he viewed as passing to the occupational "corporations". He believed there must be a moral agency and a social control mechanism which would transcend these groupings. He identified this agency as the state. He believed, however, that the state should be formed of the professional groupings. The individual professional groups should, in turn, have their power curbed by the organic state, for they might gain "a mastery over their members and mould them at will" (1958:63).

The State, thought Durkheim, stood as a reminder of the interdependence of all such groups. He also believed that its existence necessitated the recognition - by each individual and group - of the rights of the other units in the social constellation. At the same time, the occupational associations, in turn, would serve as a counterbalance to the state, restraining its tendency to expand.

There is a further point which is salient to our discussion of Durkheim's focus on professionalism as an emerging, rational substitute for property relations: his equation of professionalism with "meritocracy".

For Durkheim, in a society characterized by "mechanical solidarity", occupational choice is limited and has little relation to hereditary endowment. The social structure is constituted of "a system of segments homogeneous and similar to each other" (1958:63). In such simple societies, individual choice was not problematic. The rights and obligations of the individual are not differentiated and are understood by each member as a generalized morality or "conscience collective".

With the weakening of mechanical solidarity arising with the development of functional specialization, a rupture between the individual's self-interest and the collective conscience occurs. It was the conditions of rapid change and the extension of the division of labour that anomie emerges - the disjuncture between the traditional norms and those norms developing with the new industrialism.

The grand moral quest of industrial social man, thought Durkheim, was the amelioration of the conditions of anomie. He thought that this amelioration would be achieved through the development of a meritocracy. In a meritocracy, the social system would appropriate the special hereditary endowments of the individual for the work to which he was most suited. He believed that it was the conflict experienced by the individual whose social aptitudes had been misappropriated to social roles for which he had no talent or interest, which give rise to anomie. This condition he called the "forced division of labour". Durkheim argued of what he considered to be the transitional phase of industrial society that there is

> a greater distance between the hereditary dispositions of the individual and the function he will fill. The first does not imply the second with such immediate necessity. This space, open to striving and deliberation, is also at the mercy of a multitude of causes which can make individual nature deviate from its normal direction and create a pathological state . . . Doubtless, we are not, from birth predestined to some special position; but we do have tastes and aptitudes which limit our

> choice. If no care is taken of them, if they are ceaselessly disturbed by our daily occupations, we shall suffer and seek a way of putting an end to our suffering. But there is no other way out than to change the established order and to set up a new one. For the division of labour to produce solidaity, it is not sufficient, then, that each have his task; it is still necessary that his task be fitting to him (1964:374-375).

In Durkheim's utopian future, roles would be distributed in accordance with "biological merit" (Taylor, et al, 1973:81-87). With the obsolescence of property and the intensification of the division of labour, occupational choice for the individual would be maximized. Indeed, individualism of a qualified nature would be the new "collective conscience". Durkheim believed that this qualified individualism would not, in a general sense, work to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others. Rather, the progressive maximization of social satisfaction would come about when individuals could choose between alternatives on the basis of objective knowledge of his or her own aptitudes. Differential aptitudes were not viewed as the basis for discontent. Rather, discontent arises from the "forced division of labour". When occupational arrangements come to be in accord with individual aptitudes, men would find happiness in realizing their "true nature".

The convergence between Durkheim and Marx on a number of points is apparent. Both believed that property as the basis for power would and should become obsolete. In common, they centered their conceptions of the development of political economy on organizations of productive workers. They both viewed social solidarity of a new form as inevitable to industrial society. Furthermore, they both believed that the satisfaction of individual needs would grow through the rational utilization of industry and science. Despite these points of convergence, the differences between Durkheim and Marx are critical to the present discussion. For Durkheim's notion of a professionalizing division of labour was to be absorbed into post-industrial theory. That theory was later to be advanced in such a way as to reject the utility of Marxist analysis entirely.

Both Durkheim and Marx located the dynamic of future change within the division of labour. Marx, however, identified the tensions arising from the contradictions within the class structure as determinant of the transcendence of alienation and exploitation. For Durkheim, these tensions were caused only by a temporary aberration of the developmental processes intrinsic to the deepening of the division of labour. "If, in certain cases," Durkheim wrote, "organic solidarity is not all that it should be, it is certainly not because organic solidarity has lost ground but because all the conditions for the existence of organic solidarity have not been realized" (1964:365). For Durkheim, the division of labour is itself the necessary condition for social order in industrial society. For Marx, the division of labour in capitalist society is the fundamental basis of exploitation and conflict.

For Marx, the division of labour tended towards a bifurcation of the class structure. He believed that as it developed, larger and larger sections of the labour force would be proletarianized as the means of production became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Only a revolution would serve to expropriate the power attached to the state-sanctioned property rights of capitalist society. For Durkheim, power gradually shifted away from the propertied; a gradualism for which political action was required merely to remove legalistic obstacles.

Durkheim's programme for change was a reform project. It was meant to harmonize the functionally interdependent social relations developing normatively with the deepening of the division of labour. He envisioned an intermediary sphere of professionally modeled occupational corporations wedged between the state and workers in specialized roles.

The essential antithesis between Durkheim and Marx can be briefly summarized. For Durkheim, the division of labour in industrial society, normally would produce the basis for a new concensus. Where there were functional or moral "leakages", occupational corporations would serve to plug the holes. For Marx, the division of labour under capitalist industrialization would normally produce class conflict.

Durkheim was not entirely unaware of the resistance of the propertied classes to the subversion of their power monopoly which he saw developing with the division of labour. As noted, he suggested legal means for abolishing inheritance. However, he failed to come to grips with the explosive potential of such a confrontation. It is argued that this neglect is indicative of the basic inadequacy of Durkheim's vision of social change. In his tangential discussion of the use of legal means for the abolition of inheritance, Durkheim demonstrated his fundamental respect for the very institutional matrix which he believed to require transformation - if his vision of "organic solidarity" was to be achieved. In contrast, Marx emphasized that property relations were sanctioned by the state; they were a legal designation arising from the social base of economic power-class relations. The idea that the state system could be used in its existing form to fundamentally transform the economic substructure for which it was erected to aid, was a contradiction in terms. In so suggesting, Durkheim, in the Marxist view, was exposing his fundamental naivete of the centrality of classes in capitalist society and the relationship between the capitalist class and the state.

For Durkheim, the division of labour was a mechanistic system which operated deterministically - its specific shape simply responding to advances in technological knowledge. Curiously, there is little offered in explanation of technological advance itself. Perhaps in an overreaction to the "psychologism" that pervaded the intellectual climate of his times, Durkheim stressed a determinism which neglected the existing social cleavages and the interests which maintained them.

There has been a tendency for both devotees and opponents of Marx to impute a mechanistic relationism to his view of social change. However, for Marx, the next stage of history would be ushered in by the revolutionary will of the masses. Indeed, Marx was particularly concerned with the structural and political processes by which the working class would be conditioned to the revolutionary act. He stressed both structural aspects and subjective (social-psychological) aspects of class solidarity. He also stressed the need for a force of willful political actors to penetrate the "false consciousness" of the masses and to form a revolutionary political party.

For Marx, the majority of workers, rather than being gradually professionalized, would be absorbed into the capitalist mode of production as mere sellers of labour-power. As the majority of the work force lost control over the means of production, an irreconcilable conflict of interest between capital and labour develops. Under these conditions, a working-class revolutionary consciousness can develop out of the majority's shared conditions of exploitation.

Marx believed that the masses of workers could, and probably would, transform the oppressive aspects of the division of labour by striking out at the institutions which comprise the capitalist mode of production. Most importantly, for Marx those institutions are the class structure and the superstructural reinforcement of class relations by various established institutions.

In summary, there is a superficial "convergence" between Durkheim and Marx in certain respects. However, both the central problem of contemporary societies which they identified, and the means which they held up as solutions, differed radically. As Gouldner has commented:

> To Durkheim, as to Comte, the basic features of the new society were already in existence - that is, modern industrialism with its rational methods and its increasing division of labour. Consequently, their problem was to develop a new moral order consistent with it, so that it might remain stable and develop in an orderly manner. Their central task was not defined as producing social change so much as facilitating a natural tendency toward social order. Their problem was, in short, that of "find-tuning" the new industrial regime rather than basically reorganizing it. They saw modern society as young and immature, as an insufficiently developed industrialism. One merely needed to stimulate and gently guide the natural processes of its maturation (1967:22-23).

On the other hand, argues Gouldner, Marx:

> . . . had retained the Saint-Simonian emphasis on social classes and class conflict - did not regard modern society as an adolescent industrialism but as a senile capitalism which, containing the ripe "seeds of its own destruction", needed to be readied for burial. Expecting that the capitalist would resist his own dismissal, Marx believed that change would not be smooth and orderly, and that therefore modern society possessed deep instabilities (Ibid.).

Durkheimian themes have had a profound influence on subsequent academic sociology; the "professionalization" theme is no exception. The theoretical status of Durkheim's thoughts concerning the significance of the professions for industrial society, however, is strikingly ambiguous. His ideas represent an admixture of a secular, theological advice, predictions of a new moral order based upon the observation of emerging social characteristics contemporary to his writing, and finally, just plain wishful thinking. Whatever weighting we assign to a particular component of this mix, it is as a general theme that "professionalization" later enters sociological imaginations foreign to Marxism.

We have set out certain criticisms of the Durkheimian vision. We might underscore our resistance to it by noting Gerstl and Jacobs (1976) argument. They suggest that it was Durkheim's "coy ambiguity" with socialism that explains in part, his "blindness to the implications of the occupational or corporate state" (Gerstl and Jacobs, 1976:12-13). Further, they write, (*Ibid*.):

> He was sure that socialism was inevitable, but it would stem from the extreme individualism he took to be the quintessence of the occupational state. Solidarity was the "deus ex machina" rendering specious the dichotomy of individualism and collectivism: with it he could stretch the definition of socialism to include "every doctrine which demands the connection of all economic functions . . . to the directing and conscious centers of society (i.e., the state)" (Durkheim, 1958:54-55).

The same writers refer to Bowen's study of corporatism which suggested that most fascist regimes were to later adopt a model wherein "each of the nation's principal industries and occupational groups was constituted, by government fiat, as a 'corporation', as an 'estate' or as a 'front'" (Bowen, 1947:2). Bowen suggested that it is during periods of profound political crisis which such doctrines as corporatism engage the most lively discussion and interest. While the corporatist model was never fully adopted by the fascist regimes, Bowen shows that they were used as "levers to repress labour-management conflict" (1974:3).

Thus, by stretching the definition of socialism "to embrace conceptions of the corporatist state, the most chilling manifestation of this 'coy ambiguity' can be observed. As Gerstl and Jacobs point out, "it is no mere coincidence that Fascism in Italy, and National Socialism in Germany used socialist rhetoric in their propaganda and ideologies" (1976:13).

Bowen's study shows that Durkheim's vision was shared by the old German corporatists whose organic theory of the state opposed extreme liberal individualism, the egalitarianism of the French Revolution and Marxian socialism. In its stead, the German corporatists wished to replace individual rights with the "binding ties of community" (Bowen, 1947:15-16). Their practical program to realize these ends involved

> the statutory establishment of a universal scheme of vocational or professional organizations in which each "corporation" would be endowed with a more or less extensive body of legal rights and duties . . . Every vocational group would be organized, and every occupationally active person would be a member of the appropriate professional organization (Bowen, 1947:16-17).

All these schemes were aimed at the elimination of industrial strife and the formation of a council embracing employers and workers associated with a single enterprise. A pyramidal structure would be shaped out of combinations of these bodies at regional and national levels with a corporate chamber or national economic council at its apex "subsidiary to . . . co-equal with, or . . . superseding the territorial parliament" (Bowen, 1947:17).

In recent years, in response to stagflation, corporatist ideas have re-emerged. They have been expressed politically by governments attempting to reduce labour-management strife and introduce co-determination between government, business and labour, as a basis for national economic planning. The idea behind this thrust is to develop extra-parliamentary planning bodies - economic summit conferences. In effect, this would finalize the transformation of the historical adversary relationship between organized labour and capital as developed both through collective bargaining and representation in parliament.

Marxists have insisted that such corporatist plans, established within an economic system in which power and wealth are highly concentrated, can be expected to follow an extremely conservative course. As William Tabb has commented:

> Liberal leaders neglect to point out that the crucial question is: Who does the planning and in whose interests is the planning done? If we assume a national unity, then planning is done for the powerful by the powerful as it has been in the past and will continue to be if "unity" is allowed to act as a cover for privilege. Then we should expect that the dominant class, with the minor participation of "responsible" labour, will plan in the interests of those very corporations which liberals admit already have too much power (1975:33).

It should be recalled - if only as an antidote to the simplicity of the corporate "solidarity" theme - that it was the bifurcation of the guild system itself, between the masters (who became merchants) and dependent apprentices and journeymen, which did much to initiate the development of capitalist production relations.

III. Professionalism as the "Social" Ideology of an Educated Elite

In 1933, A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson published their study of the English development of occupations commonly regarded as professions. While the authors were formally historians, the influence and nature of their work encouraged a continued sociological interest in the peculiarities of the organizational structure of such occupations.

While not explicitly making the case against Marx's proletarianization thesis, Carr-Saunders and Wilson did imply its converse. Echoing Durkheim, these writers considered the professions to embody the principles upon which a new type of occupational structure could be built. In these occupations they saw the basis for production activity exempted from property relations and regulated by collective control rather than individual competition for profit.

A host of social analysts had shared the observation with Marx that labour in capitalist society had come to resemble the commodity. Its value did not exist independently of the market relations which determined its price. Historically, this had meant the break-up of the rigid, manorial, guild, and mercantile restrictions on the movement and allocation of labour. The elimination of formal restrictions upon entry into an occupation - "free labour" - was seen as one of the dominant features of industrial capitalist society. In striking contrast, the established "professions" demanded formal qualifications of their recruits. This exception to the rule furnished Carr-Saunders and Wilson with the inspiration for their conjecture.

The idea that the uniqueness of the organization of professional work constituted the basis for a new social ideology was also taken up by T. H. Marshall (1939:325-340). Marshall defined professions as those occupations in which caveat emptor could not prevail. Further, according to Marshall, a profession, while not pursued primarily for pecuniary gain, must be sufficiently remunerated for the practitioner can afford to pursue a life of "scholarly improvement". Marshall noted both the increasing dependence of modern society on professional services and the increase of such workers in organizational - rather than self-employment.

His principal focus lay with the central concern of his life work - the social services.

It was their self-espoused "service ethos" which so attracted Marshall to the uniqueness of the professions. He believed that the professions were by their own choice, relatively exempt from commercial values. This exemption, he held, was achieved by their normative commitment to individualized responsibility and attention to, the requirements of their clientele. The advantage of professional "individualism" lay in the credat emptor or fiduciary relationship between the client and the professional. This type of relationship, insisted Marshall, could not be secured by contract. For the rational evaluation of the professional's esoteric knowledge was beyond the capacity of the client's judgement. Its evaluation could only be reasonably undertaken by colleagues of the professional who were similarly trained. Furthermore, he argued that the knowledge of the professional was not easily standardized and therefore extra-colleague evaluation was further confounded. Objective mediation in the specialist's authority by the "outsider" was therefore extremely difficult.

> Many services can be satisfactorily controlled by commercial contracts. Some of them, like those of the builder or the tailor, lead to the production of a commodity that can be judged by objective tests and rejected if it is not according to specification . . . Standardized labour, in fact, can be treated as a commodity. But with the professions it is otherwise . . . (the professional service) is unique and personal . . . The professional man . . . does not give only his skill. He gives himself. His whole personality enters his work . . . It is hardly possible to be satisfied with a doctor or lawyer unless one likes and respects him as a man. He is called upon to show judgement and an understanding of human nature, as well as a knowledge of medicine and law. The best service can only be given when the practitioner knows his client intimately, his character, his foibles, his background,

> and his family circumstances (Marshall, 1939: 328-330).

While conceding the familiar - that the professions had not "always lived up to their ideal" - Marshall retained his fascination with their uniqueness. He noted the absorption of a variety of professions into the British government. However, Marshall did not see this development as necessarily clashing with the autonomy which encouraged their service ethic. Curiously, he was critical of Soviet control of professional work. With more than a dash of ethnocentrism, he welcomed the British expansion of specialized public services performed by professionally-educated civil servants. He argued that the intrusive effects of the state are countered by the authoritative autonomy which advanced specialization yielded.

For Marshall, it was "commercialism" - the pecuniary motive of business - which the professional institution offered relief from. In an extraordinary transformation of the concept of professional autonomy, he argued that the authority of the social services, manned by "professionals",

> . . . rests not only on the superior knowledge of the administrators but also on political power derived from the constitution. A relationship of trust is essential, but it is founded on the principles of political obligation, not on private honour and a traditional ethic (1939:334).

In short, the professional service ethic - grafted on to government administration - inspired the public administrator to treat the polity much as the Hippocratic oath advised the honourable doctor to treat his patient.

Marshall argued that the social services had lost their class character, and inspired by professionalism, they were not rendered to meet an "effective demand". Rather, they are designed and planned, "in the light of expert knowledge of the social arts and sciences and of fundamental principles of social welfare formulated on the basis of accumulated human experience" (1939:334).

Marshall's hopes for the future of the professions can be viewed as nothing less than the project of social democracy. The highly educated, specialized worker in the social services - exempt from commercialism and backed by the resources of the state - would raise humanistic social engineering to commanding heights. "Social efficiency", he wrote, "as distinct from both business efficiency and mechanical efficiency, should be, and to an increasing extent is, their objective" (1939:340). Dramatically, Marshall concludes that, "in spite of all their faults, it rests with them (the professions) more than anyone else, to find for the sick and suffering democracies a peaceful solution to their problems" (*Ibid.*).

The Political Sociology of the "Mass" Society: The Background for Karl Mannheim

Marshall focused on the unique "social" ideology emergent with the combined "socialization of the professions" and the "professionalization of the social services". His ideas, however, were not the only manifestation in sociological theory of social-democratic ambivalence to militant class politics. A not entirely different theme was developed by Karl Mannheim.

Mannheim was also inspired by the apparently hybrid class character of the professions in the class structure. As Ben-David points out, Mannheim's most general conception of what he termed the "Intelligentsia" included those who had obtained a university education, ". . . a category similar to the professions" (1963-64:249).

It is most useful to locate Mannheim's analysis within the development of the political theory of the "mass society". For Mannheim's contribution marks a turning point in that tradition; the point at which the conservative critique is absorbed by liberal-democratic theory to explain the instability of capitalist authority relations. That "turning point" was occasioned by the rise of Fascist movements in the 1930's in Europe.

We have argued that mass-society theory, as political sociology, is presented in antithetical interpretations of the participatory tendencies associated with the authority structures of industrial capitalist societies. On the one hand, mass-society theory emerged as an elitist critique of democratic tendencies in general. On the other hand, the theory developed as a critique of the tendency for an industrial society to move away from a democratic ideal towards a centrally controlled authoritarianism. The latter critique has been generalized by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theorists to become a critique of the culture of capitalist society.

The conservative or elitist critique traces to the ideological struggles and economic groups in Europe prior to the French Revolution (Giner, 1961:27). The principal concern of the conservative critique was the demise of the elite under conditions in which political participation appeared to be extending to broader and broader sections of the population.

The aristocratic view assumes that in any given population, the qualities of virtue, reason and human excellence, are rare. Is is, therefore, important that the few in possession of these premium qualities be allocated to leadership positions in the various fields of human endeavour. The majority, on the other hand, should be powerless when well-ruled; for they are conceived of as essentially superstitious, ignorant and amoral. The aristocratic view holds that there is a tendency towards disorder and irrationality when power is dislodged from its rightful location amongst a specially endowed elite. Democratization - in the most simplistic version of the aristocratic critique - is held to be co-extensive with a society's decay.

In the elitist critique, "mass man" is not the same concept as the less pejorative phrase, "the people". While both refer to the majority, and share certain characteristics, a "people", in the aristocratic view is held to be

> . . . composed of the law-abiding, tradition-oriented majority: the people are "folk", who live in communities, whose values and beliefs are enhanced by a stable traditional culture (The relative independence of these communities from each other lessens the effects of sheer numbers of the people as a whole, for local and kin identifications are predominant amongst them.) (Ginger, 1976:xi).

The aristocratic critique, in short, is the negative counterpart of the liberal theory of the individual. Giner writes:

> The opposite of a free, rational, individualistic man is not the member of the primeval tribe or horde; it is mass man. For although mass man is supposed to live in the apparently advanced environment of a modern civilization, he is not really a member of civil society: he is manipulated, unfree and alienated. Mass man is defined by his supposed affinity to the masses: he is their microcosm. He lacks individuality, that is, distinctiveness, moral sense and a sense of direction. He is thus a modern barbarian who, unlike his historical predecessors, does not threaten civilization from outside, but insidiously lurks in its very midst, forever eroding its delicate web (1976:xii).

Kornhauser suggests that the elite version of mass society theory arose in the nineteenth century as a reaction to the revolutionary changes in Europe (1960). He points to Gustav Le Bon's The Crowd (1910), amongst others, as a major nineteenth century representative of the elitist version of mass-society in political thought. For such writers, the project of liberalism had been that of social levelling. They viewed its most prominent democratic theorists as demagogues who ". . . were not only outwardly 'hommes de lettres': inwardly Rousseau and his followers were plebians. They substituted new myths and utopias (the "social contract", the "general will") for old-fashioned superstition" (Giner, 1976:55). They viewed democratic theorists as ideologists, the propaganda arm of the Jacobins. For these writers, both liberal theorists and politicians alike were seen as brokers who unethically traded on the flux of base, popular interests.

Kornhauser argues that, "during the nineteenth century, aristocratic critics of bourgeois society spun a rhetoric of pessimism concerning the value standards men lived by in an age of increasing materialism and egalitarianism" (Kornhauser, 1960:25-26). It was Gustave Le Bon who first attempted to formulate this pessimism in social-psychological terms.

A positivist, who viewed himself as a scientist, Le Bon did not share a romantic conception of the past with so many other conservative thinkers. Indeed, in equating the rise of increasing political participation with the past, he was repelled. He saw the outcome of levelling as a new Dark Age, gravely similar to the early middle ages.

Le Bon argued (1910) from his observation of crowd behaviour that the cognition of the individual - when interacting in a spatially proxemic aggregate - was subordinated to the "crowd". The individual, he held, lost his sense of "self" in such conditions; becoming instead, guided by the law of the "mental unity of crowds". That law, according to Le Bon, operated when large numbers were drawn together; behaving as if there were a "group mind" which dissolved the unique thought processes of the individual constituents of the aggregate.

Le Bon's metaphor had a certain simplistic appeal. A crude example will suffice to illustrate our point. It is hardly profound to observe when located amongst twenty thousand football fans collectively "rooting" for the home team, that discretion would suggest the advisability of keeping one's support for the opposition team subdued. Perhaps the attraction of the concept to a "pioneering science" lay in the fact that it was stated as a law.

Le Bon, however, was not satisfied simply to lay his observation of crowd behaviour to rest with its formulation. Rather, he shifted his perspective to modern society in general. Modern society, he argued, favoured the formation of multitudes and crowds, thus generalizing the conditions in which individual discretion was insignificant. In such societies, not only was the "group mind" increasingly characteristic, but unlike the individual generally, it was capable of only the most basic elements of cognition - thus there was a lowering of the common denominator of social intelligence.

Le Bon's principal effort was concerned to demonstrate a relationship between mass conditions and the simplicity of the "soul of the multitudes". Because of the lowly intelligence which he attributed to the masses, Le Bon asserted that only the most basic of ideas could achieve popular reception. Only through an elementary imagery - such as that provided by religion and traditional beliefs - could the "soul of the multitude" be controlled in the interests of order. The successes of the leaders of the French Revolution and the various socialist movements were, for Le Bon, prime examples of the need for basic slogans, readily comprehensivle and transmissable to the mass mind. Viewing the careers of each of these phenomenon as productive of turbulence and terror rather than anything affirmative, LeBon looked elsewhere for his solutions to the problem of social order.

For Le Bon, a mass-society required a set of transcendental beliefs which sanctioned order, coupled with a social agency for their production, transmission and management. This "agency", he held, must be a social elite.

Le Bon believed that the leadership of mass-society was functional insofar as it interprets, administers and officiates mass-unifying myths. Further, he argued that this elite is historically successful to the extent that it succeeds in organizing the repetition of the same myths. Believing that the "masses" exhibit an ineptitude in sustaining unifying myths, Le Bon argued that an incessant repetition of image-carrying symbols was required.

The failure of Le Bon to trace out the relationship between the spatially, temporally, and socially unique circumstances of the crowd to the concept of the masses, readily indicates the bankruptcy of his theory. As subsequent crowd psychologists hastened to point out, the crowd formation was generally ritualized and contained for specific purposes. Indeed, specific laws were designed to prevent or at least restrict, the occasions under which large congregations could gather. It would seem apparent that the "crowds" which most concerned Le Bon, were both the spontaneous and organized gatherings of restive and purposive numbers, intent upon some common political venture.

As Gabriel Tarde was to point out, the more interesting feature of industrial societies - which Le Bon had ignored - was the pervasive isolation of the individual, subjected to the conditions of urbanization and division of labour. For perhaps the first time in history, as Tarde observed, it was only as a "public" rather than through face-to-face interaction, that a population could share an identity of thought and information. By "public", Tarde referred to a social formation created by the establishment of the daily press.

Ortega Y Gasset's Revolt of the Masses (1932) stands out as another major contribution to the twentieth century conservative critique of mass society. He popularized the thesis that the rise of mass participation in all levels of social life, signalled the appearance of the "sovereignty of the unqualified" (1932:25). He held out little hope for a stable system of authority in any democratic society.

Ortega argued that political equality undermines the legitimacy of authority. To create the conditions for stability, authority must be grounded in tradition and a higher order of moral law. He wrote that by committing oneself to the rule of law, the individual, "bound himself to maintain a severe discipline over himself. Under the shelter of liberal principles and the rule of law, minorities could live and act . . ." (1932:17). However, Ortega argued, "today we are witnessing the triumphs of hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means of material pressure" (1932:18).

John Rex has included the Italian school of elite theorists, Pareto, Mosca, and Michels, as contributors to the conservative tradition of mass society theory. These writers, of course, emphasized the oligarchical tendencies of even democratically representative organizations such as socialist parties. Rex notes the familiar usage of their work as a critique of Marxism. He points to their emphasis that "democracy and the politics of the left was just as subject to authoritarianism as the politics of the right" (Rex, 1974:134).

The orientation of the Italian school has its parallel in Weber's view of bureaucratization. For Weber, bureaucracy has a logic of its own, quite independent of political creed. He believed that, once established, bureaucracy is amongst those social structures which are the hardest to destroy. Even revolutions, Weber held - which may re-orient the goals of bureaucracy - do not succeed in destroying them.

Emil Lederer carried the elitist criticism of mass-society theory further into the twentieth century. His book, The State of the Masses, published in 1940, was written as a frontal attack on Marxism. The theme is traditional to the elitist critique: an attempt ". . . to show that society is always stratified, and that not only its productivity but also its cultural evolution depends upon an independent group life" (1940:206). Lederer, who had himself once been an eminent Marxist economist and social theorist, presented the book as a personal revolt against the Marxist framework (Bramson, 1961:41).

Lederer emphasized what he called the "organizability" of contemporary societies, which implied that there was a tendency for the modern citizenry to be organized into rigidly bureaucratic, and ideological parties. His concern was that the masses could be as easily organized into irrational, singularly oriented parties, as more moderate ones. Lederer took the ease with which the Nazis had organized the German populace as an indicator of this tendency. Not only could the masses be organized against ethnic minorities, foreign nations and political institutions: Lederer argued that Fascism - which he defined as a dictatorship of the masses over themselves - showed that they could even be organized against themselves (Bramson, 1961:68).

The rise of fascism inspired the development of the "democratic critique" of mass society as well. Hannah Arendt, a principal contributor to the origins of the democratic version, sought to analyze the role of the masses in the rise of totalitarianism in her book Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Her analysis centered on the loneliness of the individual in mass society and his consequent vulnerability to pseudo-community appeals. She wrote:

> The truth is that the masses grew out of the fragments of a hightly atomized society whose competitive structure and concomitant loneliness of the individual had been held in check only through membership in a class. The chief characteristic of the mass man is not brutality and backwardness, but his isolation and lack of normal social relationships. Coming from the class-ridden society of the nation-state, whose cracks had been cemented with nationalist sentiment, it is only natural that these masses, in the first helplessness of their new experience, have tended toward an especially violent nationalism, to which mass leaders have yielded against their own instincts and purposes for demagogueic reasons (1951:310-11).

The left of social and political thought had, for apparent reasons, ignored the conservative critique. Indeed, Marx's use of the term "masses" was perhaps the most influential of provocations to inspire it. If for the elitist theorists, a fear of the masses was negatively inspirational, Marx had seen in them, the historical agency of progress. The two appeared irreconcilable, as they ultimately were. However, the same phenomenon which inspired Arendt's democratic critique (the rise of fascism), made the left increasingly sensitive to the aberrant possibilities of mass movements. Mass society theory and socialism were to have a partial rapprochement.

The sociology of Karl Mannheim, of social democratic persuasion politically, may be regarded as one of the bridges between democratic thought and the elements of caution suggested by mass-society theory. Mannheim had drawn extensively on the mass-society tradition to explain the succession to power of the Nazis. The left were anxious for such answers. Further, Mannheim was associated with the Sociology of Knowledge, one of its major contributors. It was clear that this sub-field of sociology, popularized by Mannheim, was largely inspired by Marxist themes. Furthermore, academically, the confrontation between positivism and Marxism was then well-established. The Sociology of Knowledge appeared for many to offer arguments favourable to the Marxist position in the debate.

Mannheim's interest in the theory of mass-society had been encouraged by his reading of Max Scheler. Scheler had been an early and highly influential contributor to the Sociology of Knowledge. He embraced mass-society theory as a conservative. His concerns lay with the negative implications of cultural uniformity and the social levelling tendencies of economies integrated by trade and industrialization. As such, he may be regarded as a precursor to "modernization theory" which was to stress cultural "homogenization".

In 1927, Scheler delivered a lecture in which he argued that institutional differences between economic, political and social formations were being eroded. Resultantly, he claimed that "our inevitable fate is that our very different conceptions of men shall be finally unified" (1929:39-40). Directly counter to Marx, he saw in this homogeneity, the conditions for retrogression. The subverted traditional values were not being replaced, save that of a generalizing drive for the equalization of material conditions and life chances. The result was a pervasive and unprecedented psychological, political and social confusion. Authority relations became subject to what Scheler called the "democracy of emotions", in which control over the state could be readily secured by political parties which appealed to the most pedestrian and transient motives of the masses. This was the theme which Mannheim was to take up.

For Scheler, true democracy, which he called the "democracy of reason", entailed critical engagement with issues. The structural "levelling" of mass-society, however, removed critical value differences, thus producing a politics which was intellectually mediocre and morally bankrupt. Mass man was thus vulnerable to irrational demagoguery. Only the party and the state, Scheler thought, held the society together. It was, however, a tenuous binding. Parties appealed to the politically value-free masses most easily by drawing upon "blind myths". It was Le Bon all over again with his conception of "elementary imagery".

Karl Mannheim

Scheler's notion that a "democracy of the emotions" had come to prevail attracted Mannheim who wished to explain the socio-structural precipitants of Fascism. Illustrative of his Schelerian influence, Mannheim once wrote on the subject: "Fascism is born of group integration which is mainly effective in the emotional sphere. There is no attempt to direct this stream of emotion into channels where it could join forces with reason, judgement, responsible action" (1935:358).

Irving Zeitlin has suggested that Mannheim's work can be seen as developing in two stages. Firstly, in his elaboration of the Sociology of Knowledge, he was concerned with the relationship between ideology and class interests. In the second stage - which coincided with his emigration from Germany and his residence in London - he "attempted to use his sociology to sketch the guidelines for a rational and democratic reconstruction of society" (Zeitlin, 1968:282). It should be added that there is a continuity between the two stages; each being commonly grounded in Mannheim's concern with the vulnerability of reason to the excesses of dogma.

Mannheim's efforts draw extensively on the aristocratic critique of mass-society. Indeed, Rex may not be going too far with his observation that Mannheim "saw the main danger in modern society, not in the manipulation of the masses by elites, but in the capitulation of socially necessary "elites to the masses" (1974:134). Bramson (1961) and Kornhauser (1959) share this interpretation with Rex.

Mannheim sought resolution to what he considered the "clashing principles" of liberal democracy on the one hand, and social planning on the other. A liberal who professed to be of social democratic persuasion, Mannheim attempted to reconcile the two. His ultimate concern was with the balancing of social forces in an era of coexisting but antagonistic ideologies.

According to Mannheim, the failure of the liberal-democratic machinery to solve the problems of mass-society had been tragically and conclusively exemplified by the weakness of the Weimar Republic and the events which led to the Second World War. He wrote of the Republic, that,

> the planlessness of the liberal order turned into anarchy . . . (and) the principle of laissez-faire, which once maintained the balance of the social

> process . . . resulted in chaos, both in political and cultural life (1935:4).

Mannheim argued with begrudging fatalism, that in industrial society, "planning in some form is inevitable" (1935:4). This quality of "unwelcome necessity" was clearly evident in Mannheim's statement that he, himself,

> would rather live in a period in which the social order and the techniques of control did not allow one group of people to force its conception of the "good life" upon another. But we have no power to choose the social order and its techniques of control. They are already in existence, and the most we can do is to combine them and mould them to best advantage (1935:6-7).

The bulk of Mannheim's sociology was developed as a challenge to what he called "Utopian thinking" and "Ideological thought". He considered each of these thought forms to be value systems specific to contending interest groups. In the former - utopian thought - Mannheim saw the interests of oppressed stratum. In the latter (ideology), he saw the social perspective of the ruling class or oppressors. Existing side by side, different "utopias" expressed distinctive modes of oppression. Furthermore, they all stood in overt, hostile contrast both to each other and to the ideology of the ruling class.

While ideologies were always operative in stratified social systems - attached as they were to the ruling class - utopian thinking only emerged as a force under certain social conditions. To exemplify this, Mannheim argued that in pre-modern times, the early Christians were a stratum "which had as yet no real aspirations to rule" (1936:45). In a Freudian twist, Mannheim argued that Christian thinking was sublimated into a mere psychic rebellion.

In modern history, "the decisive turning point" for utopian thought, Mannheim argued, was "the moment in which 'Chiliasm' joined forces with the active demands of the oppressed strata of society" (1936:211). He traced this point to the Anabaptist rebellions of the sixteenth century. These peasant revolts, Mannheim argued, marked the first time that milenial ideas were transformed into the activistic movements of specific social strata. In common with Scheler, Mannheim was concerned with the "myth-like" quality of such ideas: political thought as distortion and illusion.

Like Marx, Mannheim believed that the fusion of political promise with systematic oppression had a turbulent yield. He thus wrote:

> The "spiritualization of politics", which may be said to have begun at this turn in history, more or less affected all the currents of the time. The source of spiritual tension, however, was the emergence of the utopian mentality which originated in the oppressed strata of society. It is at this point that politics in the modern sense of the term begins, if we are to understand by politics a more or less conscious participation of all strata of society in the achievement of some mundane purpose, as contrasted with a fatalistic acceptance of events as they are, or of control "from above" (1936:212).

Unlike Marx, Mannheim had little faith that the consequences of such a fusion for the contemporary era would have a progressive yield, if left to the masses.

Arguing that the first form of what he called the "utopian mentality" was the "orgiastic chiliasm" of the Anabaptists, Mannheim then elaborated subsequent forms. These, he termed the "Liberal Democratic", the "Conservative" and the "Socialist-Communist".

For Mannheim, ideologies were but legitimations of the status quo - ruling class values rather than any expression of objectivity. Utopias were conceived to transcend the existing reality. While he alleged that his sympathies went out to the latter - the oppressed - his ultimate social guidance was addressed to the former - the elites.

Mannheim sought out the structural basis for what he considered the political impoverishment of the masses. Echoing Weber, a central aspect of his explanation rested on the disproportionate representation of "functional rationality" over "substantial rationality" in the social system. The former - functional rationality - referred to any act which is organized (1) with reference to a definable goal, and (2) which the individual can adjust to with reference to but a single goal (1935:54). Modern societies were characterized by the increase of this type of rationality.

In contrast, "substantial rationality" required "intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events in a given situation" (1935:53). Mannheim wrote:

> Thus the intelligent act of thought itself will be described as "substantially rational" whereas everything else which either is false or not an act of thought at all (as for example drives, impulses, wishes and feelings, both conscious and unconscious, will be called "substantially irrational" (1935:53).

These two forms of rationality are defined by difference, with the modern soldier or the "Taylorized" worker. Both of these "types", argued Mannheim, make judgements which fulfill the criteria of functional rationality. However, neither of them have the vaguest understanding, respectively, of general military strategy or the production process in its interdependent whole; these latter required "substantial rationality" to grasp.

Mannheim agreed with Weber that bureaucratic organization maximizes "functional rationality", suppressing not only all forms of functional irrationality but substantial rationality as well. A dominant trend, bureaucratization had the effect of turning over to small dominant minorities the responsibility for making decisions. It can be assumed that Mannheim was referring to party leadership rather than bureaucratic administrators. Mannheim saw in this, the basis for a "growing distance between the elite and the masses, and of the 'appeal to the leader' which has recently become so widespread" (1935:59). In turn, the existence of hostile ideologies and "utopias", provided fertile ground for irresponsible appeals to the masses.

In responding to the situation he had characterized, Mannheim called for a politics of "realism" on the part of the elites. By a "politics of realism", Mannheim meant a sociological approach which could penetrate the confusion created by divergent perspectives. In formulating solutions, sociology could help the elites to recognize the exigencies of the present. Such advice, it can be assumed, was addressed to the representatives of the "Socialist-Communist" utopian form.

Like the aristocratic critics of the mass-society, Mannheim's writing is pervaded by fears of chaos and disorder. In this regard, he once wrote:

> Only if we know why Western society in the crisis zone is passing through a phase of disintegration, is there any hope that the countries which still enjoy comparative peace will learn to control the future trends of events by democratic planning, and so avoid the negative aspects of the process: dictatorship, conformity and barbarism (1935:6).

Yet Mannheim's personal path to the mass-society conception was so heavily indebted to Marxism that he was constantly rebounding from his elitist conclusions to an empathy with the masses. Thus, he specifically shared with Marxists, an emphasis on the contradiction between the promise of mass benefits from advancing technology and the realities of capitalist underdevelopment. Illustratively, he once wrote:

> Technical progress, together with modern currency and credit economy shows every promise of increasing the common good, but nevertheless the masses are being steadily pauperized by the crises, and increased production is faced with dwindling markets. We are centralizing the powers and resources of state sovereignty and destroying the last remnants of self-government, the last chance of resistance within the national boundaries. But this process of social integration into ever larger units is counteracted by the autocratic claims of despotic states, great and small, which fortified by the latent devices of military technique, are working not for world order but for world destruction (1935:13).

It is apparent that the rise of fascism so concerned Mannheim that even the politicized "masses" of Marx's model - the progressive industrial proletariat - were rejected. Consequently, Mannheim's appeal was to the elites: an appeal which argued for balance and compromise. This spirit of moderation, however, can be traced to Mannheim's contributions to the sociology of knowledge which predated the emergence of fascism.

The problem which Mannheim addressed to in his formulation of the sociology of knowledge might be stated: "How could the sociologist achieve objective knowledge of social structures, when it was believed that all thought, save that of formal logic and mathematics, were socio-historically conditioned?" In other words, how could socio-historical relativism, which assumed that all empirically derived knowledge reflected ideological positions, be transcended?

Mannheim argued on behalf of a position he called "relationism", against a "philosophical relativism which denies the validity of any standards and of the existence of order in the world" (Mannheim, 1935: 283). He meant that the correctness of a proposition can be tested;

that test, however, bears only on the perspective of a given situation. He states:

> Just as the fact that every measurement in space hinges upon the nature of light does not mean that our measurements are arbitrary, but merely that they are only valid in relation to the nature of light, so in the same way not relativism in the sense of arbitrariness but relationism applies to our discussion (1936:283).

In short, the probability is great that the perspective of an observer will vary with his social standpoint. But which social standpoint offers the best chance of reaching optimum truth? In response, Mannheim argues for a "detached position". Such a position would be achieved only after recognizing the partiality of all perspectives - including one's own. For Mannheim, the achievement of this relative objectivity was the central aim of the sociology of knowledge. It called for the careful consideration of many social viewpoints which are, in turn, related to the respective social situation from which they emerge. "Through this effort the one-sidedness of our own point of view is counteracted, and conflicting intellectual positions may actually come to supplement one another" (Mannheim, 1936:85).

The question remained, however: "Were there no criterion of validity which cut across social perspectives?" Mannheim offers a pragmatic, if elusive criteria, which appears to be derived from his growing antipathy to utopian thought. An "ethical attitude", he wrote, is invalid if it is oriented with reference to norms with which action in a given historical setting, even with the best of intentions, cannot comply" (1936:95). Further, a theory "is wrong if in a given practical situation it uses concepts and categories which, if taken seriously, would prevent man from adjusting himself at that historical stage" (1936:95).

Mannheim knew that he had not resolved the problem of relativism. He was not prepared, however, to concede to the positivists that a universal criterion of invalidation was possible. In short, he presented a situation-related method for improving upon the relativist position. Utimately, he assumed that there was always "an irreducible residue of evaluation" in thought processes. However, there was one stratum of society which Mannheim believed could best achieve the relatively superior objectivity illuminated by the sociology of knowledge. Here, his jettisoning of the "masses" was complete. In lieu of the Marxist hopes for the proletariat, Mannheim turned to the intellectuals. For Mannheim, the "socially unattached intelligentsia", because of their exposure to various competing perspectives and their lack of class attachment, were best in a position to mediate differences in knowledge claims.

Marxism was addressed to the masses; it viewed conflicting ideologies as the inevitable reflection of underlying class differences. The solution to ideological conflict was the concrete removal of these differences; only through such means could a true democracy be established. For Marx, the cause of distorted social thought - ideologies - had to be eliminated; they did not require a knowledgeable elite to arbitrate them.

In contrast with Marx, Mannheim's audience was that portion of the population which had been exposed to an advanced or "liberal" education. Only the "intelligentsia", he came to believe, could recognize the order which must be imposed on the capitalist economy to provide the masses with security. In Diagnosis of Our Time (1943), Mannheim argued that the masses must be placated if a rational order was to stabilize. He suggested that they must be offered the benefits of socio-economic, governmental planning, Keynesian economics, social security programs and a host of other state-regulative measures were the means he recommended. For Mannheim, this was political "realism", a realism which even allowed him to swerve considerably off course from his professed political position. He argued, for example, that the elites of democratic societies - to deal effectively with the masses - could gain from a knowledge of the social techniques of totalitarian states.

Ultimately, Mannheim's hopes for democratic planning echoed Comte; they were pinned on a "science of society". Such a science would be developed to "aid those who governed". The role of the detached intelligentsia was in great part, to offer relatively disinterested solutions to social problems - policy solutions unattached to any specific ideology or utopian perspective.

Mannheim's Critics

From an empirical point of view, the main critic of Mannheim was Theodore Geiger (1949). Geiger sharply questioned the empirical validity of Mannheim's hypothesis about the behaviour of intellectuals in class conflict. His study of intellectuals was included as part of a larger attempt to develop a sociology of culture. In the larger work, Geiger distinguished three general categories of intellectuals in terms of production-consumption cycle of cultural output. Firstly, there were the creative intellectuals: the scientists and artists who were the "producers" in the cultural process. Secondly, there were the members of the learned professions who were the main "appliers" of the creations provided by the first category. Finally, there were the "generally educated". It was this final group, comprised of the "generally educated" who, argued Geiger, were the principal consumers of the professional product rather than the political governors or the masses.

Another source of criticism came from Harold Laski. Laski pointed to the fact that in Nazi Germany, "a body of learned professors, whose vocation was the disinterested service of truth, were there willing to prostitute their scholarship to ends which hundreds of them knew to be mean and false" (1935:684). Similarly, Hans Gerth pointed out that in 1935, the middle classes in general (including the various professions) were over-represented in the Nazi Party in Germany (1952:104). Further, teachers - traditionally "professional" status claimants, if not ever fully recognized as such - were the most heavily represented occupational group in the National Socialist party.

Finally, Antonio Gramsci reiterated the Marxian theme that the division of "manual" and "intellectual" labour itself originally produces ideology (1957). Gramsci argued that this division removes thought from its direct and visible connection with the process of production - that division of labour, in time, leads to the historical sequence of class societies. For Marx, the very notion "intellectual" - which implied that serious thought was a function of a distinct social group - was itself inherently involved in creating the kind of social structure which would eventually be revolutionized. A socialist revolution should have as one of its central aims, the elimination of the division between manual and intellectual labour. Gramsci developed this idea. Like Mannheim, he raised the question of the intellectual's potential for ideological independence. In response, he argued that it is class itself which creates specific social views and that every social class with some basis in production creates its own intellectuals.

Gramsci called intellectuals who functioned to give a particular class a homogeneous purpose, the "Organic Intellectuals". He argued that every class which comes into being finds itself confronted with intellectual categories already existing. Gramsci took the position that the proletariat should consciously form their own intellectuals, insisting on the dependence of this social category on class interests rather than their class-detachment.

IV. The Supersession of the Capitalist by "Professional" Management

The idea that social progress would correlate with the professionalization of the elite was not restricted to government and public administration. The idea, fueled by American students of the business corporation, was extended to the private sector of the economy. This extension traces to the 1930's, when social scientists began to notice specific changes in the relations of decision-making associated with the growth of the joint-stock ownership of business concerns.

In 1932, Berle and Means published a book entitled The Modern Corporation and Private Property. It represented an attempt to empirically demonstrate that the American economy was dominated by two hundred firms. It further argued that there was a significant degree of separation between the legal ownership of these firms and their management. It was the latter - the managers - who Berle and Means argued, were becoming the dominant class in terms of control over the disposition of productive means.

It was left to James Burnham to furnish the enduring phrase: the "managerial revolution", a phrase which appeared in the title to a book he had published in 1941. Burnham argued that "the big bourgeoisie, the finance capitalists, are still the ruling class of the United States; the final control is still in their hands" (97). However, he believed that Roosevelt's interventionist policy under the "New Deal" signalled the coalescence of the interests of a managerial class - both in the private and public sector - against private capital. Burnham concluded that, because of the increasing separation of control by managers from the legal owners, combined with an increasingly interventionist state,

> the capitalists, the ruling class of modern society, are losing control, the social structure which placed them in the position of the ruling class is being transformed, not tomorrow, but now, as we watch. In the new structure, when its foundations are completed, there will be no capitalists (Burnham, 1941:97).

This idea - that the rise of the managers to operating control of the corporate structure signalled the transcendence of capitalism - was the real substance of what was to become a major controversy waged between Marxists and their detractors. The notion obtained popular currency in much of orthodox social theory - a status which it has retained even up to the present.

What is perhaps of most interest to the present discussion actually traces back to Berle and Means' publication; specifically, those writers had raised the question as to whether or not, the motive of profitability which underpinned competitive, private capitalism, was significantly tempered through the professionalization of management. The authors wrote in response: "The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption . . . (the rule of) the quest for profits . . ." (1932:9).

What then, were the new motives? The most euphoristic reply to the question concerning the content of elite motives, prior to post-industrial theory, was advanced by Karl Kaysen. Kaysen wrote that:

> management sees itself as responsible to stockholders, employees, customers, the general public, and perhaps, most important, the firm itself as an institution . . . there is no display of greed or

> graspiness; there is no attempt to push off on to workers or the community at large part of the social costs of the enterprise. The modern corporation is a soulful corporation (Kaysen, 1957: 313-314).

While the hyperbole and exaggeration of Kaysen's conclusion are obvious to even the most casual observer, a portion of its substance drew support from a prominent theory of the modern business firm. In that theory, the very large company differs basically from the "entrepeneurial" firm; while the latter is seen to seek singularly for the maximization of profits, the former merely seeks to "satisfice" (Marris, 1964:266-277). In this view, the managerial group is more interested in the stability and growth of the enterprise and the preservation and expansion of its market strength. Furthermore, the corporation today sets its policy guidelines within an increasingly complex political framework. Its community relations are therefore constrained towards a heightened sensitivity to the most active currents of public interest. As Berle and Means first put the idea, if the "corporate system" was to survive, it was

> almost inevitable . . . that the "control" of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity (1932:356).

The notion of a "managerial revolution" became a sub-thesis of structural-functionalism. Parsons drew out its implications for the study of social hierarchy as it grew out of the social division of labour. More generally, it was taken as evidence to support the idea that class relations were being replaced by an occupational system based upon merit rather than the ownership of capital. Capital, the idea went

- in terms of its ownership - had become so diffuse as to render share ownership insignificant in corporate decision-making. Management was increasingly being recruited from the ranks of skilled professions; "status groups" were thus seen to be replacing "classes".

We shall present our criticism of these ideas in subsequent chapters; for these ideas have been absorbed into American versions of the "post-industrial" society.

V. Summary

In the previous two chapters we have selected out the most influential contributions to the mass-society tradition in sociology. We have done this to demonstrate an important historical continuity in the history of sociological theory. We are concerned, of course, with the enduring sociological hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between class conflict in industrialized societies and the professionalization of the occupational structure. The concept of professionalization, however, has been interpreted in various ways.

We saw that Durkheim viewed the professionalization process as a means for providing the social basis of "organic solidarity" in complex societies. Durkheim placed his hopes for the moral regulation of economic life in a revived version of the medieval corporation; its membership steeped in professional ethics.

Durkheim emphasized that only members of an occupation could regulate it because of the very complexity of each special competence. He believed that the regulation of production by industrial corporations (professionalized bodies of workers and managers) would generate a secularized system of occupational ethics which would counter the strain towards anomie associated with industrialization and occupational specialization. For Durkheim, professionalization was the preferred and probable solution to the ideological schisms which socialists claimed could only be eliminated through revolution. Associating professionalization with meritocracy, he believed that its advancement would serve to avoid "conflicts and disorder" (1964).

Durkheim's inspiration for these ideas probably derived from the craft-like character of the professions he observed. In seeking out modern equivalents of the medieval community, the professions stood out. William Goode describes the special "community of profession" in the following:

> (1) Its members are bound by a sense of identity. (2) Once in it, few leave, so that it is a terminal or continuing status for the most part. (3) Its members share values in common. (4) Its role definitions *vis-a-vis* both members and non-members are agreed upon and are the same for all members. (5) Within the areas of communal action there is a common language, which is understood only partially by outsiders. (6) The Community has power over its members. (7) Its limits are reasonably clear, though they are not physical and geographical, but social. (8) Though it does not produce the next generation biologically, it does so socially, through its control over the selection of professional trainees, and through its training processes it sends these recruits through an adult socialization process (Goode, 1957:194).

However, in fact, these occupations stood out because the characteristics of "community" which they possessed, "were declining in the larger society" (Larson, 1974:101). Or were they? In Part Two of our discussion, we shall see how post-industrial theorists in North America have revived this idea.

Durkheim, and Carr-Saunders and Wilson to a lesser extent, stressed the diffusion of professional organization throughout the occupational structure. Their solution to the lack of community in the mass-society, was to find "community" in the occupation. In contrast, Marshall and Mannheim appear to have assumed that professions were necessarily a minority work category: a highly educated elite.

For Marshall, it was the "service ideology" of professionalized public administrators - the personnel of the Welfare State - who were to be the vanguard of social democracy. For Mannheim, it was the relatively detached intelligentsia whose members could transcend the class divisions of mass-society. For him, the professional intellectuals could and should, give the best of counsel - the "most disinterested" of advice - to government. Only through such means as these, thought Mannheim, could the destruction of revolution and the tyranny of fascism be avoided.

We have stressed throughout this first section of our thesis that, macro-sociology has tended to fall within the mass-society tradition. We have also stressed that this tradition has been shaped by a critical encounter with Marxism. The rise of fascism in the 1930's and 1940's served to encourage a synthesis of the democratic critique of mass-society with the aristocratic critique. The masses of Marxist celebration - under the force of this "synthesis" of the two critical branches - were increasingly seen to be in need of regulation. Even social democrats stressed "regulation" rather than the "emancipation" which was central to the Marxist tradition. Professionalization appealed as a regulative mechanism which was functionally equivalent to the guilds.

Karl Mannheim and T. H. Marshall suggested that the masses could be better satisfied through the extension of welfare state benefits. In this case, the professions were turned to, in part, because their self-professed "service ideology" suggested that they were the class to extend such benefits most competently and generously. Relatedly, Mannheim was convinced that an ideologically-neutral, professional "Intelligentsia" was in a position to give the best of counsel to government in pluralistic societies characterized by antagonistic interest-group constituencies.

Finally, the managerial-revolution theorists indirectly introduced another "professional solution" to the problems of mass-society. In arguing that management had assumed control over the major business corporations, the initiated the idea that a "post-capitalist" society was emerging. In this view, the Marxist emphasis on class-conflict between capital and labour was beside the point, for capital was itself dissolving and all industrialized societies were inevitably separated into managers and managed (Clark Kerr, et al, 1965:15). In a slight of Marxism, it became fashionable to argue that class-based ideologies were fast becoming a thing of the past (Bell, 1961).

The social theory which grew out of the managerial-revolution thesis suggested that all societies which were "modern" or "industrialized", faced similar problems of co-ordination - despite the declared aims of government (whether capitalist or socialist) to the contrary. Furthermore, it was often argued that modern man's recognition of these similarities within the industrialized societies, would lead him to reject ideological leadership. Instead, an increasingly educated electorate would seek out the most competent in the skills of both management and mediation, rather than the ideologue.

In each of the arguments we have reviewed, it is apparent that the problem of "order" has replaced the Marxist emphasis on class conflict as the solution to ideological antagonisms. For Marx, such antagonisms were merely reflections of structurally-based relations of exploitation between classes - classes disparately located in the mode of social production.

In contrast with Marx, the literature we have discussed pins its solutions to the conflicts within mass-society, on the professional organization of work. These various solutions, however, had been treated in relative isolation from each other until the structural-functionalists began their integration - as indicated in Parsons' comment that, "the development and increasing strategic importance of the professions probably constitute the most important change that has occurred in the occupational system of modern societies" (1968:536).

It is not until the North American version of an emerging "Post-Industrial Society" that the task of synthesizing the various "professionalization" themes is seriously pursued. In that synthesis, the post-industrial writers have also rejected Marxist analyses. Our subsequent efforts will aim to throw the Marxist perspective into sharp relief with this body of contemporary social thought. Prior to beginning these efforts, however, we will review the concept of profession as it has been developed in the sociological literature; this is the burden of the next and final chapter of Part One.

CHAPTER THREE

Footnotes

1. We do not suggest that Nisbet assumes that Durkheim was wholly indebted to either conservative ideology or social philosophy. However, Nisbet implicitly gives the reader the impression that such a debt is the most outstanding influence on Durkheim. Nisbet argues that Durkheim gave a systematic conceptual underpinning to the principles of social transformation from pre-industrial to industrial social organization. Because Durkheim sought the basis of modern "functional equivalents" to the traditional order, Nisbet implies that his vision of the future was filtered through the prism of tradition. Thus, indirectly, Nisbet encourages the view that Durkheim's work was principally conservative.

2. The nineteenth century liberal view of society was one of an aggregate of atomistic individual members who formed a contract with each other to give assistance and receive assistance in reciprocal exchange. Beyond this reciprocity, the individual agreed not to interfere with the actions of another.

   In contemporary liberalism, the defense of the individual against the fiat of the collective is still expressed. However, the emphasis on the "personal self", best left unconstrained by state intervention to pursue his own best advantage, is substituted by a focus on the individual performing specialized roles in organized social settings - occupational, recreational, or educational. The emphasis on a sanctified private self has shifted to the social self, a self delicately sustained in a complex corporate economy through highly interdependent productive relations. It is assumed that only collectively, through representational action in "legitimate" political or economic institutions, can the interests of the individual be advanced. In the twentieth century version of liberalism, the state is idealized as an adjudicator of competing, pluralistic interest groups. whose demands it must attempt to evaluate according to rational, objective criteria.

   Isaiah Berlin argues that twentieth century liberalism, in contrast with nineteenth century liberalism, embodies a "positive theory of liberty"; the liberty to perform tasks with efficiency and effectiveness. It has to do with "mastery and control" rather than "autonomy" (1954). In its conception of the relation between the individual and the state, twentieth century liberalism emphasizes political participation and an appreciation of the rules of the political process. It holds that only through such knowledge and action can liberty be maintained. In contrast, nineteenth century liberalism viewed the state with suspicion and sought to check its growth.

   The new liberalism, in its utopian form, upholds meritocracy as the ideal stratification system, in which the flow of privilege to those with property gives way to the flow of privilege to the most talented. In sociology, the new liberalism embraces structural-functionalism as an explanatory model of stratification, with its emphasis on differential rewards for differential performance capacities and achievements. To insure that "achievement" rather than "ascription" becomes the dominant form of stratification, liberalism supports the welfare state concept. The welfare state is seen to compensate for differentials in opportunity by providing institutional supports to the less advantaged members of society.

The expansion of the state was viewed as a threat to the individual in nineteenth century liberalism. The growth of large-scale capital and the consolidation of monopolistic market structures, the growth of cities and the decline of the rural economy, the dependency of workers on wages or salaries; all these suggested the need for theoretical adaptation to contemporary realities. The state acquired a new significance in liberal theory. Keynesianism and the welfare state, grafted on to the political superstructures of capitalist economies during the middle third of this century, were absorbed into, and ultimately legitimated by, twentieth century liberalism. See, for example, Irving Louis Horowitz discussion of these two "liberalisms" (1972); also C. Wright Mills (1963).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMAGE OF "PROFESSION" IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY

I. Defining a Profession

We now turn our attention to attempts to provide a formal definition of the criteria which distinguish some work as "professional" from other occupational activities. Despite the relative abundance of such attempts, as Millerson states: "Of the dozens of writers on the subject, few seem able to agree on the real determinants of professional status" (1964:15). It is possible, however, to sort the types of attributes noted in the literature into four broad categories. These categories may be labelled cognitive, authoritiative, ethical and evaluative.

The cognitive category centres on the body of knowledge which the occupants of similar work roles apply within their specialized area of concern. The literature has tended to distinguish a profession from other occupations by emphasizing the greater cognitive demands which it places on its membership. A greater intellectual complexity and a greater responsibility for making sophisticated decisions is presumed of the worker in a professional role in comparison with normative expectations of other work roles.

The authoritative category centres primarily on the exchange relations between the producer and the consumer of an occupations' product; secondarily on the influence of some external mediation which may modify exchange relations.[1] The literature has stressed the relative strength with which professions confront the consumer in specifying the content of their work.

The ethical category is concerned with the commitment of workers to the premier ethical norm of qualitative service, provided to consumers before all other considerations. As allegedly distinct from other occupations, the "service orientation" - internalized by the professional recruit in a lengthy socialization period - is assumed to regulate the conduct of members and inspire their commitment.

Finally, the evaluative category concerns the general social distribution of occupational prestige. It is believed that a profession is a member of a family of occupations which has been generally accorded the widest social acceptance of its various claims to superior competence, ethical practice, and special authority.

In what follows we shall simply present common elements derived from attempts at definition which fall within each of the four categories noted. We should point out that the theoretical and empirical status of each of these attributes is open to question. Indeed, these attributes themselves have been objects of controversy in both sociology and social life generally. However, we should also note that these features, while plausibly viewed as merely ideological claims, tend to be conceived in the literature as structural variables; they each have been in some way institutionalized and as such are marked by some empirical referent.[2]

Cognitive Attributes

A first distinguishing feature of the professions stressed in the literature is its cognitive superiority relative to other occupations in terms of its members' command of a body of applied knowledge. This claim is assumed to be given warrant by objective indicators of the complexity of professional work when that work is compared with the activities of other occupations.

It is true that the differential attainment of work skills and variations in occupational complexity may always arise where division of labour occurs. However, the key to modern professional cognitive superiority is seen to reside in an organizational process which is itself differentiated from other work. It is through a specific mode of institutionalizing collective standards of minimum achievement that the modern professions back up their claims to objective superiority in a specialized sphere of practice.

It is generally believed that the intensification of work divisions and the creation of specialized bodies of practical or theoretical knowledge which accompanies that division, is a function of the accumulation of resources. Specialized services that are performed apart from kinship structures in preliterate societies are those connected with "the salience of the knowledge or skills for individual or collective welfare" (Moore, 1970:36). However, as this accumulation proceeds it provides the basis for the crystallization of social privilege around the possession of surplus produce. Once a society is thus stratified, the salience of specialization can be disengaged from its general welfare functions and can proceed according to the demands of special interest groups. Thus, in the ancient world salience continues to be an element of specialization, but the development of functional specialization comes to depend on the advance of inequality. By example,

> Wealth and the knowledge of writing are, in fact, unequally distributed. The emergence of the State brings forth new functions, but also differentiates the advisers of the rulers from the mass of the ruled. Writing permits the transmission and accumulation of knowledge, but it is the concentration of wealth that allows specialization to proceed on this basis (Larson, 1974:3).

As Freidson points out of the predecessors of medicine, the "folk practitioners" first in evidence were a special class only after they could be distinguished from "respectable healers" (1970:18-19). The respectable healers were those who treated or worked for an elite. This distinction of status, however, does not appear to have rested on skill or knowledge as might be tested formally. Bolaria points out that "in Greece the lawyers and physicians, during ancient times, did not receive any formal training. The physician at best was generally a student of an eminent practioner" (1968:1). In both Greece and Rome, the lawyer had

> generally (been) a slave attached to a rich man's household . . . in ancient times there were no training schools where those who followed the vocations which we now call professions received instructions . . . the practitioners seldom or never formed distinct social groups . . . they were not infrequently in a dependent position" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933:476-480).

The literature suggests that the introduction of an academic learning process, prior to apprenticeship, is a prerequisite, a "rite of passage" to a professional career. The various arguments which back up the professional's claim to cognitive superiority centre on this process. Three common arguments can be extracted. Firstly, it is believed that specialized training centres have the capacity to quantitatively increase the specialized knowledge of candidates over the level attained under the normal apprenticeship of other skilled work. Secondly, it is presumed that specialized institutional preparation of an academic nature serves to increase the quality of the practitioner's ultimate functioning. This type of preparation is seen to facilitate the learning of an abstract synthesis of principles which afford the successful candidate considerable flexibility and autonomy in specialty-related decision-making. Thirdly, it is often suggested that specialized training centres more rigorously ensure competence. Candidates are subjected to a double-testing procedure: exams to qualify for apprenticeship and then apprenticeship itself.

The claim that professional training centres provide superior conditions for preparing recruits rests on two assumptions. Firstly, the "time out" from practical work is seen to give recruits a broader perspective on the role of their vocation in the larger society. Secondly, such centres - through the employment of full-time academics who both teach and carry out research - facilitate the accelerated rationalization of a discipline. Full-time teachers afford the student an unusual exposure to the theoretical principles of the occupational practice. Furthermore, the research carried out by the academic serves, via division of labour, to much more rapidly expand both the theoretical and practical base of the art or skill. Academies build up a stock of such knowledge - a specialized literature - as one of their features.

It appears to have been the influence of the church (see Chapter One) which led to the first distinction between the crafts and the professions in terms of the nature of their training. The association with the university and especially with the knowledge of Latin, served to provide a status distinction between the "learned" professions and the craft guilds. The study of Latin does suggest a contrivance rather than a knowledge resource of practical utility. However, it did provide a basis for the shift to an academic rather than simply a practical basis for occupational knowledge. It also served to provide the professions with an exclusiveness which was instrumental in securing their lofty status. Larson argues that "the links with the church, presumably increased the aura of mystery surrounding the professions esoteric knowledge . . ." (1974:4). Latin may be assumed to have served the same purpose: mystifying professional knowledge; for it was studied only by the privileged few.

As we have noted, academic training prior to "on-the-job" training (apprenticeship) has been associated with the learning of general principles of abstract knowledge rather than simply a "technique" or "skill". The pejorative phrase: "He's just a technician!" - which professional status-claimants often make in reference to alleged "non-professionals" - reflects this assumed difference. Professions, by contrast with other occupations, are viewed as possessing an essentially theoretical basis for practicing a specialized art or science rather than a craft.[3] The professional is expected to understand his art or science as a complex set of principles which are alterable through intellectual or experimental challenge. Craft, on the other hand, is considered to be an intergenerationally transmitted routine; fixed by inflexible rules of craftsmanship, it is altered sluggishly by trial-and-error. The craftsman is seen as a passive learner and applier of a technique rather than a critical judge of his own discipline. The professional is distinguished by the expectation that he should be ever ready to question and modify the principles by which he practices.

Prior to the nineteenth century and the industrial revolution, the assumed superiority of the cognitive base of knowledge commanded by the professional was not backed up by formal test. The development of academic training institutions of an applied nature has since become a standard feature of occupations claiming professional status. This development encouraged the idea that the professions were distinguishable from other skilled occupations by their theoretical approach to training and the scholarship which is associated with the institutes. Indeed, Carr-Saunders and Wilson wrote that,

> We have found that the application of an intellectual technique to the ordinary business of life acquired as a result of prolonged and specialized training, is the chief distinguishing characteristic of the profession (1934:491).

Emphasis on the importance of this feature is found amongst Sussman (1965), Greenwood (1962), Wilensky (1964), Goode (1957), and Toren (1972). Goode (1957) argues that a "prolonged special training in a body of abstract knowledge" is one of the two "core" attributes marking the profession.

Ethical Attributes

Another repeated theme in the literature is the professional worker's ethical orientation. It has been asserted that professional work ethics are anti-capitalistic. Furthermore, the professions have been seen as essentially humanitarian. Finally, as we have observed in the previous discussion, some writers have conjectured that the professions might even form the basis of a future, generalized occupational ideology - transcendent of class-based interests. Behind these various claims is the notion that the industrial revolution created deeply-rooted, economically-based social antagonisms. Interest in the professions has, therefore, been inspired by the apparent uniqueness in the manner in which they confront consumers. Their potential for playing a moral role in regulating production and distribution is emphasized. The professions are seen as a deviant case to the norm of market competition in capitalist society.

It is generally conceded that the industrial proletariat in advanced capitalist society has tended to limit its organized political action to the defence of its market capacity and wage security. Furthermore, the entrepeneur is assumed to normally purs[illegible] his self-interest, even at the expense of any social damage which might be incurred by his economic activities. Thus, the professional's claim to an occupational value system somewhat detached from each of these orientations is of obvious sociological interest.

Prior to the industrial revolution, the precursor of the modern day professional was esteemed because of his autonomy. As one writer suggested, the "free professions" were those occupations that

> should be judged and valued according to their compatibility with the good life. They were to be tested by their effect on the givers of service rather than the recipient. The professions were,, in English parlance, the occupations suitable for a gentleman (Marshall, 1939:325).

The professions, in that period, were "those means of living which were most innocuous in that they did not dull the brain, like manual labour, nor corrupt the soul like commerce" (Marshall, 1939:325). Gradually, according to Marshall, the emphasis shifted:

> The professional man had to change his grounds. He had to admit that his occupation was laborious . . . but to assert that it was a labour of a special kind. In defining its peculiar character the emphasis was shifted from the effect of the service on the giver to that on the recipient, or more accurately, to the relationship between the two. The idea of service became more important than the idea of freedom (*Ibid*.:326).

The *service orientation* is now generally accepted in the literature as a central feature of professionalism. According to Goode, if one of the two *core* characteristics is *lengthy training of a theoretical nature*, then the service orientation is the other. Wilensky underscores the point when he states: "The service ideal is the pivot around which the moral claim to professional status revolves" (1964:140). The fundamental premise of the service ideal is that a professional is ethically bound to represent the best interest of his or her clients. This "service orientation" is assumed to be normative to the ethical system of the professions.[4]

The professional's subordination of the pecuniary motive in client relations has also received considerable attention in the literature. The service orientation, which guides the professional in his conduct with clients, is allegedly contrary to the normal principle operating in the market place: it is a credat emptor relationship rather than a caveat emptor one.[5]

Lewis and Maude have suggested that the relationship between the client and the practitioner is the essence of professional morality: "It is between individuals and it is fiduciary. The professional gives the best possible advice which the buyer is not competent to criticize, and then acts under the client's instructions" (1953:59). Such a relationship, it is often held, renders "commercialism" beneath the dignity of the professional. This does not mean that the professional should not be interested in the remunerative aspects of his or her vocation. Such mundane concerns as these, however, have often been seen as most appropriately "taken care of" outside the intimacy of the professional-client consultation. Indeed, the established professions are often considered the most worthy recipients of lucrative incomes.[6] It is believed, however, that a visible and primary concern with profit should be shunned by the professional.[7]

The service norm is also seen to have implications for colleague-colleague relations. According to Carr-Saunders,

> the professional men are allowed to compete with one another only in reputation or ability. This implies that the use of techniques such as advertising and price cutting employed in business for

> competitive purposes is forbidden. Competition is solely for clients (1955:285).

Finally, it should be noted that the acquisition of a code of ethics and a self-policing system governing standards of competence and ethical conduct is imposed by the profession. Both are seen as concrete indicators of attempts by professions to maintain a high level of ethical standards within the occupational collectivity.

Authoritative Attributes

In all societies characterized by the differentiation of work roles, relations of interdependence between producers and consumers develop. If that specialization proceeds to such an extent that sufficient knowledge for the production of a good or the rendering of a service is beyond the capacity of the consumer, then the producer is in a position to control the terms of exchange. As Johnson observes:

> Dependence on the skills of others has the effect of reducing the common area of shared experience and knowledge and increases social distance; for the inescapable consequence of specialization of production is unspecialization of consumption (1972:41).

Obviously, a heterogeneous consumer population can collectively act to shift control over their exchange relations with specialized producers. Furthermore, a "third force" such as the state may intervene to modify the imbalance. In the absence of such an event, however, the specialized producer is normally capable of determining the content of work and the terms of distribution of his product - even against the will of the consumer. In short, other things being equal, the specialized producer is in a position to either exploit or serve well, the less knowledgeable consumer of his service.

The literature has stressed the idea that the professional-client relationship is one in which the professional occupies the superordinate position.

Greenwood suggests that the client of the professional must surrender himself (or herself) to the professional's judgement; in so doing, however, the client actually derives a sense of security from this submission (Greenwood, 1962:210). He suggests that this security is rooted in the recognition by the client that the professional is the best available person who is in a position to advise him. In other words, the client respects the authority of the professional and it is this respect which is the basis of the trust relationship.

The literature also suggests that professionals are actually very jealous of outside interference and tend to suspect extra-collegial intervention as being a threat to their legitimate autonomy. Professionals strongly proclaim that the need for internal regulation (occupational self-control) is based upon the level of sophistication of their knowledge base: outsiders are in no position to judge their esoteric work. Neither the client, the general public, nor government are considered by the professional to be in a position to evaluate professional work; therefore the professional's removal from the normal operations of the marketplace are believed to be essential (Hughes, 1958:78-87).

Bernard Barber has suggested that because laymen are in no position to judge the professional's work, the professional operates in a "self-regulating company of equals". In such a "company",

> each permanent member . . . is roughly equal in authority, self-directing, and self-disciplined. If the sources of purpose and authority that are in his own conscience are not strong enough, the disapproval of others will control him or lead to his exclusion from the brotherhood (1962:195).

The professional's belief in collegial self-regulation and the view that such a practice is desirable and practical is associated with an emphasis on the importance of individual autonomy in work. Hall has argued that the professional's desire for autonomy stems from his belief that because he alone (and his colleagues) are the most competent in a specialized activity, he ought to be able to make his own decisions without external pressures from clients or from an employing organization (Hall, R., 1968).

Finally, the professional organization - represented formally by a state-licensed association - is viewed as the link between the practitioner and his or her colleagues and between the professional and the public. These associations are considered to be the "licensed" institutions in which the public "madate" is entrusted. It is the associations which are expected to ensure the public of the technical proficiency and integrity of constituent members. It is the association which assumes responsibility for the adequate training of recruits, for members' certification, and for the supervision - and if necessary, expulsion - of practitioners. It is also through the association that the code of ethics is developed and imposed.

In summary, the (a) protection of the clientele, and (b) the interests of the professional, are considered to be a function of the professional association. It is this dual feature of professional organization - its protection of self (its membership) as well as its altruism (its public interest) - which is supposed to make it unique. Furthermore, this duality of function is often alleged to sharply distinguish the profession from the trade union. Indeed, the trade union and its tactics are considred by many professionals to be "unprofessional" beneath the dignity of responsible professionals. In this regard, Lewis and Maude have observed that a

> Trade Union, being largely an organization designed to protect its members against exploitation by their employers and against damaging competition in hard times, and to assist individuals in distress - in short, to look after the material interests of its members - is not a satisfactory model for a professional association or institute; for the latter . . . must care for the more delicate interests of intellectual and political independence, must stimulate progress and research in its mystery and - most important of all - must seek always to protect the individual clients and the public at large from injury or exploitation (1950:180).

Evaluative Attributes

Locating the prestige of the professions in society generally, is somewhat complicated. It is complicated by the various systems of ranking and their interactions which an occupational collectivity and its individual members are subjected to. For analytical purposes, however, we may schematize these systems on a continuum bounded on one end by those rankings which are exclusive to the domain of production and, on the other, by those which involve social evaluations external to actual work processes. Freidson has indirectly supported this approach in stating that the modern day professional "emphasizes independence, social and economic individualism, and class dignity in his status" (1970:170). We assume that by "independence", Freidson is referring to the productive sphere, and when he speaks of "class dignity", to the other end of our continuum.

> "Clinician" and "practitioner" are words referring to consultants whose work requires the application of available knowledge to the solution of some concrete problem: they are neutral words in that they emphasize what is technically special about a job. "Professional", however, is a word that is not neutral. It may refer to a special kind of complex work, but it also connotes a highly prestigious occupation. Thus, while "clinician" or "practitioner"

> can denote a pure situs - a specific technical position in a division of labour, without hierarchical implications - "professional" combines situs with status (Freidson, 1970:172).

At the production end of our continuum, the fully recognized professional - within the immediate work environment - is generally deferred to in decision-making processes. This deference is given by both clients and co-workers. While each may harbour resentment of special authority, there is a socially sanctioned pattern of deference which is normative. Also as noted, the recognition by the state of "license and mandate" to the professional association gives to the collectivity of specialists, uncommon authority.

Professions differ in many ways amongst themselves both in terms of their criteria of recruit - selection and training and the manner in which they organize practice - differences which are compounded by cross-national comparison (Moore, 1970:224). Despite these differences, however, and the relative difficulties of precision in making comparison, the professional category of work universally commands the highest prestige ranking among occupations. Repeated studies of occupational prestige in the United States (Hodge, Siegel and Rossi, 1964:286-302), as well as international comparison confirm this uniformity (Inkeles and Rossi, 1966:329-339; Hodge, Trieman and Rossi, 1966:309-321). Furthermore, if we assume financial reward to be an indicator of prestige amongst the work-doing categories, professions again rank the highest (Moore, 1970). While there are indeed considerable variations amongst the professions themselves, particularly whether considered "fully professional" or otherwise, these differences hold up.

II. Criticism of the Conventional "Image" of Profession in Sociology

To recapitulate, the literature suggests that professions are differentiated from other occupations by their specific, socially articulated claims to superiority on the dimensions of knowledge-based competence and ethical orientation. Furthermore, it suggests that those claims have received general credibility by a consuming public. Relatedly, they are considered the most favourably ranked occupations and possess special authority.

As the above discussion would suggest, the image of the profession presented in the literature is an appealing one – an appeal extending both to the aspirant to and incumbent of, such occupational roles, as well as to the social theorist. In reviewing the various attributes we appear to have discovered an occupational authority system, ethos and institutional means, for organizing any socially useful competence. After reviewing this literature, it is not surprising that many occupations would seek to acquire recognition as a profession.

The extension of professional organization across the division of labour appears to promise the transformation of capitalist market principles. It also appears to be highly sensitized to the needs of both the producer and the consumer. Tentatively, let us assume that some occupations possess these attributes as they embrace an occupational collectivity and confront the consumer. We then might assume: (1) their members' superior production ethos to that of the ordinary wage worker on the one hand, and the entrepeneur on the other, (2) that they provide an objective means of assuring consumers that their membership are the most competent in a specialized field, and (3) that they have been granted workers' control over their production activities by the state.

Let us now critically examine these assumptions.

The "superior production ethos" - designated by the summative concept "service orientation" - is undoubtedly one of the prescriptive norms which the professions explicitly avow themselves. It is obvious that, however, the extent to which these norms are internalized by practitioners is at least questionalbe. The assumption that the individual behaviour of professionals is normatively more ethical than that of individuals in "lower occupations" is especially provocative of reservation. As Freidson notes:

> there appears to be no reliable information which actually demonstrates that a service orientation is strong and widespread among professionals . . . Even when one is quite willing to stretch the points of the scantly and inelastic data available, the blunt fact is that discussions of professions assume or assert by definition and without supporting empirical evidence that "service orientation" is especially common among professionals (Freidson, 1970:81).

Talcott Parsons (1939) once took a stand against those who wished to find in the professions a social ideology distinct from that of business. Rather, he saw the professional as principally concerned, like the businessman, with personal achievement. Parsons saw the display of altruism as a functional equivalent to good personal relations in the capitalist factory. He argued that both the businessman and the professional are concerned with the efficient performance of service.

C. Wright Mills (1951), echoing Parsons, argued that professional altruism reflected a specific mode of organizing the relations between in-group members and out-group members. Indeed, Mills pointed out that so successful had the professional model been for medicine and law that:

> businessmen, especially certain types of small traders, are eagerly engaged in setting up the same practices of non-competition and guild-like

> closure . . . (for) . . . the "professional" wears a badge of prestige. Any position that is "resposible and steady" and, above all, that carries prestige may become known, or at least promoted by its members as a profession. Real-estate men become realtors; undertakers become morticians . . . (etc.) . . . all try to look and act "professional" (1951:138-139).

The related avowal of "disinterested" service has been subjected to criticism by co-workers lacking professional credentials as well as knowledgeable consumers. The idea of "disinterested" service in professional ideology, implies unbiased or standarized service to all clients. In short, the professional is expected to place his or her client's interests above personal considerations (value judgements) outside the domain of expertise. The effect of this avowal may be in practice, to conduce an extremely narrow social perspective.

Reiff (1971) illuminates the criticism of the professional by the co-worker who lacks equivalent credentials and their perquisites: authority, income, prestige. He argues that while professionals often see themselves as liberal and humanistic, paraprofessionals tend to see themselves as "technological and bureaucratic" (a pejorative) in practice. In contrast, he argues, paraprofessionals assume that their own more varied life experience and class background gives them greater capacity for empathy with the situation of clients. The focus of Reiff's discussion is upon what have been called the "personal service occupations" such as medicine, social work and education. It should be noted in passing that both Canadian and American governments have conceded some ground to such complainants. In the "anti-poverty programs" of the 1960's they created special positions in such services for what they termed the "indigenous non-professional" (see, for example, Katan, 1977; Epstein, 1970).

Illustrative of the criticisms from "knowledgeable consumers" are the familiar attacks against the medical status quo for ignoring social and nutritional factors in both diagnoses and therapy.

We have noted that sociologists have attempted to use visible institutional artifacts as indicators of professional attributes. One such artifact discussed has been the formal code of ethics adopted by the professional association. The formal codification of ethical prescriptions may indeed reflect the good intentions of some practitioners. However, it also "clearly functions as a legitimation of professional privilege" (Johnson, 1972:25).

The assumption of altruism, applied to the legal profession, suggests that the lawyer is a mediator between the state and the needs of the individual citizen. However, the very fact that both the application of law and the rules of advocacy are state designations, calls attention to the fact that the lawyer's function is bounded by the status quo. Thus, Rueschmeyer (1964) observes that this profession's vested interest in the legal order conditions its irrelevance to radical groups seeking to change the existing order.

In an echo of Rueschmeyer's point concerning law, the "labelling perspective" in sociology calls our attention to the normative basis of practice in the social service occupations. It suggests that both the "talking therapies" and the "public assistance" agency, systematically and routinely assume their clientele to be pathological. The relevant pathology, however, is diagnosed from cues which mark an individual's non-conformity to social norms. Consequently, the "helping professions" are often led to orient their helping strategies with primary regard for dominant definitions of conformity rather than for the client's individual needs. It is almost too familiar to make the observation that an individual's failure to satisfy his or her needs often stems from inadequacies of the normative institutional system itself. Our point is that, in such occupations where the "service orientation" is claimed as the strongest justification for professional status, the principle that client-needs should subordinate all other considerations is routinely violated.

A further line of criticism suggests that a wide gap exists between the self-espoused "commercial disinterest" of the professional and the reality of his or her behaviour. Set against the professional's contributions to our vocabulary of pejoratives (such as the "money-hungering capitalist"), there is the not uncommon public image of the doctor as "scalper" and the lawyer as "shyster". However, professionals themselves allege to transcend an economistic bias in their work by objectively differentiating their process of accomplishing fee schedules from both "market-will-bear" principles and conflict-oriented, union-management bargaining.

Despite these claims, a long line of criticism-which we shall subsequently discuss,-suggests that professions tend to usurp free market principles more to their own advantage than to the advantage of their clients.

Professions claim to transcend the "bread-and-butter" emphasis attached by unions to the collective bargaining process. However, the recent spread of unionism (subsequently discussed) in the upper strata of white-collar work, has weakened their argument. This development, however, is a recent one. Traditionally, as Haug and Sussman have argued,

> instead of engaging in a power contest between
> haves and have-nots, the (professional) associa-

> tion undertakes to protect and expand the knowledge base, enforce standards of learning, entry and performance, and engage in similar activities designed to enhance the position of the practitioner while simultaneously purporting to protect the welfare of the public in the person of the client. Indeed, professional claims concerning the primacy of the public good over the practitioner's own private benefit might be viewed as a critical difference between the professionalizing and the union modes of mobility, were it not for the considerable evidence that the claims are watered down with rhetoric (Haug and Sussman, 1971:527).

In the union perspective, the determination of labour is taken as a conflict involving antagonistic class interests. It is true that business unionism waters this down (see especially, our discussion in Chapter Nine). However, according to the celebrants of professionalism, they also allege to seek to create the conditions for their relative autonomy from external mediation. As a justification for this autonomy, professions claim to have developed a mode of self-regulation which is as much interested in the consuming public as its own remuneration. However, as Haug and Sussman have suggested, the key to understanding the attempt to professionalize rather than unionize may lie in the fact that the power struggle is deflected to the societal level (1971:327).

Larson has suggested that the attempts of occupations to professionalize is a struggle against rival occupations, waged within the same class, rather than across class lines (1974:313). Illuminating Haug and Sussman's concept of a "deflection" to the "societal level", Larson writes:

> The struggle on the societal level is largely an ideological battle for recognition, for only through social recognition can personal superiority be securely affirmed. Unions, in their hours of glory, asserted the moral and functional superiority of the working class in terms that necessarily implied the rejection of the social hierarchy and basic

> values of capitalist society. The socialist movement explicitly asserted collective class identity in terms of the totality of a superior social order. But professionalization, as a movement for status advancement, is bound to appeal to general values of the dominant ideology, at least in order to make its own values acceptable . . . From their generalized, "societal" appeal, professions derive an ideology of neutrality - that is, of service to the public as a whole. It has been shown many times, however, that professions and professionalizing occupations address the "public as a whole" only in ideology: sponsorship was sought by traditional professions from the upper class, and is sought today from particular groups in the legislative or executive branches of government (Larson, 1974: 313-314).

Other critics of the alleged "service orientation" view it as an ideological legitimation of the increasing intrusion of specialist monopolies on the range of individual choice. In this regard, the professionalization of key institution functions has been associated with the re-emergence of "status" rather than "contract" relations. Here, criticism is levelled at the separation of traditionally prized spheres of social action from the individual, from the family, and from the community and their consequent relegation to institutional monopolies. In brief, the self as formed in interaction with the family and peers and through the local community, is seen to be increasingly intruded upon by authoritative "experts". With the sanction of the state and its implied or applied coercive force, these "experts" are seen to increasingly dictate appropriate action and impose values.

Behind this criticism lies the assumption that persoanl responsibility is being eroded and society's problems are swept under an institutional rug woven of specialist fabric. Illustrative of this sentiment is the notion that even the best of professional amelioration, for the emotionally distraught, cannot compete with a satisfying and supportive matrix of family and friendship relations.

Leiberman (1970), in a book suggestively entitled Tyranny of the Experts, gives the theme its general expression. He argues that the ideal of liberal capitalism - a self-regulated market economy and a pluralistic political system - is being usurped by the articulation of an ever-widening sphere of professional authority. He warns (1970:3): "Professionals are dividing the world into spheres of influence and erecting large signs saying 'experts at work here, do not proceed further'." Through such mechanisms as licensing, self-regulation, and political pressure, he argues that the professions tend to erode democracy.

Ivan Illich focuses on personal services - medicine and education in particular - arguing that "modernization" has brought with it a socially unnecessary dependency on professional monopolies and the state (1970 and 1975). This, he believes, serves to stifle individual initiative. He claims particular concern for the underdeveloped countries where the repetition of this pattern may have particularly inhibiting consequences for the growth of self-sufficiency amongst third world populations, whose economic development is already strangled by the web of international business monopolies.

One aspect of Illich's critique - cost-inflation unrelated to problem-solving effectiveness - dates at least to the 1940's. At that time, professional monopolies were criticized for distorting market price structures. Friedman and Kuznets (1945) showed that the control of entry into the medical profession in the United States by the medical associations served to boost doctors' incomes out of proportion to comparable occupations. They compared this with the profit-increasing effects of monopolization in business. Kessell (1958:20-53), following up this theme, attempted to show that a variety of normative practices, including: (1) semi-obligatory membership in the American Medical Association, (2) a reluctance amongst members to criticize colleagues openly, (3) the treatment of colleagues and their families free of charge, and (4) the opposition to advertisement, are in fact, very similar to strategies employed by monopolies and cartels to secure the same outcome.

Antipathy to the professions, of course, come not only from social scientists. Merton and Barber have identified what they term four "structural sources of ambivalence" in the layman's view of the professional (1963:110-115). These are: (1) the norm of continuity, which constrains the client to persist with his original choice among possible professionals, contrary to free-market principles and even though dissatisfied, (2) the attribute of authority, which requires the client to reveal confidences to the professional and if conscientious, to act upon advice that he will not enjoy, (3) the perception that professionals are dependent upon clients and "live off" them, even though clients recognize their own dependence on professionals, (4) the fact that professionals, in concert with their peers, tend to judge performance in terms of technical proficiency, but the client has a primary concern with results.

The idea that the professions elaborate a system for assuring their consumers that they possess superior competence in a specialized sphere, is also questionalbe. As suggested above, attempts by occupations to become recognized as professions, must be understood in part, as a collective struggle for occupational security. It would be naive to ignore the wider distribution of power within which such a struggle must proceed in reality. In a stratified society, the struggle for achievement of occupational security by any group of workers is played out within the context of a mass, internally differentiated by a variant capacity to achieve a satisfactory match between desired goals and the reasonable expectation of their fulfillment. Thus, to assume that certain occupations achieve relative autonomy and the right to privileged remuneration is related to their successful persuasion of consumers-in-general, ignores the social hierarchy. Such an assumption could only be born out by test in a fully democratized society.

As Larson has noted (above), "occupations address the 'public as a whole' only in ideology." Larson argues that claims of expertise made by professions do not require substantiation by an "undifferentiated mass" (1974:314). Rather, these claims need only be made to:

> segmental publics . . . such as clients utilizing services or colleagues employed in related tasks and fields, (who) are in a position to recognize the skills of the professional and grant the necessary autonomy (Haug and Sussman, 1969:153).

It is perhaps obvious, but it should be stressed that these segmental publics vary themselves by such common discriminators as class, race and ethnicity (Rueschemeyer, 1972:5-6; Walsh and Elling, 1972). Finally, the same criticisms which have inspired resistance to professional claims to ethical superiority, bear upon the validity of professional credentials. A more realistic interpretation of the "systematic reassurance" process would be forced to focus on the relationship between the striving occupation, its members' social origins, and the utility of its product to different groups within the general system of social production. For most of us, the establishment of professional monopolies is a remote process which ignores our individual opinions. Many of us would agree with Merton's characterization of contemporary professionals as being possessed of a "trained incapacity" for social responsibility (1957). However, as the smug doctor might put it: "Who asked ya?"

Thus, we can see that the imperfect agreement surrounding the formal criteria of profession is warranted, and upon critical reflection, the appeal of the professions is somewhat tarnished. Even assuming that the visible traits of the established professions - the training school, the professional association, the code of ethics, the licensing procedures - are socially significant, clarity evades us. As Larson has noted: "There is no clear threshold nor any definite empirical characteristics or combination of characteristics to mark the boundaries of the professional phenomenon" (1974:viii). Furthermore, as Freidson has remarked of one attempt to define profession:

> In the first (characteristic), training, are concealed at least three problems of specification - "prolonged", "specialized", "abstract". Since all training takes some time, how prolonged must training be to qualify? Since all training is somewhat specialized, how does one determine whether it is specialized enough to qualify? Since "abstract" is a relative term rather than an absolute term, how does one determine whether training is abstract or theoretical enough? (1970:78)

Finally, it should be pointed out that while most established professions do indeed rank high on prestige scales, such scales are even more favourable to positions of institutional power distinct from the professions. Furthermore, "since the rankings reflect synthetic evaluations, it is impossible to ascertain the weight assigned to the 'professional' characteristics of training and disinterestedness . . ." (Larson, 1974:ix). It would be a reasonable speculation that prestige may be assigned on grounds quite distinct from the assumed uniqueness of professional work. Controlling for high income, "upper middle class" status, or the over-representation of established professions in positions of institutional power - particularly agencies of the state - might render such prestige assignation spurious.

III. Discerning a Theory of Professional Power in the Image

As we have seen, the literature which sets out to clarify the meaning of "profession" yields a concept which is heavily burdened with ideological freight. One cannot but agree with the complaint that social scientists, in studying such specialized occupations, have tended to absorb the self-serving distinctions which professionals themselves avow.[9]

Coupling the above criticisms with the fact of dissensus over the definition of profession prevalent in the literature, the utility of the concept as a unit of institutional analysis is dubious. In the lay conception of a profession, typically medicine and law stand out as prototypes - the same initial conception which appears to have informed much of the sociological study of the professions.

With Eliot Freidson, we find ourself in agreement on a crucial point. It will be noted that, in the critical discussion, we have neglected the workers' control attribute. Freidson argues that this attribute retains its credibility for medicine - an occupation prototypical to both lay and scholarly conceptions of profession - even after the disagreement and connotation is filtered out. In his words,

> a profession is distinct from other occupations in that it has been given the right to control its own work . . . While no occupation can prevent employers, customers, clients and other workers from evaluating its own work, only the profession has the recognized right to declare such "outside" evaluations illegitimate and intolerable (Freidson, 1970: 71-72).

We can, in accepting Freidson's view, relieve ourselves of the ideological embellishment which overlays the concept in the literature we have reviewed. Most importantly, we can concentrate on an examination of the determinants of exceptional, occupational self-regulation of the production process. We can then more easily shift to the macro-sociological concern which attracted the present thesis: the extent to which professionalization is a generalizing process within industrialized societies. In this way we can sidestep the confusions invited by absorbing the subjective claims of professionals themselves - which many of the other attributes discussed assuredly represent.

In selecting out the workers' control attribute we are not making any radical dijuncture with tradition: for the very literature which we reviewed to yield our conventional "image" provides a common view of this determination process. We can divide that literature into three approaches to differentiating professional work: the "trait-list approach, the "processual" or "sequential" approach, and the "functionalist" approach.

The ideal-typical approach proceeds by abstracting a checklist of attributes which distinguish a profession from other types of occupations; an occupation is then compared with the derived ideal-type in order to establish its relative fit. This has been the most common approach represented in the literature.

The second approach was inspired by Hughes' claim that in his own studies, he passed from the false question,"'Is this occupation a profession?' to the more fundamental one, 'What are the circumstances in which people in an occupation attempt to turn it into a profession, and themselves into professional people?'" (cited in Vollmer and Mills, 1966:v). Critical of the ideal-typical approach on the grounds of its historicity, the second approach seeks out the circumstances in which claims to professional status are made.[10]

Despite the salient criticism of the trait-list approach developed by "process" advocates, we would argue that their approach is only superficially different from the approach they have criticized. It is true that the former is ahistorical in its posing the question: "What are the attributes of commonly recognized professions?", and the latter is sensitized to the historical. However, studies typical of the second approach, in deriving a sequential model themselves depend upon an ideal-type. Wilensky and Caplow, who have followed Hughes' suggestion, emerge with a number of steps in what they term a "professionalization" process. Yet in seeking to generalize this sequence, they have accomplished little more than establishing a procedure for ascertaining which stage of professionalism a given occupation has arrived at - those stages being themselves abstracted from a study of occupations commonly considered fully professionalized.

The trait-list and processual accounts each suggest that both the individual and the state surrender extra-normal authority to the recognized professions to perform specialized functions in the division of labour. The individual client, as distinguished from the mere "customer", surrenders authority to the professional otherwise reserved either for market competition or for intimates or authority figures valued by tradition, law or charisma. The state is seen to surrender to the professional, the right to regulate practice in a specialized sphere of competence - rights which are also otherwise regulated by tradition, legal-coercion, or the market. In short, a profession is conceived in the ideal-typical sense, as a monopoly of competence. To acquire that authoritative monopoly, an occupation must be able to offer certain things in exchange. It must claim its achievement of, and have the capacity to sustain its members superior basis in knowledge, in skill and in ethos relative to other occupations contesting for the same authority in a common productive sphere.

The literature implies that an occupation's superior authority is to be explained by its meshing with the value system of the larger society. The "fit" is measured by prestige scales, the depth of submissiveness of the public (in the person of the consumer), and the formal sanction of the state. This "implication" is made explicit by Parsons who argues that, central to the wider value system which conditions the accretion of professional power, is the "primacy of cognitive rationality" (1968:536-546). Parsons argues that the notion of "cognitive rationality" is *presumed* by the professions. The coverage he gives to this concept embraces both what we have called professional "ethicality" and the secularist value of technical superiority associated with scientifically-based knowledge.

The functionalist position, at least as rendered by Parsons and Barber, asserts that the real distinctiveness and prestige of the professions is related to the value which industrialized societies systematically attach to their functions. Ignoring the common, and we would argue, legitimate criticism, that the functionalist approach is ahistorical and tautological, we would direct attention to an additional source of its weakness.

As we have pointed out, it is the uniqueness of the *organizational* structure of the so-called professions in the class system which secured sociological interest in them in the first place. Parsons himself reflects a similar interest when he writes that: "professional men are neither 'capitalists' nor 'workers', nor are they typically government administrators or 'bureaucrats' (1968:536). However, when Barber (1963:671-672) says that the professions "possess a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge which allow for a 'powerful' degree of control over nature and society" . . . (and thus) . . . "such knowledge is so important to society that it must be used primarily in the community interest", the class dimension is completely ignored. As Rueschmeyer has argued, the assumption that cognitive rationality is a central cultural value implies a uniform value system - a system which cuts across class lines and interest groups (1964:17-30). It is this generalized value system - assumed to be most fully embodied in the so-called professions - which the functionalist positionassumes to be sufficient to secure an occupation the right to control its own work.

As Johnson (1972:35) has pointed out, Parsons has over-emphasized the association between science and the professions; science being seen as the mediating linkage to the professions' cognitive superiority. Leaving aside the obvious case - divinity - Rueschmeyer points out that law (one of the first "recognized" professions) is not a scientific body of knowledge, but a normative system. Rueschmeyer's argument is that, to a large extent, the role of the lawyer depends upon interpersonal skills rather than a systematic body of knowledge (1964). Extending the same argument to the case of medicine, Johnson argues that,

> it is . . . recognized that in the medical profession the general practitioner's skills are not even predominantly those of a skilled technician, but refer to the ability of the practitioner to relate in a warm and personal way to the patient who is seeking reassurance and a listening ear as much as a specific diagnosis and adequate treatment (1972: 34-35).

These criticisms aside, it can be seen that the literature provides a common answer to our question: "Why do some occupations - commonly termed professions - receive an exceptional right to control their own work?" The "common answer" is that the achievement of such a right is to be explained by the same technological-determinism we have discussed above: occupational power and occupational prestige are seen to be determined by the degree of sophistication demanded of the practitioners of a particular working technology and by the "functional importance" of a specific technique to society-in-general.

CHAPTER 4

Footnotes

1. When discussing "external mediation", we are referring to specific institutional control structures which intervene to regulate an exchange between a producer and a consumer. We are assuming that when treating consumers and producers as the rudimentary dyad to complete an economic exchange, the intervention of another authority such as the State, a large capital formation or simply a middleman such as an entrepeneur, may be considered an "external" mediation.

2. The idea that professionals are ethically disposed - in their work roles - to place their client's interests above all other considerations, is obviously questionable. Indeed, we stress the point later in the chapter. However, it is typical that a professional association requires the codification of this value priority in its constituting document. Further, such associations establish means of policing their own membership to assure conformity to certain ethical and behavioural norms. Again, we may point out the familiar controversy concerning the professional's insulation from client recourse in situations of bad judgement or ethical malpractice. Each, however, can be treated as artifacts of the professional collectivity's good intentions, however great the gap between their actual behaviour and their formal ideals.

3. Whitehead, in developing the distinction between crafts and professions suggested that a craft is "an avocation based on customary activities and modified by the trial and error of individual practice" whereas the professions "are subject to theoretical analysis, and are modified by theoretical conclusions derived from this analysi" (1964:64-65).

4. In support of the service norm, the literature suggests that there are several additional imperatives which influence professional relations with clients and colleagues. One such additional influence is the professional's assignment of primacy to the interests of the client involved immediately with the professional. Thus, other clients not immediately involved in the rendering of service are not expected to influence the specific offering. Furthermore, "other external influences including the professional's personal advancement, personal friendship considerations, money and ethnicity, religion, race or social class of the client are assumed to be irrelevant" (Gross, 1958:79). The professional is also expected to apply the best of scientific technique to the problem presented by the client, independently of these external influences. Parsons refers to this as the norm of "rationality" (1939:457-468).

5. The principle of caveat emptor is the exchange norm which burdens the consumer rather than the producer with the primary responsibility for judging a product or service. Literally, it means "Let the buyer beware!" The buyer purchases a good or service according to his own judgement and at his own risk.

The principle of credat emptor denotes that a fiduciary relationship of mutual trust is expected in an exchange. It is often assumed that because the giving of a professional service cannot be judged by the client in advance, a credat emptor relationship is necessary. In this type of relationship, as Sussman suggests, the client must place his case fully and completely in the hands of the professional (1963:187). In return, the professional is given the freedom to act on the merits of the specific case without being judged except by his colleagues.

6. The sentiment that professionals should be well compensated was once expressed by Adam Smith in the following words:

> We trust our health to the physician, our fortune and sometimes our life reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean and low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give them the rank in society so important a trust requires (cited in Marshall, 1939:325-326).

Marshall himself put it this way:

> The professions . . . are respectable because they do not strive for money, but they can only remain respectable if they succeed, in spite of this pecuniary indifference, in making quite a lot of money, enough for the needs of a gentlemanly life. Money must flow in as an almost unsolicited recognition of their inestimable services (1939:325-326).

7. Flexner has stressed that the professional should ideally "shun commercialism" (1915:901). He notes that a devotion to the interests of others and a denial of the mercenary spirit is the most important distinction marking the professions. "The traditional attitude of the professional man is characterized by a sense of responsibility towards his clients and a feeling of pride in service rendered rather than in opportunity for personal profit," argue Carr-Saunders and Wilson. Further, "the phrase professional pride indicates a code of behaviour whose first consideration is the need of the client and the quality of the work" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1955:284).

8. This collegial "company of equals" concept is, as Barber informs us, an ideal rather than an empirical phenomenon. As a component of professionalism, the ideal of egalitarian and exclusive mutuality of respect is generally viewed as characteristic. Such an ideal, however, is only relative to the judgement of outsiders; for the competition for reputation amongst professionals is clearly severe and associates with intra-professional differentials of respect both in terms of integrity and competence. Functionally, however, the idea serves to convince the public that "outsiders" cannot judge "insiders" (the professionals) in a particular specialty.

9. Everett Hughes once observed, in reference to the sociology of the professions: "One danger is that the social scientist will become pundits when dealing with newer occupations of less privilege than their own, and that they will over-identify themselves with professions of greater prestige than theirs when such deign to ask them in" (Hughes, 1971:369).

10. Wilensky's derivative sequence of professionalism in the United States comprises five stages. These are: (1) the emergence of a full-time occupation, (2) a training school is established, (3) a professional association is founded, (4) political agitation emerges from the occupation which demands the protection in law of the association's supremacy in a specialized work-activity, (5) the adoption of a formal code of ethics (1964:142-146).

    Examining this sequence, Johnson (1972:28-29) pointed out that this "natural sequence" was in fact, itself historically-specific. He noted that in England, the professional association had generally been established before the training school - instructive of the variation in reality as contrasted with Wilensky's theory. Ironically, Caplow's sequence is different than Wilensky's. It runs as follows: (1) a professional association is established, (2) an occupation changes its name, (3) it develops a code of ethics, (4) the occupation agitates for support for its public power, and (5) it concurrently develops its training facilities.

Part II

POST-INDUSTRIAL THEORY AND PROFESSIONALIZATION

CHAPTER FIVE

POST-INDUSTRIALISM: THE EMERGENCE OF TECHNOCRACY?

I. Introduction

Any attempt to synthesize the various strands of thought which contribute to the idea that a post-industrial society is emerging, is a perilous venture. We are presented with similar problems which faced us in our attempts to clarify Durkheim's intentions concerning professionalization. As with Durkheim's writing, post-industrial social thought also represents an admixture of description, advice, wishful thinking, forecast and prediction.

A complete review of the diverse literature which could be subsumed by the rubric: post-industrial thought, is beyond the scope of this project.[1] Fortunately, our concern is more limited. Our specific concern lies with interpretations which post-industrialist writers have provided us, of the impact of technical advance on the occupational structure. Furthermore, we are concerned with the theoretical impact of the post-industrial literature on sociological conceptions of class structure.

Post-industrial theory is reminiscent of various nineteenth century "grand" social theories. Like many of its antecedents, one of its central preoccupations has been with technological development and the relationship of that development to the social distribution of power and authority; as with classical sociology, it is concerned with the division of labour. As Anthony Giddens has remarked of some of the major proponents of post-industrialism, they are

> acutely conscious that most aspects of the notion can be traced back to the early years of the nineteenth century. This may be construed as indicating that the theory has a reputable ancestry; but

> it is also something of an embarrassment, for the point of the idea of post-industrial society is to attempt to encompass some of the most "modern" features of the advanced societies (Giddens, 1973: 255-256).

The sociological literature lacks concensus in identifying the primary determinants of the process which constituted the "industrial revolution". However, post-industrial theorists are not hesitant in agreeing with John Kenneth Galbraith (1971), who argues that science-based technology is now the primary source of social change. Thus, Giddens has suggested that the term "post-industrial" is a generic rubric which subsumes contemporary "technocratic" theories (1973:255). Of this latter concept, Larson has observed that,

> "Technocracy" is a fashionable term today. In advanced industrial societies, technocracy immediately suggests the growing hold of applied natural and social sciences on every sphere of life. In contemporary literature, however, the concept appears to denote many different things - a new social group, perhaps even a new ruling group, a new style of rule, a new dominant ideology and even a new phase of social organization. . . Despite their differing emphases, all contemporary conceptions tie the technocratic role to both the advance of scientific knowledge and to the ongoing transformation of governmental functions (1972-1973:1).

Norman Birnbaum suggests that the basis of post-industrial society is commonly seen to reside in changes in production technology.

> These entail the systematic and ever more rationalized application of science to the production process and to the ancillary processes of administration (1971:396) . . . (specifically) . . . the increasing utilization of automated and computerized means of production and administration, it is argued, has transformed the conditions of production as dramatically as did the first industrial revolution two centuries ago (Ibid.:394).

In post-industrial literature, the western industrialized nations in the past three decades have seen the gradual evolution from a capitalistic to a technocratic type of economy. This means that a new "technology of knowledge" has superseded capital accumulation and the development of specific industries as "take-off" factors of economic growth. The course of this logic leads us inevitably to the notion of a shift from property-based power to authority which is based on expert knowledge and skills. Behind all this is the Weberian notion of rationalization: authority structures come increasingly to be determined by the pervading influence of functional efficiency. Contradictory evaluations of this assumed trend, turn on the outcome perceived from the meshing of an increasingly expertise-based work force with the expansion of the bureaucratic organizational form.

Despite these contradictory evaluations, our initial interest concerns the common themes of post-industrial theory as they relate to the distribution of power.

Post-industrial theory assumes that the most industrially "developed" countries show "undeveloped" countries the image of their own future. The "developed" countries are conceived as "technological pace-setters" (as in modernization theory), whose internally generated innovations will eventually spread to less developed countries.

We may concede some validity to the diffusion hypothesis. Technological advances have tended to spread internationally. Indeed, there was no one more aware of this than Marx.[2] However, neither Marx, nor the post-industrial theorists (for whom time itself has provided a considerable advantage of perspective) took (or take) adequate cognizance of the systemic inhibitions placed upon the economic growth of the so-called "undeveloped" nations by economic imperialism. In this regard, as Baran and Sweezy have commented:

> As we look back on the history of the last hundred years, we can see that what Marx said to the less developed countries actually applied to only a few of them - those which never fell under, or escaped from the domination of the more developed countries and therefore could emulate the latter rather than being exploited by them and hence having their development stunted and distorted to suit the needs of the dominant economy (1966:12).

The United States, however, is commonly viewed as the most highly developed form of post-industrial society; it is, therefore, to the United States that crystal-ball gazers are advised to turn. Thus, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a post-industrial theorist who prefers the term "technetronic society", once wrote: "Contemporary America is the world's social laboratory . . . It is in the United States that the crucial dilemmas of our age manifest themselves most starkly . . ." (1970:196).

We may grant to Brzezinski that in the United States, technological and life-style innovations proceed at incredible speed. Indeed, their obsolete artifacts clutter both the social and physical span of the American landscape.

There is also some truth to the idea that the "crucial dilemmas" of our age "manifest themselves most starkly" in that country. We can point, by way of example, to the social disparities between the very affluent with their massive accumulated fortunes and the "Other Americans", whose deprivations such writers as Michael Harrington have so convincingly documented (1963).

It does not, however, take the social scientist's "trained curiousity" to find the contention dubious that the People's Republic of China is a lesser "international social laboratory" than the United States. Furthermore, as the citation from Baran and Sweezy (above) underscores: what is perhaps the most crucial dilemma of our age, manifests itself internationally rather than simply within the United States. That is, of course, the overdevelopment/underdevelopment relationship between the "have" nations and the "have not" nations in the world trading community.

There remain, however, two general trends in the western, industrialized nations - whose most powerful member is indeed the United States - with which all serious macro-sociological analyses must contend. Firstly, recent decades have witnessed a phenomenal growth in the scale of integrated (unified at some administrative level) business units, as measured by physical assets, financial assets, labour employed and productive output per unit. We refer of course, to the growth of corporate enterprise. Secondly, the state, in these nations, has greatly expanded its economic and social control functions during the twentieth century generally, but more specifically since the Depression of the 1930's.

The appropriation of an enormous range of economic activities by large-scale private and public business organizations from smaller-scale, owner-managed enterprise, coupled with state intervention and expansion, that has inspired the idea that we now or will soon, live in a "post-capitalist" era. If our paradigm of capitalism is the competitive, free enterprise economy ideal-typified by the early phase of industrialization in the west, the post-capitalist idea may be readily conceded.

The writer finds himself resisting the temptation to jettison the concept capitalism. Rather, with Andrew Shonfield we would suggest that Western societies continue to possess many characteristics "which are inextricably connected with their antecedents in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century; (and hence) the word (capitalist) helps to emphasize the continuity" (1965:3).

Shonfield argues that those nations, alleged candidates for the post-industrial description, continue to be appropriately termed "capitalist" because, in them:

> . . . still large areas of economic activity . . . are open to private venture capital, and in those areas its success or failure is determined by the familiar ingredients: the amount of liquid funds available, the efficiency of the controllers of this private wealth and the enterprise of competing owners or managers of private capital (Shonfield, 1965:3).

However, it is on the presupposition of the demise of the class structure - as depicted by Marx - that the post-industrial conception advances. Despite the fact that large areas of economic activity remain open to private venture capital, it has been argued that the antagonistic relations of capitalist production are gradually dissolving.

We will now attempt to present a synthesis of the common elements of post-industrial theory - elements which are common to both the radical optimist and radical pessimist versions of the idea. Subsequent to this discussion, we will take up the professionalization themes that are peculiar to the radical-optimist view.

II. The Technocratic Paradigm: A Theory of Imperative Co-ordination

The increasing significance of expert-based authority relations emerges as a sub-thesis of a more general explanation of the growth of the corporation and the expansion of the state. It can be regarded, as we shall see, as a fleshing out and updating of the technological-determinism which has been pervasive to non-Marxist social science.

In John Kenneth Galbraith's terminology, and echoing Weber and the modernization theorists, scientific innovations in production techniques are seen in post-industrial theory to create "technological imperatives" in both the economic system and in government. It is the combined effects of these "imperatives" which on the one hand, are seen to necessitate the organization of business activity within the corporate mould, and on the other, the expansion of the functions and associated size of the state system as coordinator (regulator and in part, planner) of the economy.

The emphasis on long-term planning and the expansion of public bureaucracies to implement such designs is carried across the ideological spectrum. Thus, Touraine speaks of the "programmed society"[3] and Daniel Bell emphasizes the increasing capacity to predict and therefore plan, economic futures.

The argument, greatly simplified, runs as follows.[4] Firstly, sophisticated production technology is desirable for the widest base of a population because it contains the potential for (a) increasing the stock and availability of consumer goods, and (b) reducing the proportion of the mundane, machine-tending labour which is required in an economy with a less sophisticated production technology. Detractors from the technological "zeitgeist" are considered to be so rare as to be theoretically insignificant.

In the second place, the growth of modern production technology is dependent upon the large-scale procurement of (a) physical resources - in the form of research facilities and materials, and (b) human resources - in the form of scientists, product promoters performing various functions, and technicians.

The third proposition suggests that the mobilization of a pool of finances large enough to purchase sufficient materials and pay incomes, in the typical case now extends beyond the capacity of individual or family-owned production firms. This argument relates to the size of the required initial capital outlay as well as the associated risk that an individual by himself or a small firm by itself, is typically able to engage. Thus, increasingly, there has been a tendency to utilize the private, joint-stock capital procurement model to mobilize sufficient capital outlays. This mechanism both allows for broad participation in investment as well as reduces the investor's risk.

Even for the large corporate firm to raise venture capital in the amount so typically required today, the attraction of the individual investor who confronts a remote and impersonal world of finance, requires the selling of the impression of organized competence.

The fourth proposition is that, to achieve this "impression of competence" technically sophisticated individuals must be available to the production firm to perform the functions of (a) promotion, (b) finance, (c) research and development, (d) operational management, and (e) onstream operations.

The competence of personnel is the principal assurance to the investor of the security and potential for a return on his or her speculation. Institutional means for providing this assurance are provided through the expansion of the means of "credentialing" manpower. These means are provided largely by the state; they centre on the colleges, universities and polytechnical institutions. As Giddens correctly observes of two major advocates of the post-industrial conception:

> . . . both Bell and Touraine argue, that the university, which is the main locale in which theoretical knowledge is formulated and evaluated, becomes the key insitution in the newly emerging society. If the factory was the epitome of industrial society, as the main source of the production of commodities, the university . . . as the source

> of the production of theoretical knowledge, is the central focus of the post-industrial order (1973: 256-257).

The sheer enormity of the tasks involved in corporate product development in the contemporary economy - and the associated risk, demands massive financing, a large and technically sophisticated labour force and massive physical capital. Scale itself, thus increases the temporal span which separates the beginning from the completion of a task (Galbraith, 1971:32).

When a large firm undertakes a technological innovation and brings it to market, the effects of its success or failure will ramify throughout the economy and affect a variety of other social institutions. It will affect wage levels, employment levels, complementary industry, and produce a variety of "spin-off" effects on related product innovation. Both the increase in the span of time - from research to marketing - and the implications of its ultimate marketing success, encourage an emphasis on scientifically plotted courses. In such a cautious economic world, the adventuresome buccaneer who was allegedly yesteryear's enterprising, risk-taking capitalist - whether the reflection of myth or reality - becomes archaic. The key to the post-industrial society is "planning"; the technocrat rather than the capitalist carries that key.

The fifth imperative arises directly out of this emphasis on planning. Post-industrial theory asserts that we have shifted away from a market economy. This assertion rests on at least two principal arguments. As Galbraith has observed, as more time elapses between the initiation of a product innovation and its marketing, and as more capital is committed, "it will be increasingly risky to rely on the untutored responses of the consumer needs no elaboration" (1971:41).

A vast literature gives credence to the view that market competition as conceptualized in the laisser-faire model - in the most productive sectors of the economy at least - has been increasingly abandoned. The literature on oligopolistic "price management" need only be consulted to illustrate the point.

The second argument is that because of the diffuse influence of the success or failure of coporate product innovation, the state is drawn into complementary economic activity. We may paraphrase Galbraith (1971:24-25):

> (1) The political consequences of miscalculations in the corporate sector when investment in technological development is high are great. Thus, the state can reduce the cost and associated risk, and increasingly does so by paying for "more exalted technical development" or guaranteeing a market.
>
> (2) Technology and the associated requirements in capital and time lead even more directly to the state's role in regulating demand. "A corporation, contemplating an automobile of revised aspect, must be able to persuade people to buy it. It is equally important that people be able to do so. This is vital where heavy advance commitments of time and money must be made and where the product could as easily come to market in a time of depression as of prosperity. So there must be stabilization of overall demand" (25).

The combined influence of Keynesian economics, governmental policy ~~adjustments to the Depression~~ and the experience of state management during the second world war, state economic planning has increasingly expanded. It now attempts to uphold business confidence in a variety of ways: by underwriting unprofitable production, providing basic infrastructure, regulating prices and sometimes incomes and attempting to achieve economistic criteria of "full employment".

Perhaps the most controversial proposition of post-industrial theory - and certainly the most novel - states that the crucial difference between industrial capitalism and post-industrial society arises from the emergence of a new factor of production. This sixth proposition has been stated in the following way by Daniel Bell:

> For Marx, capitalism was the production of commodities by labour. But the nature of the new relation of science to technology, for me the axial principle of the post-industrial society, is the production of commodities by the "exploitation" of theoretical knowledge (1974:107).

It is this sixth proposition which gives the fullest support to the notion that the "antagonistic relations" of capitalist production have dissolved and that power is increasingly associated with expert knowledge. Indeed, to supplement his argument, Bell cites the neo-Marxist "Critical" theorist Jurgen Habermas, who writes:

> . . . technology and science become a leading productive force, rendering inoperative the conditions for Marx's labour theory of value. It is no longer meaningful to calculate the amount of capital investment in research and development on the basis of unskilled (simple) labour power, when scientific-technical progress has become an independent source of surplus value, in relation to which the only source of surplus value considered by Marx, namely the labour power of the immediate producers, plays an ever smaller role. . . (Habermas, 1970:104).
> In consequence of the two tendencies that have been discussed (the other is technocratic thinking), capitalist society has changed to the point where two key categories of Marxian theory, namely class struggle and ideology, can no longer be employed as they stand (Habermas, 1970:107).

In a phrase, Bell argues that, "in effect, not labour power (and the working class) but science (and knowledge classes) is the 'decisive factor' in the growth of the productive forces of society" (1973:107).

Bell is taking his cue from a question asked and answered by Galbraith: "Why is power associated at some times with one of the factors of production rather than others?". That is, why should ownership of land at one time convey power and at another time ownership of capital? Galbraith's response may be quoted:

> Power goes to the factor which is hardest to obtain or hardest to replace. In precise language it adheres to one that has the greatest inelasticity of supply at the margin. This inelasticity may be the result of a natural shortage, or an effective control over supply by some human agency, or both (1971:70).

Galbraith argues that in the age of land, labour and capital could be readily obtained. In the age of capital, labour and land were in relatively abundant supply. He continues:

> Should it happen that if capital were to become abundant or redundant, and thus be readily increased or replaced, the power that it confers, both in the enterprise and in the society, would be expected to suffer. This would be especially probable if, at the same time, some other factor of production should prove increasingly difficult to add or replace (Ibid.:71).

In post-industrial theory, as noted, the "new factor of production" is assumed to be expert knowledge. Accordingly, the basic trend of change that has been characterizing the most advanced industrial societies in the last three decades is considered to be the gradual evolution from a capitalistic to a technocratic type of economy. In the technocratic economy, functional efficiency, evaluated in terms of technical skill levels, provides the commanding criteria for the allocation of individuals to authority positions. For Galbraith this implies that because of specialization itself, there is a tendency in a technocratic economy for power to diffuse "deeply down" into the organization.

Whereas some years ago capital accumulation and the development of specific industries were envisaged as "take-off" factors of economic growth, in post-industrial theory the focus is on a new "technology of knowledge" which fosters the use of automatic and computerized means of production and administration. Of central importance is the assertion that the power of the capitalist - which rested on the ownership of property - has been eroded. With expert knowledge assuming primacy over land and capital, power gradually shifts in the economy to those who possess it. During the past one hundred years, the capitalist businessman played the central role in the structure of societal power. As one writer has remarked:

> He was the man who would supply capital, determining the quality, the amount, and the speed of production, influence prices, costs, wages or interests, and even control the state which would be serving the will and interest of the capitalist class. He was dependent only on the market situation where he had to satisfy the demands of the customers and with the competition with other businessmen. However, today the picture is changing drastically, and the power of the businessman as a private operater is in sharp decline; corporate concentrations are taking over the field of business. Success in the business of modern corporations does not depend any longer on the imagination and risk-taking ability of a single entrepeneur, but on the use of highly specialized knowledge which has become the new dominant factor of production (Calderola, 1972:1-2).

In post-industrial theory it is contended that a new knowledge elite is replacing the capitalist. The logic of the argument follows from the conjunction of the above outlined "imperatives". The requirements of technology not only necessitates the expansion of both the corporate economic model and the state system. It also constantly calls into being the need for specialized talent for its organization. The entrepeneurial generalist, like the owner-managed enterprise, is not capable of the task. Assuming the "managerial revolution" thesis to be history - control having typically long since passed from ownership to management - the post-industrial theorists argue that even management's autonomous power is increasingly differentiated and diffused to technical specialists. In order to plan effectively - and long-term, large-scale planning is assumed to be the order of the day - the specialist must absorb the power.

In Galbraith's view of the diffused authority structure, power in the industrial system "extends from the leadership of the modern industrial enterprise down to just short of the labour force and embraces a large number of people and a large variety of talent"(1971:84). Further,

> it embraces chairman, president, those vice-presidents with important staff or departmental responsibility, occupants of other major staff postitions, and perhaps, division or department heads not included above. It includes, however, only a small proportion of those who, as participants, contribute information to group decisions. This latter group is very large; it extends from the most senior officials of the corporation to where it meets, at the outer perimeter, the white and blue collar workers whose function is to conform more or less mechanically to instruction or routine. It embraces all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making. This, not management, is the guiding intelligence - the brain - of the enterprise (Galbraith, 1971:84).

The seventh assertion of post-industrial theory is the argument that the very character of knowledge is changing. The linkage between science and production has created the possibility of making routine manual labour obsolete - by not only designing machines to replace it but by creating the automated facilities to co-ordinate labour-substitutive machinery.

Entire spheres of production knowledge can now be computerized, and formerly complex decision-making processes are now automated, becoming the routine responsibility of computers. As Galbraith suggests: "Machines have replaced crude manpower and are now increasingly used to instruct other things" (1971:21). Not only routine labour, but also routine supervision is declining in importance.

According to Daniel Bell, "industrial society" was characterized by the co-ordination of machines and workers for the production of goods; its growth depended on empiricism and experimentation. However, Bell argues that in post-industrial society, the routine use of complex information retrieval systems combines with the decision-making capacity of automated equipment to create a new orientation in the production of economic knowledge. With an increasing abundance of data at the disposal of specialists - via the computer - Bell sees the beginnings of a shift to an emphasis on theoretical modelling. Through the use of new and complicated mathematical models, decision-making based upon the simulation of alternative economic futures is made possible. Economic theory thus enters the practical domain of corporate and state management - both with their sites fixed upon more distant futures, but futures better anticipated than ever before.

Post-industrial theorists assume a general trend towards the reduction in demand for routine labour under the impact of automation. The eighth proposition of post-industrial theory suggests that there is a "structural shift" taking place: from a primarily goods-production economy to a primarily service-production economy.

According to Daniel Bell, the United States is a post-industrial society if service-production has outstripped the production of goods as the principal economic activity (1973:14-15, and 121-164).

The focus on service production traces back to the economists Allan G.B. Fisher (1935) and Colin Clark (1940) who conceptualized a tri-sectoral division of production. Their sectoral demarcation was based upon the relative proximity of a particular productive activity to the consumer. Clark wrote that,

> primary industry includes agricultural, pastoral, forest, fishing, and hunting industries. Secondary includes manufacture, electric power production, mining, building and construction. Tertiary industry is defined by difference as all other economic activities (1944:122).

It is the "tertiary" sector with which the services are normally assumed to correctly fall when classified, i.e., the distributive end of the production/consumption continuum. However, there is dissensus concerning which occupations should be included as services.

Despite this dissensus, it should be noted that it has been common to include within the tertiary classification (services), several industries which service business firms. These include wholesale trade, commercial banking, advertising and certain public services such as energy utilities whose major customers tend to be private businesses.

The conventional explanation for this structural shift in occupational activities is implied in the original formulation by Colin Clark. It runs as follows:

> The more rapid growth of the final demand for services is caused by the fact that as incomes rise the demand for goods tends to rise less rapidly than the demand for services; the growth of intermediate demand for services by goods-producing industries as a result of increased division of labour; and the much more rapid growth of output per man in industry and agriculture as compared with services, causes the first two sectors to shed labour and the third to be swollen by it (summarized by Kumar, 1976:446).

Post-industrial theory - viewing science as a "new factor of production" - alleges that the technological knowledge generated within this "service sector", is itself responsible for much of the output per man in industry and agriculture. This may be the case, but treating labour in these sectors independently from labour-in-general, raises some serious theoretical questions. We shall attend to these in the next chapter.

III. Professionalization: The Legitimation of Post-Industrial Theory

Post-industrial theory asserts that advances in production technology in the middle and latter parts of this century, are transforming the structure of economic and political power in western society in fundamental ways. If the industrial revolution spawned the rule of the industrial capitalist, the post-industrial society is alleged to raise the technically skilled to pre-eminence.

Those who have assumed the credibility of the post-industrial conception vary significantly in terms of their interpretations of its implications.

Some have seen in this conception the subordination of man's entire institutional life to the dictates of technical-rationality. They have read into this, the increasing loss of human freedoms.

For others, post-industrialism promises a complex of solutions to the social problems long associated with the industrialization of capitalist societies.

Despite this polarity, post-industrial writers assume in common, a determinate relationship between the possession of technical skill and power. Echoing Weber and the Functionalists, instrumental rationality is seen by post-industrial writers to be the unifying ethos - the basis of a pervasive, secular religion of modern man. Thus, the skilled and highly educated technical worker - the most faithful to the creed - becomes the embodiment of the new authority system.

Our attention now turns to the affirmative vision of post-industrial society; our objective is to present the legitimation of the concept. For reasons which will become apparent, the legitimation of post-industrial society is premised upon a "professionalization" thesis. We should quickly point out that our usage of the term "thesis" is a hazardous choice. Indeed, the literature does not present us with a coherent and systematic set of logically inter-related and empirically-tested propositions to give it warrant. The synthesis provided above was our own. The ensuing synthesis, likewise, is developed by this writer.

Much like early speculative social thought about the future role of the professions in the social structure of industrial society, post-industrial theory is strikingly vague.

In the affirmative vision of post-industrial society a conception is advanced, which depicts the gradual shedding of capitalist organizational and ideological principles. There are two fundamental attributes of the economy, which have encouraged the "post-capitalist" idea amongst post-industrialist writers. As we shall see, each are associated with assertions of the uniqueness of professionalism.

Firstly, there is the idea that the growth of professional occupations and membership is the most significant long-term trend in the occupational structure. This may be considered as but one of the now many versions of western society being filled out by a "new middle class". It is often seen as a crucial contradiction of Marx's proletarianization thesis; for professional work is often defined by its difference with both capital and industrial labour.

The professional regulation of occupations is seen as the most rational means for a social system to appropriate skill and talent from a population and allocate it to the required roles which in aggregate, constitute its productive mode. In contrast, industrial labour - seen as a passing stratum - is viewed as relatively unskilled and highly vulnerable to market conditions. Further, the industrial- or financial-capitalist is viewed as dependent upon his advantaged position in a system of property relations. Both the means of the capitalist's achievement - competition for profit or family inheritance - and his social responsibility, are slighted. Professionalization is, therefore, considered a progressive development amongst the radical-optimists.

In brief, the post-industrial departure from capitalist class relations is premised upon the hypothesis that, the labour force of the industrialized nations is being professionalized. As in Durkheim's early challenge to Marx's proletarianization thesis, post-industrial theory conceives of an unfolding, rational and legitimate system of occupational authority relations.

A second aspect of post-industrial social thought also presents a challenge to the classical Marxist view of industrial capitalism.

In Marx's formulation of the capitalist distribution system, it appears that the worker's consumption requirements are solely supported through the purchasing power received through the exchange of his or her labour for a wage. However, the intervention of the state in those aspects of distribution which affect the material receipts of the working class, have complicated the exchange relation between labour and capital. The consumption needs of the contemporary worker are also met by public distribution channels which appear to be external to the labour market.

If the worker subject to the demand fluctuations of the labour market, is unable to enter into exchange relations with capital, he or she must turn to state redistribution agencies and receive income in the form of "social security" payments. Furthermore, if the worker receives insufficient income to meet subsistence requirements, social security increments are often available to supplement income. Finally, with the development of the welfare state, a variety of consumption items have been either partially or wholly removed from the market and distributed through the state system. These include: recreational facilities, schools, universities, medical care insurance, personal social services, manpower retraining programs, roads, energy, communication utilities and so on.

While the extent of appropriation of distributive functions by the state system varies considerably throughout the western division of nations, in none of them can it be said that public distribution is an insignificant channel of supply for the individual worker. The expansion of state social welfare functions appears to challenge the Marxian precept that prior to a socialist revolution, capitalism would persistently convert all products and social activities into what Marx called "exchange values", i.e. the commodification process.

In the Marxist schema, every product of human endeavour normally possesses utility; it satisfies some human need. Marx referred to that utility as "use-value". However, while all products have a use value, when labour was engaged for the purposes of sale in a market, its character is altered in being produced not for direct consumption but exchange. When labour produced commodities rather than simple use-values, in order to facilitate the marketing of products, those commodities had to be assigned "exchange-values". Capitalism, according to Marx, tended to generalize the social production of commodities, producing the long-run elimination of labour expended for the production of simple use-values. What state intervention in the distribution system appears to do, is to reverse this process. It appears to remove an increasing number of goods and services from the market place and distribute them according to "public service" criteria rather than market principles.

The obvious temptation, which is taken up by post-industrial theorists, is to link the notion of "public service" distributive criteria to the service ethos espoused by professionals. As we shall see, this linkage serves as the basis for the second area of legitimation of the structure elaborated in the post-industrial conception.

Authority Relations: From Administrative Command to Professional Control

Daniel Bell has been most emphatic about the professionalization trend in the occupational structure. According to that writer, changes in the mode of production associated with the expansion of science and technology determine a long run shift in the composition of the labour force. Private property - the power base of the capitalist entrepeneur - is seen to lose its hold over the control of production. This is, of course, now a well worn argument. However, Bell suggests that it is professionalized management which is replacing the capitalist, and that this means a qualitative change in managerial authority is occurring. Why? Because the technical competence now necessary to acquire a managerial position is rooted in the professional ethos. This ethos is seen to differ markedly from the business ethos.

Borrowing from the sociology of the professions, Bell argues that a profession is a formally learned set of occupational skills. Further, under professionalism, certification and accountability is a peer function. In contrast, the business man is called to account by his customers through the market. Furthermore, whereas property can be passed on through legal title directly, a professional's market capacity must be achieved through formal training. Finally, Bell suggests that expectations about professional conduct derive from an ethic of service which is prior to the business ethic of self-interest.

Post-industrial theorists are at pains to stress the fact that higher education is increasingly becoming a qualification for remunerative employment. As we have previously observed, a "higher education" is considered in the sociology of work to be one of the "core features" of professional employment.

The expansion of the higher educational system has been seen as a principal means of achieving upward social mobility - providing a viable alternative to militant class struggle for the worker. Typically, the expansion of the white-collar labour force is related with the growth of "higher" educational qualifications - a degree being seen as a ticket to white-collar work. Such workers, it is assumed, have been traditionally less favourable to "unionateness" - they have been less willing to identify with the labour movement.

Bell and Galbraith have each argued that because of the growth of white-collar work and the stable or declining sector of blue-collar work, unions tend to lose their power in relation to general economic decision-making. Galbraith comments in this regard that,

> the union belongs to a particular stage in the development of the industrial system. When that stage passes so does the union in anything like its original position of power. And as an added touch of paradox, things for which the unions fought vigorously - the regulation of aggregate demand to insure full employment and higher real incomes for members - have contributed to their decline (1971:268).

Post-industrial theorists emphasize the limited interest of white-collar workers in unionism by pointing to the statistical decline of union membership in the United States. "The workers, particularly white-collar workers and technical scientific workers - in effect, become an extension of the technostructure and evidently so see themselves" (Galbraith, 1971:270). Thus, with the declining power of the unions and the increase of the white-collar proportion of the work force (who possess a degree of power and the lucrative remuneration which accompanies the possession of specialized knowledge), the conflict between capital and labour emphasized by Marxists, is seen to gradually disappear. If we accept these claims, this would suggest that professionalism - taken as a specialty-based occupational ideology distanciated from unionism - is growing at the expense of trade union (working-class "economistic") consciousness.

Let us tentatively assume that the capitalist class has declined in importance and the industrial blue-collar labour force has lost much of its organized power. Let us also assume that economic power is diffused amongst the new "middle class" of white-collar workers. The question then arises: "Have elites disappeared in post-industrial society?" An answer to this question must relate both to the economy and to the political process. We have indicated the post-industrial answer above: a new elite structure peopled by those with the "most specialized" knowledge emerges. What makes the new elite legitimate for the "radical optimists" is the elite-recruitment process: they consider it to be increasingly determined by merit. Within each specialized sphere, individual productivity increasingly serves as the basis for rising to key positions of influence. Bell thus writes that,

> because the technocratic mode reduces social arrangements to the criteria of technological efficiency, it relies principally on credentials as a means of selecting individuals for place in the society. But credentials are mechanical at worst, or specify

> minimum achievement at best; they are the entry device into the system. Meritocracy, in the context of my usage, is an emphasis on individual achievement and earned status earned by one's peers (1973:453).

According to Galbraith, centralized power has not supplanted diffuse power. Instead, power has spread to the "outer perimeters" of the technostructure - apparently encompassing an increasingly large proportion of the work force. In the "industrial system" of the large corporation, leadership assigns tasks to committees from which decisions emerge. Because organized intelligence is the decisive factor of production, the selection of intelligence is of paramount importance. Furthermore, "it cannot be supposed that a boss can replace or even second-guess organized intelligence on substantive decisions" (Galbraith, 1971:83).

For Galbraith, the imperatives of planning and efficiency dictate the reliance of the organization on groups of specialized, knowledge-based workers. Workers are organized in groups through a multitude of committees. This autonomy must be protected and it must pass "deeply down into the organization". Galbraith suggests that if a group is to be expected to act responsibly, it is imperative that it must be given responsibility (1971:82).

In the industrial system, according to Galbraith, interference in group decision-making is counter-productive to the overall process, "Not only does power pass into the organization but the quality of decision can easily be impaired by efforts of an individual to retain control over the decision-making process" (Galbraith, 1971:82).

> It follows from the tendency for decision-making to pass down into organization and the need to protect the autonomy of the group that those who hold high formal rank in an organization - the President of General Motors or General Electric - exercise

> only modest powers of substantive decision. This power is certainly less than the conventional obeisance, professional public relations or, on occasion, personal vanity insist. Decision and ratification are often confused. The first is important; the second is not. There is a tendency to associate power with any decision; however routine, that involves a good deal of money. Business protocol requires that money be treated with solemnity and respect and likewise the man who passes on its use. The nominal head of a large corporation, though with slight power, and perhaps in the first stages of retirement, is visible, tangible and comprehensible. It is tempting and perhaps valuable for the corporate personality to attribute to his power of decision that, in fact, belongs to a dull and not easily comprehended collectivity. Nor is it a valid explanation that the boss, though impotent on issues of policy, acts on broad issues of policy. Such issues of policy, if genuine, are preeminently the ones that require the specialized information of the group (Galbraith, 1971:82-83).

Thus, as power has passed to the decision-making groups which comprise the technostructure, and increasingly the industrial system expands, larger and larger sections of the work force become specialized decision-makers in the economy. And as in the economy so in the state, for the state borrows on the same technology of rationalization and recruits its employees from the same training institutions. Furthermore, according to Galbraith the state increasingly serves the interests of the industrial system.

Galbraith's position, which asserts the resistance of knowledge-based workers to external intervention, is shared by other theorists who predict the emergence of a post-industrial society from present trends. Viewing industrial capitalism as a specific "mix" of attributes, these theorists suggest that if present trends continue, its composition will have changed beyond a basic point of balance. As Freidson suggests:

> The decline of agricultural labour and the rise of industrial labour created such a change of balance between types of workers in the development of

> industrial society. In the present day, prophets note the decline of industrial or manufacturing labour as a trend indicating that future workers will be engaged primarily in clerical, sales and service work (1973:49).

Freidson argues that a major factor inducing this change is the automation of machine production (1973:49). He does not predict that manufacturing occupations will disappear entirely; rather, just as agricultural labour remained in industrial society, so manufacturing jobs will remain in post-industrial society. Freidson's point is that the bulk of workers will be employed in other kinds of occupations.

Who then will be the archetypal worker? Etzioni (1968) and Lane (1966) share with Galbraith and Bell, an emphasis on the post-industrial society's demands for complex skill vocations for which advanced training is prerequisite - again, an attribute which is considered in the sociology of work to be a core feature of professionalism. The focus of these writers, however, varies with their particular concern.

Galbraith emphasizes the role of the expert who plans and makes decisions in state administration and the corporate structure, as well as the "scientific estate". These experts or "technocrats" (Touraine) are engineers, economists, systems analysts, and specially trained managers. Like Bell, other writers, including Bennis and Slater (1969), and Lane (1968), emphasize a broad class of professional-technical workers. Price (1965) and Touraine emphasize the educational and scientific estate which both produces theoretical knowledge for practical application and trains the new category of professional-technical workers. Other writers, including Halmos (1970), have emphasized the qualitative importance of the "helping professions": the specially-trained workers who service the institutions of the welfare state.

According to Freidson, the shift to expert-based work poses a threat to traditional administrative authority. In agreement with Bell, he suggests that in post-industrial society, authority may be shifting from a bureaucratic to a professional mode. He argues that,

> if what is being said about post-industrial society is true, then very basic sociological concepts for the analysis of the social organization of work must be reconsidered. One of the most basic concepts is that of division of labour and, particularly, the principle of authority which establishes, co-ordinates and controls specialized labour. Since the Industrial Revolugion, administrative authority has been emphasized. However . . . I wish to suggest that a key to concepts better fitted to the emergent society lies in the logic embedded in the concept of professionalization, which stresses a different principle of authority over labour (Freidson, 1970:48).

Freidson argues that in industrial society, the manager controlled labour. However, he suggests that, "what is different in the forecasts of the post-industrial theorists is that they imply that the capacity of managers to control the productive workers is open to serious question in ways that have not really existed in industrial society" (1973:50). He notes that in forecasts of post-industrial labour, there is the implication that large numbers of the prototypical "knowledge-based" tasks are productive rather than managerial. Because of the complexity and scarcity of the knowledge of the specialized, post-industrial worker, he is better able to resist managerial control. Granting that "the jobs or organizational positions are dependent on management for capital, supportive services and at least some lines of communication" (Freidson, 1973:51), he argues that the tasks of workers are not so dependent. He writes: "their tasks are not created by or dependent on management, nor are their qualifications to perform them so dependent. Finally, evaluation of the performance of those tasks does not rest solely with management" (1973:51).

Other writers have also suggested that the closure of technically skilled occupations to outsiders provides a basis for resistance to bureaucratic control.

Jacques Ellul has written: "Technique always creates a kind of secret society, a closed fraternity of practitioners" (1964:162).

Bennis parallels Ellul's emphasis in commenting that specialized occupational groups are "pseudo-species, bands of specialists held together by the illusion of a unique identity with a tendency to view other pseudo-species with suspicion and mistrust" (1969:66).

Galbraith argues that the occupations that compose the technostructure are peopled by individuals who identify themselves with their department or function rather than with the corporation as a whole.

Reminiscent of Durkheim, Freidson notes that these writers'

> suggestions all point to the development of solidarity among workers practicing the same specialized skill, an organized solidarity strong enough to resist the pressure toward integration and rationalization exerted by management (1973:53-54).

Freidson further argues that professionalism provides a model for the co-ordination of inter-related tasks in complex organizations. In the professional authority system, institutionalized expertise is itself an alternative to bureaucratic hierarchy. Its legitimacy rests on authoritative knowledge rather than incumbency of position.

> Even now, as a class, the professions provide examples of how a structure of occupations can be ordered and co-ordinated hierarchically by the authority of institutionalized expertise. Medicine, for example, gives orders to a wide variety of other workers in an interdependent technical enterprise, and does so even when those workers are in the employ of others. In medicine, the division of labour is ordered and co-ordinated by a dominant profession

> rather than by management for its co-ordination: an at least logically possible alternative to management exists in the form of the occupational principle of authority over work. Prophecies of post-industrial society suggest that there is a very real empirical possibility that the new division of labour may in fact require a shift from managerial to occupational authority (Freidson, 1973:57).

The Equalitarian State: The Humanitarian Influence of Professionalism

Central to the ideological defence of the evolution towards a post-industrial society is the sociological theory of welfare redistribution. In the most fashionable current of that theory, the problems of acute discrepancy in distributive systems are resolved by the special complex of state social welfare institutions. Steering the output of that complex are a panoply of experts, "professionally credentialed" in the family of social science disciplines.

According to Myrdal, the concept of a welfare state includes "government commitments to full employment, equality of opportunity for the young, social security, and protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, housing, health and education for all people, in all regions, and social groups" (1958:45). The literature in the sociology of social welfare enjoins the student to perceive the evolution of the welfare state as coincident with the gradual transcendence of the most dehumanizing effects of capitalism - a precondition for the realization of the "affirmative vision" of post-industrial society.

In their attempt to describe the dominant conceptions of social welfare in the United States, Wilensky and Lebeaux coined the terms "residual" and "institutional" (1965:138-147). The residual concept ". . . holds that social welfare institutions should come into play only when the normal structures of supply, the family and the market, break down" (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965:138). While they differ from other social theorists in their stress on the market, the "residualists" do share the view that social welfare institutions are necessary in modern societies. The residualists see them, however, as "last chance alternatives" - to be turned to only after the "natural" channels of supply (the family and the market) do not suffice.

According to Wilensky and Lebeaux, the residual concept is premised on the notion that the family and the market are always preferable. However, these institutions do not always

> function adequately: family life is disrupted, depressions occur. Sometimes the individual cannot make use of normal channels because of old age or illness. In such cases, according to this idea, a third mechanism of need fulfillment is brought into play - the social welfare structure (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965:135).

Pinker has suggested that residualists tend to assume that the incidence of such problems as poverty decline with industrial growth (1971:99). This belief informs the residualist position concerning the goals around which specific social service programs should be organized. "The aim of social welfare under these circumstances should be to focus selectively upon a residual and declining minority of needy groups" (Pinker, 1971:99). The residualist, Pinker argues, asserts that selectivity will reduce the waste associated with social programs and encompass populations categorized on universalistic principles. By cutting back on universal allocations, scarce resources will flow more abundantly to those in the greatest need.

By contrast, the "institutional" approach sees social welfare programs as normal, first-line functions of modern, industrial society. In this view, social welfare is best described in Friedlander's early introduction to the field.

> Social welfare is the organized system of social services and institutions, designed to aid individuals and groups to attain satisfying standards of life and health, and personal and social relationships which permit them to develop their full capacities and to promote their well-being in harmony with the needs of their families and the community (Friedlander, 1955:4).

In a more recent text which has been widely accepted as introductory reading requisite to courses in social work and the sociology of welfare organization, John Romanyshyn suggests that the "residual" concept is corrective, regulatory, ameliorative and tends to emphasize the provision of help in only emergency situations (1971:4). The "residual" conception he suggests, is giving way to the "developmental" view. This view is a more palliative concept; according to Romanyshyn it

> extends beyond services to the needy to the recognition that all citizens in an industrial society may require a variety of social services to develop their capacity to perform productive roles and to achieve and maintain a desirable standard of well-being (Romanyshyn, 1971:4).

Each of these writers advocate the second view (either "institutional" or "developmental"). They believe that view is an evolving one, slowly winning the sympathies of most legislators. They see the development of social welfare as historically progressive. They believe that those attitudes are on the decline which give sanction only to the authoritarian provision of aid-to-the-needy in emergency situations. In concert with this trend, a network of programs, services and institutions is being erected which reflect the shift of social service provision from a secondary supply system to a primary supply system. Gradually, social welfare becomes generally accepted as a "proper, legitimate function of industrial society in helping individuals achieve self-fulfillment"

Romanyshyn, 1971:5).

In their major study of social welfare, Wilensky and Lebeaux view the traditional complaints centering on the impact of industrialization, as passing, transitional features of economic growth. They summarize:

> Coercive recruitment and painful transformation of peasant immigrants into urban-industrial workers; the insecurities of the factory system, the uncushioned impact of the dilution and obsolescence of skills; the dehumanization of work (whether backbreaking labour or machine-paced, repetitive, routine); class polarization; community disintegration - these decline as economic growth continues (1965:133).

In place of these contingencies, a new society emerges, a "welfare bureaucratic society", institutionalized to deal with the ongoing and emergent problems which beset its membership. These writers see the new society in the following terms:

> As the residual conception becomes weaker, as we believe it will, and the institutional conception increasingly dominant, it seems likely that distinctions between welfare and other types of social institutions will become more and more blurred. Under continuing industrialization, all institutions will be oriented toward and evaluated in terms of social welfare aims. The "welfare state" will become the "welfare society" and both will be more reality than epithet (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965: 149).

In the sociology of social welfare, the emergence of the welfare state is explained as a response to the need for state provision of specialized social services and income security. Need is seen to arise from the decline of the extended family as the basic unit of production, socialization and consumption, and from the growing interdependence of highly specialized production and distribution roles. These processes are assumed to be inevitable organizational concomitants of industrialization. In such a view, all industrial societies become fundamentally similar, with local distinctions and political ideologies disappearing under the weight of the technologically-determined standardization of social organization.

For Ralf Dahrendorf, the central significance of authority deriving from what he calls the "imperative of co-ordination" is that, status hierarchies have superseded the single class division of bourgeoisie proletariat (1959). Dahrendorf argues that capitalist relations of production were but a short-lived phase in the unfolding of the more generic social division of authority. Its historical delimitation, according to Dahrendorf, results from the institutionalization of class conflict through the mediation of the state. He maintains that the social rights of citizenship - including old-age pensions, public health insurance and legislated standard of living minimums - ensure that conflicts and differences of class are at the very least no longer based on inequalities of status in a strict sense of this term.

Dahrendorf's analysis echoes the thought of T.H. Marshall, who saw great promise in the development of a social ideology transcendent of market principles.

For Marshall, the professionalization of public service bureaucracies were vital to the emergence of a social-democratic society. Marshall conceived (1963) the notion of "citizenship" to comprise three elements: civil rights (equality before the law); political (equality in voting), and social (equal right to a minimum income and social services). The public professions would help advance the latter - social rights. Taken together, these make up the "status of citizenship", which provides the foundation upon which the structure of equality could be built. As Wedderburn notes,

> Marshall was well aware that while formal equality might be achieved in these three areas, in reality inequalities would and did persist. But at that time (1949) he was optimistic about the possibility of moving towards more equality in the content of the status of citizenship and through it towards less economic inequality" (Wedderburn, 1965:139).

These older themes are given new blood in the post-industrial thesis where the distinction between private enterprise and the state is blurred. In this view, the state apparatus in the contemporary "mixed" economies of the western, advanced industrial societies, functions to correct any spontaneous tendencies toward recession or stagnation. In so doing, it guarantees private business' normal payoff period of three years or more (Kidron, 1970:18). Thus becuase the state underwrites unprofitable production and basic infrastructure, regulates prices and sometimes income, and guarantees full employment, business confidence is upheld.

Galbraith's later works are representative of this post-Keynesian interpretation. As the following statement reveals, Galbraith assumes that the goals of the state system and the private economy are identical:

> . . . no sharp line separates government from the private firm. . . Each organization is important to the other; members are intermingled in daily work; each organization comes to accept the other's goals; each adapts the goals of the other to its own. Each organization, accordingly is an extension of the other" (1971:320).

Large corporations - the building blocks of Galbraith's "industrial system" - which are guided by technocrats, are seen to be more interested in growth and stability than profit maximization. As one writer puts it, their goals with reference to profit are to "satisfice" rather than maximize (Marris, 1968). Presumably, entrepeneurial capitalists pursued profit with less discretion, greater single-mindedness, and with little regard for the public. However, the size of contemporary corporations and the control they have over entire sectors of the economy gives them the capacity to be extremely disruptive. Their actions ramify well beyond the boundaries of their shareholders' margin of return. Thus, it is assumed that a politically sensitive state has an extremely important stake in the investment, production and distribution policies of the large corporations.

At the same time, the state has become the largest single consumer of corporate commodities and has been heavily involved in the subsidization of science-based research and product development. For these reasons, the goals of the state and the large corporations are seen to overlap; the corporations increasingly take the "public interest" to be their own. The state is seen to interact with the corporate structure for the mutual planning of the production and distribution of goods and services. If one is to accept their theory, the goals of the welfare state are thus realized not only the state, but also by publicly minded corporations.

According to Daniel Bell, the post-industrial society is increasingly becoming a "communal" society in the sense that public mechanisms rather than the market dictate basic priorities in the allocation of goods and services. Individual utility and profit maximization are seen to give way to collective conceptions of social welfare and public interest.

Bell argues that in the last quarter of a century, the political order has replaced the economy as the dominant control system of society. This came about because of three events.

Firstly, he suggests that the Great Depression forced government to play a leading role in directing the economy.

Secondly, the state subsidization of new science-based technology, particularly in the 1950's, intimately linked private corporate production to state policy-making.

Finally, Bell suggests that the turbulence of political protest in the 1960's drew government (particularly American) into a commitment not only to the creation of a substantial welfare state but to redress major economic and social inequalities as well.

For Bell, the shift in the locus of power from business men to a professional-technical-science class, from the firm to the university, and from the economy to the polity, signifies a basic change in the "ethos" of advanced industrial countries.(1973:chapter 4). The principle guiding industrial society, he suggests, is "economizing". It is a principle which Bell argues, tends to emphasize the best allocation of scarce resources among competing ends. Individual satisfaction is the unit in which costs and benefits are assessed. The basic condition for economizing is the market mechanism governing the allocation of scarce resources and a flexible price system which is responsive to shifting patterns of supply and demand. But the industrial economy lacks regulation. Increasing technological and ecological interdependence command a shift from an "economizing" to a "sociologizing" ethos (1973: chapter 4). This new sociologizing ethos subordinates individual utility and profit maximization to collective conceptions of social welfare and public interest.

In the post-industrial literature, technical competence informed by science-based professional theory, is considered the most scarce power resource; the command of technical expertise yields economic control. However, rather than envisioning an Orwellian tyranny of technical experts, the radical optimists look forward to a Durkheimian-like meritocracy in which decision-making power is rationally distributed amongst specialized professional bodies. In contrast to the self-interest of the businessman, the professional is assumed to be subjected to the influence of the "service ethic" which places the interests of the client above considerations of self-interest. Professional ethics and professional associations are considered to provide the social cement which binds individual workers to a commitment of service to an unspecialized public of consumers.

As argued above, the "structural shift" in the economy from the production of goods to the dispensing of services, is a pivot of the technocratic paradigm. Providing a series of tables which focus on goods-service and manual, farm, white-collar, service employment shifts, Bell attempts to describe the recent and projected growth of the service sector. For Bell and others, this implies a qualitative change.

The rise of the "service economy" has been seen by post-industrial theorists as a fundamental transformation of the very nature of the individual's ". . . relation to his work and his fellows, a reversal of the trends towards alienation and depersonalization in the large corporation of the industrial society" (Kumar, 1976:447). In this regard, Victor Fuchs states:

> Employees in many service industries are closely related to their work and often render a highly personalized service that offers ample scope for the development and exercise of personal skills. . . The direct confrontation between consumer and worker that occurs frequently in services creates the possibility of a more completely human and satisfying work experience. . . With more and more people becoming engaged in service occupations, the net effect for the labour force as a whole may be in the direction of the personalization of work . . . the line between "work" and "leisure" may be difficult to draw (Fuchs, 1968:189).

Following Fuchs, Daniel Bell says "the fact that individuals now talk to other individuals, rather than interact with a machine, is the fundamental fact about work in the post-industrial society" (1973:163).

The shift to the "service" society is also seen to have reconstitutive political effects. Gartner and Reissman (1974) and Bell (1973) argue that conflict shifts from the "point of production" to the "point of consumption". Bell predicts that "the politics of the next decade is more likely to concern itself, on the national level, with such public-interest issues as health, education, and the environment, and on the local level, crime, municipal services and costs" (1973:164). In short, political struggle in the post-industrial society will tend to be centered on the quality of government services.

Bound up with consumer politics is the internal conflict within distribution organizations between professional organization and bureaucracy. According to Bell, the post-industrial society encounters a conflict between communal (professional) and bureaucratic modes, the former typified by a value system rooted in universalism, communalism, disinterestedness and organized skepticism (1973:chapter 6). But the professional ethos of science is threatened by the growth of bureaucracy. The second source of conflict that the post-industrial society is likely to experience is that between meritocratic and egalitarian justice. According to Bell, the social division of labour in post-industrial society is most effectively served by a meritocracy in which status and incomes derive from technical skills and higher education. Echoing Durkheim, Bell assumes that professional authority is on the increase relative to bureaucratic authority.

It is left to Paul Halmos to furnish the most sanguine image of the "service society".

Halmos argues that political solutions to private problems have been largely discredited and the advanced industrial societies are shifting towards a "post-political" stage. For Halmos, this is a welcome sign. His optimism is centered on the notion that a professional service ethic is in the provess of penetrating the ideologies of all groups and institutions in industrial society, including business (1970).

According to Halmos, post-industrial occupational ideology originates in what he calls the "personal service professions" such as medicine and social work. While originating in the personal service professions, this "personal service ethic" is believed by Halmos to have a widespread influence on the self-image of professional bodies. The personal service professions are, he argues, the leaders in the creation of a new morality which will become uniform. To Halmos, these professions represent an ideological vanguard, their ideology based on "concern, sympathy and even affection for those who are to be helped by the professional practitioners" (Halmos, 1970:14).

Against this many-sided and happy conception of our smoothly evolving future, we now offer a skeptical rejoinder - the burden of our next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

Footnotes

1. Peter N. Stearns writes of the "increasingly current" concept of post-industrial society that,"it serves a variety of interests. All sorts of social scientists find validity in the concept. Sociologists lead the way, some delighting in an idea that frees them from much serious attention to history, but psychologists and even historians have joined the parade. Roger Lane, an historian, attributing the decline of crime in the nineteenth century of England and, possibly, the United States to industrialization, dismisses the twentieth century increase in crime as post-industrial. In other words, nineteenth-century specialists can defend the purity of their era against the contamination that has followed, while twentieth-century fans can trumpet the novelty of their own period. Advocates of youth culture have advanced their claims to a post-industrial society that will be dominated by the values of the young. Supporters of the aged could make an equal case, as the number and influence of older people will clearly grow in the foreseeable future. Apostles of economic affluence have made post-industrial society their own; Herman Kahn, particularly, has based his futurology on the notion that scarcity will have vanished by the year 2000. . . Perhaps most telling is the fact that booksellers now see the post-industrial label as a way to sell books. . . The concept . . . serves virtually any political tendency . . . One might claim that such diverse support adds credibility to the idea. . . After all, conservatives and radicals came to agree that industrial society existed. But here the diverse, contradictory conceptualizations probably indicate the shakiness of the idea itself (1976:10).

   Fairly comprehensive literature reviews can be found in Kumar (1976), Neuberg (1975) and Bell himself (1973).

2. In the Preface to the first edition of Volume One of Capital, Marx stated: "The country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future".

3. This phrase "programmed society", perhaps more than any other, inspires the imagery of a society of people whose daily lives are increasingly scheduled by the instrumental designs of technocrats.

4. Our presentation in this section represents this writer's synthesis of various themes and assertions held in common by the diverse palatte of contributers to the post-industrial conception. It relies, however, most heavily, on the ideas of Galbraith's The New Industrial State and Bell's The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. The writer is the first to admit that his particular interpretation is open to the severest of criticism, particularly in terms of the degree to which it reduces the coverage and complexity of the pertinent ideas. However, at the risk of being accused of assuming that "two wrongs make a right", we would point out that the ambitious output of the

two works just cited, are themselves so broad as to demand volumes to adequately dissect critically. We would argue that macro-sociological approaches by the very nature of their methodological strategies, "bite off more than they can chew". However, the only recourse for such a sin, is to follow the path of those who would focus on only that which can be made readily congenial to standardized, hypothesis-testing procedures; the art of the actuary. Such an approach, however, is foreign to the "species-object" of sociology itself - human society. The gathering of all the facts in the human world, in the absence of a theoretical framework sensitized to the inter-relationships of human institutional structures, can add little to the self-comprehension of human societies.

We should also note that Galbraith himself does not employ the term "post-industrial". However, it was the popularization of many of the themes in his book that allowed, and probably directly inspired Bell, to give a sociological version of certain trends emphasized by Galbraith in the New Industrial State.

CHAPTER SIX

INADEQUACIES IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL CONCEPTION

I. Introduction

The expression "post-industrialism" has been employed to refer to an occupational structure in which a worker's relative authority is a function of his or her technical skill. Certain contributors to the post-industrial conception - whom we have called the "radical-optimists" - have argued that, the professional mode of work-organization is in the process of supplanting the command hierarchies characteristic of industrial-capitalism.

In this chapter we take issue with three central themes which make up the radical-optimist perspective. We employ the terms "theme" and "perspective" deliberately. We wish to avoid the charge that we have assumed the professionalization notion to have acquired systematic, theoretical status.

Firstly, we will question the empirical utility of the concept "service society". Our concern lies specifically with the extent to which the relative degree of presence or absence of a service-sector can provide a barometer of qualitative improvement in the social relations of work.

Secondly, we will examine the alleged growth of a "professionalized" occupational structure in the industrialized, non-socialist nations. We ask: "Does the increasing demand by employers that workers possess advanced educational credentials (to qualify for recruitment and promotion), necessarily imply a 'professionalization' of authority relations in the work-place?"

Finally, we call into question the post-industrial writers' rejection of Marx's theory of surplus-value as applicable to the contemporary period. We will critically examine the hypothesis that the institutionalization of scientific work in the productive process renders Marx's theory invalid.

II. A Critique of the "Service Society" Concept in Post-Industrial Thought

Who is in the Service Sector and Where do they Come From?

We have seen that the notion of a "goods-to-service shift" in the economy has played a central role in post-industrial thought. In the radical-optimist view, automation is seen to increasingly eliminate the need for machine-tending labour. Consequently, an increasing proportion of the work force is freed up to tend people rather than serve as the adjuncts of machines. An obvious temptation which follows is to expect that with the more laborious physical tasks absorbed by technology, interpersonal relations on the job will experience a continual upgrading in quality. The radical-optimists yield to this temptation.

It should be noted at the outset that, impressions aside, the goods-to-service shift is a long-term trend rather than a novelty of recent history.

If we assume Colin Clark's definition of "services" as those falling into the "tertiary" sector, then as Hartwell has pointed out, "the structural change involving continuous growth of the tertiary sector has occurred in both the United States and England from the beginning of their industrialization" (Hartwell, 1971:205).

Hartwell notes that there seems to be no point in the past two centuries where agriculture and service employment combined, did not outnumber manufacturing employment. In England, the trend towards a service economy became obvious as soon as there were statistical records. From the very first census of 1801, ". . . there is a secular tendency for the percentage of employment in the services to rise" (Hartwell, 1971: 210). It should be added that, in England, over a third of the work force was employed in services throughout the first half of the nineteenth century (Mitchell, 1962:60).

The historical longevity of the expansion of the services in England and the United States must be born in mind, if only as a prophylaxis against the imputation of originality to post-industrial writers. However, it remains the case that, the past few decades have witnessed the emergence to numerical dominance of employees classified as "service workers" in each of Canada, the United States, and Britain. The same trend is being replicated in other advanced, industrial countries.[1] As Robert Heilbroner suggests: "From one industrial nation to another the magnitude of proportions varies, but the 'drift' is visible in all" (1973:163).

Following Neuberg (1975:123-128), at least three interrelated criticisms of the goods-to-service shift can be made, however. He terms these criticisms: "conceptual", "empirical", and "structural".

The conceptual criticism addresses to the difficulties of definition - the inclusion-exclusion criteria - used in the classification of service work.

Victor Fuchs, along with Daniel Bell, includes certain industries such as transportation, communication, and public utilities as services. Other writers have excluded either one or the other, or all of these; instead, they have related services to the closeness of the industry to the consumer. This latter approach, of course, follows the original lead of Colin Clark's formulation of the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Others have seen the service sector as residual - those industries that are not in agriculture, mining or manufacturing. Yet others focus on the intangibility or non-storability of services. However, even the tangibility-intangibility definition lacks fine lines. While the work of a dentist is classified as a service, the mending of a tooth is both tangible and, for the patient at least, hopefully permanent.

Post-industrial conceptions of the "service economy" tend to be derived from statistical sources which exclude goods-producing activities such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, construction and manufacturing. However, in the service-production classification they include transportation and utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finances, insurance and real estate, personal and professional services and government employment.[2]

Neuberg (1975) points to two conceptual difficulties with the post-industrial categorization of services. Firstly, he argues that the expansion of many differentiated sectors along the production-distribution continuum has been required for economic growth; therefore, neither goods-production activities nor service-production activities can necessarily be conceptualized independently in a theory of development. He writes that, "if a good is not fully produced until it is sold, then such service-production employment as wholesale and retail trade, finance, real estate and advertising could as easily be viewed as goods-production employment expansion" (1975:123). Indeed, as Baran and Sweezy (1966: Ch. V) have argued, the expansion of industrial production has become increasingly dependent on what they call the "sales effort". Advertising, variation of the products' appearance, packaging, planned obsolescence, model changes, credit schemes, and other such devices, have become fundamental features of a complex and expensive strategy aimed at stimulating artificial demand.

The second conceptual difficulty with the goods-service employment dichotomy is that a host of different occupation are aggregated which would seem to better fit the opposite side of the dichotomy than other occupations in the category to which they themselves are allocated. Employment in construction and manufacturing is classified as goods producing, while "truck-driving" and many types of technical employment are classified as transportation and utility occupations. Both of these latter are classified as service-producing jobs.

In fairness, Daniel Bell is not unaware of this difficulty, and seeks to bypass it by arguing that it is the expansion of "health, education, research and government . . . which is decisive for post-industrial society" (1973:15). We shall return to these so-called "decisive" occupations in the ensuing discussion.

The empirical criticism which Neuberg levels at the goods-to-service shift concerns the implication that, the industrial sector is declining in importance as a source of employment. With this, Neuberg quarrels. Indeed, what the abundance of evidence to date continues to attest to is that the expansion of non-manufacturing employment has not taken place at the expense of manufacturing employment. Rather, the growth of the services appears to have taken place at the expense of "pre-capitalist" employment and from increments of previously non-commodified or non-monetized work to the labour force. These "increments" include the growth of female labour-force participation formerly restricted to the household, and various other formerly household or voluntary functions which have subsequently been attached with commercial value. Heilbroner suggests that,

> the well-known rise in female labor participation (from 18 percent of all females of working age to 37 per cent, in the years 1890 to 1969 in the United States) has brought as a consequence the illusion of a rise in service "employment", as tasks that were formerly carried out within the home, where they remained invisible to the eye of the statistician, emerged onto the marketplace. The growth of the laundry industry, the restaurant industry, the professional care of the aged, even 'welfare', represent instances of this semispurious inflation of the growth of 'employment' in service occupations (1973:164).

Analyzing Canadian data, Leo Johnson (1973) concluded that, in the twentieth century the most striking change in labour force composition has been the numerical decline of the "petite bourgeoisie", farm workers and labourers.[3] He argues that the numerical gains going to the white-collar sector have obtained largely from the decline of representation in these categories rather than the manufacturing sector.

Johnson provides evidence of the historical consistency of the industrial-manual sector's proportion of the total work force. In 1901 this sector stood at 25 per cent of the total labour force. However, rather than declining, by 1961 it had actually grown to 29.5 per cent (1973:163). Johnson also points to the expansion of the female work force as a determinant of "service employment" increases. He shows that in the period 1901 to 1961, there has been a three-fold increase of female participation in the clerical, financial and sales sub-sectors (Johnson, L., 1973:176).

Albert Szymanski's (1972) analysis of United States' census data, has shown that the relative size of the "blue-collar" working class in that country has also remained more or less constant over the last thirty years.[4]

Heilbroner concludes that "the primary 'experiential' fact of the employment shift has been the decisive decline of agricultural (farm) employment and a corresponding growth of market-located service tasks" (1973:164-165). Further, he writes:

> Put differently, the industrial factory worker - the key dramatis persona of the Marxian drama - continues to account for approximately the same proportion of the total work experience of the community: unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled workers - the blue-collar group - constituted 25.5 per cent of the labour force in 1900 and 34.9 per cent in 1968, the main shift taking place within this group as most unskilled labor rose to semiskilled levels. Thus, if post-industrial society in fact represents a new stage of socio-economic relationships, the cause must be sought elsewhere than in the disappearance of the industrial sector as a milieu for work (1973: 165).

Explanations for the relatively stable percentage of manual workers throughout the twentieth century are not entirely absent. O'Connor has suggested that in the competitive private sector - where the "secondary labour market" is concentrated - costly mechanization often is unperformed.[5] This sector, being largely non-unionized and relatively low-wage, can continue to profit at the expense of the "wage bill", while owners in this sector are unable to meet the capital outlays required by costly re-tooling and mechanization. Thus, in the competitive secondary labour market, the labour to capital ratio is relatively high and this shows up in computations of employee classifications.

Neuberg has speculated that the overall effect of advancing technology may be to create and destroy occupational roles simultaneously, thus balancing each other out (1975:125). Another explanatory factor may be that "featherbedding" by unions and government has preserved jobs that might otherwise have disappeared.

Neuberg's structural criticism of the goods-service shift emphasizes that the problem must be examined within a global context. Capitalism has produced an international division of labour and consequently, shifts between countries must also be accounted for. With this in mind, Neuberg observes that

> a number of factors - e.g., rapidly rising domestic labor costs in unionized sectors and newly opened overseas markets - have led U.S. multinational corporations to locate many of the manual work steps in their productions processes abroad. Of course some completely new service work - representing post-industrial 'structural shift' - has been emerging. Yet viewed in the international context, a large portion of the goods-service percentage shift might merely represent 'functional differentiation' with the U.S. becoming increasingly the 'central-office' nation (1975:125).

Christopher Lasch has also suggested that international "functional rearrangements" may be the explanatory factor in the goods-service shift" (1973:64). To exemplify this, he argues that since World War Two, Germany has become the manufacturing centre for western Europe while France has shifted toward a service economy.

In summary, the above discussion suggests that the post-industrial theorists' attribution of historical novelty to the service society is faulty. Furthermore, the implication that the service sector has grown at the absolute expense of manufacturing labour-activity, is clearly inadequate. However, it is the case - if we employ any of the various conceptual distinctions which separate out services from resource-extraction and processing activities - that the service sector has persistently grown in the industrialized, capitalist nations. It is also true that the services have grown to a point where they are numerically overtaking all other economic activities combined. It must be conceded that this trend is a concrete feature of industrialized capitalist economies during the second half of this century.

The Quality of Service Work

It is not, however, simply the fact of the goods-service shift with which the radical-optimists are concerned. Indeed, their major emphasis is placed upon the salience of this shift for the quality of work activity. Related to the rise in service employment, some have seen a "qualitative transformation" in the nature of the individual's relation to his co-workers. Such a view assumes that a reversal of the alienation and depersonalization which so many have considered characteristic of the "mass-society" is taking place.

Daniel Bell has argued that the "fundamental fact" of work in post-industrial society is "the fact that individuals now talk to individuals rather than interact with the machine" (1973:163). Further,

> if an industrial society is defined by the quantity of goods that mark a standard of living, the post-industrial society is defined by the quality of life as measured by services and amenities - health, education, recreation, and the arts - which are now deemed desirable and possible for everyone (1973:127).

This idyllic vision, however, which stems from the identification of the expansion of service employment with the expansion of white-collar employment, begs censure. As O'Connor has pointed out, in the private sector it is in the competitive rather than the oligopolistic industries where service employment predominates. Familiar examples include "restaurants, drug and grocery stores, service stations, and many other branches of distribution; garages, appliance repair shops, and other business services" (1972:12). In this relatively non-unionized sphere of employment, work conditions - as dual labour market theorists have stressed - are significantly less congenial than in the primary market.

It is the public sector to which Daniel Bell attributes "decisive" importance in the shift towards a post-industrial society. However, even in that sector it must be recognized that the revered positions of personalized professional-services and scientific work roles, are surrounded by a greater number of workers with less authority, less remuneration for their labours, less status, less employment security and fewer "fringe" benefits. We might offer the example of the medical practitioner: the physician's work activity, traditionally undertaken from the solitary base of an independent practice, has increasingly shifted to an organizational one. The increasingly complex division of health labour has diminished the relative role of the physician in the total complex of health care. Laboratory technicians, paramedics, administrators, social workers and a variety of others now surround the doctor. Neuberg provides another example from scientific research:

> Although scientists are necessary for 'production' . . . (in a university attached physics laboratory) . . . engineers who design the equipment, secretaries (clerical) who type reports and janitors (unskilled workers) are all necessary . . . (while) . . . the image of the scientist, alone in his or her laboratory . . . reflects the reality of the working world of only a small . . . percentage of the labour force (1975:127).

Kumar has cautioned that the identification of a "service revolution" with a "white-collar revolution"

> allows one to speak . . . of all service work as 'characterized by trim surroundings, neat dress or a prestigious uniform, constant exposure to a 'clientele', coffee breaks, telephone calls, culminating, no doubt, in promotion to the Board or marriage to the boss. Even where this is an acceptable account of the generality of white-collar

> work, it suppresses the fact of the existence of a considerable body of manual workers in the service sector. The average garage mechanic or night-cleaner does not usually wear a white collar. Moreover the conditions of manual work in the service sector - in areas such as catering, cleaning, maintenance and transportation - are often more unpleasant, dirty or dangerous than in the manufacturing sector (1976:448).

As we have pointed out, the expansion of the service sector and the numerical growth of white-collar occupations has not been at the absolute quantitative expense of manufacturing employment. Furthermore, the growth of the clerical sub-sector has been disproportionately influenced by the absorption of females into the labour force. Finally, women have been consistently less remunerated for their toils in the labour market than their male counterparts - again weakening the grounds for asserting that the services necessarily enhance the work conditions of labour when compared with manufacturing.

The historically-relative quality of work for office and clerical employees may have actually shifted downward. The work conditions of these workers may have moved from an intermediate positioning - between bosses and shop workers - to a situation of equivalence with shop workers.

According to Rinehart, at the turn of the century, the clerk was typically employed in a small office where he or she was in close contact with company owners (1975:89). Clerical workers' self-perceptions of separateness from workers on the shop floor were reinforced by the relative cleanliness of the office when compared with production facilities. The office was physically separated from the shop - a separation which obviously divided office and shop workers. At the same time, management was much more socially accessible to the office worker than the shop worker (Giddens, 1973:182). The work role of the office employee was also less specialized than that of the shop worker. The small size of the office and the limited amount of paperwork allowed for a varied assignment of tasks.

> The traditional clerk performed as a sort of human integrated data processing system, handling purchasing and inventory, correspondence, accounts receivable and payable, bookkeeping, the preparation of financial statements, accounting, banking and so on, and may have helped out in the shipping room or with counter-transactions in his spare time (McDonald, 1964:4).

With the growth of large-scale business, and the bureaucratization and rationalization associated with that growth, a highly specialized work structure composed of routinized tasks was created for the office worker. According to McDonald, "the mass production rationale became as much the rule for handling paperwork in the office as for production in the plant" (McDonald, 1964:5).

As Leo Johnson suggests, "in the nineteenth century, the effects of the introduction of new technology was to reduce labour costs by breaking down complex skills into simple, repetitive, machine-defined tasks" (Johnson, L., 1972:164). While this process required highly skilled technicians and supervisors, it eliminated the need for craft workers with an intermediate level of skills. He points out that a similar process may be repeating itself among white-collar workers in the twentieth century through which ". . . workers in the clerical and professional sectors have increased (while) the proprietary, managerial, commercial and financial service sector - the intermediate skill levels, have declined" (1973:164).

In her study of office automation, Hoos found that the installation of electronic data processing equipment was of little advantage to the office worker. It simply had the effect of substituting dull jobs with equally routine tasks such as tabulating and key punch machine operations (1961:97). Indeed, Rinehart has argued that office machine operators are the most oppressed section of the office work force. He estimates that those workers who perform full-time machine duties (including typists) represent approximately one-third of all clerical personnel in Canada (1975:92). Rinehart further suggests that many of the changes affecting office work have been reproduced in the large retail chain-store.

> In such settings the sales relationship is depersonalized and distribution is carried out in mass production style. Many clerks have been relegated to performing check-out tasks, and growing numbers of the retail work force have been reduced to materials handlers who load, stock and move goods. Moreover, opportunities for advancement, wages, and overall working rules and conditions are among the least desirable in the white-collar world (Rinehart, 1975:93).

Harry Braverman has pointed to indicators which suggest that, at the turn of the century, the average clerical employee earned double the income of the production and transportation worker (1974:297). However, a Special Labor Force Report on weekly earnings of American workers employed on a full-time basis, revealed that, in 1971: "the median usual weekly wage for full-time clerical work _was lower than that in every type of so-called blue-collar work_" (Braverman, 1974:297).

In studies of subjectively-felt satisfaction amongst the lower strata of white-collar employees in the United States, increasing work alienation and convergence of dissatisfaction levels between white- and blue-collar workers has been demonstrated.[6] One of these researchers has commented:

> These workers - clerks, accountants, bookkeepers, secretaries - were once the elite at every plant, the educated people who worked alongside the bosses and were happily convinced that they made all the

> wheels go around. Now there are platoons of them instead of a privileged few, and instead of talking to the boss they generally communicate with a machine (Gooding, 1970:78).

Whereas white-collar workers enjoyed considerable job security in the past, they now appear to be as subject to the vagaries of the capitalist labour market as their "blue-collar" counterparts. Judson Gooding quoted a business school professor who remarked with fitting irony: "White collars are where administrators look to save money, for places to fire. It's the law of supply and demand. Once you're in big supply, you're a bum" (1970:78).

Are White-Collar Workers Capable of Fighting Back?

Despite the post-industrial vision, unionization does appear to be increasingly attractive to the so-called "white-collar" workers. For example, Oppenheimer (1975:34) reports that the proportion of the unionized labour force in the United States did indeed decline from 23.6 per cent to 22.6 per cent between 1960 and 1970. However, he shows that the proportion of white-collar unionists increased from 12 per cent in 1960 to 16 per cent at the end of the same decade. Canadian data reveals a similar trend. Bain (1970) demonstrates the same pattern in Britain and Adams (1975) found the same trend in Sweden.

As we observed above, Daniel Bell has tried to bypass the criticisms which he correctly anticipated - and we have recorded - by arguing that it is really the expansion of health, education, research and government which is "decisive" for post-industrial society.[7] Bell is joined in this point of view by Gartner and Riessman (1974). They have emphasized the importance of the health, education and welfare services in the "service society". It is in these latter services that such euphorias as Paul Halmos' conception of a "personal service" ideology is centered - an ideology which he believes to be penetrating all groups of workers.

We shall examine the social services in more depth in Chapter Nine. At present, however, our concern remains with the presumed qualitative improvement of work conditions experienced by the broad category of workers in service roles.

It is true that during the 1960's, the health, education and welfare occupations in North America experienced the most prominent growth.[8] However, it was education in those years which was responsible for the greatest proportion of growth, and this growth has clearly levelled off.[9] Most recently, the health and welfare services have been subjected to rigorous budgetary controls and employment demand has been significantly reduced in welfare occupations. Indeed, a number of economists have begun to discuss a "fiscal crisis" of the state. The fiscal crisis concept denotes that the demand for public services has outstripped the fiscal capacity of governments to supply them.

Miller (1975:19) suggests that service sector growth in the upcoming decades may continue in the health field as well as child care in the United States. The most plausible structural explanation for the growth of child care services is probably best explained by such factors as the inflationary squeeze on family budgets and the increase in single-parent families, rather than increasing levels of governmental "social" responsibility.

It remains the case, however, that in the United States, employment in the government sector - as a proportion of total employment - has shown a secular upswing. Nearly one-third of the available work force is directly or indirectly dependent upon the state.[10] Approximately one-fifth of the civilian labour force is directly employed by federal, state or local levels of government (Murray, 1975:231).

One study (Harrison, 1971a) demonstrates that of every four new jobs in the United States' economy, one is in the public sector. The same study (Harrison, 1971a:3) found that "in the nation's cities . . . one out of every three new workers is engaged in the delivery of such crucial services as education, health protection, recreation, waste disposal, police and fire protection."

In Canada, in 1947, thirteen percent of the non-agricultural work force was employed in the public sector, a figure which arose to approximately 25 per cent by the late 1960's (Rinehart, 1975). Within the public employment sector, the greatest gains occurred in jobs connected with education, health care and government service (Peitchinis, 1970).

The reality of labour relations in the state sector betrays the post-industrial promise.

Collective organization and union militancy are two traditional indicators of worker dissatisfaction. In 1956, the Bureau of Labour Statistics in the United States collected data which showed that only 5.1 per cent of total union membership in that country was employed at some level og government.[11] Cohany and Dewey (1970:15) showed that by 1970, union (and association) membership in government employment had increased to 18.1 per cent of total American union membership. In 1970, at least one-third of all government employees were enrolled as members of unions and associations in the United States (Cohany and Dewey, 1970).

A striking feature of unionization trends is that, in the fifteen years represented in the Cohany and Dewey study, the growth of union membership amongst government employees expanded nearly 150 per cent.

They contrasted this growth with the small five per cent gains in private industry. If New York City can be taken as any indicator of future trends, the course is clear. Zagoria (1972a:3) reports that 205,000 of the City's 210,000 employees are now represented by unions. This is particularly significant because in that country, unionization by level of government has been disproportionately concentrated at the federal level. The growth of the local and state levels of employee unionization suggests that a "catch-up" to the federal level might be anticipated.

In the United States, in 1958, government workers' strikes comprised four-tenths of one per cent of all strikes, eight-hundredths of one per cent of workers involved and three-hundredths of a per cent of total idleness. By 1968 this figure had risen to five per cent, 7.6 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively, of all strikes (White, 1969:29-30).

In the public sector, cutbacks in public expenditures in response to "stagflation" have created "an atmosphere in which not only is collective bargaining seen as inevitable but which a high degree of militancy is predictable, even amongst formerly quiescent groups" (Arthurs, 1971: 10). Rinehart (1975;112) has argued that several militant groups in the public sector - notably teachers, postal workers and nurses - "have signalled the route public employees will most likely follow in the future".[12] He suggests that increased militancy in the public sector, as evidenced in Canada in recent years: "dispels the idea . . . that white collars . . . are unwilling to use measures traditionally employed by manual workers" (Rinehart, 1975:112).

In summary, white-collar workers have exhibited an interest in "fighting back"; their means appear to be identical with those employed traditionally by the industrial, blue-collar work force.

Professional "Motivation" and the Corporation: The Service Ideology, Again!

We will now turn to the effects of the alleged "service orientation" (as espoused by credentialed occupational groups) on the corporate business sector. Here, the "soulful corporation", its decision-making functions dispersed "deep down" into the "technostructure", is invoked. Further, we are advised that this technostructure is peopled by employees with varying degrees of creative autonomy or supervisory capacity. Their conduct, according to Daniel Bell, derives from an ethic of service which is prior to the business ethic of self-interest. In a phrase, the idea might be expressed that "the soul of the corporation is a professional rather than a capitalist one".

In Chapter Four, we traced the ancestry of the "professionalization of corporate management" hypothesis to the 1930's. It began with Berle and Means' empirical study of the separation of legal ownership from administration within the large-scale, joint-stock company in the United States.

Indeed, the emergence of the large corporation to economic dominance in the resource extraction, manufacturing, financial and wholesale and retail distribution fields, demanded a reformulation of certain canons of socio-economic, theoretical orthodoxy. Perhaps most importantly, because of the amount of capital necessary for its initiation, maintenance and expansion, ownership has become fragmented and diffuse, drawing upon an enormous investment pool. By implication, it is often argued that no single investor or group of investors could manage the giant corporation. Thus, it is held, economic rationality dictates the transfer of decision-making power to specialists with technical expertise, including professional managers; management itself becoming but one amongst a manifold collectivity of technical specialists.

According to a prominent version of the modern theory of the firm, the joint-stock company stands in fundamental contrast to the traditional "entrepeneurial enterprise". Aside from the asserted differences in the class of decision-makers who control the firm, it is alleged that by comparison with old-style capitalists the directing managerial group is concerned with both more complex and qualitatively superior motives. The primary goals of corporate management become those of fostering the stability and growth of the enterprise and preserving or expanding its market strength. As opposed to the more visible and ruthless competition for profits amongst yesteryear's capitalists, in aggregate, the corporate mode is seen to have a stabilizing effect on society.

It should be immediately stressed that the secular tendency for legal ownership to separate from the actual operation of the firm was recognized much earlier by Marx himself. This is noted because in various ways, the idea of a "managerial revolution" has been alleged to run counter to Marxist theory.

Marx saw the significance of the joint-stock company and the elimination of the direct participation of capitalists in the technical and supervisory operation of the firm, as an illustration that "modern industry can function without the direct intervention of private property" (Giddens, 1973:35). However, Marx saw this development as an advanced stage of capitalist development rather than as a signal of its transcendence as a mode of production. The fundamental antagonism of corporate capitalism was the same as that underlying "entrepeneurial" capitalism: the contradiction between its increasingly social character and its enduringly private purpose.

It is true that the great majority of stock-holders have little influence over corporate policy. However, a limited number of investors can be highly influential through the relative size of their share ownership. Where ownership is widely dispersed, the effective power over key policy decisions can, and frequently is, determined by a minority bloc of shares. Thus, Berle and Means' study assumed that possession of 20 per cent of total shares was sufficient to secure the control of large corporations. More recent studies, however, have accepted 10 per cent and even 5 per cent and less for the largest companies (A useful summary of this literature is provided by Maurice Zeitlin, 1974.). Further, students of the subject have observed the use of techniques such as "pyramiding" - which can be employed by a controlling group in one firm - to extend its policy influence over a number of firms.

It can be expected that the debate over the degree of supersession of managers over the legal owners will continue to rage for some time. The conclusions will vary, depending upon the empirical data gathered. Behind this debate, however, there are really two issues.

Firstly, this data may yield the extent to which the concentration of control over the means of production has actually been secured by a small fraction of the capitalist class. Knowledge of the existence of a capitalist "super-elite" is, from a variety of vantage points, extremely significant. However, we should be cautioned that accessibility to the most relevant data may be impossible to secure (Zeitlin, 1974:1086).

Secondly, attention to the first issue should not obscure the more general study of the capital accumulation process nor the study of the more complex and diverse organization of agents who perform the functions of capital. It is to this latter concern that we shall turn to in subsequent chapters.

Presently, we are concerned to take issue with the assumption that the public responsibility of the corporation is significantly widened because of the professionalization of management.

One of the first empirical challenges to the idea of a "soulful corporation" came from James Early (1956). He rejected the "satisficing" postulate - the idea that the large corporation was less interested than smaller firms in profit realization. While recognizing certain modifications in the decision-making processes of the large corporation, Early insisted that the "principal behavioural postulate" of the large firm was "a systematic temporal search for highest practicable profits" (Quoted in Baran and Sweezy, 1966:25).

Larner, upon comparing "management controlled" and "owner controlled" firms, found that: (1) the rate of profit of the two types was about the same, (2) non-owning management did not avoid risk-taking any more than owners do, and (3) the corporation's dollar profit and rate of return on equity was the major factor associated with executive compensation, which is to say that executives are profit oriented (1970).

Larner's conclusions contradicted the post-industrial idea that a "professional ethos" distinguished the corporate executive from the earlier private capitalist. He wrote that, "although control is separated from ownership in most of America's largest corporations, the effects on the profit orientation of firms and on stockholder's welfare has been minor" (1970:66). Maurice Zeitlin has argued that,

> growth, sales, technical efficiency, a strong competitive position are at once inseparable managerial goals and the determinants of high corporate profits - which are in turn, the prerequisites of high managerial income and status" (1974:1097).

Fitch and Oppenheimer have argued, against Galbraith, that his market researchers and engineers - the alleged pilots of the technostructure - work according to the standards set by their sphere of production and distribution. Furthermore, he argues that it is the board (of directors) which establishes the technostructure's sphere of production (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1970). Similarly, Clement, who has studied the Canadian economic elite, argues that the board of directors "has the ability to remove the entire technostructure if it does not meet its standards" (1975:18).

As Birnbaum has written: "None of the evidence adduced for the existence, real or imaginary, of a technocratic elite, has been able to explain away the continued existence of large concentrations of power and property in industrial society" (1973:161). Indeed, Clement has suggested, that at least in Canada, the focus on management control versus ownership control is largely beside the point. His own research leads him to conclude that the "Corporate Elite" tends to be comprised of individuals who play out a number of roles - including membership (active) on a Board of Directors, senior management posts and investment activity (Clement, 1975:22). Finally, as Giddens reminds us: "However widely diffused and fragmented share ownership may be, the megacorporation is necessarily tied to the existence of private property" (1973:161).

What is at issue here is the qualitative influence of the growth of professional training amongst the senior posts of the corporate structure on the community orientation of the business institutions with which they are affiliated. It is submitted that the agents who perform the functions of capital, despite their typically "professional" training, are ever subject to the imperatives of capital accumulation. The most fundamental of these imperatives is not "technological efficiency" or "administrative efficiency". These are neutral phrases which deter us from the more fundamental question: "In what terms is 'efficiency' measured?" The most plausible answer to this question appears to remain the same as that provided by Marx: namely, the rate of extraction of surplus value.

There are, of course, major changes in the general social context in which business - housed in the large corporation - must seek profitability. The post-industrial theorists have touched on many of these. However, both before and after the considerations which they stress are taken into account, the fundamental goal is but an echo of earlier capitalist ventures. For the ideology of professionalism, the most salient implication of this fact can be but one. The authority of professionally-trained workers employed in the corporate firm - whether managers, creative workers or the various technical specialists - is ultimately mediated by a complex institutional framework which is geared, in the final analysis, to profitability.

We needn't belabour the now widely known and various ways, which corporations can be interpreted as "socially irresponsible". The formation, in recent years, of a variety of activist, consumer groups, has been necessitated by the negligent behaviour of corporations. It might be remembered that the environmentalist lobby in the United States (later extending throughout the west), was a populist response to corporate, ecological recklessness. Pollution and a host of other ecological problems have been directly linked to routine, corporate production. The recent "lay-offs" of thousands of "I.N.C.O." workers in Canada's Sudbury, prior to the notification of government authorities; the routine corporate investment policies which exploit the limited bargaining power of labour in racist and dictatorially-governed, underdeveloped nations - all these diminish our confidence in the idea of a "soulful" corporation.

With the following words of Larson, we cannot but agree:

> 'Service to the public' can hardly be considered a goal of the private corporation. Only a general crisis of legitimacy could seriously question the motives that govern profit-making in large private organizations (1974:355-356).
>
> Typically 'technobureaucratic professions . . . simply _do not have any autonomous orientation toward the clients, except indirectly_. The corporations which they serve mediates, in fact, the 'professionals' relations to the clients, as buyers of corporate services or products. This may be a source of _personal_ conflict that client-oriented professionals may face in the heteronomous setting of the big corporation. Short of a societal crisis, it is unimaginable that any of the "technobureaucratic professions" should collectively redefine the organization on which its power is founded (_Ibid_., 354).

To this point, our discussion of the "managerial revolution" has admittedly not given due attention to very real issues raised within it, or to the data marshalled to fuel it. The cursory attention paid thus far, however, does in no way reflect the significance we attach to it. Our strategy is to bypass what we take to be the fundamental issue - the functional relation of human beings in their work roles to the performance of capital control activity - until Part Three of our thesis.

In Chapter Eight, Part Three, we shall theoretically examine the social relations which comprise the capitalist class function within the corporate-capital, social structure. Our reason for delaying this issue is simply that a theoretical introduction to Marxist class analysis is required to deal adequately with this problem.

III. Are Professionally-Credentialed Workers Really "Professionally" Organized?

What the Numbers Suggest about the Growth of Professional Work

Daniel Bell (1973:213-250) provides a long series of tables which demonstrate such trends as the increasing percentage of the labour force classified as "technical-professional", the increasing proportion of the school-age population in school, the increasing number of both undergraduate and graduate degrees granted, and the resultant expansion of university-credentialed employment in the economy.

Bell shows that, in the United States, in 1900, the professional-technical category stood at only 4.3 per cent (1973, Table 2-4:134). By 1960 that percentage rose to 10.8 per cent and increased again to 13.6 per cent in 1968 (1973, Table 2-4:134 and Table 2-5:135).

Let us tentatively assume with Bell that these data reflect his notion that the professional-technical category is of "increasing importance in socio-economic activity?" Such a concession rests on the assumed identification of "quantitative increase" with "importance". However, as Neuberg has pointed out, Bell "wants to claim much more".

> In 'Notes, I' (1967b) he projects the professional-technical category to 14.2 per cent of the labor force in 1975, but by 'Notes, II' (1967c), he speaks of 'the "post-industrial" society . . . in which the professional-technical class had become the major occupational group'! Yet both his 1968 (16.9) and projected 1980 (18.2) percentages for white-collar clerical workers are greater than the corresponding technical-professional percentages (13.6 and 16.3, respectively) while his 1968 blue-collar operatives percentage (16.2) is nearly the same as, the corresponding percentages (13.6 and 16.3), respectively (1973, Table 2-5:135) (Neuberg, 1975:126).

Let us examine Bell's 1968 to 1980 projection table (Table IV). We see that even if we add the "manager and official" and "sales" categories to the professional-technical category, the broadest category of "professionals" could only increase during the specified period, from 29.6 per cent to 32.3 per cent of the total.

Inclusion of the "manager and officials" category within the professional type of employment, however, is contrary to the very essence of the post-industrial thesis. It will be remembered that the thesis suggests that professional authority relations are unique and resistant to managerial or "administrative" authority. The "sales" category is also inappropriately placed, for one criteria of professional work is alleged to be its anti-commercial behaviour and outlook. Sales work is obviously the very essence of commerce.

Table IV

Bell's Table 2-5:

Occupational Distribution by Numbers and Percentage
1968 (Actual) - 1980 (Projected)

Occupational Group	1968 Numbers (Thousands)	1968 Percentage	1980 Numbers (Thousands)	1980 Percentage
Total	76,000	100.0	95,000	100.0
White-Collar Workers	35,600	46.7	48,300	50.8
Professional-technical	10,300	13.6	15,500	16.3
Managers and Officials	7,800	10.0	9,500	10.0
Clerical	12,800	16.9	17,300	18.2
Sales	4,600	6.0	6,000	6.0
Blue-Collar Workers	27,500	36.2	31,100	32.7
Craftsmen and foremen	10,000	13.1	12,200	12.8
Operatives	14,000	18.4	15,400	16.2
Labourers	3,500	4.7	3,500	3.7
Service Workers	9,400	12.4	13,100	13.8
Farm Workers	3,500	4.6	2,600	2.7

Source: Bell, 1973, p. 135.

At the same time, by aggregating clerical workers with traditional categories of dependent wage workers (including Bell's "service" category), there is only a slight decrease in the time frame described; from 70.2 per cent to 67.4 per cent of the "non-middle class" work force.[13] Our previous discussion provides ample justification for the inclusion of clerical workers in this category. It can also be argued that the decrease referred to (70.2 per cent to 67.4 per cent) is fully accounted for by the projected 2.5 per cent loss of farm workers and the projected one per cent reduction in menial labour.

In short, the most significant increases in the sub-categories are in professional-technical employment and the clerical sub-sector. However, the great majority of workers continue to be located outside the boundaries of professional-technical employment classifications. Clerical workers exceed their numbers and "blue-collar" workers double their numerical representation in the 1980 projection.

We have seen that for the great majority of white-collar workers, Marx's proletarianization thesis obtains more validity than the professionalization alternative. However, it is true that the slow but real quantitative gains of the "professional-technical" classification are suggestive, at least, that an extremely gradual process of professionalization is beginning to show itself.

Professional Credentials and the Sociologist's Image of Profession

One temptation is to simply equate professionalization with the growth of university and professional-qualifying certification of employment recruits. This "temptation" is taken up by Bell. However, if we take professionalization to simply imply the increasing importance of education to production, we are back to the technical determinism we have criticized. As Neuberg (1975:127-128) observes:

> Post-industrial thinkers usually assume, at least implicitly, that the increasing technical nature of socio-economic activity increasingly demands a more educated labour force. Although this is partially true, the problem is again with post-industrial euphoric exaggeration. For example, Drucker (1968:273) writes in 1968 what in 1974 reads like a bad joke: 'Today, needless to say, opportunities for a mathematician are unlimited. He need not be a Newton or a Gauss to make a good living doing what he enjoys doing.' In fact, increasing educational levels required for various jobs may be largely caused by the increasing supply of educated labour. The increasing number of 'underemployed' cabdrivers, painters, secretaries, etc., with bachelors and masters degrees suggests just such a possibility (Neuberg, 1975: 127-128).

As we have stressed above, the identification of advanced education with professionalism is typically considered either overly simplistic or spurious. A more compelling aspect of the "radical-optimist" perspective centres on the authority relations which define professional occupations as hybrids in the class structures of industrialized societies. The expansion of such occupations thus suggests the growth of a unique mode of occupational authority.

Present trends in labour force composition reflected in official data sources do indicate the growth of such work. From this data, and in the spirit of debate, we can concede that on the extremely distant horizon, the numerical dominance of "professionally-classified" work is hypothetically possible. However, such a concession by itself, does little to advance the post-industrial case. It must be simultaneously shown that the sociological "image" of profession fits the reality of the occupational world of those workers from whom such growth statistics are derived.

Bureaucracy and the Professionally-Credentialed Worker

The sociological study of professions emerged out of an interest in specialized occupations which had obtained relative exemption from external controls such as bureaucratic authority. As Vollmer and Mills have pointed out, the early sociological literature on the professions discussed the work context and behavioural patterns of independent professionals (1966:264-265). The bureaucratization of the work structure has tended, however, to shift the social context of the established professions to an organizational one. At the same time, as Hall noted, occupations with marginal status and new occupations striving-to-be-professional are either becoming, or were conceived in, the bureaucratic form of occupational life (Hall, 1963:92).

In its popular usage, the term bureaucracy has often referred to the negative connotations associated with complex, formal, work organizations. Sociologists, on the other hand, have attempted to remove this connotation in an effort to discover and explain the administrative principles on which it rests. Since Weber, bureaucracies have been subjected to systematic analysis.

In his original formulation, Weber ideal-typified a list of attributes characteristic of the methods of administration and communication in complex organization (Max Weber, 1948). Since that time, many sociologists have constructed ideal types which display a high degree of accord on the component parts of the bureaucratic structure.

After an extensive review of the literature, Hall schematically presented the dimensions included in all of ~~these~~ theoretical formulations. He then proceeded to select those dimensions central to bureaucratic theory, based upon frequency of appearance in the literature he reviewed. These included (Hall, 1963:92):

1. A division of labour based upon functional specialization.
2. A hierarchy of authority.
3. A system of rules covering the rights and duties of each position.
4. A system of procedures for dealing with work situations.
5. Impersonality of interpersonal relationships.
6. Participants selected for employment and promotion on the basis of technical competency.

From Hall's list it is apparent that some important similarities exist between the professional and bureaucratic model. These similarities include: (1) an emphasis on the importance of specialization and therefore a division of labour, articulating specific spheres of authority; (2) the selection of candidates is ideally based on performance criteria which include training and acquired skills; and (3) standardized treatment of clients fostered by the underlying assumption that services should be detached from biased intervention and dealt with according to universalistic norms and generalized principles.

Those characteristics which differentiate between these two types of organization include features relating to:

(1) Direction of Control: Bureaucracies depend on hierarchical authority to direct and control members' work activities, while professions rely on peer group or collegial controls, typically mobilized through formal professional associations.

(2) Means of Control: The formally established rules which govern a member's behaviour in a bureaucracy, include both the appropriate means and ends of activities. These rules tend to be formalized as detailed

directives and guidelines for the completion of a negotiation. Professions, on the other hand, are apt to specify overall goals or ends to which behaviour is directed, rather than the provision of detailed rules governing specific activities. Through their associations, professions, guided by general ethical codes, achieve membership control by subjecting each member to a long period of socialization.

(3) Location of Authority: According to Weber, bureaucratic authority or "legal" authority is obeyed because a belief in the legitimacy of the established order. Thus, the ultimate source of authority in a bureaucracy lies in the position occupied. On the other hand, bureaucrats are selected on the basis of their qualifications, i.e., training and acquires skills, their position in the hierarchical order determines their authority, rather than their technical competence once they have achieved positional incumbency. The professional's authority remains his technical competence ideally subjected only to ongoing peer group evaluation.

(4) Service Orientation: Central to the professional's calling is his belief in the primacy of service to the client over other structural influences. In contrast, the bureaucratic orientation, in social-psychological studies of workers in complex organizations, emphasizes the primacy of organizational goals. Loyalty to the organization, even in situations where that loyalty conflicts with the best interests of the client, is the expected attitude of the successfully socialized bureaucrat.

These differences have been treated as sources of strain in the literature and a variety of studies have centered on the role conflicts experienced by the "professionally-oriented" worker in the bureaucracy.[14]

Indeed, both government and industry have attempted various patterns of accommodation to this "mix".

Are Professionally-Credentialed Workers Being De-Professionalized?

As we have argued, the radical-optimist image of post-industrial society traces to a Durkheimian view of professionalization. In that view, organic solidarity is based upon an infrastructure of corporate, professional, work associations, as both formal and informal structures of work organization. The guiding morality of the worker is the professional ethos. The worker, in turn, exercises collective or collegial authority over the pace, workplace conditions, his product, its use, and even to a degree, its price. His work is craftsmen-like, in the sense that the worker produces an end product. Further, his work, the product of advanced training in complex skills and theoretical knowledge, is not standardizeable. In exchange for professional services, society provides the worker - both individually and collectively through the professional association - with a mandate for occupational control.

In summary, professional work ideally involves considerable discretion and judgement on the part of the worker. It is not readily standardizable, and advanced training is required to facilitate competent task performance. If such work is expanding significantly, Marx's proletarianization is obviously rejected.

Two recent analyses of the professions have argued that bureaucratization and associated technological rationalization processes, serve to systematically "de-professionalize" the work context of credentialed labour.

Terence Johnson's book Professions and Power (1972) centred on what he defined as inherent tension or "structure of uncertainty" which inevitably arises in exchange relations when production is specialized. He argued that specialization of production tends to produce unspecialization of consumption. The specialized knowledge of the producer reduces the capacity of a heterogeneous consuming population to make sophisticated judgements concerning the exchange. Thus, an interest tension arises between producer and consumer which, Johnson argues, must be reduced to a minimum for exchange to be efficient (1972:41). Whether this uncertainty is reduced at the expense of the producer or the consumer, will be determined by power relations shaping the exchange.

Johnson develops a typology of means by which this tension has been reduced historically (1972:45-47). The typology may be paraphrased.

(1) Collegiate Control: A mode in which the producer defines the needs of the consumer and the manner in which they are met. He cites the nineteenth century professions and the guilds system as instances of this mode.

(2) Patronage: A mode in which the consumer defines his own needs and the manner in which they are met. Johnson identifies three subtypes: (1) oligarchic patronage - a type which existed in feudal systems in which an aristocratic patron was the major consumer of a craftsman's services; (2) communal control - in which the services of a worker are defined by the needs of a community or a communal organization, and; (3) corporate patronage - where a major part of demand and need definition obtains from large corporations.

(3) Mediation: The third type of authority system which manages the producer-consumer interest tension is that of 'mediative control' in which a third party mediates the relationship between producer and consumer, defining both the needs and the manner in which they are met. The sub-types of mediation, include: (1) capitalism - in which the entrepeneur intervenes in the relationship between producer and consumer in order to rationalize production and regulate markets; (2) church mediation - as in medieval Europe where the organized church

> regulated the practice of a number of occupations; and (3) state mediation - in which a powerful, centralized public bureaucracy intervenes.

Johnson criticized conventional sociological interpretations of the professions. He observed a tendency in the literature to identify such occupations as being endowed with unique skills (a complex body of knowledge and derived technique) or a special commitment to service. Johnson suggested that the power and privilege of such occupations were typically explained in terms of these qualities. Furthermore, he argued that a commitment to this view in the literature had resulted in a distorted conception of their development: a simple, unilineal trajectory of professionalization was presented. Consequently, the degree to which an occupation was recognized as professional - and could derive the associated privileges - was explained by their members' normative possession of unique skills and by their service commitment.

Johnson argued that the obvious variation in both the organization and practice of various occupations - labelled fully or partially professional - were ignored or distorted by this conventional model. In contrast, he suggested that a taxonomic breakdown of the historical variation in the institutional means of reducing exchange-uncertainty would be more illuminating. The typology he presented allowed him to locate professionalism (collegiate control) historically, and to determine the extent to which it was a receding or expanding institutional means for controlling the producer-consumer interest tension.

According to Johnson - and in concurrence with our analysis in Chapter One - the conditions of professionalism in Britain developed in the second half of the nineteenth century (1972:52). They were associated with the rise to power of an expanding urban middle class, and the industrial revolution. The numbers of the middle class, benefitting from the wealth of new industry, had outstripped the landed gentry. Thus, the demand for services grew - services which could formerly be afforded only by the landed classes. The old professions were reformed and their numbers expanded. Furthermore, many new professions arose to supply the new demands of industrial society.

> The Industrial Revolution opened up the floodgates of professionalization. Scientific and technological developments crystallized into new techniques, providing a basis for emergent occupations. Needs which had been restricted to the upper stratum of society filtered down and outwards so that medicine, law and architecture, for example, were no longer small, social prescribed cliques, but large associations servicing competing status groups of near equals (Johnson, 1972:52).

Johnson argued that such conditions were no longer present in advanced industrial societies. Resultantly, professionalism as an expanding form of occupational control was giving way to corporate patronage and state mediation.

Under corporate patronage,[15] workers are expected to conform to the values and goals of the employer rather than the profession. Patronage is further associated with a fragmented, hierarchical, locally oriented occupational group rather than the cosmopolitanism characteristic of the professions. Authority is bureaucratic rather than collegial.

Under "oligarchic" patronage, "the aristocratic patron 'keeps' his artist, architect, doctor and priest; he maintains them on his estate or in some location socially or politically controlled by him" (1972:68). Similarly, Johnson notes, corporate patronage also gives rise to the "house man" - either directly as an employee or within the organizational context of other bureaucracies. These bureaucracies outside the corporation are large "professional firms" and organizations which are typically dependent upon corporate business.

Under corporate patronage, the continuous and terminal status of professionalism breaks down; rather, a professional rises in the bureaucracy through a number of ranks. Ultimate mobility is often oriented to administrative posts independent of assignments for which the professional was trained, or to positions on a "board of directors". In these ways, the professional is removed from the solidarity and authority of the peer group. Furthermore, advancement on the basis of performance or in terms of administrative acceptability replaces the "company of equals" concept of professionalism.

The second trend which undermines professionalism is what Johnson calls state mediation.[16]

Under state mediation, the referral system of professionalism is replaced by the allocation of clients through bureaucratic decision-making. A client wishing to see an agronomist, social worker or lawyer employed by the government, will typically not have a choice as to which practitioner he may discuss his problem with. Furthermore, state mediation also places increasing power in the hands of academic institutions as a basis for socializing and evaluating recruits.

As various occupations become increasingly incorporated within the organizational framework of government agencies, solo practice is no longer the norm and fiduciary relations are either modified or eliminated. The professional's income may be in the form of salaries or determined in accordance with a system of payment geared to the level and amount of services provided on the basis of per capita or unit payments.

Under state mediation, Johnson argued, the homogeneous community of professionalism is also displaced by hierarchical forms of occupational practice and organization. This homogeneity is further broken down by the stress on localism or identification with the local agency which is a unit of a government department and by the conflicting interests of the "centre" and "periphery" of a department (such as the well known tensions between central office administrators and field workers).

Johnson also pointed out that practice within a state-mediated bureaucracy - as in the system of corporate patronage - is not a continuous and terminal career as characteristic of the profession. Service agencies themselves are the major sources of access to managerial positions.

A further source of divisiveness which Johnson identified, obtains from the separation of sponsorship and control of research activity from the professional association. Johnson argues that under these conditions, the functions of occupational associations in manifesting colleague identification give way to specifically "trade union" functions: those activities aimed only at pressing for improvements in pay and work conditions.

Johnson also argued that the differentiation of research activities from practice created under state mediation, means that the occupational community as a whole, is no longer the repository of specialized knowledge. The practitioner thus loses scientific initiative as the development of knowledge is turned over to full-time research institutions.

Finally, state mediation creates a conflict between the personal service ideology of the professions and the broader "social service" orientation of the state which emphasizes the broad social consequences of the provision of services.

> As vocational, education, research and resources are more supplied by or affected by state actions, various

> occupations find themselves increasingly anticipating, responding to, and seeking to control such actions. In so doing they are forced to relate their policies to the social and political consequences of their actions . . . The 'authoritative' pronouncement common under a system of professionalism gives way to the incorporation of practitioners, as advisers and experts, within the context of government decision-making (Johnson, 1972:84).

Johnson concludes that corporate patronage and state mediation have penetrated so deeply into the highly skilled, specialized occupations, that the central features of professionalism have been either eliminated or subordinated.

Marie Haug (1973:195-211), another detractor, has noted that estimates of the future importance of the professions centres on the professional's mastery of knowledge and the humanitarian aspect of its application. Haug, in agreement with Johnson, believes the focus should be on the indigenous occupational authority of the professions: ". . . the autonomy of the professional, his freedom from lay control in carrying out his occupational role, in a word, his power" (1973:195).

Haug hypothesized that the professions in post-industrial society will be de-professionalized, which she defined as "a loss to professional occupations of their unique qualities, particularly their monopoly over knowledge, public belief in their service ethos, and expectation of work autonomy and authority over the client" (1973:197). Haug argued that a careful examination of rapid changes in the division of labour reveal this trend.

Haug's argument comprises four assertions: Firstly, she argues that specialization has itself increasingly narrowed the task structure of professional occupations.[17] Secondly, she suggests that so-called "professional" jobs are being "reconstructed and reorganized" independently and indeed, in spite of, established professional associations. Suggesting that these changes do not simply reflect rationalization, Haug argued that a power struggle amongst competing claimants as well as clients, reflects the decline of professional skill monopolies.[18] Thirdly, Haug argued that computer technology is eroding the knowledge-monopoly of professions and the capacity for new knowledge claimants to rest power on the basis of congealed learning; professional memory is replaced by machine memory to which even the most unlearned can refer.[19] Fourthly, Haug suggested that paraprofessionals and consumers alike, are challenging the professional's claim to authority in humanistic concerns. They are both arguing that, particularly in the human or "personal social services", the social background of the academically credentialed may not be associated with effectiveness.[20]

> Thus, the professional will increasingly be caught in a bind. As experimental, clinical knowledge becomes more and more codifiable, it is more easily stored in the computer brain, making professional's human storage and integrative capacity less essential. On the other hand, to the extent that it remains amorphous, to be acquired chiliastically rather than academically, it is accessible to the less schooled person who has been trained on the job through clinical experience (Haug, 1973:203-204).

The various terms coined to describe professional claimants (see Introduction, p. 4)are suggestive of the internal differentiation within the upper levels of the white-collar stratum. It is true that classic professions like law and medicine have retained much of their capacity to control their working time comparatively free from external regulation and supervision. Even in these "established" professions, however, the general trend is towards organizational employment rather than independent practice. And the case of law and medicine is obviously not typical. The Canadian case is illustrative. Whereas over half of all

Canadian lawyers and physicians are independently employed, less than ten per cent of the total professional stratum work for themselves (Johnson, L., 1972:167-168).

It is true that certain forms of accommodation to the professionals employed by organizations have been made. One such accommodation involves the segregation of professstionals into their own departments and providing them with a certain amount of autonomy from central lines of bureaucratic authority. Another adjustment involves combining administrative responsibilities with professional skills in one role. These adjustments may partially solve the authority dilemma for the few; nevertheless, they also reflect a drift away from professionalism. Status equality is eroded by these adjustments and the basis of homogeneity of outlook, and mutuality of interest is usurped.

Can the technocrats or "professional-administrators" be construed as an emergent "knowledge elite"? Georgopolus and Mann point out that the higher one rises in the authority structure, the more pronounced the tendency for professional skills to atrophy (1969:359-363). Administrative tasks tend to become ever more consuming with authority increments. Furthermore, as professional-administrators rise in the authority structure, their concerns become more those of managers and owners than the professional colleague group of their origin. Rather than becoming the technocrats of Veblen's industrial utopia, they become concerned with profit and loss statements in the private sector and extremely budget-sensitive in the public sector.

Limitations on autonomy are more clearly problematic amongst the occupations which have not achieved full professional recognition. In number, these workers dominate the occupational membership resident in the census classifications. Typically, the term "semi-professions" is used with reference to teachers, social workers, nurses and other health-related and service occupations requiring university degrees for entry.

According to Simpson and Simpson: "In comparison with professional employees, semi-professionals lack autonomy; they are told what to do and how to do it" (1972:12). Toren points out that semi-professionalism denotes that an occupation does not rest on a firm theoretical knowledge base; the period of training is relatively short; its membership cannot claim monopoly of exclusive skills; and the area of special competence is less well defined as compared with full-fledged professions (1972).

Both Toren (1972:55-56) and Simpson and Simpson (1972:12) suggest that in many of the occupations classified as semi-professions, there is an over-representation of female employees. The prevalence of women in nursing, elementary school teaching and social work may be related to the traditional subordination of the female role in society. The public may be less willing to grant autonomy to women than men, and open out certain types of work roles to them more readily than others. Thus, as Toren writes:

> Social work is thus identified by the public as a feminine occupation; the helping, nurturant functions of the social worker are associated with the image of traditional roles of women. It has also been noticed that in the professional literature there is a tendency to refer to a social worker of indeterminate sex as "she" rather than "he" (Toren, 1972:56).

Simpson and Simpson thus suggest that, normatively, women's primary attachment is perceived to be a commitment to the family role. Thus,

> they are therefore less intrinsically committed to work than men and less likely to maintain a high level of specialized knowledge. . . (and) less likely than men to develop colleague reference

> group orientations. For these reasons and because they often share the general cultural norm that women should defer to men, women are more willing than men to accept the bureaucratic controls imposed on them in semi-professional organizations, and less likely to seek a genuinely professional status (1969:12).

We may be repulsed by these authors' use of terminology, i.e., "intrinsic commitment". We may argue with them on what actually constitutes "genuine professional status". However, historically the female role has been more weakly linked to career. Consequently, women have been "channeled" into restricted types of work roles relative to their male counterparts. If nothing else, this does dampen our enthusiasm for the potential vanguard role of the personal social services in assuming an anti-bureaucratic style of authority.

Are Professionally-Credentialed Workers being Proletarianized?

Martin Oppenheimer is one writer in the sociology of the professions to explicitly challenge the professionalization thesis from the perspective of "New Working-Class" theory. He suggests that "a white-collar proletarian type of worker is now replacing the autonomous professional type of worker in the upper strata of professional-technical employment" (1973:213). Similar to Johnson and Haug, the major thrust of his argument centres on the erosion of professionalism created by bureaucratization.

Oppenheimer argues that bureaucratization is a process which tends to replicate factory-like conditions in the work place of the professional. The bureaucratic work place, characterized by fixed jurisdictions, ordered by rules established external to the occupational group; a hierarchical command system; jobs entered and mobility based on performance in uniform tasks, examination and certification; and extensive division of labour, is a proletarianized work place. Oppenheimer defines proletarianized work as an ideal-type which (1973:213):

a. Is characterized by extensive division of labour so that the typical worker performs only one, or a small number, of tasks in a total process;

b. Private or public bureaucracies or higher authorities determine the pace of work, the characteristics of the work place, the nature of the product, the uses to which it is put, and its market conditions;

c. Centres the exchange of labour for income on large-scale market conditions and economic processes including collective bargaining rather than by individual face-to-face bargaining;

d. Leads to defensive reactions, particularly collective bargaining in some form, by the worker, in the face of deteriorating living or working standards.

Oppenheimer stresses that the professional occupational model refers to work possessing the opposite characteristics of proletarian work. He argues that only advanced training remains as a memory of professional criteria.

Post-capitalist theorists tend to emphasize the necessity for efficiency in the "planned" society. In contrasting Marxian fashion, Oppenheimer turns our attention to the question: "Efficiency for whom?" Marx's answer to this question is well known. Efficiency in the capitalist enterprise was always to be measured in terms of the profit margin of his accountant's ledger. With profit assuming primacy, indeed, the motive force behind capitalist production, the human costs of industrial production become a secondary, if not forgotten concern. Thus, the unemployment of the industrial worker was not to be considered in terms of the attendant misery for the factory-hand and his family. Rather, a certain amount of surplus labour was functional. It nourished capitalist expansion by providing a "reserve army" to be drawn upon when there was a sudden surge of demand or the possibility of a new line of production. Marx observed that in capitalist society, the function of overpopulation is to provide for the periodic sudden expansion of industry. Oppenheimer stresses the fact that unemployment has become increasingly characteristic of professional and technical employment.

In emphasizing conditions of unemployment amongst this stratum, Oppenheimer is suggesting that a new "reserve army" of highly trained workers - a superfluous labour supply subject to the same manipulations by capital as the industrial proletariat - is in the making.

The evidence would appear to suggest that the "established professions" have achieved a high degree of equivalence between their supply of trainees and the market's demand for specialists. Oppenheimer cautions us, however, that in the United States at least, even the occupation of law has recently become vulnerable to market fluctuations (1975:34-35).

Despite the relative match of supply and demand in the established professions, other occupations demanding advanced credentials have not been so secure. The "dime-a-dozen" estimate of a bachelor's degree in the arts and sciences is a cliche which is beginning to apply with similar force to the master's degree. The oversupply of teachers - from primary school teachers to university professors - is well-known. Oppenheimer also cites evidence that engineering and other technology-intensive fields demanding advanced credentials of recruits is extremely sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.[21]

Employment opportunities in the science and engineering fields are concentrated in oligopolistic sectors of the economy where large corporations dominate. The technical division of labour is extensive in these occupations. Indeed, there is an ideal-type congruence between Terrence Johnson's "corporate patronage" model and work in the science and engineering fields. In these fields, a production group which is extremely heterogeneous in knowledge and skill (highly specialized and differentiated internally), is entirely dependent upon a corporate consumer for employment. As Johnson argued, under such conditions the collegiate control of work is extremely limited.

Oppenheimer focuses on the relations between the corporate sector and the state in explaining the effects of cyclical, employment-demand fluctuations on the highly trained worker. He writes:

> These cycles and shifts . . ., trigger predictions which themselves affect later cycles: a shortage in any particular field causes an expansion of recruiting into the educational areas required for that field, but there is a delay in filling the demand equivalent to the time required to complete the education. By the time the human power becomes available, industry and government have adjusted to the shortage - for example, by upgrading lower level technicians or by breaking down professional tasks into smaller units which can be handled by lesser educated people. If, on top of this, courses of instruction have been shortened to meet the "emergency" human-power need, the labour market is likely to be swamped suddenly by professional graduates entering a field in which yesterday's shortage abruptly becomes today's surplus. Educational policy then swiftly reverses gears, and closes out programs because graduates cannot get jobs, and the cycle begins again. Meanwhile, unemployment hits older professionals, overspecialized employees whose retraining would be expensive, and of course, the upgraded lesser educated technicians, who can now be displaced by better trained people (sometimes at equally low wages). Or the technicians are retrained because they are cheaper, and the professionals enter the ranks of blue-collar labour (1975:37-38).

If this unemployment can be partly explained in terms of the periodic fluctuations of the business cycle, Oppenheimer suggests that the "fiscal crisis" of state expenditures may be even more threatening to the worker in the professional-technical classification. While he principally focuses on the United States, Oppenheimer argues that the fiscal crisis has been general in the advanced capitalist nations.

Part of this "crisis", according to Oppenheimer, has arisen from the post-World War II expansion of education which responded to the population increase associated with the "baby boom" and the post-sputnik "educational offensive" of American imperialism (1975:37). The "knowledge industry" burgeoned at all levels of the educational ladder, providing an upgraded labour force and a vast employment sector for the newly educated. Indeed, education itself became a major source of employment. However, with the reduction of births in the 1960's there was a decline in enrollment, tending to stabilize the demand for teachers at all levels. A major consequence of this declining demand is the tremendous overproduction of educators.

What may be of even more long-term significance than demographics, is the economic problem of stagflation. If this pattern of high inflation and high unemployment continues, the long-term prospects for credentialed workers dependent upon state employment is grim indeed. The response to this "fiscal crisis" by government has been to gear policy towards deflationary spending policies. Importantly, these policies are especially aimed at the public service sector. The freezing of recruitment in the public sector is joined by budget cutbacks, rigorous monitoring of work activities, limitations on work-role flexibility in decision-making, and wage restraints. These policies combine to deteriorate the conditions of public sector work.

Oppenheimer sees the beginnings of class-consciousness amongst professional-technical workers in the growing trend towards unionization. He sees this trend as a "defensive reaction" to deteriorating living standards and work conditions. He also argues that this trend reflects an emerging "working class consciousness" amongst this group of workers.

Summary

In summary, Johnson, Haug and Oppenheimer have thrown the post-industrial "professionalization" view into sharp relief.

Johnson and Haug have suggested that professionalism as a mode of work organization is on the decline in the industrialized societies.

Oppenheimer goes further than Haug and Johnson, arguing that professionally-credentialed workers are being proletarianized.

The contributions of each of these writers, however, are inadequate for our purposes. They do not provide us with a broad enough theoretical framework within which we can analytically clarify our central issue: the relationship between professional socialization and the structure of class relations. Their approaches, however, do illuminate certain features of occupational reality that post-industrial writers have either ignored or played down. With the aid of their approaches, our own analysis can move more directly to the issue which is central to this project.

IV. Post-Industrialism as a Rejection of the Labour Theory of Value

A number of theoretically intricate issues are raised by the labour theory of value, and especially by Marx's notion of surplus-value. It is recognized that orthodox economics has rejected the theory in terms of its usefulness in application to conventional economic-management problems. The writer professes neither the competence nor interest in taking on the economists in their specialized realm. It should be recognized, however, that behind the technicalities of this economic theory, there lies a sociological model of the operation of social class relations. It is against the rejection of the contemporary validity of this theory - a validity evaluated in the sociological sphere - that the ensuing arguments are mounted.

Post-industrial thinkers ask the question: "Has capitalism been transformed into a post-capitalist social formation that has overcome the crisis-ridden form of economic growth described by Marx?" Their answer to this question is in the affirmative.

The "crisis-ridden" form of capitalist economic growth described by Marx was seen to bear within itself the tendency towards the creation of social-structural conditions which would eventually result in the transformation from capitalist to socialist society. What post-industrial thought assumes is that the "crises" which Marx referred to as "revolution-generating" were identical with the recurrent downswings of business activity commonly referred to as economic "depressions".[22]

It is argued that the recurrent "crises" of the business cycle were not, in fact, the structural conditions identified by Marx as inevitably revolution-generating. It is, however, upon this premise that post-industrial thinkers reject the continued validity of the labour theory of value. Furthermore, it is assumed by some writers that because of the contemporary invalidity of the labour theory of value, a social theory which takes class antagonism as the central axis of conflict in contemporary societies (outside the socialist countries) must also be rejected.

What is the Labour Theory of Value?

The labour theory of value was originally a response by the classical political economists to the question: "How can different objects which possess social utility be assigned comparative values in order to facilitate their exchange between persons?" In an economy in which economic production is geared towards exchange rather than simply to personal, familial or communal use, this question took on profound significance. In such societies, both individual and collective survival is underlaid by a complex web of interdependent exchanges between specialized producers and unspecialized consumers.

The answer to the question provided by the labour theory of value is well known. The amount of labour time expended in production is the only logical gauge of the exchange-value of a product. Price then, is determined by the necessary labour time which on the average, is required to yield up a product to the purchaser. It may be objected that other factors obviously influence price - such as the richness and accessibility of natural resources or the varying efficiency of the physical instruments in use. However, their influence is indirect. That is, their influence is always mediated by labour. Indeed, without labour acting with capital (instruments of production) on nature, the very act of exchange could never take place.

The value of a product, as expressed in the price of a commodity good, however, is not the result of an arbitrary valuation assigned independently by a single producer to his own labour time. Rather, as one amongst a number of suppliers confronting an aggregate of consumers, the value of the producer's labour-time is subject to the discipline of the market. The market - a complex of social exchanges - disciplines price through the confrontation of competitive suppliers calculating their costs and expected returns, against the calcaulations of consumers seeking their vest advantage.

Marx and the Labour Theory of Value: Surplus-Value and Social Class

The equation of value with labour-time was, as indicated, an insight of classical political economy. In his analysis of capitalism, Marx elaborated upon the labour theory of value to embrance the considerations which the classical political economists had ignored. Furthermore, he historically located its concrete application within the specific structure of the capitalist economy.

Capitalism, according to Marx, involved not only the generalization of production for exchange rather than simple use. Capitalism also involved the separation from the producing class of economic agents deriving their income from the market itself rather than from production proper. These agents slowly crystallized into what Marx considered to be a class formation. By acquiring control over the producer's productive means, the capitalist class elaborated a system in which it could prosper, independently of, but derivative from the actual process of value production.

To the classical labour theory of value, Marx coupled a theory of surplus-value. The central point of the theory was that the capitalist evolved into a distinctive class whose wealth and reproductive capacity as a class depended solely on the appropriation of surplus-value from the producer.[23]

Marx's insight was that the capitalist's survival required that he appropriate from the producer - his employee - that produce generated over and above what was required to pay the producer a subsistence wage. If labour time was the concrete "averaging" mechanism - gauge of exchange value - Marx added that surplus labour-time was equivalent to surplus-value.[24]

As Marx stressed and history has born out, the producing class was increasingly forced away from independent - or communal goods-production, into wage-dependent labour as the mass-production factory replaced smaller shops. Such factories were typically the legal possession of families or individuals rather than a collectivity of craftsmen or other such co-operative ownership forms. The producing class, having already surrendered much of its marketing function to the merchant capitalist, now became fully wage dependent and lost its direct product market-supply function completely. The actual producer became a mere seller of labour-power only. Only the capitalist now entered the market as the direct supplier of goods.

The capitalist, however, remained subject to market competition with other suppliers, and thus he faced a critical choice. To realize a competitive advantage, he must successfully increase the surplus value produced by his paid employees. For he had no source of value other than his workers. The alternative was to lose his competitive advantage as a supplier and be priced out of the market. The disincentive to this was obvious: he lost his ownership rights to the means of production and was forced into wage-dependent labour.

To increase surplus-value, the capitalist had to vary his labour costs in diminishing proportion to the fixed cost of his capital investment (which was fixed at the time of purchase). In this way he could reduce the price of his marketed product and thus compete with other capitalists. However, the extent of this variation had its limits.

The degree to which the "wage bill" could be reduced was established by (1) the amount of purchasing power required to maintain the workers at a standard of efficiency which was profitable to the capitalist, and (2) the influence of socio-cultural expectations.[25]

To transcend the limitations set for him by the socially necessary wage bill, the capitalist was forced to introduce the latest machinery and skills to remain in business. The objective was to increase the productivity-per-worker fast enough that there was a lag between their productivity rate and the upward movement of wage costs. In short, to meet the price competition in the consumer market, the capitalist was forced to find means to reduce the time his employees expended in producing goods exchangeable for their own subsistence requirements alone. The goal was to increase the amount of labour-power expended in producing surplus-value. It was from surplus-value that the capitalist could extract the purchasing-power to further accumulate capital and thus meet the ruthless competition in the capital market.

The long-term effect of the competition we have described—on the structure of capital ownership—was to concentrate control over the means of production. Ruthless competition drove the majority of smaller firms from the market or into the legal possession of larger, more efficient firms. The economies of scale which could be realized by the larger firms capable of sustaining costly mechanization encouraged this concentration.

The decisive element ultimately determining the level of demand for consumer goods is, in a capitalist country, the sum total of wages paid to workers. Since, however, surplus value-rate increase is the motive force of capitalist production, and since that rate varied inversely with the share of total wages in the output, there was a constant tendency for capitalist society to undermine its own mass market. The contradiction between the expansion of production and the relative restriction of the mass market for consumer goods, is expressed in recurrent crises or radical, downward swings of the business cycle.

According to Marx, "These crises are always but momentary and forcible solutions of the existing contradictions. They are violent eruptions which for a time, restore the disturbed equilibrium" (Capital, Vol. III:249). Despite this passage, post-industrial theorists appear to assume that, these "crises" were believed by Marx to be the conditions necessary for the generation of a socialist revolution. Post-industrial theory argues against the probability that these crises will be of such a magnitude that revolutionary conditions are probable.

The So-Called "New Factor of Production"

A revolutionary-containment thesis is implicitly provided in Galbraith's notion that the top echelons of the corporate and state sectors converge into a "new partnership". The so-called "New Industrial State" then, essentially means a policy-unity between the corporations and the state on certain broad planning priorities. A primary policy goal is seen to be the warding off of major crises - such as the Depression of the 1930's - through the management of effective demand.

Behind this notion lies the pervasive fascination with technological development and technical rationality. The "New Industrial State" is seen as both the necessary product of and facilitator for, economic rationalization - through the integration of science with production.

Post-industrial theory sees science to be somehow disconnected from the labour-power which Marx attributed as the only "value-creating substance". For Galbraith, the growth of science-connected production has the effect of creating

> . . . what anyone in search of novelty must be justified in calling a new factor of production. This is the association of men of diverse technical knowledge, experience or other talent which modern industrial technology and planning requires (Galbraith, 1972:72).

For Daniel Bell, a pivotal distinction between "industrial labour" and "professional work" lies in the latter's theoretical knowledge-power rather than routine labour-power. He argues that the wedding of science to production in the latter third of the twentieth century has necessitated a reconceptualization of Marx's notion of "productive forces":

> Every society has always existed on the basis of knowledge. But dependence on the codification of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation is new. This is the foundation for the new science-based industries of the last third of the twentieth century - computers, telecommunications, optics, polymers, electronics - which are vastly different in their mode of innovation and occupational composition from the mass-production industries of the mid-twentieth century (1973:23-24).

Both Galbraith and Bell clearly invite debate with Marxism. Miliband, discussing Galbraith's New Industrial State, comments:

> Professor Galbraith perceives that an advanced industrial system requires the transcendence of private appropriation and much of the book is in fact a documented though seemingly unconscious comment on Marx's prediction that, with the development of capitalism, 'centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument' (1968:216).

However, Miliband continues,

> the central point of the book, which is also its central weakness, is that the 'industrial system'

> has solved the problem, and that whatever adjustments it further requires can be achieved within its present framework, and without, perish the thought, the invocation of the old socialist goals (Miliband, 1968:216).

Christopher Lasch (1973:63) suggests that Daniel Bell, despite his rejection of Marx, "remains fascinated by - one might say fixated upon - Marxian categories". Neuberg points out that there are more references to Marx than to any other person in Bell's (1973) name index. Gartner and Riessman (1973), Lasch (1973), and Neuberg (1975), all have criticized Bell for his misinterpretation of Marx.

Bell's misreading of Marx appears to arise from the technological determinism which undergirds post-industrial thought. He correctly argues that Marx's view of the mode of production comprised two parts: the social relations of production and the forces of production.

Bell contends that there are really two key theses in Marx.

Firstly, Bell contends that Marx held that capitalism would witness the increasing centralization and bureaucratization of production.

Secondly, Bell argues that Marx held that social relations were critical in capitalist society for they would become increasingly antagonistic - polarizing into the conditions for revolutionary class struggle. He argues that whole Marx was accurate on the first score, he was wrong on the second.

Gartner and Riessman point out three inaccuracies in Bell's interpretation of Marx (1973:87): (1) He is inaccurate in equating the forces of production with the technology (physical instruments) of production (Rather, for Marx, the forces of production include the production culture in both its machine form and social form (patterns of labour activity expended in transforming nature to man's use)).

(2) Bell inaccurately assumes that Marx viewed the *forces* of production as the *primary* determinant of social change. In fact, Marx emphasized the social relations: Feudalism failed because as a system of social relations it could no longer expand the forces of production and capitalism would fail because it would eventually prove to be a fetter on the expansion of productive forces. (3) Despite the location of primary determination in the *social* relations, Marxism always stressed a dialectical interplay between the forces and relations of production. In consequence, Bell

> sees chiefly a one-way relationship whereby the forces of production and their new representatives, the engineer and scientists, are primary. He fails to see the interaction of the existing relations of production and the derivative corporate state (Gartner and Riessman, 1973:87).

It is this same tendency to reify technology that encourages (or allows) Bell to see economic power flowing to the bearers of technology-related theoretical knowledge. Bell thus argues that new "intellectual techniques" such as Keynesian and mathematical economics, econometrics, game theory, statistical decision theory, and systems analysis, are increasingly involved in the *successful* direction of change. However, Neuberg points out that he provides ". . . not a shred of empirical evidence that these 'intellectual technologies' have been successfully used to direct change" (1975:128). Furthermore,

> for empirical evidence to the contrary one needn't search far for an example. Despite several sophisticated economic theories of inflation and elaborate econometric models of inflating economies government planners daily confess that they do not know how to (or at least can't) control inflation (*Ibid.*: 128-129).

Neuberg also points out that Bell and other post-industrial thinkers conceive of abstract information as directly entering material production

(Ibid.:129). In so doing, they reify information. Neuberg continues:

> In fact, in the absence of capital and/or labour, information can produce nothing. Theoretical knowledge in production is a reified conception of the enlightened working routines of men (perhaps scientists and sometimes with machines). Scientific research is, after all, work (Neuberg, 1975:129).

It is this final point which begs emphasis. Scientific research, despite its mythical celebration is after all, work. Nevertheless, the strongest argument against the notion of equating all value with labour-power expenditure stems from a distinction between ordinary labour power and scientific creativity which accelerates productivity.

Solow (1957) and Denison (1962) have been most influential in pointing out the relative increases in productivity that can be achieved with a better educated and better trained work force.[26] Indeed, it may be conceded to Heilbroner that,

> there is little doubt that statistical examination of growth patterns among industrialized nations shows a steadily increasing importance of 'knowledge relative' inputs, and a corresponding decline in increases of brute 'labour power' or sheer quantities of unchanged capital (e.g., the edition of new railway tracks) (1973:165).

What is at issue, however, is not the fact that the instruments of technology and the techniques of production are changing. This may be readily conceded. The real issue, however, is whether or not the labour theory of value is rendered inoperative by the productivity increases yielded by scientific advances in production.

To advance this position, Bell turns for support to Jurgen Habermas. The advantage of Bell's "borrowing" on a contemporary theorist sympathetic with Marxism is that we are provided with a unique occasion to confront the issue squarely in Marxist terms.

Habermas: Science as Labour "Of a Different Sort"

Habermas, in *Theory and Practice* (1973) attempts to provide the basis for a rejection or at least a modern revision of the labour theory of value. As Laska (1974:155) suggests: "Habermas, in his revision of Marx, reduces the conception of recurring crises of capitalist production to a 'breakdown thesis' centering on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall". It is against this "reduction" by post-industrial theorists generally that our critique is levelled.

According to Habermas, Marx failed to recognize that capitalism could marshall offsetting forces from the mass of total capital which could neutralize the tendency of the profit rate to fall. He argues that the possibility is at least open that capitalist accumulation could be stabilized by increasing the rate of surplus labour by adding a new source of value. Marx, of course, had insisted that in capitalist society, only labour could be seen as value-producing and accumulation was solely dependent on the increasing rate of exploitation. Habermas argues that Marx overlooked the possibility that

> with mechanization the organic composition of capital changes not only quantitatively but qualitatively - that is, in the specific mode that enables capitalists to retain a greater portion of surplus labour from the given quantity of labour power (Habermas, 1973:225).

Labour-saving machines, argues Habermas, cannot simply be included as items of constant capital. For, he argues, they have the effect of raising the rate of surplus value.

Marx saw the limit to capital accumulation to reside in the fact that surplus-value could only be extracted to the extent that labour was exchanged with capital. Increasing constant capital (mechanization) relative to variable capital (labour-power), simultaneously undermined the very system itself. For pushing this process to its logical extremity means that labour would be completely eliminated. The elimination of the labour-capital exchange would eliminate capitalism itself.

Habermas argues that the emergence of science and technology to the fore as increasingly dominant elements in the production process, creates a novel situation. He argues that science must be seen as labour, but labour of a different sort : a "second-order productive labour". Scientific labour, he argues, can be justifiably treated as a new value-creating substance.

Habermas suggests that the value created by science can only be realized through labour directly involved in the production of goods. It is not made clear why the product of science does not itself fit the "goods" classification. However, what makes science distinct from other labour is that it makes it possible for the latter (in constant or diminishing numbers) to produce more surplus-value. Thus, science can be seen as an additional source of value and one which contributes to the survival of capitalism. And thus, Habermas argues, the Marxist labour theory of value must be revised. The theory must show that value is dependent not merely on productive labour but on productivity itself.

It thus becomes clear why Bell would be enamoured by such a conception. Science is not classified as proletarian labour but rather, appears more consonant with the "professional service" classification. Science diminishes the dependence of economic growth on the exploitation of an industrial labour force. Thus, the bulk of the working population can gradually be re-allocated amongst more satisfying and challenging occupations - say humanistic, personal services. Furthermore, the "breakdown crisis" can be averted forever. In short, we appear to have a cogent source of support in the Marxist camp itself, for the "radical-optimist" vision. As Laska summarizes Habermas' position:

> If value arises from an increase in productivity *per se*, then the expansion of surplus value through the harnessing of science will provide for the continued accumulation of capital, and Habermas will have described the basis of a capitalist heaven (1974:156).

Habermas, in claiming that the scientific development of productive forces is an *additional* source of value, has mistaken a central Marxian premise. The mistake ~~is~~ revealed by the following quote, which Habermas cites as evidence in Marx himself of a need for a revision of the theory of value:

> . . . to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on the labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose 'powerful effectiveness' is itself to turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on production, but depends rather on the general state of science and the progress of technology, or the application of this science to production (*Grundrisse*:141).

As Laska points out, in this quotation Marx was only speaking about an increase in *real* wealth rather than value or surplus value. Habermas misreads the quote, assuming Marx was referring to the latter. Assuming tangential support from Marx, he then argues that the possibility exists for capitalism to increase surplus-value without increasing the rate of exploitation - through the contribution of second-order productive labour.

Marx's Clarification in the "Grundrisse": Permanent Crisis

Marx was fully aware that the scientific development of productive forces and their capacity to accelerate economic productivity and thus real wealth. The difference between the position of Habermas and Marx is made clear by Laska in the following:

> But Marx did not consider the scientific development of productive forces as an additional source of value. On the contrary, rather than adding value to the product, Marx argued that scientific development, in so far as it teaches industry 'how to replace human labour with natural agents', diminishes the value of products . . . labour-power . . . alone is a value-creating substance, and . . . value . . . has only a social reality . . . With scientific development of productive forces, capitalist society can produce more wealth, *but the problem it faces is that of keeping this wealth within the value form*(italics mine) so that the surplus value contained in these goods can be realized as capitalist wealth, i.e., as increased power over labour and nature (Laska, 1974:158-159).

Indeed, especially in his later works, Marx was particularly sensitized to the possibility that enormous amounts of *real wealth* were possible with the development of capitalism. He was also acutely aware of the possibility that capitalismwould generate a level of automation far beyond that of any present day society (Nicolaus, 1975:329). However, for Marx, this development of productive forces within capitalism was a measure, principally, of an increasedrate of exploitation - the gap between the enormous societal wealth produced by the worker's surplus labour-power and his control over the disposition of that wealth.[27] In the *Grundrisse*, Marx states of the worker:

> He inevitably impoverishes himself . . . because the creative power of his labour established itself in opposition to him, as the alien power of capital . . . Thus, all the progress of civilization, or in other words every increase in the productive labour of society, if you want, in the productive

> power of labour itself - such as results from science, invention, division and organization of labour, improved communication, creation of the world market, machinery and so on - does not enrich the workers, but capital, and thus increases the power that dominates labour (Cited in Nicolaus, 1975:322).

As Mandel (1968, Vol. I:150-151) pointed out, Marx never expounded the thesis of absolute impoverishment in his mature works.[28] Rather, absolute impoverishment applies more specifically to the unemployed or industrial reserve army. It was the exploitation of labour-power with which Marx was continually concerned. The worker sold not only his labour time, but surrendered control over his own creative power during that time. Marx argued that, the worker's impoverishment can only be measured in terms of the entire social world which his labour constructs to capitalist specifications rather than his own (Nicolaus, 1975:322).

> An index of exploitation and impoverishment . . . which actually captures the variables to which Marx was referring . . . would have to array on one side the net property holdings of the working class, and on the other side the value of capital stock of all the factories, utilities, infrastructural investments, institutions, and military establishments which are under the control of the capitalist and serve its policy aims. Not only the economic value but also the political power and social influence of these established assets would have to be included in the equation. Only a statistic of this kind would be adequate to test whether or not Marx's prediction of increasing exploitation and increasing impoverishment had been validated by the course of historical development (Nicolaus, 1975:322).

For Marx, it was the permanent crisis character of capitalism which would necessitate the eventuality of revolution. Capitalism required an ever-expanding market in commodities. Science wed to mass-production tended to cheapen commodities and thus, the commodities necessary to go to market must expand simply to realize the same amount of value. While science was a force of production which accelerated technology and thus the expansion of real wealth, the value-form of capitalist social relations was ultimately a block to continual expansion. Why? Because the generation of new investment required the growth of surplus-value, but its growth was inhibited on the consumption side by the inevitable cheapening of commodities.

Marx, with great foresight, well recognized the flexibility of the capitalist system in responding to this contradiction. As Nicolaus points out:

> Cataclysmic crises rising to a revolutionary crescendo are only one possible variant of the breakdown process, and indeed, Marx lays little stress on this type of crises in the Grundrisse. For every possible tendency towards breakdown, Marx names a number of delaying tendencies; this list includes the development of monopoly, the conquest of the world market, and, significantly, Marx mentions the payment to workers of surplus wages (1975:328).

Marx thus laid the groundwork for the later descriptions of monopoly capitalism and imperialism. The development of these dramatic means for averting the declining profit-rate were themselves necessitated by the continued application of the theory of value in capitalist economies.

Capitalism has indeed found means to continually develop its productive forces. This is consistent with Marx's insight that "no social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed" (Nicolaus' cit.:328). What is the indicator of the "disappearance" of capitalism then? Marx responded: "As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth,* labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange value of use value" (cited in Nicolaus, 1975:328).

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* Marx is equating wealth with private capital in this statement.

For Marx, the level of advancement of the technological forces of production - taken by post-industrial theorists to suggest the disappearance of capitalism - provided but an indicator of capitalism's maturity. It may in fact be the very maturity of capitalism which provides the most solid foundations for the construction of the most fully "socialist" society. Indeed, we would agree with Mandel in his claim that, in complex societies, where an extreme scarcity of industrial resources continues to prevail, only bureaucratic centralization and coercion are the likely contestants of the capitalist market, i.e., the concrete application of the theory of value. Such a reality is hardly consistent with socialism.

Marx makes the point in the following:

> To the degree that large-scale industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour-time and on the quantity of labour expended and more on the power of the instruments (of production) . . . (which) . . . depend . . . on the general state of science and the progress of technology . . . Labour no longer appears as an integral element in the productive process; rather man acts as supervisor and regulator . . . He stands at the side of the productive process, instead of being its chief actor . . . (with the collapse of labour-time as a measure of value) . . . the system . . . collapses. Capitalism is its own contradiction in process, for its urge is to reduce labour time to a minimum, while at the same time it maintains that labour-time is its only measure and source of wealth. Thus, it reduces labour-time in its necessary form in order to augment it in its superfluous form; thus superfluous labour increasingly becomes a precondition - a question of life or death - for necessary labour (*Grundrisse*: 141).

Rather than invoking a "new source of value" as the saviour of capitalism, the application of the theory of surplus-value to the monopoly capital era provides a better yield. Examination of the extension of the "value-form" of capital throughout the so-called "underdeveloped" trading nations, the transformation of ever-increasing spheres of social activity from use to exchange, and the expansion of state economic functions, suggests that the "permanent crises" is the most fruitful locus of analysis. Ther permanent crises is set by the contradiction between the capitalist value-form and the productive capacity developed with technology and a skilled labour force.

In contrast, Habermas asserts that, in a partially revised form, the labour theory of value has universal validity. Marx saw its application in historical context. As Laska (1974:160) observes of Habermas:

> In an ahistorical manner he goes on proposing to measure wealth in terms of labour time when the material necessity for doing so has been eliminated . . . Instead of identifying the crisis of capitalism implicit in the overthrow of the value-form, Habermas obscures the crisis by continuing to see the value form as valid absolutely.

In line with our recommendation to apply the theory of surplus-value to the monopoly capitalist era, we now return to our central theme: the impact of the growing stratum of professionally-credentialed workers on the social relations of capitalist production.

CHAPTER SIX

Footnotes

1. Heilbroner (1973:164) has computed the following table indicating the percentage distribution of employed workers within the agricultural, industrial and service sectors, for selected countries. It shows the numerical predominance of the service sector in the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED WORKERS*

	Agriculture	Industry	Service
U.S., 1900	38	38	24
1970	4	35	61
France, 1950	35	45	20
1970	17	39	44
West Germany, 1950	24	48	28
1970	10	48	42
U.K., 1950	6	56	39
1970	4	45	50

*Sources Cited (Heilbroner): "U.S. Historical Statistics: Economic Indicators (1972:74); OECD, Basic Statistics of Community (1970)."

The disproportionate representation of service work in the Canadian economy, relative to manufacturing and of course, agriculture, is well known. The Yearbook of Labour Statistics (1977), published by the International Labour Office, Geneva, reports that in 1971, Canada's service sector contained 52.5 per cent of the economically active population, rising to 62.1 per cent in 1976.

It may be noted that, in contrast with the post-industrial thesis, Canadian political economists have advanced what has become known as the "Staples" thesis of Canadian economic development. That thesis - building on the work of the late Harold Innis - suggests that Canada's service sector growth has advanced at the expense of industrialization (for a review, see Watkins, 1967:49-73). Indeed, more recently a group of writers concerned with the economic control of the Canadian resource extraction sector, has argued that Canadian industrial underdevelopment is correlated with the growth of U.S. ownership (see Robert M. Laxer (ed.), 1973). Such a view accords with Christopher Lasch's argument that international "functional rearrangements" in the capitalist nations may be responsible for the goods-service shift (1973:64). Just as West Germany has become a manufacturing centre for Europe, Canada has become (or better, remains), a resource-extraction economy. This, indeed, was the basic point of the staples thesis. The explanation for the size of the service sector might be found in the limited labour-intensity of the resource extraction industries and the relatively high demand for Canadian raw materials; the latter being the basis of a surplus which affords the size of service sector growth. The experience of recent years, however, suggests that the disproportionate growth of the service sector is strongly inflationary and that the lack of industrial development has created extremely high levels of unemployment.

2. Both Bell (1973) and Gartner and Riessman (1973) use this list of "services".

3. Johnson defines the "petite-bourgeois" class as comprising: farmers, fishermen, independent businessmen and investors, and self-employed salesmen (1972:147). He shows that their numbers, as a percentage of the total labour force, have declined by approximately 25 per cent between 1948 and 1968, from 14.7 per cent of the total to 10.9 per cent. He also shows that farm workers declined from 40.3 per cent of the work force to .0.2 per cent and menial labourers from 7.2 per cent (12.0 per cent in 1911) to 5.4 per cent in 1961 (Ibid.:163). Thus, between 1901 and 1961, their combined percentage fell from 47.5 per cent to 15.6 per cent of the total work force.

4. Szymanski provides the following table, derived from, as cited (1972: 107): *Historical Statistics of the United States*, p. 74; *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1970, p. 225; *The U.S. Economy in 1980*, Table A-24, p. 27.

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS (UNITED STATES): BOTH SEXES

	1900	1920	1940	1950	1960	1970
Managers, Officials, Proprietors, Farm Owners, and Managers	7,460 25.6%	9,245 21.9%	9,132 17.7%	9,530 16.1%	10,400 15.5%	9,998 12.7%
Professional and Technical	1,234 4.3%	2,283 5.4%	3,879 7.5%	5,081 8.6%	7,475 11.1%	11,322 14.4%
Independent Professional & Technical	320 1.1%	420 1.0%	570 1.1%	654 1.1%	873 1.3%	1,200 1.5%
Professional and Technical Workers	910 3.1%	1,860 4.4%	3,310 6.4%	4,427 7.5%	6,602 9.9%	10,100 12.9%
Clerical and Sales Workers	2,184 7.5%	5,443 12.9%	8,432 16.3%	11,365 19.3%	14,104 21.2%	18,548 23.6%
Service Workers	2,625 9.1%	3,313 7.9%	6,069 11.8%	8,180 10.5%	8,349 12.5%	9,724 12.4%
Manual Workers	10,401 35.6%	16,974 40.2%	20,579 39.8%	24,266 41.1%	24,211 36.1%	27,452 34.9%
Craftsmen and Foremen	3.062 10.5%	5,482 13.0%	6,203 12.0%	3,350 14.2%	8,560 12.8%	10,027 12.8%
Operatives	3,720 12.8%	6,537 15.6%	9,518 18.4%	12,030 20.4%	11,986 17.9%	13,811 17.6%
Non-Farm Laborers	3,620 12.5%	4,905 11.6%	4,875 9.4%	3,885 6.6%	3,665 5.5%	3,614 4.6%
Farm Workers	5,125 17.7%	4,948 11.7%	3,632 7.0%	2,578 4.3%	2,057 3.1%	1,400 1.8%
TOTAL	29,030	42,206	51,742	58,999	66,631	73,408

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5. O'Connor (1972:12) argues the point in the following: ". . . competitive industries are largely confined to producing for markets (or, in the case of trade, selling in markets) that are seasonal, subject to sudden changes in fashion or style, or otherwise irregular or unstable. The irregular nature of product markets means that small businessmen have little opportunity to stabilize production or employment. And, since very little capital is invested per worker there is little incentive for them to do so (even when the opportunity presents itself). The reason is that business losses from excess physical capacity and time lost in set-up and shut-down operations are relatively small."

6. See Rinehart (1975:95-96) for a review of these studies.

7. The following table reveals the dramatic growth of "office" employees (a rough approximation to "white-collar") in Canada in recent years.

GROWTH OF OFFICE EMPLOYMENT: 1964 - 1975

Year	%	Year	%	Year	%
1964	12	1968	15	1972	32
1965	11	1969	19	1973	31
1966	14	1970	(not reported)	1974	33
1967	14	1971	28	1975	34

Source: Labour Canada: *Working Conditions in Canadian Industry*, Volumes 1963-1975.

8. See Table V.

9. This point is made by S. Michael Miller (1975:19).

10. Both Murray (1975:231) and O'Connor (1972, 1973 and 1974) make the same estimate of U.S. state-dependency.

11. Murray (1975:231) provides the following table which illustrates the growth from 5.1 per cent to 18.1 per cent. His sources are reproduced as he has cited them.*

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES' UNION MEMBERSHIP, 1956-1970[1]

	Number			Membership			Per cent of Total[2]		
Year	Total	Fed.	State/ Local	Total	Fed.	State/ Local	Total	Fed.	State/ Local
1956	34			915			3.1		
1958	41			1,035			5.8		
1960	41			1,070			5.9		
1962	41			1,223			7.0		
1964	59	56	18	1,453	897	356	8.1	3.0	3.1
1966	38	37	17	1,717	1,073	644	9.0	5.6	3.4
1968	59	37	18	2,155	1,331	804	10.7	6.7	4.0
1970	83	60	40	4,080	1,411	2,669	18.1	7.3	11.8

*Footnotes and Sources, next page.

Murray's footnotes and sources:

> [1] Included in the totals are employee associations. These columns are nonadditive because many unions and associations have membership at all three levels of government.
>
> [2] This percentage refers to the proportion of government union membership of the total union membership in the United States.
>
> Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971). U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1972). United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1968).

12. Rinehart (1975:112-118) discusses the growing militancy of each of these groups. He refers to Jamieson's (1968) depiction of the 1965 postal workers' strike in Canada as ". . . one of the most important strikes in recent Canadian history, because of its broad impact on the public sector. The strike was illegal, nationwide in scope, and it was carried out by white-collar employees, a group previously regarded as unsusceptible to unionization and opposed to confrontation tactics" (Rinehart, 1975:113).

13. Dependent wage workers (excepting clerical) include the blue-collar, farm worker, and service worker categories in Bell's table.

14. See, for example, Gouldner (1957); Merton (1957); Wilensky (1956); Reisman (1949); Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958); Shepard (1956); Marcson (1960); Kornhauser (1962), and Scott (1965-66).

15. For the source of this discussion, see Chapter Five in Johnson, 1972:65-74.

16. Again, for this discussion, see Chapter Six in Johnson, 77-86.

17. Haug, in this regard, writes: "The auto worker who 'specializes' in tightening hub cap bolts and the surgeon who concentrates his practice on inner ear operations are in the same league from this perspective" (1973:197).

18. Haug is here referring to the various "paraprofessional" jobs such as those designated by the titles: "physicians's associate", "paramedic", "nurse's aide", "teacher's aide", the social work "casework aide", & c. & c., which she argues, have been established in spite of or independently of, professional associations.

19. As Haug writes (1973:201): "To the extent that scientific knowledge can be 'codified', it can be broken into bits, stored in a computer memory, and recalled as needed. No longer need it be preserved in the professional's head or books alone."

20. Haug associates rising levels of education with the "demystification" of the professional's role. She also points to the organized criticism of consumer groups as well as the challenge of paraprofessionals, of and to, the legitimacy of the authoritative knowledge base and behavioural competence, of the established (credentialed) "professions".

21. Oppenheimer (1975:37) writes:

> In West Germany, both employer and government publications agree that the employment outlook for university graduates in such fields as chemistry, physics, mathematics, and some engineering categories is significantly more problematic than it was a few years ago, especially for older, more specialized professionals. It is predicted that by 1975 every third new chemist won't find a suitable job, by 1977 every other chemistry grad will have to find a job in another field. For mathematicians in 1970 there were six jobs for every applicant; by the end of 1972 this had decreased to two jobs for every applicant . . . In the United States, unemployment rates for aerospace and electronics engineers were 5.3 per cent in 1971, for solid-state physicists 4.9 per cent, for manufacturing engineers 4.5 per cent. Much of this was related to defense cutbacks and varied regionally, with the area around Boston, and the state of California being hit hardest. Yet the Engineering Manpower Bulletin declared in August, 1972, that by 1980 there would be a shortage of over half-million qualified engineers. On March 11, 1973, the New York Times predicted a serious shortage on the order of a 'crisis' within two years . . . This mixed picture is partially accounted for by economic cycles and shifts in government spending. Rosy predictions are based on the assumption that the public sector will at some time in the near future once again pick up the slack. As the Engineering Manpower Bulletin, 'Engineering employment is particularly sensitive to government spending on research and development, which is highly engineering and science intensive'.

22. The idea that radical downswings in the business cycle breed social and political conflict is generally accepted. The assumption, however, that Marx and Marxists found these breeding grounds the necessary and sufficient conditions for a socialist revolution, as we shall argue, is misnomered. History, of course, itself denies the assertion.

Imputing such a "prediction" to Marx, however, is not unique to post-industrial theorists. Indeed, the advent of Keynesianism, has encouraged the view quite generally, that 'managed capitalism' can scale down the distance between the peak and trough of the business cycle. Consequently, it is often held, that in the liberal democracies where increasing degrees of fiscal and monetary economic management have occurred and where the Welfare State is established, these 'breeding grounds' lack the requisite nourishment for the 'ripening' or revolutionary seeds. Consequently, it is often argued, Marx's alleged 'warning' of capitalism's demise, need no longer be taken seriously. Our contest is with the importance which Marx purportedly assigned to these downswings.

23. The idea of surplus-value - treated as an analytical economic concept - was not, of course, unique to Marx. Indeed, Marx himself traced it back through the classical political economists. What Marx did, was to discover in it, the basis for the development of class antagonisms. In so doing, he was able to formulate a theory of social change, centered on the relations of production which were set in conflict by the struggle for capital accumulation. It should not be forgotten, however, that Marx's projected fourth volume of Capital (which he himself referred to as 'Theories of Surplus Value'), was devoted to the strictly "economic" as well as "political-economic" usages of the concept.

24. The idea that average labour time was the guage of value of a product was gleaned from classical political economy. Marx's theory of "surplus-value" production under capitalism, asserted that capital accumulation could result only from the extraction of the exchanged value of the labourer's product which remained after the worker's basic needs were met. By "basic needs", Marx was referring to the socially necessary wage bill paid out by the capitalist to his employees for the performance of the tasks he assigned them. It is in this sense, that surplus value is equivalent to surplus labour time. It should be noted, and stressed, that Marx did not consider profit identical with surplus value.

25. In Marx's words: "The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labour time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this special article . . . Therefore, the labour-time requisite for the production of means of subsistence" (cited in Anderson, 1974:20, from Capital, Vol. 1:189-190). Anderson asks: "But what is the subsistence level?" (Ibid.). Firstly, he cites Engels' assertion that wages will be paid at the lowest rate necessary to reproduce labour power. However, he then correctly notes that Marx clarified the obscurity of Engels comment. In these regards, Marx wrote: "Besides the mere physical element, the value of labour is in every country determined by a traditional standard of life. It is not mere physical life, but it is the satisfaction of certain wants springing from the social conditions in which people are placed and reared up . . . the value of labour itself is not a fixed but a variable magnitude . . ." (Anderson, 1974:20, from Marx, "Wages, Prices and Profits", in Selected Works, Vol. 2, pp. 71-72.

26. Denison attempted to demonstrate that in the United States, in the two decades prior to 1929, the coupled factors of increased capital stock and labour supply accounted for about two-thirds of the increase in national economic output. In the period 1929 - 1959, quantitative increases in these factors accounted for only 44 per cent of growth. At the same time, in the two decades prior to 1929, improvements in education and training accounted for only 13 per cent. Subsequently, from 1929 - 1959, this factor was presumed to affect twice the proportion of total growth.

Denison also studied the sources of growth in Western European nations. His data indicated that while the magnitude of the influence of improved education and training varied, the direction was the same for all - increased influence. Solow and others have yielded similar findings.

It can be fairly said that there is a concensus amongst economists, that the technological sophistication of the labour force, the product of education and training, is an increasingly influential growth factor. We should emphasize, however, that the economist's attempt to statistically isolate influential elements of the "forces" of production, concerns quite another set of interests than those required of a holistic, political economy. Efforts to borrow piecemeal from such studies, has resulted in the technological reductionism that we have criticized. Thus, to treat improved "technology" - the only concrete application of knowledge - or improved technical education and training, as determinant of changes at the macro-sociological level or total societies level, is to commit the logical error of reductionism.

The appropriate issue for a "political economy" analysis (which we would argue should be identical with "macro-sociological" analysis) as it pertains to such factors, is to ask: "What is the fundamental, variable determinant of advancing technical education in capitalist society?" The Marxist answer to this question is not complicated: It is the drive for capital accumulation. It might be added that Marx well recognized the importance of these factors to capital accumulation long before Messrs. Solow and Denison. In Capital, Vol. III:266, he wrote that a second of three cardinal facts of capitalist production was: "Organization of labour itself into social labour: through co-operation, division of labour, and the uniting of labour with the natural sciences."

27. In this statement, "his control" (referring to the worker in the singular), we are in fact referring to what Marx called the "collective worker", and would better read: "working class control over the disposition of . . . wealth". The concept "collective worker" is discussed at length in the subsequent chapters.

28. Classical Marxism has come under considerable criticism for its emphasis on the "immiserization" (the increasing impoverishment) of the proletariat. Again, we are led, mistakenly, to this interpretation by overzealous rhetoric or Marxist detractors. Marx himself,

actually emphasized the relative impoverishment of the proletariat rather than its absolute loss of material advantage. Indeed, this emphasis is incorporated within the notion of the socio-historical relativity of the subsistence level. The following quote may clarify the issue:

> Although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, and in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature (cited by Anderson, 1974:23; from Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital", in Selected Works, Vol. I:167).

Part III

PROFESSIONALLY-CREDENTIALED WORKERS AND CLASS RELATIONS UNDER MONOPOLY CAPITALISM: A MARXIST ALTERNATIVE TO TECHNOLOGICAL-DETERMINISM

CHAPTER SEVEN

WORK AND AUTHORITY: FROM TECHNOLOGICAL-DETERMINISM TO MARXISM

I. Introduction

We have attempted to show that the underlying explanatory framework of post-industrial social theory is "a-sociological": its contributors implicitly or explicitly assign independent causal status to technology as a force affecting social relations. On these and other grounds - both empirical and theoretical - we have sought to demonstrate the inadequacies of the post-industrial conception.

We have argued that macro-sociology can be historically conceptualized as having undergone a bifurcation into Marxism on the one hand, and mass-society theory on the other. In the mass-society tradition, the development of economic production-technology has typically been viewed as a central force around which social relations must adjust, re-adjust and adapt. Marxism, in contrast, has emphasized the causal priority of socio-structural conditions.

Central to the mass-society tradition is a concern for the conditions and quality of work which serve to either integrate the masses with - or disengage them from - the broader context of society. Contributors to the tradition argue that the constant turn-over of production technologies has been extremely subversive to social order. It has tended to disassemble and reassemble work roles so rapidly that, social control in industrializing societies becomes a persistent and nagging political problem. As Robert Nisbet has argued, sociologists have been forever looking for a functional equivalent in the mass-society to the authority relations characteristic of the traditional community.

Sociologists in the mass-society tradition, since Weber, have argued that, in industrialized society bureaucratic-administrative authority must inevitably be the principal regulating mechanism of the economy and polity. Yet few have been charmed with its effects.

As Mannheim argued, bureaucratization eventuates the predominance of "functional rationality" over "substantive rationality" in economic and political decision-making processes. Simply put, intensive occupational specialization is seen to reduce the capacity of leaders to make decisions through recourse to a holistic conception of social structure. Similarly, it is held, the political cognition of the individual in mass-society deteriorates under the influence of intensive work-role specialization. Mass man becomes vulnerable to the demagogue who appeals to his narrow self-interests rather than to a balanced social perspective. Self-interests tend to aggregate into class-interests.

We have reviewed and critically analyzed the various resolutions to the mass-society dilemma which have been influential in social thought. We have emphasized one recurring theme in these various resolutions: the sociological fascination with the professional mode of work organization.

The professions have been viewed as a hybrid in the structure of class relations. They have inspired the belief that the socialization of workers in the ideals of professionalism will provide a legitimate and humanistic basis for the moral regulation of production and distribution. Durkheim was perhaps the most influential proponent of the professionalization idea in nineteenth-century sociology.

The importance of the professions in the industrialized nations of the twentieth-century has been emphasized by Mannheim, T. H. Marshall, Carr-Saunders and Wilson, the managerial-revolution theorists, and the structural-functionalists. All have provided different interpretations of the importance of professions and the value system of professionalism to industrial society. However, in the specialized study of the professions in sociology these macro-sociological themes have been eclipsed in recent decades by micro-sociological studies.

While specialized students of the professions have ignored the broader themes of the mass-society tradition, the imaginations of less specialized theorists have not been so constrained. Indeed the radical-optimist view of an emerging post-industrial society draws together all the earlier macro-sociological themes and grafts them on to their "emergent" model of occupational authority.

The radical-optimist view suggests that both the mechanistic and tyrannical excesses of bureaucracy and the class tensions of industrial-capitalism are - fortunately - being tempered by and perhaps supplanted by, the growth of knowledge-based authority relations. Recent trends and future projections of the growth of employment in which advanced credentials are requisite for recruitment and promotion, provide their basis of evidence. The mass-society, we are advised, is being professionalized.

Our case against this happy vision has been explicated.

The post-industrial vision is the most contemporary contribution to the mass-society tradition. As we have argued, that tradition stands in antithesis to the Marxist interpretation of the capitalist political economy.

The burden now shifts to us. We must show that Marxism provides a more illuminating analytical framework than the technological-determinism inherent to the post-industrial conception.

We now turn to our own analysis of the location of professionally-credentialed workers in the structure of class relations in contemporary society.

In this chapter, we shall introduce some basic concepts which are essential to an analysis derivative from Marxism. We begin by demonstrating the important difference between Martin Oppenheimer's superficial convergence with Marx, and Marx's own analytical method.

II. Oppenheimer's "Technicist" Position

According to Martin Oppenheimer, a white-collar, proletarian-type worker is replacing the professional in the upper strata of non-manual occupations.

What, according to Oppenheimer, is professional work?

Oppenheimer suggests that professional work is that work over which the worker exercises collegial authority in relation to time, workplace conditions, product, product-use and even to a degree, price. It is craftsman-like in the sense that the worker produces an end product. Furthermore, Oppenheimer argues that the professional's work is not standardizable and involves considerable discretion on the part of the worker in making judgements. Finally, professional work also requires advanced training for both qualification and performance.

It is the last characteristic - advanced training - which Oppenheimer suggests is becoming the only remnant of professionalism for great majority of workers classified as professional. Why? Because, argues Oppenheimer, bureaucratization, which tends to create factory-like conditions, has come to permeate all professional work.

For Oppenheimer, a bureaucratized occupation is roughly equivalent to a proletarianized occupation. The latter is characterized by the opposite attributes of the professional ideal-type: (a) the worker performs only one of a small number of tasks in a total production process, (b) private or public authorities determine the pace of work, the characteristics of the work place, the nature of the product, the uses to which it is put, and its market conditions, (c) a proletarianized occupation is centred on the exchange of labour for income in large-scale market conditions and collective bargaining rather than face-to-face price determination.

Oppenheimer argues that the growth of collective bargaining amongst professionally-credentialed workers is a "defensive reaction" which can be taken as an indicator of the beginnings of working-class consciousness.

To follow Oppenheimer's argument through is to discover that the alleged proletarianization of professionally-credentialed workers is the logical consequence of bureaucratization. However, the question remains unanswered: "Why are these occupations being bureaucratized?". Oppenheimer fails to answer this question, consequently leaving us with recourse only to the conventional view that bureaucracy is simply part of a rationalization process: it is more "functionally efficient" to place occupations within a bureaucratic framework. We are returned to the technological-determinist argument best represented by Parsons' statement that,

> . . . technological advance almost always leads to increasingly elaborate division of labour and the concomitant requirement of increasingly elaborate organization. . . The fundamental reason for this is, of course, that with elaborate differentiation of functions the need for minute coordination of the different functions develops at the same time (Parsons, 1951:507).

Oppenheimer's failure to come to grips with this problem appears to stem from the neo-Marxist literature from which he takes his inspiration. As Poulantzas has complained of that literature, its contributors

> . . . have tried to reduce the ideological-political differences within the working class to technico-economic differences in the organization of labour, or even to differences in the size of wages. . . The basic criterion is that of 'skills' conceived in a 'technicist' fashion. (However). . . these differentiations can be used as the basis for contradictory generalizations: either to maintain that unskilled workers, etc., have a higher class consciousness and revolutionary potential than the rest of the working class, or to attribute the same thing to the so-called skilled workers (1973b:35).

Without taking issue with Oppenheimer's description at this point, we would argue that his theoretical failure stems from his partial rather than fully realized debt to Marx. That is, his theoretical explanation for "proletarianization" does not centre on the surplus-value accumulation process. Instead, it stops at finding an identity between bureaucratization and the degradation of the value of "professionally" and "technically" classified occupations.

III. The Radical-Optimist View: Eliot Freidson

The post-industrial position is given its simplest and most explicit expression by Elliot Freidson. He identifies the key to professional development in "the division of labour, and particularly, the principle of authority which establishes, co-ordinates and controls specialized labour" (1973:48). Like Daniel Bell, Freidson conjectures that post-industrial society will witness the demise of factory labour.

Freidson argues that, in industrial society, administration involves the managerial exercise of authority over workers through the establishment of bureaucratic organization. He argues that industrialism is characterized by the ever-increasing systematic control of the worker by management.

In post-industrial society, Freidson speculates, the most fundamental change may well be in the principle of work authority - from managerial or administrative authority to professional authority. He contends that these two principles are "radically different".

Whereas under "industrialism" administration dominates, "knowledge-based" labour is now on the increase as automation eliminates menial labour. Furthermore, this "knowledge-based" labour will tend to organize itself into stable occupations similar to those of the present day professions. Why? Because, reasons Freidson, "knowledge-based labour. . . may be resistant to rationalization both by the very nature of the skill and knowledge it possesses, and by its tendency to organize itself into stable occupations similar to the present-day professions" (Freidson, 1973:58).

IV. The Orthodoxy of Freidson and Oppenheimer Contrasted with Marxism

Both Oppenheimer and Freidson have each followed the orthodoxy of defining class in terms of distributive criteria. In the orthodox view, classes are distinguished according to the conditions of employment or other rewards and opportunities available to their membership. In short, class membership is viewed as a correlate of occupation and class structure simply becomes a typology of occupations. In sociology generally, this strategy has meant that the study of social class has given way to stratification theory.

In social stratification theory, the focus centres on the distribution of differential rewards to occupational groups, inequality of opportunity and condition, mobility, differential access to elites and rankings of occupational prestige. As Hill has observed,

> even in areas where the use of the concept (class) is directly implicated, such as in the examination of class consciousness, the

> logically prior elucidation of class structure has often been ignored. Where class structure has come under investigation. . . the term has often become synonymous with changes in class composition. An increase in the size of the white-collar component of the occupational distribution raised issues of the emergence of a 'new middle class'. An expansion of technically and scientifically trained workers has raised similar issues over the emergence of a 'new working class'. This sociological definition has focused on disputes over the definition of class, the number of classes and the precise delineation of the boundaries between them (Hill, 1975:2).

Marxist theory, unlike stratification theory - and unlike certain neo-Marxist approaches - does not conceive class structure as a typology of occupations. Nor does Marxist theory see class structure primarily as a gradient of rewards and opportunities associated with different types of occupations. Class and occupation are viewed as two qualitatively different dimensions of the internal structure of production organizations.

In the study of social class, the emphasis on distributive criteria, we would argue, may be followed to the extent that, as Giddens (1973:107) suggests, social mobility remains a major axis of stratification. The emphasis on occupations may be specifically followed to the extent that they reflect the technical relations of production which, however, are themselves largely dependent on class-specific economic interests.

The class identification of so-called "professional" work - or for that matter, any other type of work - can only be partially determined by identifying the skills or the social rewards of remuneration or status attached to occupational membership. In the Marxist view, a structural analysis of class demands that we relate the changing content of work roles - the occupational distribution, and the relations between workers - to the processes necessary to the accumulation of capital. For Marx, this was a dynamic process which he identified with the appropriation and expansion of surplus-value. As Johnson insists

> It follows then that any attempt to identify social class must initially theorize class relationships at the level of production rather than distribution which is itself an outcome of the mode of production and includes conditions for its reproduction (Johnson, 1976:16).

What Johnson argues in a paper published three years after Professions and Power (1973) is that, Marx's critique of political economy should encourage students of the professions to examine their power from the vantage point of the capital accumulation process. Johnson, drawing upon a recent Marxist literature for insight,[1] goes far beyond his earlier work in relating the growth of professionally-qualified labour in the work force~~,~~ to class structure. This literature adopts structuralism as a meta-theoretical perspective - an approach which marks itself off by centering itself on the social production process.[2] As Hill comments of this literature:

> If there is one assumption which all varieties of structuralism seem to have in common it is this: that a structure cannot be comprehended by the analysis of its elements or units alone. What gives a structure its specificity is the way in which the units of a structure are combined - i.e., the relationships between them. This premise sensitizes us to re-focus the analysis of class structure on the content of class relations rather than on the definition, enumeration and delineation of classes alone (1975:2).

In Chapter One, we subjected the conventional sociological image of the professions to criticism. At the conclusion, we claimed agreement with Freidson's notion that if "profession" denotes anything of occupational distinction, it principally implies an exceptional right to self-regulation. Furthermore, we suggested that post-industrial theorists assumed a major point in common with the specialized literature on the sociology of professions. Both assumed the explanation for this "exceptional right" sprang from the value which society systematically attached to their functions. Assuming the primacy of cognitive rationality in contemporary value systems, the technical expertise of certain occupations afforded them the mandate to control their own work.

In contrast, Oppenheimer and Marie Haug have argued that the rationalization of technique renders such "relatively autonomous" control permeable. As Haug writes,

> To the extent that scientific professional knowledge can be 'codified', it can be broken into bits, stored in computer memory, and recalled as needed. No longer need it be preserved in the professional's head or in books along (1973:201).

In acknowledgement of this paradox, Jamous and Peloille, decided to begin their study of the French university-hospital corps by suspending their acceptance of the normatively associated attributes of the so-called professions. They write:

> Our analytical procedure is best characterized by a refusal to define initially both the specificity of the product provided by the so-called 'professionals' and the nature of these social categories; likewise, this procedure precludes any preliminary definition of the social functions thought to be fulfilled by these professions (1970:111-112).

Jamous and Peloille, to avoid the simplistic determinate relationship explicit to functionalism, argue that any occupation, including but not exclusive to those we typically consider professions, may be compared and contrasted in terms of what they call the "indetermination/technicality" ratio. As an operational index, this would "provide a dimension along which it would be possible to order any given set of activities" (1970:112). Technicality (T) in such an index, would represent the possibility of transmitting by means of apprenticeship, "the mastery of intellectual or material instruments used to achieve a given result" (112). In contrast, indetermination (I) represents the means of occupational control that escape such rules. As Johnson summarizes their concept of "indetermination",

> . . . technical knowledge is by no means the only or even the most important form of knowledge learned during a process of socialization. . . (indetermination) or what Jamous and Peloille. . . refer to as the virtualities of an occupation; the basis of its mystique, the sources of its legitimations, the elements of its ideology which create the conditions of. . . indetermination. . . underpin its monopolistic position and successful resistance to external authority--whether that be client authority or some form of heteronomous authority. Occupational creation and maintenance of indeterminacy is not, however, an autonomous process. The institutions within which professional knowledge is generated, transmitted and applied are subject to wider social structures which condition the success or otherwise of the indetermination process, and create new demands as far as the social use of the production underlying this occupational activity is concerned (Johnson, 1976:23).

Jamous and Peloille argue that any interpretation which "favours only one side of this duality" will present a distorted view of the so-called professions. This, of course, is their major criticism of the conventional structural-functionalist approach. Further, it may be used to critique both Freidson and Oppenheimer's position. Technicality, which inevitably increases the possibilities for intervention, is particularly marked within bureaucracies. This provides a basis for Oppenheimer's argument. However, it is but one side of the duality. Further, while Freidson stresses aspects of indetermination, at the same time, ". . . he seeks the conditions for its existence in technicality: the duality collapses and the possibility of distinguishing between professions and the variations in the form of institutionalized control they are subject to, evaporate" (Johnson, 1976:24).

Jamous and Peloille must be credited with a theoretical advance over the functionalist view, Freidson's post-industrialism and Oppenheimer's proletarianization conception. However, as Johnson points out, their failure stems from their inability to explain indetermination. In contrast, he draws the sociology of the professions into a Marxist framework, stating that:

> The conditions for indeterminacy are, the very conditions which will enable us to identify the class characteristics of the professions for both technicality and indetermination derive from the more fundamental dualism characterizing the capitalist mode of production (Ibid.).

V. The Marxist Duality: "Forces" and "Relations" of Production

We have argued throughout the present thesis that, misinterpretations aside, Marx effectively rejected any attempt to reduce the process of division of labour to some technical prime-mover. The Marxist approach to the indentification of the class position of white-collar workers in general and the professional-technical classification in particular, requires initially that we ignore the distributive characteristics of such workers. Amongst "distributive" characteristics we include their level of scientific and technical education, the white-collar or blue-collar status of their occupational roles, or their income levels. The Marxist approach encourages us to focus on the role such workers play in the capital expansion process.

For Marx, there were two fundamental axis along which the production process was organized; the "forces of production" and the "relations of production". Combined, these comprise the "mode of production" when identified with what Poulantzas has called the "economic sphere".[3] The idea that all other phenomena (i.e., the superstructure) were determined by the economic sphere is contingent upon this conceputalization. However, the definition of social class is not wholly given by the identification of the worker's role in the production process. As Poulantzas has written of the Marxist conception of class:

> What are social classes in Marxist theory? They are groups of social agents or men defined *principally* but not exclusively by their place in the *production process*, i.e., by their place in the economic sphere. The economic place of the social agents has a *principal* role in determining social classes. Marxism states that the economic does indeed have the determinant role in the social formation; but the political and the ideological (the superstructure) also have an important role. For whenever Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao analyze social classes, far from limiting themselves to the economic criteria alone, they make explicit reference to political and ideological criteria (Poulantzas, 1973b:27).

It remains the case, however, that the precondition for class consciousness which brings to fruition the Marxist definition of class is the social relations which structure groupings as they enter into material production.

According to Marx, the "forces of production" included all those social divisions and production knowledge which men (and women) organized to appropriate their subsistence from nature. This axis refers to the labour process. It is inclusive of, but not restricted to, what in sociology is taken to be the division of labour. Avoiding slippage to a technological reification, Marx always stressed the *social* character of productive forces. Simply put, technique is a social variable, as is the physical instrumentality of production which is labour-substitutive. For it, too, is socially conceived, produced, and when on-stream, must be organized through social means. If its useful, productive potential is to be realized, it will be necessarily linked to a broader social system which is ultimately labour-dependent.

Secondly, the "relations of production" include those divisions which separate groups of people (classes) according to their control over the disposal of the forces of production and the use to which they are put. Marx's study of capitalism, in-so-far as it was a unique contribution, rested on the identification of the structural pressures towards capital accumulation and technological advance created by antagonisms systemically articulated in this second axis. In contrast with Durkheim and his subsequent followers, who have identified the division of labour (specialization of technique) as principally determinant of the shape of work organization, Marx saw the conditions of work as dependent upon the relations of production.[4] From such a perspective, the breakdown of the craftsman's skill is not inevitable because of some generalized desire for efficiency, or the universal effects of industrialization. Rather, it was the result of identifiable, social-relational pressures which drove owners of the means of production to accumulate capital.

One reason that it is so tempting to abandon Marx's insights today is that the economic system is, from reasonable appearances, much more complex than the industrial Britain that was closest to Marx's analyses. Superficially, a "post-industrial" conception is a plausible alternative imagery. Prior to abandoning Marx, however, we would do well to scrutinize contemporary, industrialized societies, with the theoretical tools Marx developed.

Oppenheimer's analysis, it will be remembered, focused on the labour process alone. He restricted himself to the forces of production, one element of which - bureaucratization - is seen to affect (negatively) the conditions of "professional" work. This is the sense in which he has fallen short of a Marxist approach.

In his analysis of capital "relations of production", Marx distinguished two essential classes in the capitalist economic system. These were comprised of human agents who performed either the labour function or the capital function.[5] The two were inter-related in practice. The agents of the capital function were involved in the process of appropriating from the agents of the labour function, the surplus product which their labour yielded. The labour function involved the associated labour activity of individuals interacting with the means of production to appropriate new values from nature. They were bound to the agents of the capital function because lacking control of adequate productive means individually, they were forced to sell their labour-power to the agents of capital.

As Johnson points out, Marx distances himself further from any simplistic determinism by separating out a number of elements and processes within the relations of production. After Garchedi (1975;1975;1975), four such "elements" have been identified in Marx, which create systematic antagonism between the agents of the capital function and the agents of the labour function.

The capitalist function is performed by those agents in the economic sphere who are: (1) non-producers, (2) non-labourers, and at the same time, (3) owners of the means of production. Interfacing with the capitalist function, are the agents of the labour function who are: (1) producers, (2) labourers, and (3) non-owners of the means of production.[6]

Capitalist relations of production, however, are not only antagonistic because they differentiate individuals in terms of whether they labour or not, produce or not, or own the means of production. They are also antagonistic because the bond between the two sets of agents is asymmetrically exploitative.

New values necessary to reproduce labour (to sustain the worker and his family) are created through the labourer's working a certain number of hours. These hours Marx termed "necessary labour-time", for obvious reasons. In the capitalist mode of production, the worker works longer than the time necessary to reproduce his labour power. He must also surrender a certain portion of the working day to the capitalist for the production of surplus value. Marx termed the time expended on this "unnecessary labour-time":"surplus labour-time". Unnecessary to sufficiently reproduce labour-power, surplus labour-time was the defining resource of the capitalist mode of production. For it was the only source for the production of capital.

Property rights, sanctioned by the coercive force of the state, allowed the agents of the capitalist function to benefit from the appropriation of surplus labour. Therefore the fourth element which divides the agents in the economic sphere between the labour function and the capital function is that between (4) exploiters/exploited.

These elements of the "relations of production" are described by Garchedi as "pure relations", implying that while such relations may or may not exist in perfect fit with the scheme, capitalism articulates in variations of these antagonisms. Two major implications may be drawn from this. Firstly, the study of social class involves, in the economic sphere, an identification of the distribution of agents within the various units of capitalist production relations. Secondly, it involves tracing the changes in that profile over time, to ascertain the broad trends in the structure of capitalist relations of production.

It should be stressed that, for Marx, it is the dominance of a specific mode of appropriating value, which yields the determining feature of a type of society. Both the capital function and the labour function are essential to the capitalist mode of production. The costs of reproduction of labour are met through values created by labour. There must, in addition, be the assurance of a continuing supply of capital. Capital, as new values, is created by labour which in turn, is appropriated by the capitalist as surplus value. For the capitalist mode of production to continue, the agents of the capitalist function must continue to appropriate and accumulate these values as surplus value. Thus, inherent in the capitalist mode of production are continual pressures towards accumulation.

The manner in which the above elements are institutionalized, as noted, can and in fact do show extensive variation. It is the particular form of their institutionalization in contemporary industrialized societies which is at issue here. An examination of this form can reveal the functions - labour or capital - engaged by various work groupings which have been subsumed, for classification purposes, as professionals or as skilled, technical workers. Under the scrutiny of such an analysis, it becomes clear that we are dealing with class identification from an entirely different perspective.

The preference for the Marxist approach is taken because it affords a much more subtle, as well as fully sociological analysis, of the relationship between technological advances and changes in the function and content of economic roles. The historically specific alterations of the division of labour are examined in relation to the process of capital appropriation, accumulation and reproduction.

As Braverman suggests in contrasting technological-determinism with Marxism:

> The first volume of Capital may be considered
> as a massive essay on (among other things)

> how. . . the social form of capital, driven to incessant accumulation as the condition for its own existence, completely transforms technology (1974:20).

As Johnson has observed:

> The analytical power of the Marxian concept of relations of production resides, then, in its capacity to generate a theoretical view which comprehends power as integral to the organization of work rather than the effect of a technical cause. While the production of surplus value is enhanced by the continuous revolution in the technical means which is in turn integrated into an increasingly complex labour process, at the same time the input of technology follows the requirements of capital and reflects its basic social divisions (1976:28).

The Marxist approach then, in successfully avoiding the technological reification we have discussed at some length, does not view automation or bureaucratization as the cause of occupational change. Nor does it see division of labour as some universal, independent variable. Finally, it does not view the social use-value of technical skill or theoretical knowledge as determinant of occupational authority. Rather, it places emphasis on the functional importance of occupations to the general process of capital accumulation. Indeed, it argues that for social use-value to determine occupational status, the value form of capital would itself have to be destroyed.

VI. Productive and Unproductive Labour

We have defined the social relations of capitalist production in terms of the antagonistic, systemic, integrated relations between the agents of the labour function and the capital function. In the pure economic sense, these agents, then, are the essential classes (bourgeoisie/proletariat) in the capitalist mode of production. They are "essential" because without them, the capitalist mode of production could not exist. Marx, however recognized peripheral economic agents in the total social formation. These, he considered to be "unproductive" from the perspective of capital accumulation, if they did not produce surplus-value. At the same time, he recognized that the growth of labour-substitutive technology tended to swell the ranks of the non-productive labour force.

During the twentieth century there has been a tremendous expansion of peripheral agents in the production process (from the perspective of pure capitalist relations). We have insisted that it is the variant institutionalization of the relations of production which are of central empirical interest for contemporary analysis. What we shall argue is that many of these peripheral groupings have themselves, today become "essential" to the continuation of the capitalist mode of production.

Marx himself actually presented a very complex theoretical elaboration of the proletarianization process, from which we may single out two specific hypotheses.

Marx argued that proletarianization was equivalent to the transformation of unproductive workers into workers who were productive of surplus-value. This statement, however, may be interpreted as mere tautology; the definition of proletarian and productive labour being isomorphic.

In his mature works, Marx foresaw, in part, the expansion of the non-productive work force relative to its productive counterpart.[7] However, while he could not anticipate the extent of such expansion, Marx did argue that proletarian-like conditions would come to prevail amongst non-productive workers (e.g., the established professions, he suggested, would become capital's wage-labourers). Furthermore, as Braverman argues, Marx never sharply distinguished between productive and unproductive workers in terms of the class structure (1974:419).

It is not, however, Marx's specific conclusions about proletarianization - during the time he was writing or the few decades after - that constitute our primary interest. Rather, we are interested in his method for analyzing class relations. Marx's method involved the treatment of class relations as the building-blocks of class structure. This contrasts with the more prevalent and static usage of specific occupational attributes to indicate class composition.

Recent analyses of contemporary capitalism have shown that there has indeed been a tremendous expansion of economic activities which Marx would not have considered productive. However, as we shall argue, many of these workers perform functions which are necessary if capitalist organizations are to successfully market their products and finance their operations. Other workers, also in great abundance today, are necessary for the reproduction of labour-power, for social control and for the preservation of capitalist ideological hegemony. Today, the efficient performance of these functions is essential if the capitalist mode of appropriating value - the struggle for surplus-value - is to remain intact..

According to Marx, in the social relations of capitalist production scheme, productive work is defined in terms of its productivity relative to the capital accumulation process. Productive work is work exchanged with capital for the purposes of producing surplus-value. Thus, in Capital, he writes:

> That labourer alone is productive, who produces surplus-value for the capitalist, and who thus works for the self-expansion of capital. . . Hence the nation of a productive labourer implies not merely a relation between work and useful effect, between labourer and product of labour,

> but also a specific, social relation of product, a relation which has sprung up historically and stamps the labourer as the direct means of creating surplus-value (Capital, Vol. I, 1974:477).

In short, only labour which is directly transformed into capital is productive. On the other hand, unproductive labour was that labour which may or may not have social utility, but is not transformed into capital. That is, it is exchanged against the revenues[8] obtained from either wages or profits but not converted into capital. This distinction, however, required an important qualification, which Marx did not fail to make.

Some labour, such as that performed by the independent commodity producer, while sustained by revenues largely generated from the capitalist production process, was not unproductive by universal standards. That is, it produced values which were market-exchangeable, and were socially useful. It was then, only unproductive from the historically specific vantage point of the capitalist mode of production. As Gough concludes: "In other words labour outside the capitalist mode of production cannot be analyzed in terms of Marx's distinction between productive and unproductive labour" (1972:52).

A further qualification is also required to designate the fundamentals of Marx's notion of productive as opposed to unproductive work. Marx argued that transport workers were productive and workers in the "sphere of circulation" were unproductive.

Marx considered transport an integral part of material production along with agriculture, extractive industry and manufacturing. Here, he considered the relation between wage labour and capital the same as the other spheres because transport alters the use-value of a commodity. His reasoning is that:

> the use-value of. . . (articles produced in agriculture, extraction or manufacturing). . . is materialized only in their consumption, and their consumption may necessitate a change in the location of these things, hence may require an additional process of production, in the transport industry (Capital, Vol. II, 1974:153).

Circulation, however, involving the acts of buying and selling, is a sphere which does not add value to a commodity.[9] As Marx wrote, in identifying merchant capital with the sphere of circulation:

> Merchant's capital is simply capital functioning in the sphere of circulation. The process of circulation is a phase of the total process of reproduction. But no value is produced in the process of circulation, and therefore, no surplus-value. Only changes of form of the same mass of value takes place. In fact, nothing occurs there outside the metamorphosis of commodities, and this has nothing to do as such either with the creation or change of values (Capital, Vol. III, 1977:279).

The conclusion is that while commercial workers are unproductive labourers, Marx did see such workers as being proletarianized.

> In one respect, such a commercial employee is a wage-worker like any other. In the first place, his labour-power is bought with the variable capital of the merchant, not with money expended as revenue, and consequently it is not bought for a private service, but for the purpose of expanding the value of the capital advanced for it. In the second place, the value of his labour-power, and thus his wages, are determined as those of other wage-workers, i.e., by the cost of production and reproduction of his specific labour-power, not by the product of his labour (Capital, Vol. III, 1977:292).

The worker in the sphere of circulation, from Marx's perspective, was unproductive from the vantage point of universal social use as well as from the view of productive capitalist enterprise. For neither did he produce new values (socially useful commodities) nor expand surplus-value.

Finally, Marx analyzed the productivity of management within this same framework. He argued that in any complex economy, the work of supervision and management was essential. However, in capitalism, a part of this management and supervision is required simply because the relations of production are antagonistic. In brief, necessary labour time itself required supervision and co-ordination. However, surplus labour-time expenditure required a coercive management process essential to its extraction. The former was productive, the latter unproductive. Marx thus wrote:

> One part of the labour of superintendence merely arises from the antagonistic contradiction between capital and labour . . . and belongs to the incidental expenses of production in the same way as . . . 'labour' occasioned by the circulation process (1972:505).

VII. Professional Services: Anomalies in the Social Relations of Production

It is apparent from the above discussion that in the Marxist conception of the social relations of capitalist production, the independent professions represent economic agencies peripheral to the two essential classes. Furthermore, they are anomalies.

In the first instance, the independent professional is unproductive, acquiring his income from revenue.[10] In the classic "person" professions, the exchange of services takes place between the "free" professional and his individual client. Use-value is met in this transaction and is not converted into capital by the consumer. However, if the professional works in the service of a capitalist acting in the capital function, that service becomes productive. Thus, Marx writes:

> If we may take an example from outside the sphere of production of material objects, a schoolmaster is a productive labourer,

> when, in addition to belaboring the heads of his scholars, he works like a horse to enrich the school proprietors. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory, does not alter the relation (Capital, Vol. I, 1974:477).

Further:

> An actor, for example, or even a clown, according to this definition, is a productive worker if he works in the service of a capitalist. . . to whom he returns more labour than he receives from him in the form of wages. . . (1969,I:157).

In the second instance, they are anomalous because being involved in a labour process, they perform, like the labourer and unlike the capitalist, a labour function. Being a non-producer of surplus value, their labours are not subjected to capitalist exploitation processes. Further, they are the owners of their own means of production, the bulk of which is acquired knowledge of a technical nature. In the fully individualized practice they do not exploit others because they do not employ others. Finally, their labours while not "productive" in the sense of producing surplus value, may be productive of social use values. That is, the product of an independent professional, say the traditional family doctor, may be useful and vital to any society. From the perspective of capital expansion only, then, are such workers unproductive. Underlining this distinction between productivity in general and capitalist productivity, Marx wrote:

> Only bourgeois narrow-mindedness, which regards the capitalist form of production as absolute forms--hence as eternal, natural forms of production--can confuse the question of what is productive labour from the standpoint of capital with the question of what labour is productive in general (1972:177-178).

Much as Marx's polemic in the Manifesto anticipated, however, the image of the "independent" professional is of limited relevance today.

Independent practices are a statistical rarity and they are a small and declining proportion of the total representation of professionally-qualified workers in the labour force. Furthermore, where such independent practices exist, it is the rule rather than the exception that, additional paid labour is necessary for their competitive operation.

One must, however, separate out polemical intent in Marx from the rigorous, social-scientific project of his careful analysis of capitalist political economy. We could follow Harry Braverman in his interpretation that in the contemporary era, unproductive and productive labour "forms a continuous mass of employment which at present and unlike the situation in Marx's day, has everything in common" (Braverman, 1974:423). However, such a position fails to account for many real differences between work strata. It would lead to the absurd conclusion that the cleaning lady has "everything in common" with the salaried lawyer.

In Chapter One, we examined the historico-structural conditions which marked the transformation of "status professions" to "occupational professions". We have further argued (Chapter Four), that the "self-regulation" of work was the core feature of professional occupations. We argued that the resource employed by aspiring occupations to achieve self-regulation and consequently, the monopolistic benefits which accompanied that achievement, was the standardization of educational qualifications.

The institutionalization of minimum educational standards was achieved through the affiliation of the aspiring "middle occupations" with the rising, industrial bourgeoisie. The educational reform movement was part of the more general political elaboration of industrial capital's purge of mercantilism. In short, professionalization was linked to the conquest of state power by the industrial bourgeoisie during the industrial revolution.

As stated in the introduction, Marx's analysis of the commodity form reveals its dual nature. It has a use-value, which is to say, it possesses a utility in that it can meet certain human needs. The use-value of a product in the commodity form, however, only becomes a reality when it can fall into the sphere of exchange, i.e., when it can be consumed.

Capitalism, through the development and generalization of money as a universal equivalent expressing quantitative relations among circulating commodities, increasingly extends this dual character of production to all spheres. Labour-power, the "value-creating substance", itself appears as a commodity on a market. Once a particular sphere of labour has become commodified, its agents enter into an antagonistic relation with the agents of the capital function or assume the capital function themselves.

We have stressed that the institutionalization of these antagonistic relations can and does assume many variations on the Marxist schema. By extending Marx's analysis of this institutional, historical variation we can identify the so-called "professional-technical" workers with the labour or capital functions. From the Marxist perspective, this approach reveals their functions in the economic sphere and the associated (class) interests to which they are tied.

In equating the monopolistic privilege of certain occupations in the control of work with the credentialing process, we confront a distortion of market principles. For labour in general, under the capitalist form, is standardized by the "averaging" pressure of the market. Price standardization is but the expression, in money terms, of the routinization and de-skilling of the more organic work roles of the craft process. Thus, the price of labour, in general, is determined by a contest in the market between labour and capital. However, for the nineteenth-century professions. . .

> Monopoly implies that the length of training can be arbitrarily determined. Together with the indeterminate aspect of intangible skills, the monopoly condition destroys the equivalence between professional training and the 'average labour time' socially necessary for the 'production of the professional'. Monopoly of training means, therefore, that the price of professional services is not freely determined on the market as a function of the socially necessary length of training or 'average' (educational) labour time (Larson, 1974:398).

For an occupation to acquire the capacity for monopolistic price determination, it must receive a state mandate to arbitrarily determine the required length of recruit-preparation. This allows for a restriction of the base of popular recruitment - a condition necessary to limit the eventual labour supply and creating a "seller's market". Thus, through restricting supply, an occupation achieves the exceptional right to set prices.

This "exceptional right", as achieved in the occupational professions of the nineteenth century, could be observed even at that time as a variable. For such control required the confrontation by the professional as a direct supplier with a heterogeneous consumer market. While this was true with the "classic" person professions, it was less characteristic of many occupations, professionally-credentialed, which were tied to new technological developments.

Today, most professionally-qualified workers, like the wage-worker, must sell their labour to either public or private organizations, thus becoming employees rather than independent agents. They sell their services as labour-power only and the product of that labour is organizationally appropriated. That labour-power may have greater market capacity than other labour, dependent in great part upon the labour supply restrictions employed by the credentialing institutions. Whatever the case relating their market capacity as sellers of labour-power, for most professionally-qualified workers the act of directly supplying a heterogeneous market of buyers, as sellers, is largely unknown. This suggests support for Johnson's notion that the prevalence of "corporate patronage" and "state mediation" has largely replaced collegial self-regulation amongst professionally-credentialed workers.

What then, are the implications of this trend for the "universal service orientation" espoused by occupations claiming professional distinction? Such an orientation was first articulated in the conditions which created independent occupational professions. An answer to this question requires an examination of the nature of the product which professionally-qualified workers sell.

In Chapter One, we showed that in the nineteenth century, occupational monopoly in a sphere of expertise was achieved through the homogenization of a specific knowledge base. That is, through the development of "credentialing" institutions, competing claimants on the state for control over a specialized service were subjected to standard training and examinations. Thus, various groups were either consolidated under the rubric and regulatory auspices of one "profession", or they were eliminated. Further, as we have argued, following Marx's analysis of the labour theory of value, capitalism creates pressures to reduce (average out) skill differences and consequently standardize the value of all labour. This eventually, according to Marx, leads to capitalist monopolies, for those firms in which wage differences remain are eliminated through competition.

The interesting point, then, about the nineteenth-century occupational professions is that, paradoxically, they themselves used skill-standardization to achieve collegial self-regulation. That standardization process, however, must be viewed as a means of achieving upward social mobility for middle-class occupations. The key to their uniqueness lay, not so much in the nature of their product, but rather in their relationship with the state. With state sanction they established the right to regulate the supply of professional services. With this control, they were able to stay out of the capitalist labour market, operating much like the earlier crafts.

The distinction between the earlier crafts and the occupational professions was that the former produced their own producers. That is, through the apprenticeship system, the crafts largely bore the cost of their own recruiting. The training of the occupational professions, however, was largely socially produced in the sense that it was (and is moreso now) subsidized by the state. The categories of Marxist analysis suggest that labour standardized in expert services is that which goes into training. As Larson suggests:

> Despite the special distorting effects of monopoly, the production of special skills can be viewed, in general, as a process which creates value vested in the individual. The social character of production is perhaps more visible in this case than in any other, for most education is subsidized by the state out of public funds; the products, however, are privately appropriated (1974:398).

The development of corporate patronage and state mediation, however, weakens the monopolistic advantage over production achieved by the monopoly of training. However, it remains the case that, while professionals are publically produced (state-subsidized in training), they appropriate saleable "knowledge" power individually. When they confront a heterogeneous market of consumers, the "universalistic orientation" claim of disinterested service might potentially be realized. However, when their congealed knowledge is appropriated as labour-power by either the state or the private corporate sector, the situation is obviously different.

In contemporary circumstances, the occupational claim to a universalistic, use-value orientation, must turn on the assessment of the policy determinants of their employing organizations. Thus, we are returned to our previous evaluation of the socially useful affects of the growth of professionally-credentialed workers on the determination of output by the private corporation and the state.

There remain other aspects of the expansionary dynamics of capitalism which, from the Marxist perspective, must be accounted for in locating the class relations born by professionally-credentialed workers.

VIII. The Reproduction of Labour-Power Under Monopoly Capitalism

As the above discussion would suggest, Marxist analysis informs us that "productive" capitalist relations extend from the direct production of commodities to their transportation to markets. We are here dealing with the direct appropriation of surplus-value. Class position is determined by one's allocation of roles necessary to the performance of the labour function or the capital function.

Capitalist relations also extend to the unproductive sphere of circulation. Here the merchant capitalist approximates the position of the industrial capitalist in performing the capital function. In antagonistic relation with the merchant capitalist is the commercial proletariat.

There remain, other vital aspects of the expansionary dynamics of capitalism, beyond the production/appropriation of surplus-value and in its realization in the sphere of circulation. Most importantly, they include those tasks associated with the reproduction of labour-power. These entail all those processes, specific to the capitalist mode of production, which condition recruits to the efficient replenishment of the necessary positions required to perform the labour and capital function. Of particular importance here, are the now various institutions which have replaced the family in preparing the young for the adult work force. Also included are those institutions which in some way modify or improve the health and readiness of workers for the efficient performance of the labour and capital functions. We are referring to those institutions which function to adapt workers to the changing requirements of capital. Under this rubric, the principal institutions are incorporated into the state system. They include mass education systems, health service delivery systems, social services and social security systems.

The processes of reproduction also involve the performance of tasks which serve to legitimize the distribution of economic agents and the power relations between them. We are thus referring to all those institutionalized social practices which serve to contain the tendency for capitalist antagonisms to manifest themselves in conflicts which disrupt the capital accumulation process. Principally, we are again dealing with state institutions, from schools and social agencies to security forces (domestic), which create the ideological support for, and which control the deviations from, capitalist relations of production.

The central ideological framework which these institutions are responsible for reproducing is that of liberal-democracy. As an element of the superstructure, the forms of liberal-democracy-from the Marxist perspective tend to vary with the modifications in the relations of production. Thus, as an increasing proportion of the work force is absorbed into wage- or salary-dependent employment with large organizations, the individualist ethos associated with private capitalism declines.

As the acquisition of private productive means becomes ever more remote for the majority of the people, individualism is translated into an incentive system anchored in an emphasis on personal success linked to educational credentials, creative autonomy and managerial authority. State institutions and ideology of professionalism, have come to play a dominant role in adapting economic functionaries to the altered reality.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Footnotes

1. See, in particular, Garchedi (1975a, b, c); Crompton (1976); Braverman (1974), and; Poulantzas (1973b;1975).

2. Credit must be given, in particular, to Harry Braverman (1974) for re-directing attention to the structure of production relationships within advanced capitalist society. His study did much to inspire more theoretically sophisticated work on the labour process in the monopoly capitalist era.

   Braverman's work was a major representative of a theoretical shift "in focus of Marxist theory since the late sixties, away from philosophical concerns and toward more classical preoccupation of an active Marxism" (Coombs, 1978:80).

3. Nicos Poulantzas' interpretation, also separates out the "superstructure" from the "economic sphere". Thus, the mode of production is taken to comprise both the forces and relations of production while the superstructure, in practice, may contain critical elements which impede or enhance the class struggle, but do not determine the fundamental structure of antagonistic, socio-economic relations. To illustrate, Garchedi (1975b:7) writes: "for example, the capitalist economic structure, being based as it is on antagonistic production relations (exploitative), generates class struggle. . . (which). . . could jeopardize the reproduction of the economic structure itself. Thus, the political and ideological structures, by limiting class struggle, make possible such a reproduction.".

4. Braverman's discussion of the distinction between Marx and others, is most useful here (1974:Ch. 3):

   > The earliest innovative principle of the capitalist mode of production was the manufacturing division of labor, and in one form or another the division of labor has remained the fundamental principle of industrial organization (70).

   However, he writes:

   > The division of labor in capitalist industry is not at all identical with the phenomenon of the distribution of tasks, crafts, or specialties of production throughout society, for while all known societies have divided their work into productive specialties, no society before capitalism systematically subdivided the work of each productive specialty into limited operations. This form of the division of labor becomes generalized only with capitalism (Ibid.).

Braverman argues that Marx sharply distinguished between the social division of labour and the manufacturing division of labour. The former is universal; it follows simply from the differentiation of craft roles emergent with the development of associated labour activity. In contrast, the latter (the manufacturing division of labour), is almost a reversal of the general principle of division of labour. It marks the ". . . breakdown of the processes involved in the making of the product into manifold operations performed by different workers" (72).

The tendency to identify the social division of labour with the detail (or manufacturing) division of labour - treated as a single continuum - ". . . is by far the greatest source of confusion in discussions on the subject. . . (for) The division of labour in the workshop is the social product of capitalist society" (Braverman, 1974:72).

Representative of the "single continuum" conceptualization, Wilbert Moore has argued that the division of labour is a universal attribute, and the modern society and primitive (or peasant) communities differ on this single dimension only in degree rather than kind (1962:92-93). Such a view grows out of The Division of Labour in Society, in which Durkheim argued that the ideal of human fraternity would be achieved only in proportion to the progress of the division of labour.

For Durkheim, as we have argued, the division of labour in the capitalist factory was simply an "abnormal" form of the division of labour. However, Braverman directs our attention to Kennedy's "when we inspect these abnormal forms throughout the world, it becomes difficult to find one clear-cut case of the normal division of labour" (1968:185-186).

5. We will stress throughout the remaining discussion, that a major advantage of the Marxist approach is that classes are viewed as continually changing entities rather than static categories. Marx viewed the individual, within the class structure, as the bearer or "embodiment" of social class relations. Thus, in the Preface to Capital, he wrote: "To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personification of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class-interests" (Capital, Vol. I:20-21).

Garchedi's interpretation offers us the advantage of both clarifying Marx's meaning and making it more congenial to the conventional lexicon of modern sociology. He recommends the use of the terms labour function and capital function. We have chosen to adpot this usage. The term "agent" is also adopted in order that, Marx's distinction between the individual and the functional relations he or she enters in the production process is underscored.

6. At first glance, to those with cursory familiarity with Marxism, these "antagonistic" categories appear to overlap. This is indeed the case. They are not, however co-terminous. To illustrate, as

Poulantzas (1973:29) has argued, the producer/non-producer relationship is associated with the overlapping relationship of owner/non-owner. However, they are not equivalent because a non-producer such as a senior manager of a corporation, does not legally own the means of production. However, he does carry out the functions of capital while not being directly productive. Similarly, while it is true that all producers are labourers, all labourers are not productive from the perspective of capitalist relations of production. That is to say, all labourers are not productive of surplus value.

7. In Theories of Surplus Value, Part I (1963:201), Marx wrote: "According to the latest report (1861 or 1862), on the factories, the total number of persons (managers included) employed in the factories properly so called of the United Kingdom was only 775,534, while the number of female servants in England alone amounted to 1 million. What a convenient arrangement it is that makes a factory girl sweat twelve hours in a factory, so that the factory proprietor, with a part of her unpaid labour, can take into his personal service her sister as maid, her brother as groom and her cousin as soldier or policeman!".

8. As Gough explains the Marxist interpretation of the distinction: "The capitalist qua capitalist purchases labour-power with which to create surplus-value. The capitalist (or the worker for that matter) qua consumer purchases labour services for the direct use-value they provide" (1972:51). In other words, the distinction between productive labour and non-productive labour from the perspective of capitalist relations of production, is that the surplus product of the former is converted (or re-invested) into capital, while the latter is initially exchanged against income. "Revenue", then, denotes income which is not re-invested for the purposes of capital accumulation.

9. The utility of a commodity is not modified (upgraded or even preserved) in the social act of buying or selling. In this sense, buying and selling does not include the various preservative or packaging processes which, independently of the utility they add to a commodity, are required for either its preservation or sale. Today, of course, such a line is blurred.

10. The professional's services are sold as use-values, exchanged against the revenues possessed by either capitalists or labourers.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PROFESSIONALLY-QUALIFIED WORKERS AS BEARERS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN THE ERA OF MONOPOLY CAPITAL

The stance taken in this chapter - premised upon Marxist theoretical foundations-is that to identify class "hybrids" or anomalies, one must first identify historical changes in the relations of production. From Marx, in Part Four, Volume One of Capital, it is possible to abstract three relatively distinct stages in the transformation of both the labour process and the relations between the agents of the capital function and the labour function. From more recent Marxist theory, it is possible to extend Marxist class analysis into what has been described as the "monopoly capitalist" era.

We have rejected those approaches to class which focus on the distributive characteristics of different occupational groupings prior to analyzing the relations between them as they confront the means of production. In the tradition of Marx, we are concerned with the structural determinants of class. Our approach is to identify the functions of predominant groupings of economic agents in the social relations of capitalist production. The "professionally-qualified", from computer technicians to corporate executives, are located in the class structure by ascertaining their role in expanding capital, in preserving it, or in reproducing capitalist relations of production. Economic power is conceived as functionally derivative from the existing economic relations of domination/subordination which underlie the capital accumulation process.

I. Marx's "Three Stages" in the Development of Capitalist Relations of Production[1]

In the early period of capitalist development, Marx observed from historical sources that the entrepeneur was characteristically the administrator of the production process as a whole. This involved him in both a uniquely capitalist process (the capital function), as well as a labour function. As indicated in the previous chapter, Marx emphasized that any complex labour process required co-ordination. As Crompton writes:

> Not only did these early entrepeneurs own the means of production but they ensured that both raw materials and labour power were brought together in the right places at the right time, that energy sources were available, that machinery was developed and in good order, and that workers carried out the duties allotted to them. In addition, early entrepeneurs often had to arrange for transport and distribution and develop their own markets (Crompton, 1976:414).

In any complex production process, work must be guided according to certain rational criteria in order to achieve socially necessary production levels. The early entrepeneur, to the extent that he was engaged in these processes, was thus involved in a labour function. This would also apply to the contemporary petit-bourgeoisie.[2] However, the entrepeneur was also involved in a purely capitalist function: that of the direct control and surveillance of employed workers to assure that surplus labour time was extracted at a optimal rate. In the former instance he was involved in a necessary aspect of the labour process and hence related to other workers along the forces of production axis, in the latter he was engaged in an antagonistic relations of production function.

In the briefest possible restatement, capitalist production relations are fundamentally comprised of the dual process of labour and surplus-value appropriation. From the perspective of the "pure relations" of capitalist production, the early entrepeneur was himself an anomalous economic agent, for he embodied the fusion of ownership, control (the capital function) and administration (the labour function).

Co-operation: The Formal Subordination of the Labourer

In this first stage of capitalist development, where the capitalist is himself engaged in a dual function, the labourer is formally subordinated to capital.[3] That is, the labourer, with his production routines and skills intact, is absorbed into a dependent wage nexus. In developing his theory of labour's subordination to capital, Marx was abstracting from the historical transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production.

In its first appearance, the capitalist enterprise is simply an assemblage of artisans under one roof. Each artisan produced a whole commodity or a part in its entirety, thus reproducing the labour process inherited from handicraft production. Furthermore, in this early period, the capitalist enterprise co-existed with other types of enterprise - including the petit-bourgeoisie form and remnants of the feudal order.

> Industrial capitalism begins when a significant number of workers is employed by a single capitalist. At first, the capitalist utilizes labour as it comes to him from prior forms of production, carrying on labour processes as they had been carried on before. The workers are already trained in traditional arts of industry previously practiced in feudal and guild handicraft production. Spinners, weavers, glaziers, potters, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, locksmiths, joiners, millers, bakers, etc. continue to exercise in the employ of capitalist the productive crafts they had carried on as guild journeymen and independent artisans. These early workshops were

> simply agglomerations of smaller units of production, reflecting little change in traditional methods, and the work thus remained under the immediate control of the producers in whom was embodied the traditional knowledge and skills of their crafts (Braverman, 1974:59).

According to Marx, this assemblage of workers together, ". . . is the first change experienced by the actual labour process, when subjected to capital" (Capital, Vol. I:317). It is also the "starting-point" of capitalist production.

The transitional period from feudalism to capitalism then, involved a change in the relations of production without an attendant change in the forces of production. Thus, it is upon historical moorings that Marx's assertion that the relations of production were the primary determinant of social change rests.

Marx termed this initial stage in the development of production relations "co-operation", which he coupled with the next stage, "division of labour", under the more general rubric, "manufacture". This period preceeded the introduction of power-driven machinery into production.

As Marx emphasized, and indeed premised his entire theory of the development of capitalism upon, capitalism was the elaboration of structural pressures towards surplus accumulation. However, in the early stages of capitalist production, the amount of increase of the mass of surplus-value was optimized relatively quickly. For it was limited by the existing production techniques and the individual strengths, knowledge and skills of the workers. Beyond this point, surplus-value could only be increased relatively. Its increase could only arise from improvements in the efficient organization of labour-time, the techniques of labour, and improvements in machinery - all aimed at increasing the per capita productivity of workers.

The dialectical relationship between the forces of production and relations of production is not asserted on the basis of pedantic choice or ideological zeal; nor does the assertion depend on Hegelian metaphysics. Rather, historical scholarship reveals the dialectical process in the development of the capitalist political economy.

Division of Labour: Real Subordination and the "Collective Worker"

Beyond the stage of co-operation, the labour process was adapted to the surplus-value producing process through a continuous revolution of the forces of production. Specifically, the technical division of labour is elaborated. The product is no longer that of individual activity but of a developing complex labour process. In this process, the worker, in interdependent relations with other workers - including non-manual workers who co-ordinate production - collectively produce commodities. At this stage, the co-ordination function is devolved away from the capitalist to a tier of supervisors. Marx called both the labourers and the non-labourers (supervisors) the collective worker, who only in aggregate, carried out a total production process.

The period of manufacture, subsuming the stage of co-operation and division of labour, has been summarized by Eaton.

> From the period of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, prior to the age of modern industry with its use of large-scale powered machinery, the most mature form of capitalist production. . . involved the development of extensive division of labour between many workers who were brought together in one place of work or factory. Most of the newer industries, such as paper, gunpowder, cannon-making, sugar-refining, etc., which developed in England in the sixteenth century, were--indeed, had to be, undertaken in this way. Manufacture was, however, adopted also in the older industries (where the domestic system or putting-out system, still lingered for many years) (1963:56).

Manufacture adapts not only the worker to the performance of a simplified, partial labour function. It also adapts the implements of production to the exclusively special functions of the detail labourer.[4] Further, while the co-ordinated, interdependent production process becomes much more complex, it reduces the complexity of the individual work task. The down-grading of the individual's skills and the sophistication of the co-operative labour process are two aspects of the same process: functionally, they each serve to reduce the capitalist's wage bill.

Marx termed the pre-eminent change in production relations during matured "manufacture" to be the real (in contrast with formal) subordination of labour to capital. In describing the "collective labourer", Marx says:

> Since, with the development of the real subordination of labour to capital and thus of the specifically capitalist mode of production, the true agent of the total labour-process is not the individual labourer but a labour power more and more socially combined, and the various labour-powers which co-operate and which make up the total productive machine, participate in various ways to the immediate production process of the commodities, or, better said, here, of the products--some working more with the hand and some with the brain, some as director, engineer, technician, etc., some as controller, some as hand labour or simply as helper--an increasing number of functions of labour-power is grouped into the concept of productive labour and an increasing number of people who can carry out this labour as productive labourers, directly exploited by capital and subordinated to its process of production and surplus value creation (Marx, Resultate:74:481).

Modern Industry

The third stage, after manufacture, was the period which Marx called "modern industry". This was the period typically identified with the industrial revolution. At this stage, co-operation and division of labour remain integral to the mode of production. However, what distinguishes it from early stages was the introduction of machinery into the labour process. This period roughly extends from the last third of the eighteenth century in England through Marx's own lifetime. In Lazonick's words: "Marx dissected the anatomy of the machine to show why it was such a powerful force in subjugating labour to capital" (Lazonick, 1977:114). Marx wrote that all fully developed machines

> consist of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism, the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or working machine (Capital, 1954:352). (Further) machinery, by replacing the strength of the labourer by a motor mechanism and by replacing the skill of the labourer by a transmission mechanism, transformed 'the special tools of the various workmen. . . into the tools of specialized machines' (selected from Capital by Lazonick, 1977:114).

The Three Stages: A Summary

In brief summary, the stage of manufacture, in yielding to modern industry, further extends the subordinate relation of the worker to capital through the mediation of the machine. The entrepeneurial or mercantile capitalist devolves his "labour function" to a tier of supervisors, assuming himself, merely the "control and surveillance" function.[5] The anomaly of the capitalist who performs the fused functions of labour and capital is largely eliminated. Further, the craftsman, in being absorbed into a collective labour process and further subjected to machine processes, is now a pure labourer. The term "craftsman" becomes but a vacuous, symbolic carry-over from the past.

Thus, in the early period of manufacture (during its co-operative stage), labour was but formally subordinated to capital. In its later stage, under the division of labour, the labour function undergoes a real subordination to capital. Subsequently, in the period of modern industry, mechanization completes labour's subordination to capital. The labourer is not merely individually subordinated to the collective labour process and the wage nexus, the product of his labour now issues from a work schedule paced by the rhythm of a machine.

Marx's analysis of the collective labourer, the product of labour's "real" subordination to capital, occasions a changed conception of productive work under the capitalist mode of production. The final product is no longer simply the result of the labour of an individual but rather, it becomes "the outcome of a complex labour process in which several workers take part on a co-operative basis" (Garchedi, 1975a:16). The notion of productive labour is herein extended to all those who take part in the labour process. As Marx himself wrote,

> the product ceases to be the direct product of the individual, and becomes a social product, produced in common by a collective labourer, i.e. by a certain combination of workmen, each of whom takes only a part, greater or less, in the manipulation of the subject of their labour. As the co-operative character of the labour-process becomes more and more marked, so, as a necessary consequence, does our notion of productive labour, and of its agent the productive labourer, become extended. In order to labour productively, it is no longer necessary for you to do manual work yourself; enough, if you are an organ of the collective labourer, and perform one of its subordinate functions (Capital, Vol. I:508-9).

Professionals and Capitalist Transformation

Let us now consider the implications of this extension for those occupations classified by educational credentials as professional. As our analysis in Chapter Two suggests, prior to the age of modern industry, the recognized free and independent professions in

European society, were practically only three. These were the professions of divinity and university teaching (the latter subsumed under the former until late); the law, and; physics (medicine). These professions existed outside of the capitalist mode of production as remnants of the feudal order.

The established professions were reserved for the kin of the landed classes. They were approximate income-generating equivalents to the possession of land. The services provided by these "liberal" professions were largely reserved for the prevailing elite. Aside and below (in status) these "liberal" professions, there existed a cluster of occupations which functioned commercially (in the case of medical and legal functions) in the service of a much broader clientele.

As our analysis in Chapter Two suggests, the age of modern industry produced the conditions for the accelerated expansion of the "lower branches" as well as the formation of a variety of new, skilled occupations. To purge the old person professions of their protected status, the lower branches successfully introduced standardized qualifications. During the nineteenth century, the "credentialing" process and the related development of modern, professional associations spread throughout the middle-class occupations.

It should be acknowledged, however, that during the period in which modern industry was first introduced, the fully realized model, exemplified by medicine and law, was prohibited from the outset amongst certain occupations. Technology-dependent workers such as engineers were faced with special problems when attempting occupational self-regulation.[6] Tied exclusively to industrial capital, the services which they rendered were immediately vulnerable to the capital function/labour function bifurcation process.

Many engineers simply became employees of manufacturing, mining or other production firms. Similarly, accountants, from the outset, often became simply employees. It was perhaps the recognition of this process that suggested to Marx that the so-called "professionals" would (1) increasingly become wage labourers and (2) become productive workers from the perspective of surplus-value expansion.

It is true that private accounting firms and private engineering firms have existed since the industrial revolution, side-by-side with credentialed accountants and engineers employed in departments of large production organizations. Our point, however, is simply to emphasize that from the very outset, the image of the "free" professional best exemplified by law and medicine was never fully realized amongst these occupations. Furthermore, the clienteles of engineers and accountants have largely been drawn from business rather than the theoretically "universal" clientele served by medicine and law.

II. Monopoly Capital and the Collectivization of the Capital Function

The literature on the post-Marxian development of capitalism which centres on the concentration of capital into its oligopolistic or monopolistic organizational form is abundant, and need not delay us here. Briefly, however, certain key features may be identified:

(1) The economic surplus becomes so expansive that a major problem becomes finding new outlets to absorb it. The state, the conditioning of consumers to predictable purchasing patterns, the drive for international markets, all become systematically necessary to absorb this surplus.[7]

(2) The state becomes increasingly responsible for the management of effective demand.

(3) The state increasingly absorbs responsibilities for the training, socialization and reproduction of labour as well as the regulation of surplus-labour.

(4) Just as under the second stage when the worker was transformed into the collective worker, so in the fourth stage (monopoly capital), the role of the capitalist is subdivided into fractional operations associated with the appropriation of surplus-value.

It is with the fourth feature that we shall presently concern ourselves. As Harry Braverman argues, under monopoly capitalism management becomes "scientific" (1974, Part One). The development of managerial technique, commonly referred to as "scientific management", represents a significant advance in the capital accumulation process.

In nineteenth century England, the widespread use of sub-contracting reflected a relative underdevelopment of capitalist management. As Braverman points out:

> . . . the early domestic and subcontracting systems represented a transitional form, a phase during which the capitalist had not yet assumed the essential function of management in industrial capitalism, control over the labor process. . . Such methods of dealing with labor. . . understood the buying and selling of commodities but not their production. . . It was bound to prove inadequate. . . The subcontracting systems were plagued by problems of irregularity of production, loss of materials in transit and through embezzlement, slowness of manufacture, lack of uniformity and uncertainty of the quality of the product. But most of all, they were limited by their inability to change the processes of production (1974:63).

During this early stage the capitalist would hire a wage labourer by the piece, who would in turn hire assistants out of his own wages. Thus, in many occupations, the worker in the direct wage employ of the capitalist performed both an operative function and a supervisory function. However, the relative ineffectiveness of this process from the perspective of the capitalist occasioned the attempt to separate the people involved in production from supervision.

According to Braverman, "the separation of hand and brain is the most decisive single step in the division of labour taken by the capitalist mode of production" (1974:126). The logic of capitalist control over the labour process then, is the complete separation of the conception (planning) of work on the one hand and its execution on the other.

The development of scientific management - which centres on the increase of relative surplus-value - is accompanied by an acceleration of technology-related scientific advance. The former extends control over the production process by making it more efficient in the production of surplus-value. The latter revolutionizes the instruments of production which the organized worker employs. Yet from the perspective of capital accumulation, each fulfill the same function: the expansion of relative surplus-value. These two processes, however, themselves required specialized personnel. Thus, under monopoly capitalism, there has been a tremendous growth of economic agents performing the functions of capital.

As Crompton remarks: "The application of these techniques, it has often been noted, has led to the increased division of labour and differentiation within the labour function. What is less often noted is the parallel division of labour and differentiation within the capitalist function" (1976:415). Indeed, the now familiar growth of marketing agencies, advertising agencies, sales departments, financial structures, research and development institutions, organized either as arms of production organizations or independently, reflect this fundamental point.

The "capital function" then, is dispersed into a complex array of fractional institutions and occupational roles. Taken together, these may be subsumed under the generic term, the "collective function of capital" or "collective capital". This term denotes that the functions of capital tend to become the task of a complex structure. The performance of the various functions of capital are distributed amongst agents within the organization.

III. Capitalist and Proletariat: Identifying the Polar Classes in the Antagonistic Relations of Monopoly Capitalist Production

Garchedi, developing a definition of classes under monopoly capitalism, includes both productive agents (owners, operatives or workers) in commodity-producing organizations and unproductive workers and owners in the circulation sphere. To continue Marx's distinction between the workers and owners in these two types of enterprise, Garchedi considers only productive workers to be "exploited" by capitalists (the "exploiters"). He distinguishes workers in the unproductive enterprise from "exploited" workers. The worker in the unproductive enterprise is termed "oppressed" rather than "exploited"; those performing the capital function in the unproductive sphere are termed "oppressors" rather than exploiters. Exploitation is a term which is reserved for the capital/labour relationship centering on the direct surplus-value appropriation process.

A further point is crucial to this analysis. In specifying the distinction between the collective function of capital - Garchedi prefers the term "global function" of capital - and the function of the collective worker, Garchedi employs Marx's managerial dichotomy: co-ordination on the one hand, and control and surveillance on the other. The former, it will be recalled, is considered essential to any complex production process. In contrast, the latter - control and surveillance - is necessary because of the antagonism (exploitation and oppression) rooted in the capitalist mode of production.

Under monopoly capitalism, according to Garchedi, the bourgeoisie comprises all those economic agents who (1975c:98-99): (1) either exploit or economically oppress[8]; (2) possess the real, economic ownership of the means of production; (3) are the non-labourers in the sense that they perform the collective function of capital, and; (4) their incomes are derived from surplus-value.

By difference, Garchedi identifies the proletariat as those economic agents who: (1) are exploited or economically oppressed; (2) are non-owners of the means of production; (3) perform the function of the collective worker, and; (4) are either (a) paid a wage which tends to be determined by the value of their labour power or (b) are paid back out of the surplus value produced in the productive sectors.

IV. The Managers and Social Class Relations

It will be noted that to this point we have given but minor attention to the debate centering on the alleged "managerial revolution". This neglect has been deliberate although as noted, post-industrial theorists have assumed its premises and considerably extended its implications. We have delayed our response to this issue because until this point our theoretical framework has not been sufficiently articulated. The preceeding sections of Part Three, however, have accomplished this background task.

The distinction which informs our approach, was first specified by Nicos Poulantzas. He emphasized the critical difference between real (or economic) ownership - denoting control of the means of production - and juridical ownership, "which is sanctioned by the law and belongs to the superstructure" (Poulantzas, 1973a:29). While the latter may reflect the underlying control of the means of production, it is the former which is determinant of capital control.

It will be noted that we have referred to this distinction above, in arguing that, the different elements of the "antagonistic relations of production" were associated and overlapped, but were not co-terminous. Indeed, we would argue that it is a fundamental feature of advanced capitalism that real ownership in functional terms, is separated from the numerical majority of investors in capital (the legal owners of capital).

Garchedi has implied that the "managerial revolution" controversy is a curiosity of muddled scholarship, rather than a continuing puzzle. He writes

> . . . as Marx noticed in his analysis of the joint-stock company; as Hilfdering subsequently examined in great detail in his Finance Capital and as the bourgeoise social scientists rediscovered with great fanfare in the 1930's, the development of the joint-stock company resulted in the separation between its legal, juridical ownership and its real economic ownership (1975a:30).

It is obvious that the stockholders possess legal ownership of the productive means. The question remains, however: "What is the real economic ownership?". Garchedi's response may be repeated. Economic (or real) ownership, involves,

> . . . the control of the means of production (i.e., the capacity to determine their use, to hire and dismiss labourers, to decide what and, how much to produce, etc.). . . (1975a:30).

A further distinction crucial to a comprehension of the social class functions of management, is that the majority of stockholders lie outside capitalist relations of production entirely (Garchedi, 1975a:31). Thus, they are related like the absentee landlord (rentier capitalist) who is not involved in the actual administrative process. According to Garchedi, it is the *top managers* who are the real owners of the means of production; they are the embodiment of the capital function.

We would differ with Garchedi in the extent to which he assumes the passing of the capital function to senior management. The evidence we have discussed above suggests that his closure of the managerial-stockholder debate is somewhat premature.

Our point is much like that of Wallace Clement who identifies the "pure" bourgeoisie - though not in these specific terms - as the active decision-makers in the sphere of ownership (economic control), when that decision-making comprises ultimate control over investment decisions as well as the hiring and firing of managerial personnel. Often, those who exercise such power do so without being active in the daily administrative functions of the firm. These individuals may be either senior managers or directors with relatively large shares of stock. Inclusion or exclusion in the capitalist class then, does not turn on legal ownership or involvement in the economic possession function. Rather, it turns on the capacity of the economic agent - whether manager or large stockholder - to initiate or veto decisions affecting the disposal of means of production (Poulantzas, 1975a:18).

In differing "in degree" with Garchedi, however, we are not challenging his fundamental theoretical premise. That premise is that the functions of capital have become highly differentiated; they are dispersed amongst a diverse range of specialized agents within the corporate institution. We do not challenge Garchedi's conception of the contemporary bourgeoisie from the perspective of capitalist relations of production.

The advantage of Garchedi's conceptualization is that it directs our attention to the active, functional behaviour of economic agents within the capital accumulation process. In such a view, class location can be derived from the structural antagonisms which underlie their economic activity. As Garchedi points out, at the top of the complex structure of variegated roles which comprises the global function of capital,

> we find all those who only perform the global function of capital, the social nature of whose function is exclusively connected with the antithetical nature of the capitalist mode of production (1975a:31-32).

The task remains, of course, for us to identify the functional anomalies within the social relations of production. This we shall attend to, while again differing in part with Garchedi.

To give Garchedi his due on the points we have raised, it should be noted that he himself anticipates our doubts. In this regard, he has written:

> If it is true that the small stock-holders are partically powerless, the same does not apply to those who are at the top of the social structure for whom the separation between legal and economic ownership (they retain real ownership through a partial legal ownership) and the separation between capital as ownership and capital as function (they still perform managerial functions) is only partial. . . (However), if we want to understand. . . the shift from private capitalism to monopoly capitalism. . . the manager rather than the rentier capitalist. . . is the non-labourer, the non-producer, the exploiter. He, rather than the capitalist rentier is capital personified. This does not imply that he has replaced the capitalist as a class. The managers are only part of the capitalist class, the most representative part from the point of view of the production relations typical of monopoly capitalism (1975a:48).

V. The Anomalies of Class Under Monopoly Capital

There remain, in the era of monopoly capitalism, economic agents who are not clearly identifiable with either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Inclusive to this category is non-monetized female household labour and the petit-bourgeoisie. This latter category includes independent commodity producers at the margins of the production process and the small and declining fraction of self-employed vendors of services. A fraction of the self-employment category are "credentialed" in professional training institutions. However, there is a much larger grouping of agents who depend solely on either the monopoly capitalist sphere or the state for employment. It is on this last category of agents that the debate is centred between those who assert a major professionalization trend and those who by contrast claim that, credentialed white-collar workers are being proletarianized.

It is our strategy, as suggested in Chapter Four, to suspend the use of the term "professional" as conventionally employed, and retain it simply as an indicator of occupational self-regulation. Instead, we prefer to use the term "professionally-credentialed workers". We are thus afforded considerably greater coverage in our analysis. We are able to examine a wide spectrum of occupations rather than being restricted by the numerous and contestable attributes of "profession" derived from the sociological literature.

Garchedi, in identifying anomalous agents under monopoly capitalism, identifies the old middle-class in terms of their ownership of productive means and their continued performance of the labour function of co-ordination. It thus can be identified as comprising those agents who: (1) own both economically and legally the means of production;

(2) perform both the function of capital and the function of the collective worker; (3) are both labourers and non-labourers, and; (4) are exploited and exploiters. Such agents are defined as "middle-class" because they possess characteristics of both the capitalist class and the working class.

In effect, the "old middle-class", best represented by the owners of small businesses and independent commodity producers, are remnants of earlier capitalist production relations. Garchedi identifies the new middle-class as a derivative of the antagonistic bourgeoisie/proletariat production relations. It is comprised of those economic agents who (1975a:48-54): (1) do not own, economically or legally, the means of production; (2) perform both the collective function of capital and the functions of the collective worker; (3) are both (unproductive and productive) labourers and non-labourers, and; (4) are both exploiters (and oppressors) and exploited (or oppressed). It is the element of ownership that is crucial to the distinction between the old middle-class and the new middle-class.

VI. The Proletarianization of the New Middle-Class in the Spheres of Commodity Production and Circulation

We have argued from Marxist premises that the institutionalization of social relations of capitalist production, in reality, is historically variable. However, the constant feature of capitalism can be analytically reduced to the dual processes of labour and surplus-value appropriation.

In the mature stages of manufacture and in the period of modern industry, the labourer is collectivized. This development arises not because of some universal desire for efficiency (as implied in the "technocratic" tradition embodied in post-industrial theory) or from the fiat of technological progress. Rather, both division of labour and the drive for labour-substitutive technology are systemically induced by the antagonistic relations of production. To employ a current terminological favourite, the "system goal" is the relative increase in the mass of surplus-value; its absolute increase having long since been reached in the "co-operative" era.

The dual processes of division of labour and surplus-value in the monopoly capitalist era, are dually manifested. The co-operative nature of the division of labour institutionalized in the collective labourer (carried over from the past) is set over and against the exploitative functions of institutionalized capital. The latter - the collectivized or "global" function of capital - can be reduced, from Garchedi's restatement of Marx, to those tasks involving both the control and surveillance[9] of the surplus-value appropriation process and control and surveillance in the sphere of realization (circulation).

Garchedi argues that the function of co-ordination (a labour function) and the control and surveillance function (to which the collective function of capital can be reduced), may or may not be performed in balance by the new middle-class. He means that the summation of both functions constitutes unity, but the proportion of each function performed by an economic agent will vary according to the situation. Under monopoly capitalism, from the perspective of class analysis, it is the variation in this proportion which is of critical interest.

With Oppenheimer and the "new working-class" theorists, Garchedi argues that the proletarianization of anomalous economic agents involves the devaluation of their labour processes. However, Garchedi argues that this tendency is common to all phases of capitalism. What is distinctive to the monopoly capitalist era is the necessity to include not only work devaluation in the definition of proletarianization, but the progressive disappearance of the collective function of capital.

It should be stressed that in following Garchedi's analysis to this point, we are restricting ourselves to the spheres of commodity production and circulation. Subsequent analysis will attend to the social relations of reproduction.

According to Garchedi, the capitalist function - which is separated from legal ownership - comprises: (a) top managers, who, like the individual capitalist, perform only the capitalist function, and (b) a graded hierarchy of officials who perform - as did the individual capitalist - both the functions of co-ordination and the coercive aspect of surveillance. To illustrate, the second category is represented by a middle-level manager in a trucking firm who is responsible for negotiating transportation contracts (co-ordination), supervises six workers, and is responsible for their hiring, firing, etc.

This second tier comprises the white-collar stratum which has confused class analysis and is anomalous, for it: (1) does not own the means of production; (2) performs the labour function of co-ordination, and; (3) performs the capitalist function of control and surveillance. Thus, the proletarianization of our ambiguous employee of the trucking firm, involves not only the deterioration of his work situation in terms of its pressures, his derived income or the routinization and simplification of his work schedule. It also involves the elimination of his role in disciplining those six subordinate workers for the purposes of optimizing their surplus labour.

VII. Professionally-Trained Workers and "New Middle-Class" Proletarianization

How then, does this analysis apply to the worker we normally assume to be professional but who is typically employed by the corporation, unlike the early independent - occupational professional.

We have stressed the growing interdependency of all labour under monopoly capitalism, inclusive of those workers performing the collective function of capital who do not own the means of production. To accentuate the "socialized" nature of even the most revered occupations, the following citation from Neuberg will be recalled:

> Although scientists are necessary for 'production'. . . (in a university-attached physics laboratory). . . engineers who design the equipment, secretarial (clerical) who type reports and janitors (unskilled workers) are all necessary. . . (while). . . the image of the scientist, alone in his or her laboratory. . . reflects the reality of the working world of only a small. . . percentage of the labour force (1975:127).

We have also pointed to the patterns of accommodation which bureaucratic organizations have evolved to integrate highly trained, credentialed workers into hierarchical authority structures. Against Oppenheimer, we would argue that under monopoly capitalism, the emphasis placed on the "anti-bureaucratic" nature of workers who are socialized in professional training institutions, is greatly exaggerated. We are speaking here, of those employed in the productive and realization spheres of the capitalist economy. The error in Oppenheimer's emphasis on "professionalism versus bureaucracy", can be explained in part, in terms of his sluggish retention of pre-industrial conceptions of "independent" professions and the nineteenth century middle-class consulting professions.

Let us recall a point made in our introduction. We noted that recognition of the bureaucratization of occupations professing cognitively-specialized superiority has discouraged specialized students of the professions from identifying the growth of credentialed labour with a macro-sociological, professionalization thesis. The conflict which these later studies downplayed has been summarized as follows:

> The concensus seems to be that (professional) workers require a kind of autonomy that is antithetical to Weber's model of rational-legal bureaucracy. . . The proper way for such men to work is as members of a self-regulating 'company of equals' (Freidson and Rhea, 1972:185).

Studies of professionally trained workers within bureaucratic organizational structures (see Chapter Six) have decomposed both the Weberian model of bureaucracy and the concept of professionalism into separate constellations of variables. In one such study, Hastings and Hinings' - investigating British accountants in large industrial organizations - found a congruence between their subjects' values of cognitive rationality and their employing organization's emphasis on "analyzing, planning and controlling action" (1970). In another study, Richard Hall found a strong positive correlation between professionalism and bureaucracy's emphasis on technical competence in selection and advancement processes (1967, 1968). Hall also found that the "hierarchy of authority" and the "pressure of rules" yielded only weak correlations with most "professional" variables. The same variables were positively (though weakly) related with the professional's "sense of calling". Hall thus concluded that,

> in some cases an equilibrium may exist between the levels of professionalization and bureaucratization in the sense that a particular level of professionalization may require a certain level of bureaucratization to maintain

> social control. Too little bureaucratization may lead to too many undefined operational areas if the profession itself has not developed operational standards for these areas (Richard Hall, 1968:104).

In focusing on the different orientations of lawyers, engineers and professions in bureaucratic settings, Wilensky found mixtures of "pure professionalism" and "pure careerism" to be typical (1964:153). He found that professionalism is "most likely to flourish" amongst urban university professors, while church university professors and lawyers scaled medium and engineers were low. He thus wrote

> These findings. . . emphasize that (1) bureaucracy is not a necessary bar to professional commitments (e.g. recruitment and administrative policies encourage professionalism at Urban University, not at Church University); (2) occupational training is generally more important than workplace indoctrination as a source of role orientation (e.g. despite contrasting organizational contexts, firm and solo lawyers are similar in professionalism; and engineers, the occupational group with least professional training, are by far the most careerist and least professional). Thus, organizational threats to colleague control, which have received so much attention in the debate about the rise and fall of professionalism, are attenuated by occupational training and organizational purpose (153-154).

Larson suggests that credentialed occupations like engineering and accounting, which are typically dependent on the large corporation for employment, are peopled by members who have managerial or "technobureaucratic" career aspirations. At least one empirical study supports Larson's speculation. That study revealed a tendency for engineers and accountants to define success in terms of "getting into management" (Becker and Carpo, 1956).

In research disciplines where considerable independence in the conception and design of one's own work is professionally rewarded, bureaucratic accommodation has tended to take a different form (Etzioni, 1959; Kornhauser, 1962; Miller, 1967; J. W. Kuhn, 1971). Here, special units within the bureaucracy have been established which are partially exempt from external regulation over actual research processes. However, the ultimate goal of research and its funding is indeed set by senior management. Miller, in underscoring the necessity and reality of these two patterns of accommodation, thus writes that,

> if scientists and engineers differ in their professional goals, then the alienation manifested by engineers may result from their lack of power and participation in organizational affairs whereas the alienation manifested by scientists may reflect their lack of autonomy to pursue their work. . . (Miller, G.A., 1967:767).

This pattern of accommodation to research scientists has been spread to other spheres of employment. Thus, organizations have developed multiple career lines in which management is not the only road to success. In short, if we can't "all be chiefs" then let's make "being an Indian" more attractive. In those occupations in which workers characteristically have management aspirations, "professional" incentives may be imposed from above.

> . . . management attempts to impose professionalism as a definition of success within the organization in order to maintain commitment on the part of specialists who would ordinarily be considered failures for not having moved up into management. . . (Goldner and Ritti, 1967, II:12).

The strategy of seeking alternatives to management as a criteria of success has also been sought "from below". This can be seen as "one of the reactions to blocked mobility", exemplified in a company which has created an elaborate "professional ladder" for its salesman (Goldner and Ritti, 1967:15-16). This was seen as an attempt to create enough difference between senior and junior salesmen to reduce the feelings of frustration on the part of seniors who had failed to secure management positions.

The employers of new middle-class labour rely upon the skills of its salesman or scientists, lawyers or accountants. Therefore, the creation of multiple career lines is a functional response, requisite to insure the continued maximization of the output of such workers despite their lack of colleague control or sharing in administrative decision-making.

The studies discussed suggest support for Stinchcombe's hypothesis that bureaucracy and professionalism are but two subtypes of the larger category, "rational administration" (Stinchcombe, 1959:183-186). Thus, to equate the proletarianization of professionals with the encroachment of bureaucracy, as Oppenheimer would have us do, is clearly inadequate. Furthermore, Freidson's post-industrial thesis that professionalism is anti-bureaucratic and that its growth heralds the emergence of a different mode of work organization suffers a similar shortcoming.

* *

In adopting Garchedi's Marx-derived strategy, we are encouraged to observe the conditions of credentialed work and relations between highly qualified workers and others, from the perspective of capital accumulation. This strategy demands that we relate the fortunes of credentialed workers to the requirements of monopoly capital as a value-expanding mode of production.

Let us take up, hypothetically, the example of the aerospace industry. If sufficient funds are available for large firms to expand their investments in research and development, then the demand for appropriately trained research scientists and technologists will expand. In such a case, the market capacity and conditions of work can be expected to be favourable to considerable autonomy and a degree of occupational self-regulation. However, once that supply is sufficiently trained to meet the requirements of expansion, the market capacity and degree of self-regulation is diminished.

As Oppenheimer noted above, and as we have stressed, the supply of credentialed labour is heavily subsidized by public funds. This has crucial implications for the career of any occupation, expert or otherwise, in terms of its capacity for collegial regulation. In the earlier, more competitive phase of capitalist development, the weakening of market capacity was responded to either by the formation of professional associations to resist capitalist control or by the organization into conflict-oriented bargaining units of threatened wage workers. However, the intervention of the state on behalf of capital (i.e. the expansion of funds or contraction of the same, in response to the needs of the private, aerospace industry), excludes expert-based occupations from the type of control associated with nineteenth-century professionalism.

Typically, the state will subsidize not only a highly skilled body of research scientists to meet the demands of the aerospace industry; it will also typically subsidize a host of less skilled workers as well as the development of labour-substitutive technology which will have the effect of weakening the research scientists' monopoly of competence. In this way, the highly skilled labour required initially can be devolved to a complex social labour process in which the employer is much less dependent upon the special knowledge base and skills of a limited number of experts. The value of scientific labour power thus draws tendentially towards a social average, reducing the value of skilled labour and its bargaining capacity (its occupational power) with the corporate firm.

The process we have described is similar to the one described by

Oppenheimer. However, according to Garchedi, the proletarianization of new middle-class labour involves more than simply these work devaluation processes. From science, Garchedi provides the illustration of the chemist, whose expert function involves him in the performance of quality-control tests (1975, IV:65). This expert function is performed as a part of the collective worker. However, the same chemist may supervise a number of technicians. He is therefore part of the collective labourer in that he performs a labour process (and a socially necessary supervisory function). As well, he performs the capital function of control and surveillance. However, at the moment when the tests which he performs can be carried out by someone with lower skills, perhaps the same technicians under his direction: (1) the value of his labour-power is reduced to that of a technician; (2) he loses his function as co-ordinator of the technicians' labour-power, and; (3) consequently, there is no need to assign to him the work of control and surveillance of those technicians.

This illustration depicts a process which both eliminates the collective function of capital and devaluates the chemist's labour power to an unskilled level.

> In short, proletarianization is the limit of the process of devaluation of the new middle-class' labour-power, i.e. the reduction of his labour-power to an average, unskilled level coupled with the elimination of the global function of capital (Garchedi, 1975:65).

Garchedi, however, has not sufficiently emphasized the significance of the worker's relative independence in such activities as research, planning, and design, as a discriminator of satisfaction in work. We have pointed to the salience of focused decision-making capacity for the satisfaction of highly trained research workers. It is this very fact which has occasioned the establishment of relative "bureaucracy-free" zones within the large production organization.

In the aerospace industry, Miller found that scientists with Ph.D.'s were "less alienated" by their work context than scientists with only M.A.'s or M.S. degrees. He suggested that research freedom and opportunities to obtain professional recognition outside the company are more important to the fully credentialed research professional than the type of supervision and incentives unrelated to scientific expertise (Miller, G.A., 1967:767).

It *is* the case that scientists participate, like the administrator, in the collective function of capital by facilitating capital-expansion as supervisors. However, unlike the administrator, the labour process in which they participate is not merely supervision in its dual form but is also *directly* productive of surplus-value. Thus, their alienation can be expected to be as much or more acutely experienced by the loss of their role in the conception or design of the research process than by their loss of responsibility for the supervision of other workers.

In contrast with Garchedi, we would underline the significance of creative, scientific work to certain sections of the new middle-class because of the necessity of science to corporate capitalism. This very necessity does more than any other structural attribute to encourage special organizational accommodations to scientists.

The "technocratic paradigm" outlined in Chapter Five, can be interpreted as a social-theoretical recognition of the absorption of science to production. This integration, at the superstructural level, manifests as an ideological appeal continuous with earlier capitalism. However, that appeal is adapted to the transformed matrix of a corporation-dominated economy. The standardization of expert training which signalled the rise of occupational professions in the nineteenth century, appeals to liberal definitions of a free market in labour. Expert knowledge, the appeal suggests, frees the economy from the incompetent functioning of both labour and capital.

The "scientific management" approach to corporate work organization not only "rationalized" the social division of labour in terms of the law of value. At the level of superstructural relations it also made science the ultimate legitimation of corporate capitalism. Thus, "scientific management" anticipates

> . . . the transformation of the productive forces in the monopoly phase of capitalism by the integration of applied science and technology at all levels of the system of production, from execution to administration to management. . . In. . . industry. . . the ideology of scientific management expresses the demise of the self-made man or captain of industry as the central self-justifying myth of the capitalist class (Larson, 1974:283).

The "managerial revolution" thesis can thus be interpreted as an ideological attempt to present corporate capitalism as a new economic mode. Its central claim is that scientific rationality will eliminate the arbitrary use of class power. In Frederick Winslow Taylor's own words:

> The man at the head of the business under scientific management is governed by rules and laws which have been developed through hundreds of experiments just as much as the workman, and the standards which have been developed are equitable (Quoted by Bendix, 1956:268).

In this liberalized view, science is considered a class-emancipatory agent. Hence, the manager and expert technician are seen as the bearers of a new system of production relations. In the "radical optimist" version of the post-industrial thesis, a science-wed bureaucracy is seen to articulate as a hierarchy based upon merit. Thus, the legitimation suggests, it is merit upon which an individual climbs to a position of either creative autonomy or the right to control and supervise the work of others. However, as these functions are themselves subjected to routinization, the decision-making activity of such workers is reduced and with that reduction comes the devaluation of their labour-power.

The recognition of the distinction between the work of design (of a social or physical production process or instrument) on the one hand, and the management of pre-established designs on the other, suggested an important distinction to Harry Braverman (1974). Braverman analyzed the process of separation of all "conception" from "execution" under the capitalist mode of production. The scientist, like the early independent inventor, is partially engaged in the process of conception. Typically, however, working in a research section of a corporation or a research corporation (or additionally, in a university-attached research lab, indirectly tied to the expansion of corporate capital), his labour is subject to the contingencies of capital accumulation. Thus, his proletarianization can be seen to involve not only the elimination of his independent status (i.e., from the early role of the individual inventor) and the elimination of his control and surveillance function. It also entails those processes which diminish his independent role in the holistic conception of the specialized product of his own labour.

In reality, it is extremely difficult to locate fixed categories which yield a simple answer to the class position of the research scientist. Indeed, it is because of the dynamic nature of monopoly capitalism that the static approach of stratification theory must be rejected. In contrast, class, when approached from the perspective of Marxist political economy, is indexed to the very dynamics of monopoly capitalist expansion. Marxism encourages us to examine the effects of the dialectic relationship between advancing forces of production and the production relations which set the parameters of that advance - on the formation of differentiated groups of economic agents.

We have stressed the distinction between creative autonomy and the work of control and surveillance. Our purpose in doing so is that we feel Garchedi has over-emphasized the importance of the supervisory function to certain classes of economic agencies best exemplified by the research scientist. Scientific workers are of critical importance to our discussion because of their revered roles as the embodiment of professionalism. Further, the salience of their work to the expansion of monopoly capital is obvious.

Corporations have willingly accommodated bureaucracies to the potential resistance to external intervention by highly qualified workers oriented to creative work. It can be expected that this accommodation proceeds to the extent that their work output draws sufficiently close to the growth policies of the employing organization. Such patterns of accommodation are noteworthy, however, not only because they accommodate the research worker. They also extend to a variety of other workers with both advanced qualifying credentials as well as those with abundant experience. Significantly, it is professionalism, vague and imprecise as a concept, which is appealed to ideologically in attempts to create the illusion of secure new middle-class status. Thus, professionalism can be seen as an important ideological means to control the development of a proletarian class consciousness amongst new middle-class workers experiencing or vulnerable to work devaluation processes.

Our emphasis on the distinction between "conception" and "control and surveillance" adds complexity to contemporary class analysis.

However, we would argue that the reality of class structuration under monopoly capital demands this analytical complexity. The application of Marxist categories of political economy into the monopoly era, indeed, suggest that in reality, a highly fragmented new middle-class structure exists.

This fragmented class division - complicated by the diffusion of labour and capital functions amongst workers - arises even in the sphere of commodity production. In that sphere, proletarianization, as Garchedi suggests, involves the devaluation of new middle-class labour power coupled with the loss of the control and surveillance function. To this, we would add that proletarianization also involves the progressive diminution of an increasing number of workers from involvement in the "conception" of social production. Each process, however, proceeds under the same underlying structural pressure: the systemic inducement of capital accumulation.

To this point we have primarily described the changes in the labour process and relations of production in the sphere of appropriation. In the sphere of realization, however, new mechanisms of control, which expand under monopoly capitalism and create a social labour process employing a diverse range of economic agents. As Crompton has suggested:

> because of. . . ever-present pressures towards accumulation and profit-making the capitalist mode of production has become increasingly complex and sophisticated. Specialized sectors have been developed which are essential to the capitalist mode of production. Here I would mention such activities as accounting, advertising, some state services, finance (e.g. banking in all its aspects, insurance), etc.. All of these activities facilitate and enhance the rate of extraction of surplus value. Such activities perform a vital role in the capitalist mode of production as a whole. Although,

> however, they do perform this vital role, they do not themselves create new values; but acquire a share of surplus value actually produced elsewhere. They would, clearly, be superfluous given a hypothetical non-capitalist mode of production. . . (Although these employees perform useful labour in terms of the capitalist mode of production). . . they do not create surplus value. . . (1976:417).

As we have noted above, in its earlier stages, clerical work primarily concerned with the "accounting of value" can be likened to a craft. It was located in the "office" rather than the "shop" and its perquisites - a white collar, a privileged income, physical proximity to management, mental work rather than manual work, and distanciation from the chemical pollutants and noise given off by the machine - made it highly appealing.

Braverman elaborates on the "likeness" between clerical work concerned with accountance, in its earlier stages, and the craft (1974:298-299).

> Although the tools of the craft consisted only of pen, ink, other desk appurtenances, and writing paper, envelopes, and ledgers, it represented a total occupation, the object of which was to keep current the records of the financial and operating condition of the enterprise, as well as its relations with the external world. Master craftsmen, such as bookkeepers or chief clerks, maintained control over the process in its totality, and apprentices or journeymen craftsmen--ordinary clerks, copying clerks, in the ordinary course of events advanced through the levels of bookkeeping on the double-entry or Italian model (to which was added the rudiments of cost as well as profit-and-loss accounting at the beginnings of the nineteenth century), such tasks as timekeeping and payroll, quality control, commercial traveling, drafting, copying duplicates by hand, preparing accounts in several copies, etc.

Braverman then goes on to analyze the process of differentiation of such work under the advancement of monopoly capital. Office work, generally entails record-keeping and accounting, planning and scheduling, filing and copying, correspondence and interviewing. With the development of the corporation, these functions are differentiated in correspondence with the specilization of organizational units within and sometimes independent of, the enterprise. He summarizes these changes as follows (Braverman, 1974, Ch. 15:293-358).

> I. The rudimentary functions of the time-keeper in the factory office, was first coupled with a second functionary, the foreman's clerk who assisted the foreman in keeping track of the work in process. Such clerks were responsible for the records of workers, materials and tasks. These responsibilities, with the growth in scale of the corporations, were differentiated into cost, planning and scheduling, purchasing, and engineering and design sections.
>
> II. The sales function, in the early stages was handled by the owner himself or with the assistance of a clerk who often doubled as a traveler. As the firm grew in scale under the impact of capital concentration, these functions were devolved to a marketing division. This division was sub-divided into sections responsible for travelling sales, correspondence with salesmen, customers, advertising, promotion and a separate financial office which takes care of '. . . statements, borrowing, extends credit, ensuring collections, assessing and regulating cash flow, etc.' (298-299).
>
> III. A central administrative office is established to make corporate policy and enforce it upon the divisions described under 'I' and 'II' (above) as well as the production floor.
>
> IV. Commercial concerns completely separated from the production processes also have evolved. These firms, which deal only with purchase and resale components in the production-distribution process, require three types of labour: sales, clerical and distributive (for warehousing, packing and shipping). Of these three types, clerical labour, in both wholesale and retail firms, generally comprise the majority of employees.

V. Independent financial firms also evolve, which even more than in the commercial sales firms, rely on clerical workers.

In short, a labour process engaged by a mass of people has emerged which functions to produce increasingly elaborate mechanisms of control associated with the realization of capital. The increasing productivity of productive workers brings about the need to: (1) find new employment outlets for superfluous, non-capitalist economic agents and; (2) to rationalize consumption (the science of conditioning markets to expect previously unnecessary products) in order to constantly find new outlets of absorption for the growing mass of relative surplus-value. The labour process attending this sphere of capitalist production thus becomes a collectivized process in which the formerly individuated and personalized clerical activity becomes devalued. As Braverman writes:

> These management functions of control and appropriation have in themselves become labour processes. They are conducted by capital in the same way that it carries on the labour processes of production: with wage labour purchased on a large scale in a labour market and organized into hugh 'production' machines according to the same principles that govern the organization of factory labour (301).

How then, does this process affect the credentialed accountant; accountancy was one of the occupations which assumed the mantle of "profession" during the nineteenth century. As Johnson points out, "the development of accountancy as an occupation has been tied to the functions of capital and, in particular, to the proliferation of institutions of secondary control" (1977:218).

Following Braverman, Johnson argues that the growth of accounting systems is not sufficiently explained by rationalization - a theme we have stressed throughout. For no single accounting of value is, in practice, taken at its face value.

> The internal record-keeping of each corporate institution is. . . constructed (on the assumption of). . . possible dishonesty, disloyalty or laxity of every human agency it employs. . . (this being). . . the first principle of modern accounting (Braverman, 1974:303).

To further support the point, Braverman notes the necessity for the "independent audit".

> Since corporations must exhibit financial statements to the outside world for the purpose of raising capital, and since various other needs for such public disclosure exist--such as bank credit, settlement of accounts with outside parties. . . still another means of establishing the truth of records is provided (1974:303-304).

It is thus suggested that *control* rather than the processing of information is the dominant function of such accounting mechanisms (Johnson, 1976:47).

Johnson points out that much of contemporary accounting simply involves the routine, technical functions of the daily recording of stock or cash flows (1977:218). Similar, routinized functions abound in the information-gathering and information distribution jobs which have been made possible by computerization.

> Such tasks are essentially a part of a labour process brought into being by the dispersal of the functions of capital and such functionaries find themselves in the lower rungs of the bureaucratic hierarchy (1977:218).

While these workers comprise a growing proportion of the labour force, they are not involved in the labour process of managing the production of surplus-value. Rather, their proletarianization proceeds through (1) the devaluation of their work through its fragmentation and routinization, and (2) their separation from those accountants who conceive or "frame systems of financial and stock control and supervise their implementation" (1977:219). These latter include both the "housed" accountant who works as an employee of a large corporation or the "partners" of an independent firm.

Johnson stresses the "unproductivity" of such workers by distinguishing their work as part of a secondary control process which involves the allocation of previously extracted surplus-value, rather than a primary control (appropriation) process. He points to the internal stratification of the so-called "accounting profession", a fact which belies the professional image of a homogenous "company of equals".

Accountancy's bifurcation has followed the suit of corporate business in terms of its increasing concentration. "The growth of large-scale accountancy partnerships on first a national and then an international scale has followed the course of business amalgamation, the rise of the holding company and the internationalization of capital" (Johnson, 1977:220). Smaller accounting firms are thus diminished in number and a few giants dominate, the original partnerships become either management-owners or simply owners. The majority of accountants thus become non-owning employees.

> That partners in the large firms also dominate the 'professional' hierarchy, enables them to control the recruitment, training and work activities (through codes and etiquette) of their colleague-subordinates thus facilitating the fragmentation and devaluation of certain grades of accountancy work within the labour process. As a result the professional associations can be viewed as having important political functions in relation to the organization of the work (Johnson, 1977:220).

VIII. Summary

In the preceding analysis we have analytically derived the variations in the primary (appropriation) and secondary (realization) structures of social control associated with the accumulation of capital under the capitalist mode of production. From Marx, we depicted the processes of labour's subordination to capital from simple "co-operation" through "division of labour" during the manufacturing stage, to the stage of the "collective labourer" associated with the technological revolution in nineteenth-century Europe.

Marx's description of the evolution of labour's subordination to capital articulated the diminishment of the individuated role of the craft worker. It traced the increasing socialization of the labour process and the simultaneous transformation of relations between capital and labour.

From more recent Marxist theory, we extended this analysis into the monopoly era. In the era of monopoly capital, the ownership of capital is increasingly concentrated in the national and multi-national joint-stock ownership form. We have seen that during this stage, the secondary control structures associated with the accounting and allocation of value are greatly expanded to co-ordinate the growing mass of relative surplus-value. It should be stressed that the expansion of the secondary control structures is concentrated in the metropolitan (advanced capitalist) nations linked by trade with hinterland (neo-colonial, underdeveloped) nations.

The application of Marxist political economy to the monopoly era suggests that, the function of capital during this stage is itself subdivided into a number of fractional operations. Whereas, under private capitalism the functions of the individual worker are collectivized, under monopoly capitalism the work of capital is itself collectivized. Furthermore, there is a tendency towards the separation of legal and economic ownership of the power to dispose of the means of production. Consequently, the function of capital is dispersed amongst a growing stratum of agents who do not own the means of production themselves. These agents become employees with varying degrees of economic power and tend to be housed in complex bureaucracies. These structures operate to perform collectively the same functions performed individually by the individual capitalist under private capitalism.

It is recognized that the diversity of the contemporary occupational structure does not immediately encourage the application of Marxist class concepts to the contemporary period. The industrial proletariat upon which Marx admittedly centered his analysis has not absorbed the majority of the labour force within the industrialized nations. However, the internationalization of capital has severely altered the terms of reference.

The dispersal of the most menial of industrial labour functions throughout the less developed trading nations must be recognized as a major qualification on the facile rejection of Marx's proletarianization-immizeration thesis. This qualification, however, should not confuse the issue of the historical trends in the structure of social class relations within the advanced capitalist nations.

It is generally recognized that Marx was at least minimally correct in anticipating the absorption of the majority of workers in the industrialized nations into a dependent wage nexus. However, the upgrading of that labour (from the perspective of capitalist productive efficiency) through educational institutions appears to contradict a principal Marxist theme; i.e., all labour is persistently subjected to devaluation pressures when subordinated to capital. Indeed, one alternative view, advanced most recently by post-industrial theorists, is that the occupational structure is being professionalized. Post-industrial theorists argue that, the dispersal of the labour and capital functions amongst professionally-credentialed, organizationally employed workers, coupled with the gradual automation (and therefore elimination) of menial tasks, is gradually eliminating antagonistic relations between capital and labour.

The post-industrial literature links with a pervasive tradition in sociological theory which advances a technological-determinist explanation of societal change. Simply put, that position holds that scientific innovations in production technology shape both the labour process and the ideological system which sanctions the evaluation of various positions in the division of labour. Thus, professionalism - the sanctioning occupational ideology most similar to the general economic ideology (cognitive rationality) - is seen to advance at the expense of the ideologies of private capitalism (laisser-faire) and proletarian class consciousness.

The ideology of profession draws upon a variety of economic values. It inherits from pre-capitalism the idea that work is a "calling": a dignified, socially responsible vocation. It inherits the appeal to "pride of craftsmanship" associated with handicraft production. Its appeal couples the virtues of revolutionary liberalism (individualism, specifically in the context of workplace decision-making) with traditional critiques of capitalism (specifically, the indictment against the all-pervasive "profit motive"). Thus, if a distinctive mode of work organization guided by professional ideology is growing, it is tempting to extrapolate the very decline of the antagonistic production relations conceived by Marx. If both labour and capital are subordinated to technological rationality, and professional work organization yields hierarchical authority to a meritocracy, then the class system dissolves into a rational stratification system.

Profession, this seemingly anomalous mode of work organization, has been critically examined in the preceeding discussion. Our analysis in Chapter Four suggested that the concept "profession" was better ideology than stable organization concept. We also argued, however, that the successful acquisition of state-sanctioned professional status by an occupational group was associated with the privileged right of an occupation's membership to control the labour process. The conditions for middle-class "professionalization", however, emerged with the successful contest of state power waged by industrial capitalists against the mercantilists. Professionalism signalled the right of certain occupational groups to set their own standards and fees, regulate recruitment, and police their members' deviation from collectively imposed norms - all achieved through the professional association. In short, the interest tension between the specialized producer and the unspecialized consumer was resolved in favour of middle-class producers of certain types of services.

Under monopoly capitalism, when speaking of "professionally-credentialed" workers, we are generally referring to organizational or heteronomous professions. Even medicine and law, which were the classic occupations out of which the concept profession derives, have shifted from the independent practice to a much more interdependent social labour process. In this transformed matrix of credentialed, occupational practice, the conditions of autonomy enjoyed by the nineteenth century middle-class credentialed occupations, are dramatically transformed. In such conditions, it becomes extremely difficult to simplistically identify the expansion of occupations claiming professional distinction with a macro-sociological "professionalization" thesis. For the notion of a self-regulating "company of equals" is pivotal to most conceptions of professional work organization. Increasingly, credentialed labour is fractionated by function, stratified and regulated by external bureaucratic command.

Our analysis in Chapter Six has shown that the post-industrial subthesis, which associates service work with professionalization, is clearly inadequate. Indeed, proletarian conditions have come to fully characterize the majority of occupations classified within the service sector. Furthermore, the concept "professional" - as extracted from the sociological literature - was shown to be inadequate in reflecting the expanding sections of credentialed occupations. This was shown in both the appropriation and realization spheres of capital accumulation.

In applying Marxist analysis to describe and explain the structuration of both the labour process and the relations of production, we are able to theorize the conditions under which the exceptional right to self-regulation accrues to certain occupational groups. Let us restate the argument.

The dual processes of labour and surplus-value appropriation (reproduced approximately in the realization sphere) underlies the central antagonisms of capitalist relations of production. On the one hand, the "collective labourer" represents a socialized, interdependent labour force. On the other hand, the functions of capital, under monopoly capital, are themselves collectivized. Thus, the work of scientific production (and the specialized labour process involved in the work of "conception" generally) and management, has a double nature. Both are necessary to the production of surplus-value as well as to its optimization and expansion. Thus, both represent economic functions of the collective labourer as well as of the economic functions of capital.

Creative work serves to facilitate the expansion of surplus-value by introducing technical innovations. The work of management involves the control and surveillance of labour to optimize subordinate workers' productivity levels. Both, however, are also essential labour processes to the monopoly capitalist mode of production. In the former instance, unlike Habermas's revision of Marx - in which scientific work is seen as a new source of value - we can see that such work merely constitutes a dual function. If we accepted Habermas's revision, we would be ignoring the persistent reality of capitalism through history. That is, the social-structural pressures on capital to expand relative surplus value tend to incorporate all value-expanding work into its dynamic.

This analysis suggests some important conclusions for the class analysis of credentialed workers which cannot be derived solely from an examination of the work devaluation processes which effect them.

Firstly, specialist occupational tasks performed by professionally-credentialed workers may include the typically fragmented and routinized tasks of the collective labourer. A now manifold list of technicians - computer analysts, laboratory technicians, lower-grade engineers, etc. - come immediately to mind. Furthermore, such workers may also perform the functions of co-ordination - also a part of the collective worker or labour function. As Johnson suggests:

> In such occupations technicality is the dominant element in the occupational organization of work and saturates occupational ideologies. Such agents may be regarded agents of the collective labourer and their incomes derived from labour in the form of wages (1976:43).

Secondly, specialized occupational tasks performed by credentialed workers may be associated with the global function of capital in carrying out its control and surveillance functions. Such workers, while performing such roles, bear capitalist class relations and can thus be expected to be protected from the processes of work devaluation which agents of the collective labourer are subjected to. Their identification with capital is structurally assured by the functions they perform. In addition, a variety of perquisites are offered as rewards (fringe benefits, etc.) which do not facilitate their interest in collective bargaining procedures. Like the private capitalist, they compete with each other for mobility by successfully increasing the rate of exploitation of the collective worker. Their incomes thus derive from revenue - the realized, uninvested surplus-value appropriated from the collective worker.

As technocratic theorists have themselves pointed out, the privileged work involved in the performance of the capitalist function is itself vulnerable to rationalization. The automation of supervision can serve not only to eliminate the human work of co-ordination, but also the necessity for the human work of control and surveillance. Thus, in large national or multi-national corporations, middle-management functions in territorial offices are eliminated and centralized in the head office. Such devices as the teletype and centralized data banks facilitate this process.

Thirdly, specialist, credentialed occupational tasks which involve the creation or conception of physical or social innovations are protected by their relegation to "bureaucracy-free" zones of work activity. As Oppenheimer has stressed, however, credentialed workers are themselves vulnerable to the shifting demands of capitalist markets.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Footnotes

1. This discussion follows from Part IV, Volume One of Capital (1974: 296-475), which traces the transition from feudalism to industrial capitalism. The treatment is as much as anything else, a sociology study of the dialectical interplay of economic-technical development and the authority relations which govern the labour process.

2. When discussing the "contemporary petit-bourgeoisie", we are referring to the owners of independent, relatively small production organizations (whether agricultural, resource-extractive, light manufacturing) or distribution organizational (sales of goods or services) who themselves partake in socially necessary supervision activities and even actual labour processes.

3. At this stage, the technical conditions of the labour process do not change significantly. That is, the forces of production are not altered. Rather, the important change is on the relations of production axis. The craft workers, in being drawn together, still perform individually the crafts inherited from the past. However, they are subordinated to the surplus-value-producing process in the sense that they lose control over the means of production and enter the wage nexus. The capitalist (often a master craftsman or guild merchant), expends saved income on the purchase of either labour or tools or both, and must divide up the returns acquired upon the exchange of his product on tools, his own income and re-investment. As the market expands, the latter (re-investment) becomes a more significant source of reallocation and the capitalist's willingness to pay his wage bill is systematically reduced. For the market forces the capitalist to increase surplus-value extraction or to become insolvent as a consequence of price competition. Thus, while the labourer's technique remains intact, his labour is subordinated to the surplus-value-producing process. We may also say that the capitalist superordinates the surplus-value-producing process while not superordinating the techniques of production.

4. Braverman (1974, Part I: Ch. 3) gives an excellent outline of the subdivision of the social division of labour under capitalism, into detail, of various production processes, and the allocation of simplified tasks - e.g., the former "craftsman", say a tinsmith, being made responsible only for the day-long repetition of straightening sheets of metal - to individual workers.

5. We shall subsequently specify the distinction between "supervision" and "control and surveillance".

6. See, for example, for Britain, the discussion in Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933:155-165) and David Noble's recently published study of the relationship between Engineering and the development of the corporation in the United States (Noble, 1977).

7. See, in particular, Baran and Sweezy (1966).

8. The distinction between "economically exploited" and "economically oppressed" requires explication. Garchedi, in this regard, writes:

> Even though, strictly speaking, we cannot talk of exploitation of unproductive workers because these workers do not produce, and thus cannot be expropriated of, surplus value, we can talk of economic oppression of these workers. The value of their labour-power is determined in the same way as the value of the labour-power of the productive worker, i.e., by the value of the goods and services going into the culturally determined subsistence minimum. The application of this labour-power, even if it does not create value and thus surplus value, is, just as in the case of the productive worker, by no means limited by the value of the labour-power itself. Take the example of the commercial worker, the typical unproductive worker. Suppose the value of this labour-power is the equivalent of five out of a seven-hour working day. For the remaining two hours of the working day he does not produce value but provides the capitalist with unpaid labour. That is, while the productive worker is expropriated of his labour in the form of value, the unproductive worker is subjected to a direct expropriation of labour. No surplus value is created in the commercial sphere. The commercial capitalist only participates in the sharing of the surplus value produced in the industrial and other productive spheres. The commercial worker 'creates no direct surplus value but adds to the capitalist's income by helping him to reduce the cost of realizing surplus value, inasmuch as he performs partly unpaid labour' (Marx, Capital, III:300). The more he performs unpaid labour, the more he is the agent through which the commercial capitalist realizes the surplus value produced in other, productive enterprises. From the point of view of the individual capitalist it does not make any difference whether his activity is productive of surplus value or not. But from an aggregate point of view, the larger the number of productive labourers, the higher the general rate of profit, other things being equal.

9. Baran and Sweezy make a somewhat similar depiction of the function of the "managerial capitalist". They write:

> In one respect (the corporation manager) represents a return to pre-tycoon days;

> his chief concern is once again the 'surveillance and regulation of a given industrial process with which his livelihood is bound up'. On the other hand, in another respect he is the antithesis of classical entrepeneur and tycoon alike: they are both individualists *par excellence*, while he is the leading species of the genus 'organization man' (1966:16).

CHAPTER NINE

STATE OCCUPATIONS AND THE REPRODUCTION OF MONOPOLY CAPITALIST RELATIONS

I. The Expansion of the State Under Monopoly Capitalism

The state in the industrially advanced nations has undergone a tremendous transformation in the twentieth century, most notably in the last four decades. That transformation has been most significant in terms of the extent to which it has intervened in the economy.

A number of social theorists have drawn the implication from this expanded state economic intervention that the traditional labels of "capitalist" or "socialist" are archaic. Behind this claim is the idea that Western Europe and Japan, Canada, Australia and the United States, as well as the Soviet bloc of nations, are each following a similar course. All of them, despite the divergent ideological commitments of their respective governments, are converging on a common pattern of increased state regulation and centralized economic management.

There are, of course, substantial grounds for resisting this convergence interpretation. In this regard, we have previously stressed the theoretical error committed by those who assume the inevitability of a unilinear unfolding of "industrialized" societies. In such a view, the division of labour and the organization and scale of production units are seen to follow the inexorable logic of "functional adaptation" to technological advances. As we have argued, this explanation suffers much the same burden of mystification as the "market fetishism" of the nineteenth century. It successor in the twentieth century: technological-determinism removes the "social" from determinant status, making socio-structural adaptation a complex but merely dependent cluster of variables. To read both modernization theorists and post-industrial theorists, one is left with the distinct impression that this adaptation, like the market regulation of the nineteenth century, follows a universal or law-like course.

In further qualifying this convergence idea, it should also be emphasized that in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet bloc of nations, state intervention was a swift and all-encompassing process. Armed insurrectionists seized control of the existing state institutions and subsequently used their centralized power to initiate industrialization. National economic planning was centralized and industrialization was introduced on the basis of specific and purposive social priorities. Those developments can be clearly distinguished from the experience of other countries which followed a course of capitalist evolution. Most importantly, the latter were not ruptured by a class-conscious political revolution.

State economic intervention in capitalist society is, of course, hardly restricted to the twentieth century. Indeed, mercantilism - which preceded industrial capitalism - is commonly identified with an assertive interventionist state. Ralph Miliband argues against any view of a "state-free" capitalism in the following passage:

> On the contrary, state intervention presided at its birth or at least guided and helped its early steps, not only in such obvious cases as Germany and Japan but in every other capitalist country as well; and it has never ceased to be of crucial importance in the workings of capitalism, even in the country most dedicated to laisser-faire and rugged individualism (*the United States**) (1969:9).

However, unlike the formally "socialist" nations, there have been no hard and fast rules for state intervention adopted in the advanced capitalist nations (Murray, 1975:3). Rather, it has been adopted gradually, in what might be described as an "ad hoc" response to changing social, political and economic conditions. Furthermore, the history of state intervention in these countries has been characterized by considerable resistance. This resistance has been especially strong towards the extension of public goods and public service provision on the basis of need (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965:Ch. 2). Nevertheless, Baran and Sweezy were able to show that in the United States of the mid-1960's, increasing rates of government spending had been uninterrupted since 1929 (1966:146).

**Italics* added.

While state intervention in capitalist economies is nothing new, the influence of Keynesian economics and related public policy-making, signified a profound change in the relationship between private capital and the state. The threat to both capital accumulation and political stability posed by the Depression of the 1930's combined with the experience of large-scale state intervention and regulation of the wartime economy of the 1940's to make the direction of Keynes enticing. Keynesianism signalled both the emergence of a policy framework for state intervention and the decline of anti-interventionist orthodoxy.

Keynes had expressed the belief that stagnation was the normal state of capitalist affairs in the modern era. He discovered that as a capitalist nation becomes wealthier it saves increasingly large amounts of its national income. A period of extensive, unused productive capacity and heavy unemployment resulted. Because there was no automatic mechanism for ensuring that private investors would be able to find the investment outlets for available savings, something had to be created. Keynes' solution was for increased injections of government spending in the form of direct government purchases and transfer payments.

In the 1920's, one out of fifteen American workers was on government payroll, whereas now the proportion is one out of six (Gonick, 1975:186). The trend is similar in Canada. In the 1970's, while 12 per cent of the labour force was working directly for the state, 18 per cent of the labour force was directly or indirectly supported by government payrolls (Deaton, 1972:28). O'Connor has estimated that the combined labour force working either through enterprise supported by state contract or on direct payroll, actually comprises one-third of the American work force (1972). It has been estimated that for the United States, between 1950 and 1970, nearly 66 per cent of all new jobs generated in the economy were created in the state sector (Deaton, 1972:29).

The expansion of state-dependent employment is but one indicator of the trend towards increasing state intervention. In Canada, between 1926 and 1970, the rate of public investment increased by 27.2 per cent while private investment decreased during the same period by six per cent (Deaton, 1972:25). In absolute terms, in the same period, public investment as a percentage of total investment increased from 13.1 per cent to 18.0 per cent (Deaton, 1972:25). Further, aside from direct government purchases, government collects another 20 per cent of the national income (Canadian) which it transfers between groups in the form of social security, social services and business subsidies (Gonick, 1976:25).

The combined total of expenditures of all levels of government, if we include both government purchases and transfer payments, accounted for 40 per cent of the Canadian Gross National Product in 1974. This contrasts with 31 per cent in 1966 and 22 per cent at the start of the 1950's (Gonick, 1976:26).

II. The Growth of the Welfare State

A central component of Keynesianism of course is the "welfare state". If we define "welfare" expenditures as inclusive of all public expenditures for health, education, income maintenance, deferred income and funds for community development, including housing allocations, the magnitude of growth is indeed outstanding. In the United States, by 1935, as a response to the Depression, these expenditures had risen to 10 per cent of the Gross National Product (Janowitz, 1976:2). It fell to 4.4 per cent during the Second World War, but climbed again to 9.5 per cent by 1966 (Janowitz, 1976:2). While United States' expansion in welfare spending lagged behind other major western European nations and Canada, by 1970 it rose to 17 per cent, and by 1973 stood at 17.6 per cent of the Gross National Product. As a proportion of combined totals of federal, state and local government expenditures, "welfare" - as defined above - accounted for 55 per cent of total public expenditures (Janowitz, 1976: 46).

A further indication of the significance of governmental welfare activities is the growth of employment in the institutions of the welfare state. From 1960 to 1970 in the United States, growth in employment in this sector increased enormously, as expressed in Table III. As these data illustrate, combined employment in the institutions of the various social services increased 69.1 per cent compared to an 18.18 per cent gain for total employment, and 13.3 per cent growth in manufacturing employment.

Table V[1]

Employment Growth in Human Service and Other Industries (1960-70)

Industry	1960	1970	% Change
Education	3,385,207	6,138,324	81.3
Health	2,589,253	4,247,671	64.1
Welfare & Religious	608,581	1,587,605	40.7
TOTAL (Human Services)	9,172,294	15,510,192	69.1
Manufacturing	17,529,762	19,864,209	13.3
TOTAL (All Industries	64,646,563	76,805,171	18.8

Source: G. Stevenson, 1976, p.80.

These data attest to the increasing intervention of the state both in the production and distribution system. Further, the expenditures on what has been ostensibly defined as "welfare" have consumed an increasing portion of these outlays.

III. The Post-Industrial "Institutionalist" Legitimation

In 1939, T.H. Marshall welcomed a trend which he associated with the welfare state and the ideology which its employees espoused. He thus wrote:

> The professions are being socialized and the social and public services are being professionalized. The professions are learning to recognize their obligations to society as a whole as well as to those of individual clients . . . (1939:335-336).

Marshall believed that the "administrative professions" were a leadership base of the intermediary classes. The value of such leadership was that they were exempted by their form of employment from the "competitive motives and incentives which are reputed to make capitalism work" (1965:176). Such occupations, Marshall suggested, worked for "social efficiency" which he contrasted with the more narrow interests of "business efficiency" and "mechanical efficiency" (1939:340).

We have also seen that Karl Mannheim and Carr-Saunders and Wilson drew a similar inspiration from their observations of professional ideology and its organizational form.

Marshall's optimistic view of a "professionalization of public administration" has been incorporated into recently popularized versions of an emerging "post-industrial" society. As a theory of state expansion, it is expressed in what Murray has termed the "neo-corporatist" hypothesis (1975:48). It argues that "expanded state economic intervention is associated with an emergent technocracy" (Murray, 1975:48).

The neo-corporatist idea is essentially that the state has begun to carve out definite interests and prerogatives of its own. Furthermore, these interests are seen to transcend class biases, tending to serve the general benefit of society. Finally, in the neo-corporatist hypothesis, the expansion of state activities is seen to be associated with abundance in the population and the assumption that remaining pockets of poverty are "slowly reformed out of existence" (Murray, 1975:50).

As we noted,these views derive in great part from an "institutionalist" theory of social welfare. In that theory, a professionally managed web of public institutions oriented to social welfare goals has evolved to respond to various social contingencies. These "contingencies" - such as unemployment, income differentials, urban crowding, and the decline of the extended family - are seen as inevitable concomitants of industrialization.

In the institutionalist view, both the "residualist" model of social welfare - which is essentially a laissez-faire approach to government - and Marxism, are considered "anti-statist". In contrast to both the residualist and Marxist views, the logic of the institutionalist view leads to the post-industrial argument: a new social system evolves which is neither socialist nor capitalist.

The growth of public expenditures on social welfare items has been a key buttress to the argument that the contemporary state is a class-neutral technocracy. Daniel Bell draws upon this theme in suggesting that a post-industrial society tends to subordinate profit maximization to collective conceptions of social welfare and public interest. He argues that the political order rather than the economy dictate the growth of public welfare institutions. Significantly, Morris Janowitz has been so confident about the political basis of welfare state expansion that he attempts to show that even Keynesianism no longer dictates the growth of welfare expenditures (1976). For Janowitz, this is a source of concern.

According to Janowitz, since 1955, in the United States, expenditures for social welfare have decreasingly been the result of expansionary economic policies as prescribed by Keynes. Rather, social welfare expenditures have become "more and more a system of self-sustaining expansion in response to the social and political definition of welfare requirements" (Janowitz, 1976:46). What he is implying is that, originally Keynesian strategy centered on a cyclical pattern of government deficit spending to prevent unemployment and contraction of production. It was followed by a "balanced" or positive budget. However, for the period after the Korean War until 1975, a budget deficit was recorded for only four years (49). In short, rather than a cyclical administration of economic policy, there has been a relatively consistent and accelerating budget deficit. After examining the growth of social welfare expenditures, Janowitz concludes that the "welfare state" has been a major cause of inflation.

Janowitz may well be correct in assuming that welfare expenditures, as he broadly defines them, have increasingly become the major inflationary pressure generated within the government sector. Where Janowitz may be called to task is in his assertion that the expansion of public welfare spending is in some way independent of the structural requirements of monopoly capitalism. What he and others are implying is that such expenditures are in some way out of line with the requirements of the economy. He points to a changing political culture; his most admonishing finger directed at the psychology of "consumerism" and the translation of that psychology into demands of the state. It is an old complaint which in the vernacular, warns that the "government teat" cannot be milked forever.

Ironically, it is this "changing political culture" which celebrants of the post-industrial society have held up as a major factor conditioning the transcendence of capitalism. Paradoxically, in the 1970's the welfare state is under siege. The "rationalization" of social welfare by national governments is currently defined in terms of expenditure reduction. The management of "stagflation" is defined as the central policy concern of capitalist governments. The "War on Poverty" of the 1960's has receded, replaced by a "War on Welfare Expenditures".

It is safe to assume that the rise in consumer expectations is a factor conditioning the working population to living standards extravagant by historical and international comparison. Indeed, these rising expectations are reflected in the increasing demands for health, education and social services. What is more to the point, however, is to ask if rising expectations are not essential to the very survival of monopoly capitalism

IV. The Myth of Rigidity in the Marxist Theory of the State

With the development of the welfare state, the Marxist polemic that in undertaking revolution the proletariat had "nothing to lose but their chains", appears as mere dogma. The "radical-optimist" version of post-industrial theory assumes that the negative Marxist view of the state has been rendered obsolete in its application partially because of the expansion of state welfare programs.

It should be made clear at the outset that Marxism does not presuppose a simple anti-statist perspective. It is true that Marx and Engels did hold the view that the state, as formed in pre-capitalist and capitalist society, was fundamentally oppressive. At the same time they also believed that the state was inevitable in such societies.[2]

It is also true that Marx and Engels did not believe that the state was inevitable under all circumstances. It had not been necessary in those societies with an undifferentiated labour process. Furthermore, they believed that the state could and should "wither away" in communist society. For, "when it at last becomes the real representative of the whole society, it renders itself unnecessary" (Anti-Duhring: 386-387). It was "rendered unnecessary" when the "development of production makes the existence of different classes of society . . . an anachronism" (Ibid.:393).

History, of course, has shown that the continued existence of the state, even in socialist countries, has been essential in the face of opposition from external, imperialist nations. Nevertheless, it remains central to Marxist theory that in an internationalized communist mode of production, the state, at least as we have come to know it, would and should become an anachronism.

For Marx and Engels, the modern state had arisen to serve the interests of private capital. It was this relationship and its negative consequences for the working-class movement which primarily concerned them. However, Marx and Engels also asserted that the state, as society's centralized authority, had inherited some of its functions from non-class society.

In Anti-Duhring, while Engels emphasizes the class-determinacy of much of the behaviour of the functionaries of the state, he insists that the state does not arise simply as a "plot" by the ruling class. Rather, it arises in the beginning from certain indispensable functions of society.[3] Arising from the division of labour, the state emerges only after the division of society into classes. Its roots, however, are in the functions which it administered previous to the development of a class structure.

While little work was actually undertaken to identify these appropriated "indispensable functions", Engels did begin such a specification. In Anti-Duhring he wrote:

> In each such (primitive) community there were from the beginning certain common interests, the safeguarding of which had to be handed over to individuals, true, under the control of the community as a whole; adjudication of disputes; repression of the abuse of authority by individuals; control of water supplies, especially in hot countries, and

> finally, when conditions were still absolutely primitive, religious functions. Such offices are found in aboriginal communities of every period - in the oldest German marks and even today in India. They are naturally endowed with a certain measure of authority and are the beginnings of state power (1959:247).

Marx was apparently in agreement with Engels on this. In the third volume of Capital he wrote that despotic states perform both the general function of undertaking "common activities arising from the nature of all communities and the specific functions arising from the antithesis between government and the mass of the people" (1977:384).

For Marx and Engels, the revolutionary project, with regards to the state, was not its immediate abolition. Rather, the primary task as Lenin later understood so well, was the forceful seizure of the state apparatus in which coercive power was concentrated. Because the social system of property relations was protected by the state, the expropriation of the means of production from the control of the capitalist class preconditioned the necessity of that seizure. However, in expropriating the control of the state from the capitalist class, the proletariat also undertook the responsibility for the "indispensable" functions necessary to the co-ordination of any society. Similar to the management functions in the corporate firm, the capitalist state embodies the dual functions of co-ordination and the control required because of class antagonisms.

The revolutionary seizure of state power was but the first action necessary to initiate the long transition from capitalism to socialism. It was a necessary but not sufficient condition. The "post-seizure" revolutionary task entailed the devolution of certain indispensable societal functions embodied in the state into the hands of democratic workers' organizations. The means of administering these functions - which had been inherited by capitalism from non-class society - had themselves come to reflect and reinforce the exploitative relations of capitalist production.

The Marxist choice of the phrase "withering away" was discriminately chosen. It implied Marx's coming to grips with the practical realities of transforming the relations of production subsequent to the seizure of state power. In the transitional period, a "Workers' State" would have to be established. Marx, learning from the mistakes of the commune leaders (Paris Commune), whose attempt to destroy the permanent state apparatus had failed, isolated two preconditions for the success of such a project (Mandel; Red Pamphlet, No. 5:13). A third condition was added by Lenin:

> (1) The political functionaries of a workers' state must have wages on a par with those of skilled workers.
>
> (2) All officials should be elected and subject to the right of recall at any time by those who elected them.
>
> (3) The third requirement, alluded to by Marx, and later made explicit by Lenin, was to immediately end the separation of the legislative and executive functions.

The underlying theme in all three of these conditions was an attempt to draw the proletariat into the decision-making arena formerly monopolized by state legislators and bureaucrats. The third precondition: the separation of executive and legislative functions, "was suppressed in this new state which was already not quite a state - i.e., the creation of a workers' state marked the beginning of the withering away of the state" (Ibid.).

Marx believed that the workers should be involved in both the passing and execution of laws from the outset. As these functions were absorbed into the various organizations of workers, the separation of these "indispensable functions" from the control of the masses would end. The central role of specialized bureaucracies would thus be diminished. This was the meaning of the phrase, "withering away of the state".

It is clear that certain social services now commonly classified as public "social welfare" functions were considered indispensable by Marx and Engels. The Communist Manifesto included a brief list of social welfare measures that should follow the revolution. The tenth and final prescription in the manifesto is, "Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, & c., & c.".

If it is inaccurate to associate Marxism with a primitive anti-statism, it is also a misconception to assume that Marx, Engels or Lenin, assigned a simple isomorphism to the relation between the state and the capitalist class. There are, of course, ample quotations from them which lend crdibility to such a view.

In the famous polemic of the Manifesto, there appears the phrase: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie". In Anti-Duhring, Engels stressed that the basic and determining function of the state is its class-determined function of coercion and repression. As Lenin later interpreted Marx, ". . . the state is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of order which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression, by moderating conflict between classes" (1970:8).

In recent years, a re-reading of Marx, Engels and Lenin has suggested that they themselves were fully aware that the relations between the state and capital were more complicated than many subsequent interpretations would suggest. Indeed, they assigned a "relative autonomy" to the actual behaviour of the state system.

As Engels suggested, there are times when different sections of the capitalist class have different economic interests.[4] In such cases, the state assumes a special degree of autonomy. It is not only that sections of the ruling class may be divided, while the state institutions have a continuing unity. There are also periods "when the warring classes so nearly attain equilibrium that the state power, ostensibly appearing as a mediator, assumes for the moment a certain independence in relation to both" (Engels, cited in Brown, 1971:187).

Much of the recent attention paid to the Marxist conception of the state, has centered on the work of Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas. In his book, The State in Capitalist Society (1969), Miliband argued that the economic elite of advanced capitalist society is now a complex of groups interacting in a variety of ways with the state elite.

Miliband models what he calls the "State System" to include: (1) elected government, (2) administration (which he argues now extends far beyond the traditional bureaucracy of the state to encompass public corporations, central banks, regulatory commissions and bodies which manage social, economic and cultural activities), (3) the military (in which he includes both national security forces and domestic security forces such as the police), (4) the judiciary, and (5) the various units of sub-central government. The leaders in each of these units of the state system, according to Miliband, comprise the "state elite".

Miliband argues that the state system is "relatively autonomous" from the economic system. However, he contends that the essential interests of the state elite and the economic elite are common. Together, the two comprise a "class for itself", sharing common origins, purposes and associations.

What does Miliband imply in his conception of the state's "relative autonomy"? He argues that within the contemporary, capitalist political economy there are important variations in the policies of both legislatures and administrators. A social democratic government comprised of teachers and social workers will be more "reformist" than a conservative government comprised of businessmen. Miliband stresses that an exaggerated bourgeoise-state determinism fails to account for these variations. In his words:

> The political danger of structural superdeterminism would seem to me to be obvious. For if the state is as totally imprisoned in objective structures as is suggested (by some) it follows that there is really no difference between a state ruled say by bourgeoise constitutionalists, whether conservative or social democrat, and one ruled by, say, fascists (1972:259).

The quote cited is extracted from a published exchange between Miliband and Poulantzas. It was the latter, amongst others, to whom Miliband attached the label "structural superdeterminists".

Poulantzas' concept of "relative autonomy" centres on the autonomy of state leaders - in terms of their interaction patterns - from the capitalist class. According to Poulantzas, the most efficient capitalist state is one that has the least direct personal ties to the bourgeoisie. His reasoning is that the state's activities are defined by deep structural relations rather than observable interaction. Poulantzas therefore challenges Miliband's assertion that recruitment patterns may be taken as evidence of bourgeoise-state hegemony. Indeed, he implies that a government comprised of teachers and social workers is a more effective instrument of the capitalist class than one composed of businessmen. For the objective functions of the state are less obvious to the subordinate classes when non-capitalists, particularly social reformers, hold the "official" seats of power. Furthermore, when the bourgeoisie has the least personal ties to the state, it is most cohesive.

Poulantzas charges that when Miliband attempts to use "common social origins" and "developed personal ties" as indicators of elite interaction (and shared goals), he is led unwittingly to a bourgeoise conception of modern capitalism. For Poulantzas, the very term "elite" is unacceptable. The bureaucracy, which in Miliband's conception contains part of the state elite, should not be considered the same as a class. Poulantzas argues:

> According to Marx, Engels and Lenin, the members of the state apparatus, which it is convenient to call 'the bureaucracy' in the general sense, constitute a 'social category', not a social class. This means that, although the members of the state apparatus belong, by their class origin, to different classes, they function according to a specific internal unity. Their class origin - class situation - recedes into the background in relation to that which unifies them - their 'class position': that is to say, the fact that they belong precisely to the state apparatus and that they have as their 'objective function', the actualization of the role of the state. This in its turn means that the bureaucracy, as a specific and relatively 'united' social category, is the 'servant' of the ruling class, not by reason of its personal relations with the ruling class, but by reason of the fact that its internal unity derives from its actualization of the objective role of the state. The totality of this role coincides with the interests of the ruling class (1972:246-247).

Miliband criticizes theories of pluralism on ideological grounds, arguing that they function to deny the existence of the ruling class. However, Poulantzas argues that Miliband himself is employing "elite theory" as an explanation, or at least description, of state power.

Poulantzas stresses what he calls the "objective relationship" between the state and the capitalist class rather than the motivations of agents within the class. He accuses Miliband of assuming, as against Marx, the "problematic of the subject". He writes:

> According to this problematic, the agents of a social formation, 'men', are not considered as the 'bearers' of objective instances (as they are for Marx), but as the genetic principle of the levels of the social whole. This is a problematic of 'social actors', of individuals as the origin of social action: sociological research thus leads finally, not to the study of the objective co-ordinates that determine the distribution of agents into social classes and the contradictions between these classes, but to the search for finalist explanations founded on the motivations of conduct of the individual actors (1972:242).

Despite their important theoretical differences, both Miliband and Poulantzas have each emphasized the importance of ideology rather than simply repression, in sustaining capitalist relations of production. It should be noted on this score, that Poulantzas actually goes further than Miliband, suggesting that the ideological role of the state is carried on through clubs, parties, unions, schools and the mass media. These institutions, he argues, are also part of the state system.

Both Miliband and Poulantzas may be credited with a refinement and extension of the Marxist theory of the state in capitalist society. Their contributions serve to dismiss crude interpretations of the Marxist view of the state. Their very denial, however, is evident even in the classical writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

V. The Mutual Dependence of the State and Monopoly Capital: The Necessity of Socialized Inflation

Miliband and Poulantzas, however, have not adequately explained the phenomenal growth of the state in recent decades. A more sufficient treatment of this problem has been provided by Deaton (1972), O'Connor (1973), and Murray (1975). They have attempted to clarify the relationship between the private and state sectors to explain the accretion of state economic functions.

This group of writers asserts that the development of monopoly capitalism is both a cause and effect of the growth of state spending and state institutions. Furthermore, they argue that in recent years there has been an excessive use of the state system in the defense of monopoly capitalism. It is this "excessive use" which has created the "fiscal crisis" which others, such as Janowitz, have laid at the feet of rising "mass expectations". Provisionally, the "fiscal crisis" refers to the inability of the public sector to pay for social services due to a combination of increasing public expenditures as against adequate tax revenues.

In this line of argument, the state functions to stabilize the economy, which it does in two fundamental ways. Firstly, it attempts to maintain open, private and profitable investment opportunities. Secondly, it develops institutions which serve to inhibit class antagonisms from erupting into political conflicts - conflicts which might interfere with orderly capital accumulation. These functions cost and that cost is born by the population as a whole. Financially, the necessary revenues for fulfilling these functions are acquired through taxation directly, or indirectly "through state-induced inflation and state approved oligopolistic prices of commodity goods" (Murray, 1975:17).

The increasingly social nature of production places a rising burden upon state expenditures. In short, capitalist stability has required the continuing inflation of the state budget.

O'Connor (1973) has argued that state expenditures can be classified in correspondence with the basic functions of the capitalist state. Firstly, social capital expenses are outlaid to render private venture capital profitable. This type of expenditure establishes conditions under which private investment would not otherwise be undertaken.

There are two kinds of social capital. These may be classified as "social investment" on the one hand, and "social consumption" on the other.

Social investment comprises those projects and services that expand productive capacity. They include "physical capital" such as the physical economic infrastructure of transportation facilities (highways, airports, railroads, ports; the energy grid), water and sewage services, and a diverse range of other such development expenditures. They also include "human capital". Human capital consists of teaching, administration and other services at all levels of the education system - including scientific and research and development services.

Social investments in either physical or human capital are expended to increase productive capacity; that is, they invite private investment. Social consumption expenditures consist of projects and services which expand social benefits to the populace. From the standpoint of capital, they lower the costs of labour to private employers.

Outlays for "social consumption" comprise goods and services consumed collectively by the working class. These include: suburban development projects (e.g. roads, schools, recreation facilities and home mortgage subsidies); mass transit and other commuter facilities; and child care and social insurance against economic insecurity.

O'Connor argues that, "in general, the greater the socialization of the costs of variable capital, the lower will be the level of money wages . . . the higher the rate of profit in the monopoly sector" (1973:124). Thus monopoly corporations often give active support to the extension of governmental social consumption expenditures.

While _social capital_ expenditures (including social investment and social consumption) create a growth framework for private accumulation, _social expenses_ "consist of projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony" (Murray, 1975:196). Both defense expenses (foreign military and domestic security) and welfare expenditures can be included as social expenses.

According to O'Connor, social expenses are essentially unproductive, while social capital is indirectly productive. The former are designed essentially to maintain social peace, a prime example being public assistance. Cloward and Piven's excellent study, _Regulating the Poor_ (1971), analyzed the expansion-contraction cycle of public assistance in Europe and America in terms of this social control function. In their introduction, their thesis is succinctly expressed:

> Historical evidence suggests that relief arrangements are initiated or expanded during occasional outbreaks of civil disorder produced by mass unemployment, and are then abolished or contracted when political stability is restored (Cloward and Piven, 1971:1).

The "fiscal crisis" is seen by these writers to result from the state's willingness to socialize the costs of private production without socializing profit. These costs have been exacerbated by what amounts to a "class compromise" between organized labour's leadership and monopoly capital. We can briefly outline the argument.

Various writers treating the United States as paradigmatic have developed a three-sector economic model based on the distinction between the public sector and private sector. According to this model, the private sector is comprised of two divisions - the oligopolistic or monopolistic sector and a "competitive fringe" or competitive sector.

The oligopolistic sector is the leading factor inducing economic expansion, rationalization of the labour process and significant innovations in production technology. Comprised of large corporations which are geared to national or international markets, their production is mediated by market-sharing practices, price "administration" and market analysis. Thus, relative to the competitive sector, their economic strength is stable. In this sector, the labour-to-capital ratio is low (capital intensive) and strong unions mediate on behalf of wage workers.

If, from the business point of view, the oligopolistic sector is relatively stable, it is also relatively stable for the approximately one-third of the American work force which it employs. Employment stability is reinforced by the strength of unions in this sector. In O'Connor's words,

> . . . the relatively inelastic demand for labour and the physical and geographic concentration of production units, all facilitate the growth of powerful unions in monopolistic industries. More, monopolistic product markets, stable industrial structures and large profit margins all make it relatively inexpensive for corporations to recognize unions that are trying to get established (1972:18).

In this sector, wages, like prices, are virtually administered.

O'Connor points to studies which have demonstrated a strong pattern of annual increases which show that wage decreases have been virtually eliminated since the second world war. He traces this coordination of wages in the monopolistic sector to the "agreement" between big business and big labour which began in the early twentieth century and was virtually institutionalized by the United Auto Workers' 1948 decision to accept wage increases in line with productivity.[5] Since that time the corporations have agreed to pass productivity gains on to the workers in the monopolistic sector - the "class compromise" to which we have referred.

In contrast, the competitive sector comprises an enormous number of medium-sized to small firms which operate within regional or local sales markets. Rationalization and expansion are sluggish. Productivity increases thus tend to depend on the growth of employment rather than increases in the amount of venture capital. Here, the labour to capital ratio is high (labour intensive) relative to the monopoly sector.

Workers in the competitive sector tend to be the most exploited members of the working class. The relative instability of small business is mirrored in the instability of labour markets. Casual, seasonal part-time and temporary wage labour is common and union organizing is difficult - leaving many workers either uncovered by collective bargaining agreements or represented by weak unions. In the terminology of the "Dual Labour Market" theory, the "secondary labour market" is concentrated in this competitive sector.

The effect of comparative disadvantage of employment in the competitive sector, for the state, is an inducement towards expansion of "welfare" expenditures. Work conditions in the competitive sector are poor, unemployment is high, incomes are not sufficient to accumulate savings to cover "contingencies" such as unemployment, indebtedness, sickness and old age.[6] The result is that, "the work force in the competitive sector is compelled to look to the state to provide means of subsistence that it cannot provide for itself, and which private business cannot provide" (O'Connor, 1972:16). Thus, workers in competitive industries are often full or partial dependents of the state - a dependency which amounts to a subsidy to low-wage employers.

In response to the inadequacies of the labour market on the competitive fringe, an expansive and functionally segmentalized bureaucratic structure of "human services" has arisen to ameliorate the instability and dislocations experienced by workers in the competitive sector. Various public services, including: manpower counselling, vocational retraining programs, regional development strategies, and a host of life-situation, "adjustment" therapies, as well as the workers who administer them, owe much of their existence to the very fact of this secondary market.

The expansion of these services induces increased taxation rates, largely born by workers in the productive, monopolistic sector. This has a divisive effect on relations between workers in the primary and secondary markets. Thus, there is a tendency for non-unionized workers to blame organized labour for inflation and union workers to blame rising welfare expenditures for rising taxation.

State economic activities include (a) industries directly organized within its framework, and (b) those indirectly organized under government contract. Those organized directly by the state include such services as public health, welfare, education, postal services and the military effort. In Canada, additionally, a number of state corporations in the transportation, communications and utilities fields are state-controlled. Those organized under contract with the state include military and aerospace equipment, capital construction of public utilities, highway construction, some utilities, and in Europe, many manufacturing activities. Combined, these two sectors, in the United States, comprise, as do the competitive and oligopolistic sectors each, roughly one-third of the work force (O'Connor, 1972, 1973, 1974; Murray, 1975).

In those industries organized directly by the state, the ratio of capital to labour is relatively low, as is productivity. The growth of production depends mainly on the growth of employment. In those organized through state contract, the capital to labour ratio is relatively high, and the growth of production depends on capital investment, technical progress and the number of workers employed.

Production in both groups of state industries is born by taxpayers or the work force as a whole. Growth is determined by budgeting priorities and the state's ability to mobilize tax revenues. Employment in the state sector is relatively stable, but subject to shifts in political forces which cause changes in budgeting priorities.

The state sector is better organized than the competitive sector in terms of the extent and strength of unionization and less organized than the monopoly sector. Stability of employment, labour immobility and the large size of production units all favour unionization.

Wages in the state sector, unlike those in the competitive sector, are positively affected by the "agreement" between the monopolistic sector and organized labour. In a time of high inflation, causes which originate in the monopoly capitalist sector can easily be perceived as the fault of government and the state bureaucracy.

The fiscal crisis of the state, then, can be seen to arise from the costs which monopoly capital has shifted to the state system. In capitalism, labour activity is appropriated for private profit. Because state industries are not directly organized (in the United States) for the realization of profit, the private sector is the leading force inducing economic expansion.

Within private, monopoly industries, production is expanded through the relative growth of physical capital, the rationalization of the labour process, and stimulants in the distribution system. However, because of both "live-and-let-live" agreements between oligopolies and administered prices, declines in unit labour costs are not reflected in lower product prices. Furthermore, because monopolies pass productivity increases on to its workers in the form of wages, there is a floor on labour costs.

In the United States, the leadership of the trade union movement has acted largely as an interest group rather than as an agent of fundamental social change. Organized mainly in the corporate sector, it has agreed with capital to let wages rise in line with the cost of living, rather than fighting for lower commodity prices for the entire working class.

One effect of this labour-capital compromise has been to impoverish the living standards of those workers outside the monopoly division of the private sector. The leadership of "big labour" may therefore be seen as collaborating with monopoly capital to protect its own interests. The consequence is that the conflict between capital and labour in the monopoly sector is diluted. Conflict, in O'Connor's words, is "exported" to the less vital competitive sector where working class power is weak.

The state then, must substitute economic supports in the competitive sector which would otherwise be realized in union/management bargaining.

As a further trade-off for its wage-productivity agreement with capital, the trade union leadership has tended to allow technological advance to proceed with little resistance. Technological innovation, however, tends to induce capital intensification, reducing the level of demand for productive workers in the monopolistic sector. The result is that increasing numbers of workers become "technologically unemployed" and are compelled to seek work in the competitive and state sectors. Expectations that the state subsidizes the unemployed, and that it act as an "employer of last resort", places a great burden on public finances.

In response to an increasing tax burden in recent years, various government strategies for reducing social services expenditures have been developed. "Rationalizing" techniques based upon business efficiency criteria have been introduced. The withdrawal of social welfare services, the application of more stringent qualifying standards for service recipiency and hiring freezes, have all become standard means.

We have previously discussed some of the implications of the "fiscal crisis" for government labour relations (see Ch. 6). Specifically, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the nature of both the state bureaucracy in general and the purposes of state occupations. Indeed, Murray has suggested that,

> the state sector contains the most explosive elements of an incipient labor revolt, owing to the dramatic increase in public employees' unions and the expanded number and durability of state employees' strikes against the government (Murray, 1975:19).

VI. Reproduction: State Occupations and Class Relations

Contradictions in the Social Service Function

In the previous chapter, we identified the "new middle-class" in the spheres of capitalist appropriation and realization. Our identification involved a specification of the contradictory economic roles performed by such employees. They were seen as agents of both capital and labour in so far as they performed both the functions of the collective worker and the global functions of capital. However, a singular focus on the relations of production and the labour process in these two spheres is clearly inadequate. This would neglect a large portion of the work force employed within the state system. Furthermore, it would ignore the institutional employers on which vast numbers of professionally-credentialed workers now depend.

We submit that the class identification of employees within those enterprises organized by the state (directly or indirectly) for the appropriation of surplus-value and its realization follows the same pattern as those in the private sector. Therefore, its agents can be identified as proletarian, new middle-class or capitalist. To illustrate, Garchedi has provided the example of a state-owned steel works, comparing it to a similar enterprise under joint-stock ownership. He writes:

> . . . the real ownership belongs (in both) . . . to the managers. In both forms of enterprise, it is the manager who is the non-labourer/exploiter/non-producer/real owner. In both enterprises, the manager, as capital personified, is opposed to the labourer/exploited/non-owner/producer (1975c:105).

These antagonisms derive from the parallel laws of accumulation to which they are subject. They each produce commodities in order to produce surplus-value rather than use-values, and to re-invest, largely in terms of profitability criteria rather than need.

We would extend this "correspondence" of class relations to all those state activities which O'Connor has categorized as social investment in physical capital, i.e., public investment designed to improve private productive capacity through physical infrastructure development. While these investments do not aim to increase surplus-value as a policy priority, they do aim to increase the productive capacity of capital as a whole. Thus, in a state-owned highway construction enterprise, money is expended to improve private productive capacity or to invite private investment otherwise not available. The aim is not to increase the value of state investment; it is to socialize the costs of private production. These investments are expended out of tax-generated revenues and thus are only indirectly tied to the laws of accumulation. However, the labour process and the social relations of production approximate those in the private sector. Rationalization techniques borrowed from private industry are employed, bargaining is collective, and the division of labour is hierarchical. Thus, the proletarianization of such workers can be similarly identified with: (1) the devaluation of employees' skills and market capacities; (2) the elimination of their control and surveillance function, and/or (3) their loss of creative autonomy.

We now turn to those state enterprises responsible for the reproduction of labour power. We are concerned with those various public employees who labour within state institutions which are ostensibly designed to meet either the needs of the citizenry-as-a-whole, or specific, disadvantaged groups. These institutions, as the sociology of social welfare informs us, have become essential institutions in any complex industrial society. Most of the employees of the various "social services" are professionally-credentialed. Are such workers exempt, as T.H. Marshall suggested, from capitalist relations of production?

O'Connor has illuminated the latent functions of a number of state activities and expenditures normally taken to be of general social benefit - the "social" services. These include, "human capital" (public investments designed to increase the productive capacity of labour), "social consumption" expenditures (designed to lower the labour costs to private employers), and "social expenses" (social control). At the same time, each of these do contain elements of universal necessity (in any complex, industrialized society) and must be seen as beneficial to the working-class.

A teacher can be seen as a primary socializing agent who both conditions students to an exploitative social hierarchy (see Bowles and Gintis, 1976) - and teaches socially useful and necessary knowledge and skills. The teacher gives formal rank to the gradations of student suitability for the occupational hierarchy. At the same time, the same person may impart the rudiments of sociability in a manner far superior to those transmitted by the family.

A social worker administers a variety of useful services to various categories of state-dependents, many of whom would have historically relied upon either the family or on philanthropic institutions. He or she may be responsible for the income transfers which assure that the unemployed or unemployable obtain sufficient purchasing power to exact the goods and services for the satisfaction of basic needs.

Obviously, however, the social services are also required to assure the orderly functioning of production by maintaining a "reserve army of labour". They also reduce pressures towards rebellion.

The availability of a host of public social services is now assumed to be an ordinary right of citizenship. The availability of these services as use-values rather than exchange-values, must be seen as a consequence of working-class struggle. However, these institutions are often created, and owe their very existence to the fact that the working class needs socialized services. Those "needs" are associated with the contingencies of a capitalist economy. As Stevenson argues:

> Increased capital accumulation and concentration effected both the demand for and the supply of human services. First, the need for new forms of social and health services as well as for social control grew due to the increased proletarianization and urbanization of the population, the increased numbers of elderly and dependent people, and a general increase in alienation. In other words, there was an increasingly individualized, atomized populace, containing rapidly rising numbers of displaced persons. Second, the social institutions which had previously provided the services that people needed as well as the social control required to maintain the status quo were being destroyed: nuclear and extended families became smaller and more dispersed, due to economic and consumptionist pressure and increased urbanization and geographic mobility . . . (1976:78-79).

Both Michael Baratt Brown (1971) and Dorothy Wedderburn (1965) have recently encouraged the empirical demonstration of the benefits of social services to the working class. These writers argue that the welfare state is one of the many battlegrounds of working class struggle. They suggest that the social services, to some extent, are delivered according to needs criteria. Thus, in those countries (such as Britain and America) where working-class consciousness is relatively undeveloped, such services should become focal points around which socialist politics are organized.

Criticism, from many angles, can be mounted against the various institutions of the welfare state in terms of the very goals which its advocates espouse. However, the welfare state also embraces social structures which fulfill what Marx termed "indispensable" societal needs. While necessary to the reproduction of capitalism itself, social services also represent the progressive outcome of working-class struggle within capitalism.

We are led to the conclusion that social service workers - broadly defined - perform contradictory class roles within distinctive structures of social provision. They work in structures which are distinctive from the labour processes and relations of production which we have identified with the appropriation and realization spheres. These structures have expanded dramatically under monopoly capitalism in scale, number and manpower. Indeed, Johnson has suggested that,

> it could be argued that the dominant role of the state has, with the development of monopoly capitalism, increasingly shifted toward that of reproduction and that, as a result, major fields of class conflict are located at the level of intra-state relations (1976:59).

Thus, an analysis of the class relations embodied in the roles of such employees must include not only the relations of production, but the relations of reproduction as well.

Social Service Workers and Distinctive Class Relations

The class identification of workers in the social service sector both follows and diverges in certain specifiable ways from the pattern of those workers employed in the spheres of appropriation and realization. Firstly, they are dependent for their livelihood on a wage which is exchanged with an employer for labour. That employer, however, is the state rather than a capitalist or capital-power embodied in the person of a manager. As in the case of the unproductive worker, income is derived from revenue. The state, of course, is also the employer (directly or indirectly) of workers in those institutions organized for the production of surplus-value. This may be the case. However, the relationship between employer and employee in this latter situation is set by an antagonism rooted in the employer's need to optimize profitability.

It is true that in the public "social services" sector, cost-efficiency criteria *may* be employed to "rationalize" the delivery of services (i.e., decreasing social workers caseloads by imposing more stringent needs-testing criteria or increasing student-teacher ratios to reduce costs of labour). However, the application of such policies depends more on the political struggle over budget priorities than directly on the laws of accumulation. Thus, on the surface, the case is weak for assuming that we can extend the same pattern of class identification in other sectors to the sphere of reproduction.

Reproduction: The Extent of Colleague Control

We have argued that heteronomy - bureaucratic intervention by the state to remove from both the occupation and the consumer, the authority to determine the content and manner of practice - has greatly increased under monopoly capitalism. The state has undertaken important functions which cannot be profitably engaged by any single productive enterprise. As Johnson points out (1976:53):

> There are variations in the extent of this intervention. At one extreme the state may attempt to ensure a desired distribution of occupational services of a determinate kind through the creation of a state agency which is the effective employer of all practitioners who have a statutory obligation to provide the service. Social work is an example of this type as is education . . . at the

> other extreme (it may only minimally encroach on an existing system of colleague control by way of grants-in-aid, e.g., legal aid or by making resources available to an occupation which (to a greater or lesser extent) continues to determine priorities and the ratio and remuneration going to its various membership grades (e.g., medicine in the National Health Service).

The time at which a service occupation obtained professional licence from the state has been an important determinant of its capacity to resist heteronomous encroachment. Medicine and law "professionalized" - obtained collegiate regulatory control through state sanction - during the nineteenth century. Even prior to the nineteenth century, their "upper branches" had obtained monopolistic control over certain activities, even despite their failure to demonstrate competence. With this initial power and the advantage of time, medicine and law were able to accumulate a disproportionate power base relative to similarly demanding occupations. As state heteronomy expanded in the sphere of reproduction, these occupations were better able to ward off heteronomous intervention than more recent occupational formations in the reproduction sphere.

Professionalization in the nineteenth century must itself be seen as an important factor conducing the expansion of the state in the sphere of reproduction. The development of medical academies and research institutes accelerated the advancement of medical knowledge. The utilization of those advances by a popular clientele was functional from the perspective of capital: it increased the productivity of labour-power. Out of political necessity, in response to the demands of capital, of labour, and of the medical profession itself, health care costs have increasingly been funded through tax revenues. In this way, one of the last vestiges of private, small-scale ownership - the medical practice - has been assured, while the larger system of curative medicine -

hospitals, medical research, etc. - and almost all of preventive medicine, have become state functions.

The demand for legal services has grown persistently with the expansion of a principal function of the state: regulative legislation. At the same time, the very juridico-legal framework of liberal democracy is characterized by a structural separation of legal advocacy from other state institutions. This has assured the continued viability of private practice, however large may be the units in which such practices are organized. Furthermore, the very extensiveness to which contractual regulation over all spheres of life has proceeded assures the legal specialist a position of power and status unattainable by most occupations.

A related consequence of this expanded legalistic regulation has been that the law professions's monopoly over legal interpretation has given its membership privileged access to economic and political leadership positions. The derived lobbying power of such a masterful body has assured even its most lowly members an exceptional right to resist encroachment. Thus, these monopolistic occupations - like the monopolistic business firm - can be seen as both a cause and effect of increased state economic intervention.

The practice of medicine and law is carried out as part of a now complex and differentiated production process. The delivery of "curative" medicine is largely engaged through private practices and public hospital systems. Doctors' services and the private corporate-production of remedial pharmaceuticals are mutually dependent. If the production of pharmaceuticals was nationalized, it could be expected that heteronomous intervention in medicine would increase. Similarly, a major consumer of independent legal services, of course, is the corporate business sector. Corporations depend in various ways on these services to assure their growth and stability.

One effect of the continued salience of private medical and legal services is that their privileges overflow to their counterparts within the state system. For this reason, extremely privileged incomes can be successfully demanded by publicly employed doctors and lawyers. In part, this overflow of privilege stems from the fact that the value of legal labour is largely determined within the private sector. The assurance of an adequate supply of the same quality of manpower has involved attempts to provide a certain level of income equivalence between the two.

In contrast, teaching and social work were to become almost totally absorbed by the state; indeed, each was largely a creation of the state. The creation of special training institutions for these occupations was thus, from the outset, designed to train recruits to these occupations in the application of a knowledge base regulated by external agencies. The legislature, planning bureaucracies and the courts, set the parameters to the knowledge employed by these occupations in the pursuit of their daily work.

We are not arguing that these occupations have not had any influence over the nature and practice of their own work activities. However, their inputs are heavily constrained by the guidelines established by extra-collegial agencies.

In education, the shift in emphasis to a natural science curriculum in the 1950's, largely resulted from the "sputnik syndrome". It was determined, ultimately, by the reaction of national states to Cold War politics; it was not an independent manifestation of the collective decision-making of educational workers.

Successful occupational attempts to "re-define" the content of practice in the public services appears to vary with the ideological purpose of that re-definition. The "new professions" movement - essentially a radical attempt to reformulate occupational practice in the personal services, from a socialist perspective - has recorded but marginal achievements. It would appear that public service occupations in the sphere of reproduction can only be innovative to the extent that their recommendations articulate with the general needs of capital accumulation.

When the state expands social services in response to the political volatility of a certain segment of the population, it is often prepared to incorporate new ideas from these occupations. Furthermore, the increased expenditures on services to such a segment (for example, the unemployed or a recently politicized, oppressed, minority group) - will tend to increase the demand for social service manpower. In short, both the content of work roles and the market capacity of such workers will vary, in part, with the degree of threat to capitalist production posed by identifiable, rebellious segments. Once the threat is reduced, however, both colleague control and the occupation's market capacity can be expected to recede. A prime example has been the fate of social workers in recent years. Their services and ideas were in great demand during the War on Poverty Programs. More recently, their market capacity and innovative approaches have been devalued.

It can be argued that employees of the social services have an important stake in the expansion of their own employing institutions. To some extent, their interests are independent of the social-control requirements of capital. Illustratively, reformist or social democratic governments tend to be favoured by teachers and social workers because of their expenditure on, and orientation towards, the services which they perform.

Worker and Management Relations in the Social Services

We have argued above that Marxism asserts that the managers of the state apparatus must respond to the general needs of capitalism as a mode of production. They do not respond automatically to specific capitalists and often ignore the short-term interests of capital.

We have also argued that state employees in the social services perform contradictory functions. Their work is necessary to the reproduction of capitalism, while at the same time they provide services struggled for by the working class. Occupations in these services have a self-interested stake in the expansion of state intervention in the sphere of distribution. This puts them in partial antagonism with capital. Finally, we have argued that these workers share certain similarities with the worker in the private and semi-private sectors. Both are wage or salary workers. They are both vulnerable to cyclical shifts in demand for their labour. However, not being subject to profitability criteria in the evaluation of their work, reproduction workers stand apart from other workers.

How then, do these workers relate with their managers? Furthermore, what effect does this structural relation have on the production relations internal to the institutions in which they work?

Under monopoly capitalism the state increasingly absorbs the functions of reproduction. Thus, an increasing number of workers are employed in the social services. How do managers of these institutions relate to the managers in the production and realization sphere? Furthermore, how does their relation with capital affect the social relations between them and their subordinates?

As Block has argued (1977:15), state managers, legislators and bureaucratic executives, regardless of their individual political ideology, are dependent on some reasonable level of economic activity. He cites two reasons. Firstly, the capacity of the state to finance itself through taxation or borrowing is dependent upon economic conditions. Declining economic activity (i.e., investment) depresses the state revenue base. Secondly, electoral support for a government will decline if it presides over a serious drop in economic activity with the resultant unemployment and shortages of key goods and services.

Capitalists, as a collectivity of investors, indirectly exercise a veto power over state policies through their investment activity. State managers are therefore discouraged from taking action that might seriously decrease the rate of investment. Indeed, their own power depends on an economy which is "healthy" from the perspective of economic growth (i.e., capital accumulation).

It is true that state managers, in facilitating private investment, must have a much more global perspective than the individual capitalist. A reformist government may pursue inflationary policies for a time in the pursuit of "social goals" (i.e., redistribution policies, progressive labour legislation, expanded social services). However, if such a government refuses to take necessary action to seal itself off from international economic and political pressures (and even military coercion), it must eventually return to more orthodox policies. Thus, state managers are themselves ultimately tied to the laws of capital accumulation.

In brief, there is a division of labour between state managers and capitalists which may be manifest in widely disparate policy orientations in the short-run. However, in the long-run, state managers are structurally constrained by monopoly capital. Surface features notwithstanding, they are ultimately tied to the laws of capital accumulation. This situation applies indirectly, even to those state managers who wish to expand service provision on the basis of need.

Capitalism may require the extension of social services for a variety of reasons. Capitalists, as a class, may be unaware of their own interests in reformist social policies. Indeed, from Bismarck through the New Deal to the War on Poverty, state managers were far in advance of capitalists in realizing the effectiveness of state intervention in de-fusing an incipient labour revolt. Such programs, however, do have inflationary effects, and therefore state managers must ultimately seek to "rationalize" - synchronize their expenditures with the needs of private capital - the costs of reformist social programs.

Broadly speaking, this "rationalization" involves two options. Firstly, it can involve the withdrawal or reduction of investments in tax-based social programs. Secondly, capitalist methods of accountancy and work organization can be applied to the labour process involved in the production of services. In this latter case, there will be an attempt to freeze the expansion of services and manpower hiring and to develop productivity-related supervisory methods. In reality, the two are likely to be combined. Each, in combination, sets into motion a work-devaluation process similar to what transpires in the private accumulation sphere.

In sum, in the sphere of reproduction which is now concentrated in the state, production relations approximate those in the spheres of production and realization. Senior bureaucrats and elected officials, in carrying out policies constrained by the laws of accumulation, are antagonistically related to public-service workers who perform the work of the collective labourer. Large numbers of workers, the majority of whom are professionally-credentialed, perform the dual function of (1) control and surveillance and/or planning policy or delivery systems at various levels of the division of labour; and (2) the routine, clerical functions of the collective labourer, including co-ordination. Finally, there are the proletarian workers who carry out highly routinized repetitive tasks, scheduled exclusively by those above them in the organizational hierarchy.

The new middle-class workers in the sphere of reproduction obtain but minimal protection from professional credentials. That is, of course, with the exception of medicine, dentistry and pharmacy, which were organized on the professional model during the nineteenth century. However, professional credentials are almost universally necessary for entry to new middle-class occupations in the reproduction sphere. In the absence of occupational self-regulation and in the face of deteriorating work conditions, many of these workers have turned towards what appears to be their one option: unionization.

VII. Reproduction Workers and Social-Unionism

This returns us to the "fiscal crisis" of the state, and its effects on class relations between reproduction workers and their clientele. As O'Connor has argued, the economic and social interests of workers in this sphere and their consumers are linked through the state budget. This would suggest the basis for a political alliance.

Oppenheimer, in observing the growth of unionization amongst state employees, has pointed to examples of such an emerging alliance. He suggests that such examples indicate a new trend in union strategy, beyong "bread and butter" or self-interested issues. More generally, this trend has been referred to as "Social Unionism". Specific examples may be cited.

Welfare Rights organizations and other Claimants Unions have welcomed and utilized the skills of social workers employed by the state in Canada, Britain, Sweden and the United States. Gough has argued that ". . . state employees by the very nature of their employment tend to inject qualitative, political issues into their struggle to protect and improve their terms and conditions of service" (Gough, 1976:92). He provides the case of the British public sector union, the National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.), which was at the forefront in the attempt to end private beds within the National Health Service in that country. A similar point is made by Grace Hartman of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.). In an interview in 1976, she stated:

> The new unionists are bringing some changing attitudes into the labour movement. They bring more complex knowledge and superior education. They are able to look at the more complex aspects of the economy and help guide other unions (Macleans, Feb. 23, 1976:22).

Murray has reported that teachers' unions in the United States, such as the American Federation of Teachers (A.F.T.), have demanded "limitations on classroom size, more administrative control of schools by teachers themselves, and equal educational opportunities for the poor and minorities" (Murray, 1975:246-247). Indeed, the A.F.T. has explicitly advocated social unionism.

Ehrenreich has reported that hospital workers have in some cases made demands for better patient-care facilities, for free day-care for workers and patients alike, and for the extension of clinic services (Ehrenreich, 1970a & b). Oppenheimer points to the C.U.P.E. proposal for a complete restructuring of the University of Toronto, including participation by service workers in governance (1975:46). It might also be noted that two of the five largest unions in Canada are in the public sector and (in English Canada) these are the most militant. As for Quebec, it is generally recognized that the militancy of public-sector unions far exceeds that of their counterparts in English-speaking Canada.

The issue of social unionism has been seized upon by "new working-class" theorists. They see highly educated technical workers generally as possessing great political potential, "precisely because of the specialization of their training and work, the threat of skill obsolescence, and the consequent greater subordination to management" (Larson, 1974:448). Furthermore, the gap between expectation and fulfillment may be greater for highly educated workers who have come to lodge much of their identities in career aspirations. Blauner made a similar point when he wrote (1964:29):

> self-estranged workers are dissatisfied only when they have developed needs for control, initiative, and meaning in work. The average manual worker and many white-collar employees may be satisfied with fairly steady jobs which are largely instrumental and non-involving. . . One factor which is most important in influencing a man's aspirations in the work process is education. The more education a person has received, the greater the need for control and creativity.

Finally, as Larson points out, the dissatisfaction of "educated labour" may be exacerbated by the very growth in importance of such workers, both in number and productive role. He writes: ". . . the amount of critical information available on society as a whole to an increasingly educated labour force contrasts with the narrow definition of functions and rank in most work situations" (1974:449).

Professionalism as a Counteragent to "Social-Unionism"

Social-unionism may be the most exciting possibility on the horizon for progressive students of labour organization in capitalist society. Business unionism appears to be locked into "live-and-let-live" arrangements with corporations; interpreters of labour relations have therefore generally conceded that significant social changes will rarely come from such sponsorship. Furthermore, the major growth in union membership in the advanced capitalist countries has taken place within the public sector. Much of this labour is professionally-credentialed. Finally, some of these unions have transcended "economistic" issues in collective bargaining. They have been the most active in extending their organizing efforts to non-unionized labour and have included various demands in contract negotiations which have included client-oriented concerns.

In these pages we will make some general observations on the ideology of professionalism as it may counteract the social unionist movement.

The social unionist strategy appears to premise its long-range effectiveness on its capacity to spread outward from its rather tenuous and sporadic origins. Presumably, while beginning in the public sector unions, the achievements of social-unionism must become popular amongst more traditional unions. Indeed, its central tenet calls for the re-politicization of the union movement across the diversified spectrum of wage-dependent occupational groupings.

As we pointed out above, perceived antagonisms between public and private sector workers centre on public budgeting. Services or facilities provided through the state for use rather than profit cost tax dollars. Those tax revenues, in the absence of the nationalization of potentially self-paying industries, must come from the earnings of the working class as a whole. Thus, while the achievements of social unionism may ultimately become standardized strategies of all unions, the initial militancy of public sector unions may not be supported or may even be actively rejected by workers outside the public sector.

The practical blockages to such alliances should not be slighted. An industrial worker may perceive the benefits of lower student/teacher ratios and thus support the intent of a teachers' union strike for the same. His child may well receive a better education from the outcome of negotiations favourable to the teachers. However, while the teachers are "out on strike", it is he and his wife who must pick up the added burden of child care necessitated by the closure of schools.

It is true that the difficulties paosed by such crude examples are not insurmountable for inter-union alliances. However, they do represent serious obstacles which must be faced in their practical circumstances by social unionist organizers.

It is obvious that the receptiveness to occupational alliances for political purposes within the working class varies considerably from country to country. The recent emergence of Euro-Communism indicates the very real differences in the level of political receptiveness to inter-occupational alliances when comparing European workers to their North American counterparts.

If we assume that the ranks of the largely "professionally-credentialed" new middle-class are indeed being proletarianized, then we can correctly identify them as a "new working-class". One traditional indicator of working class self-identification has been assumed to be a willingness to unionize. It is the growth of union membership amongst white-collar workers (particularly public employees), coupled with various examples of social unionism within the public services that has inspired enthusiasm for the radical potential of such workers. However, the question remains open as to whether the general trend towards white-collar unionization is necessarily a "radical" development.

Marshall has suggested two interpretations of "the political activity represented by trade unions organizing new middle-class unions" (1977:8). Firstly, union organization amongst new middle class workers could indicate that proletarianization has been completed. In order to accept trade unions as a legitimate organizational mode for expressing their interests, these workers had to be proletarianized.

> The new middle class had to become working class in order to accept working class organizations. This necessitates a subjective awareness to their proletarian condition. It also necessitates the assumption that the proletarianized segments of the new middle class accept their working class status and act _as_ a working class (Marshall, S., 1977:8).

Secondly, unionization may indicate that new middle-class workers recognize their increasing subjection to proletarianization processes and are arming themselves against it. Their objective, however, is not working-class integration, but rather, the protection of their traditional privileges. As Marshall suggests,

> in this case the new middle class does not act _as_

> a segment of the working class but against becoming working class. In other words, they turn to a vehicle (the trade unions) which is traditionally identified with the working class in an attempt to prevent their absorption into that class (1977:8).

The latter interpretation, we would argue, may be supported in part by the extent to which new middle-class workers have internalized their identification with professionalism. Such identification, while obviously more easily achieved by the fully recognized professional occupations, also has a powerful influence on more subordinate claimants.

Larson has argued that amongst those occupations born of the heteronomous mode, "the creation, expression and protection of special status, tend to be the sole central dimension of the professionalizing project" (1975:453). This concern with status works as a preventive against alliances with less prestigious work groups, with clients, and even against the willingness to unite with peers against management.

In the heteronomous mode, individual advancement tends to depend on amicable relations with management or the actual attainment of management positions. Thus, the very structure of occupational heteronomy serves to militate against alliances with less prestigious workers, with clients and with peers organizing on conflict lines against management.

As an instrument of working-class power, unions symbolize a loss of general social status. Furthermore, "even when there are unions, professionals are reluctant to engage in militant tactics ['typical of longshoremen', as it was said during a college professors' strike]" (Larson, 1975:453). Thus, aspiring professional workers who are subjected to proletarianization processes may be caught in a "status trap" which does not allow them to actualize their collective power.

The ideology of profession itself rests on a contradictory appeal.

Its most successful occupational adherents have achieved their gains through collective organization. However, their collective organization was itself mobilized to secure individual privileges. It has been traditional amongst those occupations seeking distinction as professional to attach primary significance to values associated with individualism. Indeed, as our earlier discussion suggests, a profession, in both the pre-industrial and industrial period, has been viewed as something of an equivalent to property. The allure of its command has been that it provided a measure of independence from the dictates of managerial superordination or the insecurities of capitalist labour markets.

In his study of industrial workers, Blauner found that lack of control over the immediate work situation is a principal determinant of their sense of powerlessness (Blauner, 1964). In particular, Blauner's study correlated feelings of powerlessness with a lack of control over the rhythm and pace of work. For professionally-credentialed workers in heteronomous work situations, the "tyranny of the clock" has not been so severe. "Experts" are not usually expected to punch time cards; they take their coffee breaks when they wish, and they often have considerable flexibility in scheduling appointments. As Larson points out:

> Even if their products and the organization of their work lives escape their control, they are masters of their time: their freedom extends from apparently trivial but nevertheless fundamental aspects of the work situation, to the discretion which they enjoy in the production activity itself (1975:451).

One view of the proletarianization of new middle-class workers, of course, is that such privileges would be ended upon the completion of that very process. However, as we have stressed, managerial sensitivities to the possible effects of status reduction on such workers have produced a variety of organizational compromises. While these may be interpreted as presenting simply the illusion of privilege rather than the reality of self-control over production, perquisites as well as power do have divisive effects.

The specialization of occupational functions, proceeding under capitalist rationalization, has been the mainstay of capital's subordination of labour. However, professionalism has served to edify this very process. The professional tends to see himself as a specialist, and so he is. However, his ideology purports that he is the very best of specialists which in turn, gives him (or her) and his peers a monopoly over certain occupational activities. Indeed, professionalism is a major ideological defence of social stratification. That defence, which appeals to meritocratic values, argues that the recognized professions represent the social articulation of meritocracy itself. The bearers of the title are often considered the most "functionally important" to the society in which they perform their services. Like the earlier difficulties confronting progressive union organizers which centered on status distinctions between craft workers and their less skilled counterparts, professionaly-credentialed workers can be expected to insist on a privileged status within the union movement.

Finally, "the technocratic ideals of science and objectivity exclude from the specialists' concern the social and political consequences of his acts" (Larson, 1972). This may be particularly the case in the technical and scientific fields. As Merton once argued:

> The intensified division of labour has become a splendid device for escaping social responsibilities. As professions subdivide, each group of specialists find it increasingly possible to 'pass the buck' for the social consequences of their work . . . engineers, not unlike scientists, come to be indoctrinated with an ethical sense of

> limited responsibilities. The scientist, busy on his distinctive task of carving out new knowledge from the realm of ignorance, has long disclaimed responsibility for attending to the ways in which this knowledge was applied (Merton, 1967:568).

One possible effect of this narrowness of social vision has been that scientists and engineers in the United States have been most resistant to union efforts. Hoffman has shown that the proportion of unionized engineers and scientists has hovered between 5 and 10 per cent for about twenty years (1976:i). She contrasts this resistance with the rapid increase in unionization amongst other specialized, professionally-credentialed, occupational groups. She concludes:

> Engineers and scientists are not responding to the union call. They constitute a unique group: still relatively well-paid, many with management aspirations, and still looking to their professional societies or their own individual efforts - rather than to any union effort - to improve and advance within the company (Ibid.).

The narrow conception of autonomous function and limited responsibility of the expert "simultaneously prepares the technician to execute blindly the designs of others" (II Manifesto, 1972:76). As Larson cautions, "the expert's and the professional's outlook on their work lives tend to be shaped, today, by individualism and narrow specialism" (1975:455). Thus,

> the 'needs for control, initiative and meaning in work' of which Blauner speaks tend to be defined, by education itself, in a way that is compatible with the requirements of production in advanced industrial capitalism. Flexibility, autonomy, circumscribed responsibility, are precisely, qualities expected from 'expert labour': as long as the protests of subordinate professional workers ask for more of these individual privileges . . . their potential disloyalty can be easily managed. In this sense, professionalism, having incorporated the ideology of expertise and social irresponsibility, appears as an essential means for controlling

> the bulk of 'educated labour' and coopting its elites (1975:455-456).

These qualifications on the overzealous radical expectations of "new working-class" theorists for the professionally-credentialed workers are shared with Rosemary Crompton (1976). She argues that the very ambiguities of function embodied in the economic activities of such workers suggest that they are likely to have ambiguous and contradictory forms of collective representation. She anticipates differences between working-class unions and new middle-class unions, and between unions within the new middle-class itself. Crompton argues that some new middle-class unions will assume the traditional adversary relationship between employees and employers. Others, however, may assume coincidence of interest between employers and employees.

We are left then, with contradictory theoretical interpretations and slim empirical evidence for assuming that the movement towards worker status amongst the new middle-class leads necessarily to radicalization. Indeed, even the weakening of market capacity and high levels of unemployment experienced by such workers in recent years must be cautiously interpreted.

We are recalled to Laski (1935) and Gerth (1952), who both challenged Mannheim's glorification of the professionals. It will be remembered that both writers pointed to the submission of so-called "professionals" to Nazi politics in Hitler's Germany.

Finally, "new working-class" theory may be taken to task on the critical issue of the relative importance to production of the new working class. It is obvious that the potential power of the productive, industrial work force, if unified, could paralyze the vital production centres of society. This may also be true for white-collar technical workers such as engineers, production supervisors and managers, scientists and computer operators (Aronowitz, 1971). It may also be true for domestic police forces and is certainly true for the national military. However, as Galper suggests:

> In an indirect and longer-range sense, the roles of teachers in educating and socializing the labour force or of welfare workers around issues of social control are also important in the productive process, although strikes by these populations have a less damaging impact on social stability (Galper, 1975: 163).

VIII. Summary

Tentatively, and cautiously, we have assessed the evidence to support anticipations of the radical potential of professionally-credentialed workers. These anticipations have been suggested by "new working-class" theorists and the partially derivative social-unionist perspective. We have argued that the evidence and the arguments are lacking in sufficient depth to support anything but conjecture. We are not denying the importance of the analytical dissection of these structural contradictions. Obviously, it is not merely objective contradictions which induce social change. The development of social unionism also requires a pervasive consciousness amongst workers of their common interests. The achievement of such a consciousness requires theoretical labour, as well as empirical research and practical political organization.

CHAPTER NINE

Footnotes

1. The table is reproduced from Gelvin Stevenson (1976:80). He computed it from the following sources: "U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, "Industrial Characteristics", Table 2. U.S. Census of Population, 1970: "Industrial Characteristics", Table 32.

2. Thus Engels wrote:

> Society thus far, based on class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, of an organization of the particular class, which was 'pro tempore' the exploiting class, for the maintenance of its external conditions of production, and therefore, especially for the purposes of forcibly keeping the exploited classes in the condition of oppression corresponding with the given mode of production (slavery, serfdom, wage labour) (1940:194).

3. Engels repeated this point in a letter a few years later:

> Society gives rise to certain common functions which it cannot dispense with. The persons appointed for this purpose form a new branch of the division of labour within society. This gives them particular interests, distinct too, from the interests of those who empowered them; they make themselves independent of the latter and the state is in being (cited in Draper, 1970: 298).

4. Engels wrote:

> The state is a product of society at a particular stage of development; it is the admission that this society has involved itself in insoluble antagonisms, that it is powerless to exercise. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests shall not consume themselves and society in a fruitless struggle, a power, apparently standing above society, has become necessary to moderate; and this power arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state (cited in Brown, 1971:187).

5. O'Connor (1972:22) argues that the 1948 United Auto Workers contract, which included a cost-of-living escalation clause, was 'decisive' in that it subsequently became a standard amongst the major unions.

6. In the United States, federal minimum wage legislation applies to all companies conducting inter-state commerce under license. However, many states do not have minimum wage legislation. The effect of this may be to encourage the proliferation of smaller businesses which could not survive if they were required to pay workers adequately.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In the foregoing pages we have traced the intellectual and ideological ancestry of an idea that has recently become a fashionable macrosociological thesis. This thesis asserts that the social relations of work, which were characteristic of industrial capitalism, have been in the process of transformation in the latter half of the twentieth century. Some writers have deemed it appropriate to coin a phrase to signify the alleged transition. We are told that we are passing from an "industrial society" to a "post-industrial society".

At the centre of the post-industrial vision is an emphasis on the growing significance of highly trained specialists in the work force, and on the patterns of organization and the occupational ideologies which such specialists espouse. Amongst post-industrial thinkers, critics and celebrants alike have tended to identify both economic and political power with the possession of technical expertise.

Critics, whom we have dubbed "radical-pessimists", have described a "one-dimensional" society in which "functional rationality" has become a pervasive secular religion. In this view, power has flowed from the individual capitalist to the technically superior specialist. This new leadership, however, rather than being welcomed as a qualitative improvement on its predecessor, is grimly assessed. It is seen to possess a "socially trained incapacity" for the execution of decision-making based upon "substantive rationality". In short, it is precisely because of its technically narrow orientation that we should regret its commanding role.

Celebrants of the post-industrial society have projected a much happier vision. We have attempted to show how their "radical-optimism" is associated with salutory conceptions of a work force which is professionalizing. For them, professionalization is the welcome outcome of technological advance and the related increase in educational qualifications for all types of work. It is welcome because it suggests the development of meritocracy, the decline of production oriented only to profit, and the erosion of - or at least counterbalance to - authority systems in the work place organized around hierarchical command.

The popularity of this technocratic imagery in social thought has directly or indirectly encouraged doubt concering the continued efficacy of the Marxist political economy of social class relations. Indeed, the reality of the post-industrial society is also viewed as a "post-capitalist" one; it is therefore considered to be outside the grasp of Marx's most compelling theoretical schema.

The radical-optimist view would suggest that professionalization is the very process which most blatantly contradicts Marx. According to Marx, under capitalism, the majority of the work force is inevitably proletarianized.

In this work, we have subjected the professionalization thesis to critical scrutiny and have found it inadequate on several grounds. We will not in these final pages, however, belabour the reader with a recapitulation of the arguments which led to that rejection.

Our project, however, did not end with the case we mounted against the professionalization view. Rather, we followed it up by attempting to demonstrate the continuing salience of a Marxist, analytical framework. We did not simply attempt to counter the post-industrial theorists by arguing that even professional workers were now being proletarianized. As Johnson has rightly suggested, this tact has often involved a "misguided" attempt to "save Marx" (1976:16). Thus, we rejected Oppenheimer's position on theoretical grounds derived from Marx himself.

In the remaining text, we wish to present a summary review of the Marxist approach to the problem of abstracting class relations in the capitalist mode of production in general, and its variations under monopoly capitalism, in particular. With this approach, we have been able to identify the class relations which give functional significance to the "new middle-class". Furthermore, we were able to indicate the structural determinants of the proletarianization of new middle-class workers.

I. A Restatement of the Structuralist, Marxist Perspective on Social Class

We have argued that technological-determinism underlies post-industrial thought. In contrast, we have argued for the employment of a dialectical approach which draws upon the Marxian duality: "relations" or production and "forces" of production. The analytical advantage of such an approach is that it achieves a theoretical view which comprehends power as integral to the or ganization of work rather than the effect of a technical cause.

In the Marxist perspective, it is the dominance of a specific mode of appropriating value which is the determining feature of a mode of production. In capitalism, the mode of production is dominated by the appropriation of surplus-value. In this mode, the relations of production - the social bonds which link the various members of the economically active population - are underpinned by four fundamental antagonisms. In unity, these bonds and antagonisms reveal the specificity of capitalist production relations. A morphology of these relations produces a framework within which the distribution of social classes can be identified.

The primary antagonistic polarity (or duality) of capitalist relations of production is between producers and non-producers. The second polarity is that between the labourer and non-labourer. While the second element overlaps with the first, it is not equivalent, for while all producers are indeed labourers, all labourers are not productive in terms of the capitalist mode of production. They are not productive in the sense that they are not producers of surplus-value. Thirdly, there is the duality between the owners of the means of production and the non-owners of the means of production. Again, while this duality overlaps with the former two, they are not equivalent. For a non-producer, such as a top manager of a productive enterprise, may not own the means of production. At the same time, he is not a labourer, but rather carries out the functions of capital. Finally, there is the polarity between the exploited and the exploiters - the former receiving income from his or her labour exchanged for a wage, while the latter accumulates capital from the surplus-value produced by the former.

It is the systematic linkage of these elements which constitutes the structure of capitalist social production. Its persistent dynamic is the struggle for capital accumulation through the expansion of surplus-value.

Borrowing extensively on Garchedi's analytical conception of interfacing antagonisms of capitalist production, we were able to derive the distinguishing characteristics of the capitalist class and the proletariat. They can be identified in terms of which side of the duality their economic functions fall. Thus, the bourgeoisie (capitalist class) is defined by: (1) their non-productivity, (2) the fact that they do not engage in the labour process essential to social production, (3) their ownership of the productive means, and (4) their role as exploiters.

The proletariat can be identified as falling on the other side of the four polarities. Thus, they (1) produce surplus-value, (2) labour, (3) do not own the means of production and are thus wage-dependent, and (4) are exploited.

We argued that while these four elements, in unity, comprise the social relations of capitalist production, the specific form in which they are combined has shown extensive variation historically. Indeed, a principal objective of our analysis has been to elaborate the general form which that institutionalization has taken in the contemporary era. We argued that an examination of this form (of institutionalization) reveals the social functions (labour or capital) performed by various groupings who have been subsumed for classification purposes as professionals.

It was not implied that Marx himself simply elucidated an ideal-type construct of nineteenth-century social-class relations. In fact, we traced the empirical analysis which Marx accomplished from his study of the evolution of labour's subordination to capital as the capitalist mode of production gradually developed, stage by stage.

It is a signal advantage of the Marxist approach that social classes are viewed as continually changing entities rather than as static categories. With the insights of the structuralist perspective, recent writers have added clarity to the Marxist approach in sociological terms. Marx viewed individuals as "bearers" of class relations. Garchedi suggests that the most comprehensible way of viewing this, is to conceive of class relations as economic functions essential to the mode of production. This relieves us of the static view of social class which is often misguidedly assumed of the Marxist schema. It also affords the flexibility necessary to identify historical changes in capitalist production relations. Thus, rather than beginning with a fixed notion of a capitalist class and a proletariat, we examine individuals as agents of the "capital function" or the "labour function".

Marx had observed during the time of his writing that, between the capitalist class and the proletariat, a middle-class (or petit-bourgeoisie) was positioned. From his reading of Marx, Garchedi identifies four analytically distinct elements which distinguish that class. They were: (1) owners of their means of production, (2) performing both the capital function and labour function, (3) both labourers and the non-labourers, and (4) both exploiters and exploited. We note these distinctions because they show the way Marx's view can be interpreted in functional terms. It also recalls our contrast of the old middle-class with the "new" middle-class of monopoly capitalism.

After developing Marx's concept of the "collective labourer" as a stage in the subordination of labour to capital, we extended his analytical mode of analysis into the contemporary period.

The "collective labourer" concept denoted the development of a complex interdependent labour process, in which the "direct product" of the individual detail worker became a social product. This altered the definition of productive labour. With the development of the collective labourer, many varieties of non-manual work and supervision were proletarianized.

Under "monopoly capitalism" - a concept which denotes capitalism in the advanced industrial nations - science in the oligopolistic firm becomes integral with the production process. It is this integration which has been recognized by the post-industrial theorists. Indeed, many of the facts with which post-industrial theorists are preoccupied are also the focal points of contemporary Marxist analysis. The differences, however, between the two explanatory frameworks used to interpret these common data, are crucial.

The integration of science with production in the monopoly era has a number of fundamental consequences. Firstly, and obviously, research and product innovation and development accelerate technological advance dramatically. Relatedly, occupational specialization intensifies. Furthermore, as Braverman stresses and a now vast literature supports, management itself becomes scientific. This leads to even further rationalization and differentiation within the labour function.

Another feature of the scientific revolution of production technology is that the capacity to realize the growing mass of surplus-value becomes a principal concern. No longer can consumer demand be relied upon to regulate supply. Indeed, it was one of the important contributions of Galbraith (1971) to popularize this fact. A battery of corporate marketing strategies have been developed to achieve two principal corporate objectives. Firstly, there is an attempt to stimulate "artificial" demand - to persuade consumers to purchase goods and services for which they would under normal conditions perceive little or no need. Secondly, prices become "administered" - the fact which gives the name "oligopoly" or "monopoly" to the modern corporate firm. One extremely important affect of this, is to swell the ranks of the work force concerned solely with the realization and accounting of value. Thus, under the corporate form, or "institutional capital", the individual capitalist is replaced by the corporation (Baran and Sweezy, 1966: 44). The capitalist function - as with the earlier transformation of the individual labourer into the collective labourer - is dispersed into a diverse array of fractional operations.

We then confronted the problem of identifying the monopoly-capitalist variant of the social relations of production. Dividing capitalist production among three fundamental spheres: "appropriation", "realization", and "reproduction", we initially examined the first two.

Following Garchedi's lead, the bourgeoisie, under monopoly capitalism, comprises all those economic agents who (1) either exploit or economically oppress; (2) possess the real, economic ownership of the means of production; (3) are the non-labourers in the sense that they perform the global functions of capital, and (4) derive their incomes from surplus-value.

It was stressed that the separation of legal ownership from real ownership was a dominant feature of monopoly capitalism. The interpretation of this "separation" as construed by post-industrial theorists was traced back to the 1930's.

Since the "managerial revolution" idea was popularized, it has often been suggested that professional management has superseded the individual or family-based form of business control. In the North American or "radical-optimist" view, that control has increasingly shifted to a "technostructure". The "technostructure" is viewed as comprising the whole army of technical specialists on whom policy-making must finally depend. Such a view supports the notion of a "decomposing capital". The idea is that a levelling process has been occurring in which economic decision-making is the summative product of subdivided functions which are performed by professional specialists.

Our view accords with these ideas to the extent that all serious observers take for granted the tendency for the joint-stock form of business organization to produce a division between those who control and the majority of legal owners. This simply indicates that most stock-holders have no say over either major investment decisions or the control of business operations.

We did argue, however, against the view of a "decomposed" capital. It was suggested that the joint-stock company remains subject to the laws of capital accumulation and hence that its various functionaries bear social relations antagonistic to labour.

After qualifying the extent to which family influence had in fact declined in the corporate world, we pointed to studies which suggested that "family" or "management" control differentials had little effect on corporate behaviour. This fact also served as a disclaimer to the idea that the professionalization of decision-making transformed the firm from "profit responsibility" to "social responsibility".

In our interpretation, the "decomposition of capital" issue turns on the element of "ownership". Here we must distinguish between "legal" ownership and "economic" ownership. While the two may overlap - as they tended to under private capitalism and do today more frequently than is generally recognized - it is the latter rather than the former which yields "real" ownership. For it is the latter which denotes the real economic control. As Poulantzas explains,

> it is the owners who have real control of the means of production and thus exploit the direct workers by extorting surplus-value from them in various forms. But this ownership is to be understood as real economic ownership, control of the means of production, to be distinguished from juridical ownership, which is sanctioned by the law and belongs to the (juridical) superstructure. Certainly, the law generally ratifies economic ownership, but it is possible for the forms of juridical ownership not to coincide with real economic ownership (Poulantzas, 1973b:29).

Our point is that while legal ownership, in being sanctioned by law, is an aspect of the superstructure, it does not define class relationships (Poulantzas, 1975:19). Rather, class relationships are defined in terms of production relations. It is the effective control over the social means of production which defines ownership in class terms.

The significance of this distinction for contemporary class relations is crucial. The vast majority of small stock-holders, in not assuming economic control, do not enter directly into production relations. Thus, like the absentee agricultural landholder of Marx's time, such owners can be defined as "rentier" capitalists. On the other hand, both top-level managers and large stockholders exercise the power to assign the means of production to given uses, and so to dispose of the products obtained. The top-level manager and the large stock-holder, who themselves actively participate in corporate policy and investment decisions, together are, "the central figures. They, rather than the capitalist rentier, are capital personified" (Garchedi, 1975a:48).

Such a view does not imply that the managerial capitalist - typically embracing the large stock-holder, including the family capitalist, as well as the manager lacking stock ownership - is the only membership base of the capitalist class under monopoly capitalism. Such a view is represented in the most exaggerated versions of the managerial revolution.

Rather, "the managers are only a part of the capitalist class, the most representative part from the point of view of the production relations typical of monopoly capitalism" (Garchedi, 1975a:48).

Set in systemic antagonism, the proletariat are those agents who (1) are non-owners of the means of production; (2) who perform the function of the collective worker; and (3) who are either (a) paid a wage which tends to be determined by the value of their labour power, or (b) are paid out of the surplus-value produced in the productive sector. Finally, (4) they are either economically exploited or economically oppressed.

The "new middle-class" is specific to the monopoly capitalist era. Its membership is identified as those (1) not owning, economically or legally, the means of production, (2) performing *both* the collective function of capital and the function of the collective worker, (3) who are *both* labourers and non-labourers, and (4) are *both* exploiters (oppressors) and exploited (oppressed). The new middle-class workers differ from the old middle-class in that they do not own their means of production and they solely receive their incomes from labour services exchanged for a wage.

II. The Conditions of "New Middle-Class" Proletarianization

As distinct from Oppenheimer and "new working-class" theorists, we have argued that proletarianization amongst credentialed workers does not simply involve various factors of labour power devaluation (income levels, bureaucratization, market capacity, career frustrations and dissatisfaction). Rather, these processes were seen as a dependent correlate of a process linked to antagonistic production relations. This point is crucial, and it is a mainstay of Marxist social science. While production relations and productive forces are dialectically related, production relations are the primary determinant of the advancement of capitalism.

Work devaluation processes are associated with proletarianization. This point is stressed by "new working-class" theorists. However, it is the elimination of the "collective function of capital" that is causally prior. Thus, proletarianization - as applied to the new middle-class - involves the progressive diminution of their performance of the collective function of capital in combination with work devaluation processes. Indeed, our analysis suggests that it is the actual ratio of the capital to the labour function performed by these works which indicates their location in the class structure.

In developing this analysis, the designation of those functions subsumed under capital's "collective" function becomes crucial.

Garchedi has argued that the collective function of capital can be analytically reduced to the function of "control and surveillance". Such a reduction indeed renders an expedient method by which the contradictions embodied in the "new middle-class" can be conceptualized. After Marx, Garchedi (and Crompton) have pointed to the dual function of capitalist supervision. A supervision process (co-ordination) is obviously necessary to the production of use-value in any complex production process. Thus, all such work must be seen as a necessary labour function. However, because capitalist production produces not only value but surplus-value, supervision is also necessarily a "control and surveillance" function geared to the coercive appropriation of surplus labour-productivity.

According to Garchedi, the proletarianization of new middle-class workers involves the elimination of their "control and surveillance" function and the devaluation of their work-employment security, wages, and other perquisites. This interpretation, we have argued, does not sufficiently cover the reality of production relations fundamental to monopoly capitalism.

If our discussion of post-industrial theory and professionalism told us anything, it was that relative autonomy in the work place is a prized social value. Indeed, under monopoly capitalism, a profession is held up as the only means by which most of us can achieve exemption from mundane, routine, daily labour. Despite the absorption of the majority of professionally-credentialed workers into organizationally-dependent employment, there remain two rather than one means for such workers individually to protect themselves from proletarian status.

The first means, as Garchedi has correctly emphasized, is that of "occupational climbing" to positions which singly entail the performance of the control and surveillance function. Secondly, however, there are a variety of work tasks which are differentiated from both supervision (as a capital function) and the collective worker. We include those jobs which involve creative and autonomous work processes. Many such jobs exist which are part of the "capital function" to the extent that they were once performed by the individual capitalist. The archetype of such a worker is the creative worker such as a scientist who has replaced the early inventor, and is employed by a large corporation.

Scientific innovation prior to the advent of the giant corporation was one means for an individual to gain access to the capitalist class. However, such a possibility has greatly diminished today. The scientific process has been greatly differentiated and the ingenious corporate strategies for manipulating patent regulations have served to "institutionalize" scientific innovation.

We have argued, however, that despite the collectivization of the scientific process, the importance of scientific and creative labour to the monopoly capitalist firm has given it a relatively privileged status. In brief, monopoly capital largely depends on the agents of "conceptual innovation" to create means for expanding and realizing relative surplus-value.

While some of the methods in which scientific or conception workers are engaged serve to rationalize (de-skill) and thus reduce their own autonomous roles, their work confronts the proletariat as a contradiction. Like supervision, conception is necessary to the production of use-value in a complex economy. Also, like control and surveillance, it is increasingly necessary to the accumulation and realization of surplus-value.

We have argued that a variety of accommodations and adaptations in the firm have been developed in response to the functional importance of this type of task performance. As Ohlin-Wright has written:

> Today there are still categories of employees who have a certain degree of control over their own immediate conditions of work, over their immediate labour process. In such instances, the labour process has not been completely proletarianized . . . such employees . . . have lost the legal status of being self-employed, they can still be viewed as occupying residual islands of petty-bourgeois relations of production within the capitalist mode of production itself. In their immediate work environment, they maintain the work process of the independent artisan while still being employed by capital as a wage labourer. A good example of this is a researcher . . . or a professor . . . Such positions may not really involve control over other people's labour power, yet have considerable immediate control over conditions of work (i.e., research). More generally, many white-collar technical employees and certain highly skilled craftsmen

> have at least a limited form of this autonomy in their immediate labour process . . . While there is some debate . . ., it seems likely that in the course of capitalist development over the last fifty years, this particular kind of contradictory location has been somewhat reduced (1976:36).

Thus, we have extended the definition of the collective function of capital to embrace not only "control and surveillance", but "conception" as well.

We have argued that professional credentials - a specialized, vocationally-oriented, university or extensive technical education - have increasingly become essential for an individual to successfully acquire new middle-class employment. Further, in recent years, the labour market capacity of such "credentialed" workers has been diminishing. Coupling this latter fact with the observation that the de-skilling process has begun to operate amongst such workers, "new working-class" theorists have argued that such work is being proletarianized. We have objected to this position in terms of the explanatory framework utilized in this analysis. From our conceptual framework, we have come to basic agreement with Ohlin-Wright. As he suggests, the extent to which the reduction of the numbers involved in these "residual islands" has taken place remains an empirical question.

We have instead argued that proletarianization is better explained by examining the production relations born by such workers. We adapted Garchedi's strategy which suggested that credentialed workers' new middle-class status is protected to the extent that the functions they perform coincide with the changing requirements of capital accumulation. From this, we concluded that a professional education does not of itself protect workers from proletarianization processes. Rather, it was the extent to which they had secured the right to self-regulation. Indeed, it was this latter feature which Freidson perceptively defined as the principal indicator of professional occupational status.

In agreement with Johnson's analysis (1972), we argued that a principal factor determining collegiate control was historical. That is, the most favourable conducing conditions for the achievement of collegiate control of an occupation are long past. Such conditions appeared with the emergence of industrial capital to class supremacy in the nineteenth century. The occupations which "professionalized" in the modern sense, were those which secured a mandate for self-regulation during that period. Later candidates, aspiring to the fortunes of their earlier prototypes, confronted a different milieu. It was an economic reality in which the giant corporation and the state had monopolized the great majority of marketable work activity.

The expansion of the corporate and public sectors of the economy, in absorbing the majority of the work force, has produced various consequences for different occupations.

The classic consulting professions, law, architecture, medicine, dentistry and optometry, to name the familiar ones, have been in part, protected by the accumulated power which time has blessed them with. These occupations professionalized - in the modern sense - during the nineteenth century. As powerful lobbies, they are able to exert restrictive controls on entry to their occupations. Such control, of course, is a vital strategy for insuring a "seller's market" in labour.

We also argued that such occupations as medicine and law tend to be integrated as independent, monopoly components of a differentiated production chain in which the corporate sector and state share. Thus, lawyers in private practice often specialize in corporate law, and doctors function symbiotically with a diverse public health system - including universities, hospitals and research institutes, as well as pharmaceutical companies. Architects work under contract with both the state and the corporations. Consequently, their colleagues in the corporate and state sectors share some of the power which they have accrued.

Finally, a number of occupations - many of which are associated with the reproduction of labour power - have been from the outset or are now, organized almost wholly by the state. As a consequence, they are subject to state heteronomous intervention. These occupations, when subjected to proletarianization processes, appear at surface to have but one option for self-defense: to unionize.

We have argued that reproduction workers can be sorted into the variations of class, much as those workers in the spheres of appropriation and realization. They are either (1) agents of capital, (2) new middle-class, or (3) proletarian. However, because the object of their production process differs from that of other workers, they are of special interest. As agents of the reproduction of labour-power and employees of socialized services, they embody a unique set of contradictions.

Perhaps of most interest, from the perspective of class politics, is the fact that reproduction workers' fortunes tend to be tied to (1) the vitality of the socialized sector of services rather than private services, and (2) they confront the most alienated and oppressed members of society directly. These workers have been most active in "social-unionist" strategies.

III. In Summary

In adopting a Marxist approach to the problem at hand, we have not set out to specify the conditions necessary to the revolutionary transformation of capitalism. Our efforts have been considerably more modest. We have simply attempted to demonstrate the continued applicability of Marxist class analysis to advanced capitalist society. Efforts such as these may aid in the empirical enquiry which is necessary to inform socialist political strategy.

We make no claims to have begun the required empirical work which is recommended. Our analysis, however, would suggest that those who have seen professionally-credentialed workers as a revolutionary vanguard have been premature. The "new middle-class" in which such workers are concentrated, retains many privileges relative to other workers; their privileges exist in the sphere of appropriation, the sphere of realization, and the sphere of reproduction.

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